 Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining us here at CSIS. Over the past several months, we've embarked on a study. I think it's a very exciting and timely study of what the potential for India-Azion connectivity is and what are the ramifications of a closer India-Azion relationship. Why does it mean to the United States? What does it mean for regional architecture? And what recommendations do we have together for our governments? A very exciting effort was led by a visiting colleague from the State Department, Mr. Ted Oceas, who we'll hear from later today. Ted has been a great leader within CSIS. He's taken us to India and to Indonesia on this effort, and we've all enjoyed his working under his direction. I think we've come up with a great product, and I'm honored to be here with my colleagues who have worked on this project with us, specifically Rick Inderforth, who's my colleague here at CSIS and the Wadwani Chair for India Studies and Ambassador Hamant Singh of ICRIER and the counterpart to Rick and his India chair based in India. I'd also like to thank the people in each of our teams who've worked very hard to get this report and research out, special appreciation to them and their efforts. So I would like to hand it over today to Rick Inderforth and Ambassador Hamant Singh and to Ted, and we'll dig in and I think we'll have some very interesting discussion. Rick, over to you. Welcome, everyone, to this rollout today of the report. I trust that you have all received copies as you came in of enhancing India-ASEAN connectivity. I think Ernie has sort of given the appropriate welcoming remarks and acknowledgements. I'd like just to say three things because we want to get to my colleague Hamant Singh and especially to Ted Oceus and give them the bulk of the time and speaking with you. First of all, about Ted, I'm personally, professionally delighted that Ted has been with us at CSIS for the past eight, nine months. We want to keep them longer. The State Department seems to be knocking on the door a little bit. We'll thin them off as long as we can. We are a think tank. State is a do tank, so he's got to get back doing things rather than just be thinking here, but he's been doing great work with us. Ted and I have worked together in many capacities. He is the perfect person to have come to CSIS as a visiting State Department senior fellow to do ASEAN in India as political counselor in India as Deputy Chief of Mission to Ambassador Cameron Yom in Indonesia. He was the perfect connectivity. Connectivity, by the way, is a big word today. Everybody's going to have to spell it. We just had the national spelling bee. It was completed. Connectivity is the theme of this discussion, but I'm delighted that Ted has been able to be with us and we hope he has founded a enjoyable and productive sabbatical before you go back into the trenches. Ted, you've been great. Let me do two, let me make two sort of framing remarks if I could. The first one is about connectivity. I said that we would be using that a lot here. There was a few years ago, I may get in trouble for saying this, a few years ago there was the expression of the full Monty. Do any of you remember that, the full Monty? Well, here we're talking about the full connectivity. That's why I'm saying this, full connectivity. Now, what does connectivity mean? I mean, a lot of people think connectivity is roads and those kinds of things. And I'd like to read you from the executive summary which you have, what Ted has written, saying the following, and this is what full connectivity is. Connectivity is not just about governments and navies, civil society and the private sector. Not governments alone play key roles in connectivity. The connectivity agenda should include not only developing infrastructure, land, sea, air links, and regional energy solutions like a common electricity grid and gas pipelines across borders, but also people-to-people cooperation on education, rule of law, water resources, climate, the environment, science and technology, health, human trafficking, and food security, including fishers. So that's the full connectivity that we're talking about. It's not just about those things which we normally think about. Connecting regions and countries, power grids and the rest, it's all of these things. Secondly, the other framing point I wish to make is about what several of us have launched as something of a cause, which is to talk about, and you'll see it in this report, references to the Indo-Pacific more often than you will see Asia-Pacific. We do believe that the Indo-Pacific is a better way to describe this region, making it very clear the role that India plays within the Asia-Pacific region, which has in the past not fully incorporated India into that broader regional concept. One thing that we left for you out here as another handout was a statement that was issued at a conference that Ambassador Singh and I just attended in Tokyo, a Track 2 U.S.-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue. We just did this week and a half ago. We were in Tokyo for that. It's a continuing effort that we've done as a Track 2 or Track 1.5 because some U.S. officials and Japanese officials attended, including Prime Minister Abe or the opening dinner briefly. But in this statement you will see a reference to, and I'll read you one other thing, that participants welcomed the Indo-Pacific concept as an economic corridor based on the unobstructed flow of goods in an open and secure maritime domain and the emphasis on peaceful diplomacy to resolve disputes. They pointed to the Indo-Pacific as the guiding strategic framework for the U.S. rebalance to the region and the emergence of an inclusive and integrated economic and security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. So Indo-Pacific is something that you'll hear spoken to today and one that we urge all of you to start incorporating into your thinking about this very important region of the world. Having said that, I would now like to turn to Ambassador Hamant Singh, welcoming here back to CSIS. Wonderful to have him here. His daughter is here. I'm not going to call her to stand up. This is a family occasion as well. So Hamant, please. Thank you, Rick. Thank you very much. Ernie and Rick, we've been working on this project together, which has been led by the first anchor, which is Ted Oseas, for the past several months. And I must say that it's been an excellent example of the way the two chairs, the two India Chair and U.S. Chair, Addie Creer and CSIS have been putting things together. I'd just like to say a few introductory things about the project which we have been involved together and to frame for you the kind of counterpart report which we will be coming out with in about a month and a half, which will follow up on the report which Ted has recently authored. Basically, let me say that in this process, what are we looking at? Why are we focusing on emerging Asia? Why was that a subject which brought us together in a Track 1.5 conference in Delhi in February? There are three aspects I'd like to mention there. The first is that the Indo-Pacific region, and using Rick's word for this, the Indo-Pacific region is witnessing what are absolutely clearly profound social and economic changes on a scale and at a speed which we haven't seen many times in human history. The second is that the region at the same time faces some major challenges because of unresolved issues. We have growing economic interdependence on the one hand and unsettled questions of history persisting on the other. So we are grappling with this as emerging Asia comes to the center of the weight of the global economy. That leads to the third point, which is that as this economic weight shifts and the drivers of global growth shift to Asia, what happens here will also shape the contours of the rest of the world. With that as a background, let me say that there have been very rapid advances in India's Look East policy over the last six months. And perhaps we haven't seen this pace of advance or this sense of urgency in the earlier periods because after all this policy started in 1991. 1992 it was actually launched and started being implemented. Now it's clear that India with its geographical location and its civilizational ties with Southeast Asia has a pivotal role to play within the region. With that in mind in December of 2012, we saw that the India-ASEAN relationship was upgraded into a strategic partnership. We also see that the growing economic interdependence between India and ASEAN or India and Southeast Asia is leading to a greater stake holding on the part of India in the security frameworks and other regional frameworks like the East Asia Summit. An interesting element of this engagement is that India's role does not generate anxiety in the region. To the contrary, there is demand for greater Indian engagement in the Indo-Pacific and appreciation of India's capacity to emerge as a long-term security provider. Now the Prime Minister of India used his visit to Japan which occurred last week to announce a new stage of our Look East policy. And I wanted to share that with you because this is really at the core of where we are headed. He said that the Look East policy began with a strong economic emphasis but has been transformed today into an increasingly strategic outlook. And the current phase, this means that there is a focus on connectivity on the one hand, which is on the economic side, and shaping the regional anchors of security on the other side. And with that in mind he announced a three-point Look East policy. The first being the need to strengthen mechanisms which help develop habits of consultation and cooperation and evolve commonly accepted principles for managing differences and addressing common challenges. The second is of course to expand a wider and deeper regional economic integration including connectivity, which I spoke about. The third is maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, upholding the principles of freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce in accordance with international law, peaceful resolution of maritime issues, cooperation for harnessing the potential of the seas and addressing sea-based challenges. Now this really, if you take a look at this statement and juxtapose this with what we have been hearing for the last two years from major figures in the Obama administration, you will see how much convergence there is in terms of the outlook which India brings. On top of that there was always a doubt, there's always been a lingering doubt, does India wish to play a role which is wider or region-wide? Does it wish to play a security role? And the Prime Minister had something very categorical to say about that, not in Japan, but just before he left for Japan. And he said that we have sought to assume a responsibility for stability in the Indian Ocean region. We are well positioned therefore to become a net provider of security in our immediate region and beyond. And that's very interesting because this kind of clear emphasis has never come out of India thus far in terms of policy statements. And as purely symbolic of what the Prime Minister said, a four-ship detachment of the Indian Navy's eastern fleet is currently on a one-month-long voyage beyond the Malacca streets. And the principal ports of call will be in the Philippines and Vietnam. This is just symbolic of what is happening. Now finally, let me turn a little bit, just a couple of comments on the US pivot before I make a couple of conclusions which might interest you. I'm not going to go into the background of the pivot and things like that, but I would like to say that there are the recent statements which have come out of the administration in the past three or four months. Some of them signal continuity of the pivot. Some of them signal perhaps a change in the pivot. And I'm referring here to the statements made by National Security Advisor Donald in one hand and Ash Carter from Pentagon. These two go in one direction of continuity. And there's some element of change which Secretary Kerry interjected into this discourse during his trip to China and Japan and Korea in April. I won't go into the details of that, but I'll just say that for the line which is projected by Donald and Carter, there is absolutely no doubt that India-U.S. convergences are now even greater than they ever were. There are three points there. The first is that the U.S. rebalance within the Asia Pacific to recognize the importance of Southeast Asia, which is exactly what India has been trying to do for a while. Second, ASEAN's indispensable role in regional stability, support for ASEAN unity, and endorsement of ASEAN efforts to create a rules-based framework for the South China Sea. This is again completely in line with what India sees happening in the region. And finally, emphasis on freedom of access to global commons and peaceful resolution of disputes under international law. So we see here that when the National Security Advisor says that there is a peaceful convergence of U.S. interests with those of India in Southeast Asia, he is just spot, right? He's bang on target. And we see that these convergences are going to grow in the future. So let me conclude with three or four points. The first is that there is going to be long-term convergence of Indian and U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. The second, that the full embrace of India's rise, which has been repeatedly mentioned by administration officials, serves both the economic and the strategic interests of the United States. That's important to understand because on the hill, when these things are understood on a broader basis, then they become much more stable as parts of American policy. The third is that India-U.S. partnership for creating a rules-based regional architecture which will secure Asia against the use of force or coercion to change the regional order. That's something which we need to look forward to and to welcome. And then the next, I'd like to mention, there is need for the both sides to look at advancing these geostrategic elements of the partnership when we have the strategic dialogue later this month between Secretary Kerry and my foreign minister Salman Kursheed. The last point, and that's not the least, is that I believe that the Indian Prime Minister's recent policy statements indicate that India is taking some robust strides through a new strategic orientation of its look east policy, which will deeply impact Asia's geopolitics and regional balance in the coming years. And that is something which America should note and America should welcome. Thank you very much, and dead all yours. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador Singh. Let me say thank you very much to Ernie for inviting me to come to CSAS, for my friend Rick Inderforth, for welcoming me into his team, and to Ambassador Singh for his incredible hospitality when we went to New Delhi in February. I'm very pleased that Aman and Sanjay from Ambassador Singh's team are here. They worked extremely hard on that conference. Also here in the back are two of Ambassador Inderforth's interns, Samir and Guru Amrit, who were incredibly helpful. My colleagues, Nick and Greg, who worked hard and were very, very supportive. I think if there are successes in this product, it's because of the collaboration between the South Asia and the Southeast Asia teams here at CSAS, and between the two halves of the Wadwani chair, the one in New Delhi and the one here in Washington. And if there are mistakes, I take responsibility for them. Maybe we can go to the slide. Ambassador Singh referred to Tom Donilon and his recent remarks. Tom Donilon said, U.S. and Indian interests powerfully converge in the Asia Pacific where India has much to give and much to gain. And last week he was echoed by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, who spoke of the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor. And I expect someone over on this back wall wrote some of those words. My colleagues from the Department of State who have been terrific collaborators through this project. Thank you to all of you as well. What Wendy said was she paraphrased Prime Minister Singh, who dreams of a world where one can have breakfast in Kolkata, lunch in Dhaka, and dinner in Rangoon. So we gathered together decision makers from the American side and the Indian side in New Delhi. We had a Track 1.5 conference, so quasi-official dialogue. And the conclusion was that overall American and Indian security policies converge, and most particularly when it comes to India's look East approach. That's an area of long-term and very clear conversions. And as Rick mentioned, they spoke of the Indo-Pacific as a unifying concept, and that's a concept that we deploy throughout this report. I will discuss three things, background and civilizational ties, the economic benefits of India-ASEAN connectivity, and some of our key recommendations. When the final report comes out on about June 21st, it will include 42 concrete recommendations. Believe me, I'm not going to go through all of them today, but I will go through a handful, and when the report comes out, I would urge you in particular to look at that set of 42 concrete recommendations. On background and civilizational ties, I won't read these quotes to you, but it was important to highlight what Nehru had said, what Manmohan Singh had said, and then to quote the ASEAN-India eminent persons group when the group gathered in 2012 for the historic summit. They said, while peoples of ASEAN and India inhabit a shared geographical and cultural space, each country retains its distinctiveness and unique identity. It is this celebration of diversity of plural yet related cultures which underlies the ASEAN-India partnership. Our vision is to recreate in a contemporary setting the many linkages that have bound our countries together in the past and unleash a creative surge which will impart even greater momentum to the Asian resurgence. So one of those eminent persons, Shyam Saren, joined our group in Delhi thanks to an invitation from Ambassador Singh, and he underscored this concept. He told us that he believes that the celebration of diversity gives hope for an enduring partnership. You're looking at a picture of Cham temples in southern Vietnam, but of course those temples could very easily be from Tamil Nadu because they reflect Tamil architecture. It was Indian merchants from Gujarat who brought Islam to Southeast Asia. The Look East policy which Ambassador Singh described so well was launched in 1992, so this is its 20th anniversary. And India held summits with ASEAN every year since 2002. India joined the East Asian Summit in 2005. And what this report seeks to do is to document this continuing upward trajectory in the relationship, especially since 1992, and then lead us to conclusions about what we could do to keep it moving forward. So let me talk about the economic benefits of India ASEAN connectivity. Looking, acting, and engaging East is a core interest for India. One-third of India's external trade is with its East Asian neighbors, and that share of its trade will grow. India and ASEAN together constitute one-fourth of humanity. They have a combined GDP of $3.8 trillion. And India seeks to expand trade with ASEAN from its current $43 billion per year to $100 billion by 2015 and $200 billion by 2022. And because India's market is so vast, ASEAN nations see tremendous opportunities to diversify their economic relations by engaging West. I like this graphic because it shows very clearly that China's ASEAN trade has grown dramatically. India ASEAN trade has also grown, but it's starting from a much lower base. That's the lines between China and India you see get thicker on the lower part. The lines between India and ASEAN also get thicker, but they're still not thick enough. There's still a long way to go in deepening these economic ties. Now I like to call this Hemant slide. It's actually from ARIA, but it's been referred to even in the State Department, which originally pointed me to it, as Hemant's slide, because it's a graphic map of the Comprehensive Asia Development Plan prepared by ARIA. The Economic Research Institute for ASEAN in East Asia. And what this plan is, is a grand spatial design for infrastructure development. It was commissioned by ASEAN's leaders. And when the report comes out in a couple of weeks, you'll see the plan as an appendix of the report. A crucial element is this green horizontal line. It's the Mekong India Economic Corridor. For greater land connectivity, there are plans underway. There are two sets of plans underway. One is to complete the India, Myanmar, Thailand trilateral highway. So that's obviously on land. And that will not only boost incomes in the region, but also, I think very importantly, help solidify Myanmar's shift toward democracy. The other piece is the sea connectivity piece. And given that so much of the region's trade travels by ship, this is very, very important. There are major port projects that have been proposed, including the 8.6 billion dollar Dawey deep sea port in industrial state. And if that's funded, that's, there's Siftway and then south of that where the N in Yangon is. That's Dawey. And if that is funded, it will link east and northeast India to Myanmar, Thailand, and beyond. And what we heard, we had Asian Development Bank participation in our conference in February. And what we heard from the ADB is, the ADB is as the implementer of this plan, ADB is ready to help enhance connectivity. But what it really needs is guidance on what are the member nations priorities. Their ADB is ready to provide technical assistance and co-financing. But as Ambassador Inderforth mentioned, connectivity is about more than just ports and bridges and roads. It's also about law, regulatory reform, fighting corruption, and strengthening the ties between people. And let me just mention again, Ambassador Inderforth recognized him, but my friend and mentor Cameron Hume is here. And it is he who's taught me and so many of us who have worked for him over the years, the importance of this people-to-people connectivity. Another friend of former boss, P.D.S. Jeff Piat, talks a lot, when he talks about connectivity, he talks about connectivity software and connectivity hardware. And the hardware, of course, are these region-wide improvements in energy, water, transportation, infrastructure. That's the roads and the bridges and the ports and the railways that are so needed to connect good services and people together. But the software is equally important. That's the trade facilitation, the reduction of non-tariff barriers, the improved regulatory regimes, transparent and efficient border procedures, and coordinated policies that accelerate this flow of people, goods, and services throughout the region. And one of the suggestions that came out of our conference was that India can provide software, China is already providing hardware, and the United States can provide technology and know-how. So if you think about the importance of this infrastructure investment in light of Wendy Sherman's comments, an Indo-Pacific corridor, an Indo-Pacific economic corridor would allow cars in Chennai to reach Ho Chi Minh City through multimodal transport, different kinds of transport across the Bay of Bengal, through Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. And importantly, if you look at the, well, back to that map, if you look at the land piece, Bangladesh can be part of this connectivity process. Bangladesh can help link India's markets to those of the rest of Asia. And there's also this antivirus software, which is what you need to help deal with some of the downsides of greater connectivity. And in the 42 recommendations, quite a number of them are ones that seek to address health and environmental challenges, as well as non-traditional security concerns, such as human trafficking. So when the leaders of ASEAN in India got together in December 2012, as the Ambassador Singh mentioned, they elevated their relations to a strategic partnership. They also concluded negotiations on a free trade agreement in services and investment. And they produced a vision statement that requested additional recommendations for specific and near-term steps. Conference participants agreed that that's what we could most usefully do for the leaders is provide these concrete steps and then push government entities to do more, especially by identifying collaborative initiatives. And that's what we seek to do with our 42 recommendations. We've divided them into three baskets, recommendations for diplomacy and security, for infrastructure and energy, and for people-to-people collaboration. And I'll just stick to a few, particularly in the first basket, and select one from each of the next two. The first two in the diplomatic and security basket aren't particularly controversial. I mean, from what Ambassador Singh just mentioned and Ambassador Inderforth just mentioned about the Track 2 statement that came out of dialogue in Japan, this is where governments are already headed on these first two. On the third, the U.S. side encouraged India to send a resident ambassador to ASEAN, and participants also agreed that meanwhile, until that happens, the ambassador to ASEAN would coordinate closely. The Indian ambassador in Jakarta would coordinate very closely with the U.S. ambassador to ASEAN, especially prior to the East Asian summits and the ASEAN summits. Oh, with Myanmar. Let me talk just for a moment about Myanmar. The opening that's taking place in Myanmar that is far from secure or solid really does give an opportunity. It opens an opportunity for enhanced regional connectivity. So what the participants agreed was that the U.S. and India could work together to support Myanmar's economic development and its democratic consolidation while at the same time helping to strengthen ASEAN. And they also agreed on the importance of integrating Bangladesh into regional structures and pursuing opportunities for its development. Here is a cover of Siraj Mohan's latest book, Samudra Mantan. He's an ORF distinguished scholar and the co-author of this report. He focuses his chapter of the report on maritime security. And this is an area of obvious need and also of clear convergence in our interests. Ninety percent of the region's trade is seaborn, particularly energy resources. And the littoral nations of the Indo-Pacific really share a commitment to freedom of navigation. So the participants in the conference recommended that we intensify both our bilateral security engagement and our multilateral efforts to create an Indo-Pacific maritime security regime. So in the recommendations that flow from Raj's part of the report, among them are CBMs, creating CBMs that use the U.S.-Soviet incidents at sea agreement as a template. Such agreements can be modeled on the 1972 U.S.-Soviet incidents at sea agreement, which really provided both sides a way to stand down if something untoward happened at sea. We don't have such an agreement now. That's a pretty urgent need. Second, and this comes from Shivshankar Menon, the National Security Advisor of India. He urged collective security arrangements. He said that shared maritime and energy security interests provide the major powers with a rare potential area of convergence. And that this could be the starting point for building a flexible and adaptable Asian order. And finally, this idea of joint concept of operations. The U.S. and this comes from among others, Senator John McCain, who said with political will on both sides, there's no reason we cannot develop a joint U.S.-Indian concept of operations. What the United States needs to do to make this work is to offer India a more ambitious framework for maritime cooperation, one that really redefines the framework for our maritime cooperation. The report also recommends that we include India in the regional economic architecture. And let me emphasize what's on page one of this report. I am speaking in my personal capacity, not in my capacity as an employee of the Department of State. The U.S. participants in this conference agreed that the Trans-Pacific Partnership is a laudable goal, one that we support. The idea of a binding comprehensive agreement is important. It's crucial. But they also expressed serious concern that TPP excludes key partners such as India. And they expressed concerns that at this point U.S. trade policy doesn't sync with America's broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Participants welcomed the Expanding Economic Engagement Initiative that came out of the last EAS summit, but they questioned whether this is sufficiently ambitious. And the Indian participants, for their part, reiterated their interest in joining APEC if invited to do so. So the bottom line here is that TPP may well be the way of the future, but India and Key ASEAN countries need a roadmap for joining it. On energy collaboration, and here the State Department gave me a great tool, which is the, I didn't realize that this had been launched until writing the report, the U.S.-Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership, a great vehicle. One of the recommendations is that we, that you could begin developing an interconnected energy super grid that extended from India to Southeast Asia so that power from one nation can be transmitted to another in the case of blackouts and shortages. This U.S.-Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership has over $6 billion in funding from XIM, OPIC, and TDA. It's a good place to start. Also, we emphasized enhanced people-to-people collaboration. And this falls into a variety of areas, education, rule of law, collaboration on water, on climate and the environment, on science and technology, on trafficking and food security, including fisheries. Basically, the human and natural systems in the Indo-Pacific are terribly stressed, and sustainable development needs to be a central part of this discussion. On health in particular, one of our recommendations is to explore opportunities for using American technology, using technology at least that was born in America. There are real opportunities in telemedicine, especially for rural populations. There are opportunities using modern technologies to improve healthcare access through smart infrastructure planning that puts a premium on available medical access. And finally, there's an opportunity to share best practices to improve healthcare outcomes in treating diseases that are endemic to the region. There are another 31 recommendations. I won't go through all of them. I promise. But I do encourage you, as soon as the report comes out, to take a look at those other recommendations and see which ones might be most useful. I wanted to thank you again. It's really heartening to me to see so many friends here. My spouse Clayton Bond joined us today. Thank you all for showing up, and I welcome your questions. I think the first one, by right of seniority or distance traveled or wisdom in general, goes to Ambassador Singh. That is you in that photo. That is. Working for Cameron. I think the first question should be a simple one. So, with the background of writing this wonderful report and all its 40 odd recommendations and also some amount of track 1.5 activity, I'd like you to take us forward in terms of what are the immediate concrete projects which we can pursue. We've discussed these at the track 1, India-Japan-US dialogue, which was held about a month ago. But what exactly do we do on the economic side, on the connectivity side, and on the security side, where India is engaged, the United States is engaged, and ASEAN are engaged? One in each would suffice. And how exactly are we going to benefit from U.S. technology and know-how? Because, yes, the framework is there, the XM and other backup is there, but, for example, Japan has already moved very fast in working on infrastructure in Myanmar. And India is moving rapidly to try and complete the connectivity projects through Myanmar. So, within that framework, if you can see what, look at the future and tell us how are we going to move forward in each of these areas. Thank you very much. I think there are land and sea projects that could be moved on very, very quickly. I gave an event here a few months back on infrastructure and investment, and I don't predict that the United States will lead the way in infrastructure investment. However, the United States can and should be part of the picture in infrastructure investment. But the two port projects, which I think are most ripe, are Dawe and Sitwe. Those two port projects make a huge difference right away. The road projects, including the Stillwell Road that my friends have traveled on, is probably going to take longer to accomplish. These road projects should not be set aside. We ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. We ought to be able to invest in port projects and invest in road projects at the same time. The obstacles are real. There are obstacles including statelessness of the Rohingya. It's going to take a while to sort out, but it affects connectivity, especially land connectivity in the border areas. But I don't think, I think that it's crucial to proceed on the road projects while proceeding on the port projects. I think the technology that the United States provides is very often going to be used in the software and antivirus software part of connectivity and a little less in the hardware. Rick Rosso and the Clardy Associates. Ted, if you were to sort of gauge the American business community right now on America's relationship with Indian trade and investment, it's pretty negative. Of course, in D.C. we're always supposed to be negative, but I think more legitimate beefs on IPRs, certainly on a lot of local content stuff. They're actively pursuing an agenda in some areas of using American diplomatic tools, the immigration bill, GSP they're talking about, to try to use those as tools on these economic issues in India. Have you got the same sense about companies in ASEAN that they're as concerned about these things, full steam ahead, guns going, that kind of thing? Is there a blowback from these things in ASEAN, or is it just kind of like we'll plow through and just keep going? I think a lot of ASEAN nations have the same concerns. So actually in that event, moving forward with an agenda that really deepens India-U.S. economic relations, and I think this is an agenda that has tremendous support, both in New Delhi and in Washington, will pave the way for, ironically, for a lot of other countries also to take advantage of that deepening. As the United States, there's no way to, no one will ever succeed in pushing around India. That's a bottom line. Does the United States have some influence on the progress of India's economic reform? I think so, at least at the margins. I think when we can outline what are the benefits of going ahead with the reform agenda, then I think we can have some impact. The CSIS put out in November, and then formally put out in January, an ambitious framework for deepening and enhancing the United States' economic trade and investment relationship with India. It involves, it's going to be a long-term process, nothing happens fast when it comes to India, but it's worth it. The strategic benefits are worth it. The economic benefits are worth it. We have to work hard. People like my colleagues from the State Department are going to have to work hard. People from USTR are going to have to work hard. And the answer is not, as some people might say, well, keep India out of the economic architecture because they're hard to negotiate with. That's what we're paid to do. We have to do it. We have to have them on the inside. As someone who worked very hard on the Civil Nuclear Agreement, the Civil Nuclear Initiative for three years of my life, once India is inside a regime, part of a regime, it is much better to deal with than when it's on the outside. So bringing India into our economic structures I think is critical, and it will help with the problems that both ASEAN and the United States has on the trade front. Now, Wolfgroves North of Grumman, since you mentioned the international regimes, that brings up the ones on the more military side, Wassonar, the Australia group and whatnot. India is interested in these, but it hasn't been encouraged as far as I can see on getting into the regimes. And the US side has been less than proactive, let's say, in making it happen. The one that is near and dear to my heart, as Rick knows, is the missile technology control regime. And that in the context of this Indo-Pacific arc, we give our best technology, or sell our best technology hopefully, to the Japanese and to the South Koreans and my Indian friends say, what about us? An exception to the missile technology control regime in favor of India would seem to be a great carrot. And I'd like your comments, and even was it considered in the writing of the report? Thank you. It's not specifically in this report, but as someone who was part of all the discussions during the Civil Nuclear Initiative, I know that it was promised to India, that being part of those regimes was a promise that was made to India. A promise that was made to us was to deal with the liability legislation. Neither of those promises has yet been fulfilled. The bottom line, though, is if you try to be too transactional about this, well, we'll do this, if you do this, that doesn't work. I think the way is to move forward in both of these areas, and it is possible. I am convinced that India will deliver on its liability promises. I'm also convinced that the United States will deliver on our promises to bring India into all of these regimes. It just doesn't happen fast. We're two big, awkward, rambunctious democracies, and we don't move fast, but we will succeed in both of these areas. Again, I'm speaking personally. I don't know what the timetable is, but I am convinced that we will succeed in both of those areas. Thanks. Boomer Smith. I'm an independent researcher from Australia. I just wanted to return to where we started with Ambassador Indoeperth's remarks in relation to the idea of the Indo-Pacific now emerging as a term by which we refer to, I think not only a security concept, but perhaps also an economic zone. Now, this is getting traction fairly quickly, and I'd note that the Australian defence white paper was just released in last month seems to use it almost exclusively in place of Asia Pacific, which its predecessor would use. But it's interesting, it seems to me, the Australian conceptualisation of it, and I think many others seems to cut off the Indo-Pacific, the western boundary of it, at the subcontinent. And I'd make the point that the portals into, one of the most important portals, into the Indo-Pacific if it is an economic zone, and the way in which it connects, for example, with the North Atlantic Economic Zone in the Middle East, and if the New Silk Road or Asian roundabout idea gets up and runs probably through the Central Asian states overland as well. Obviously the merit of connectivity of India with ASEAN and with the East Asian economies stands on its own merits, but is there a danger that we're over-centralising our conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific as an economic zone, and we're taking our view off the left shoulder, which is part of the world, which is very unstable, and if it doesn't remain healthy and stable, it will affect the health of the economies in the Indo-Pacific as well. Hi, I'll work with Blackboard Law and Lobbying Firm, and my question is very similar. Just where does Pakistan fit into this equation? Wouldn't a relationship with Pakistan also be central to security in the region? Thank you. Okay, thank you very much. I have to comment on a question or my first comment is that I think oil work is direct to one country, is China. I don't know why. I don't know except for me, is there some other Chinese scholars, but I think China should be included in this young search kind of dialogue. My second question is that I think ASEAN countries welcome the participants of India, China, United States, and Japan to participate in the cooperation, economic cooperation, and development in ASEAN countries. But I think ASEAN countries don't want to become the theater, the field for these countries to compete in these areas. They want to become victims of such a competition. And I have a question. I know that in India, look at this policy, there is a Macon-Ganga cooperative organization. But in the past 10 years, this organization developed very slow. So I would like to know, to Ambassador Singh and to Ted, why, what is the reason for its slow development? Thank you. How do you think, what is the role of this organization in the connection for India and ASEAN? And will India open up your northeastern part because this part is very important for your connection? Thank you very much. Okay. Some good questions here. The range of the Indo-Pacific, the inclusion of Pakistan, China's role. Ted, you want to start? And then we'll go to the down the panel. Maybe I'll start with the last one. I don't actually have a specific answer on Macon-Ganga. I don't know what is causing it to be slow. I do know that as we wrote the report, we've included that as one of the key institutions that can help this connectivity. I would argue with this contention that it's all directed at China. I think that there are tremendous benefits. This is not a zero-sum game. There are tremendous benefits to China from this agenda of connectivity. When I served in India and when I served in Indonesia, people would say, well, why is the United States developing these partnerships with these big democracies? Isn't it all about China? No, it's about 1.3 billion Indians, 250 million Indonesians. As I mentioned, one quarter of humanity is comprised by India plus ASEAN. So we confine the scope of this study to India plus ASEAN. But this is not a zero-sum game. And it really has to be seen. Connectivity has to be seen as beneficial to beyond just those nations that we covered in this study. ASEAN certainly does welcome the plus three. And ASEAN certainly does not want to be a stomping ground for great powers. ASEAN wants to be connected to the economies of these nations. You mentioned Northeast India. And yes, Northeast India is surrounded by ASEAN, India and China, some of the most dynamic economies in the world. Northeast India is not yet benefiting from that dynamism. And that's because it's not connected. And I would say the same about Bangladesh and Myanmar. They're not yet connected in ways that allow them to benefit from the dynamism of the economies around them. China is going to play a tremendous role in filling out this entire agenda. Where does Pakistan fit in? Bob Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, gave a couple of terrific speeches in India when he was there. One was on Look East and the connectivity agenda, if you look east, the other one was basically Look West. It's how you can strengthen connectivity on the Afghanistan-Pakistan side, connect them to the dynamic economy that is India's. And that's how to achieve prosperity in the long term. We didn't cover that in this study, but it's still going to be about connectivity. It's also about the United States and India collaborating very closely, working together very closely before, during and after the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan. We will leave India still there. We will leave Pakistan is still there to deal with the challenges that follow our withdrawal. And there has to be very, very tight coordination before, during and after that withdrawal. And then finally, the broad question about the merits of connectivity. I mean, Australia is kind of in the perfect position when it comes to Indo-Pacific. Australia and Indonesia are at that sweet point when it comes to the connection of the Pacific and the Indian oceans. And Australia is one of the nations that has been most articulate about the Indo-Pacific arena and how it can be engaged. Indonesia as well. Indonesia is taking a leading role in defining what is the Indo-Pacific and what can be a collective agenda for securing it as a peaceful and prosperous zone, keeping sea lines of communications open. I think this is a discussion that the United States and Australia have quite frequently. I'm not really going to go in the Middle East because I don't feel equipped to do so, but maybe my colleague says something to add. Ambassador. Okay. A quick comment on some of the questions which were raised on Mr. Wolfcross's comment regarding the control regimes. I think it's a very important aspect of the India-US cooperation agenda to get India on board as far as the NSG, MTCR, Basenar and Australia group regimes is concerned. It's moving forward slowly because every time you move forward a little bit, there is some other issue which comes up, but it is definitely moving forward. And I don't think the United States is slowing down this process at all. I think they are very much there to help India to become a full-fledged member of these control regimes. As far as the question about Pakistan is concerned, yes, Pakistan is a part of the connectivity. We would very much welcome an improvement of the security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan so that India can become fully connected with Central Asia. And all the economies of this region can benefit much more at the moment. Those possibilities are in fact inhibited by the security situation. And there we hope that the new government in Pakistan and then how we all manage together the United States, India, Pakistan and other countries with a stake in it, the withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan. I hope that these will eventually lead to the kind of New Silk Road agenda which was outlined by Hillary Clinton so articulately a couple of years ago. Now, on the northeast of India and the opening, I think the question was, yes, one of the decisions taken during the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister to India about 10 days ago is precisely how we work together, China and India, to open up this entire segment which involves Myanmar, Bangladesh as well. And this is an idea which is already there on the agenda for future cooperation. On the Indian Ocean question from our Australian colleague, yes, the broader Indian Ocean, you cannot create the same architecture across this entire region. So, you know, you cannot argue that the new architecture which is coming up on security, whatever the anchor may be, it may be the EAS, it may be something else. And the regional integration architecture in East Asia which can be RCEP or it can be TPP or it can be the Asia-Pacific FTAAP, these cannot be exactly fitted into the entire region across. So, what India is envisaging as far as the Indian Ocean is concerned is a much broader expanse of open regionalism through the IORARC, long word, but nonetheless this organization seems to have come to life again with the focus on maritime commerce, on maritime commerce infrastructure and on maritime commerce security across this broad expanse which includes energy security from the Middle East, it includes the connectivity across these vital sea lanes which carry three quarters of the world's trade and 80% of the world's energy trade. So, I think I've probably answered all the questions which were there and BIMSTEC and other things, Mekonganga, these are processes. Now, when countries are dealing with a huge range of issues, some of them have to be at the micro level, which is BIMSTEC and Mekonganga cooperation and that has to go on hand in hand as the software part of it which was referred to by Ted in his report. Thank you. A third bite at this apple on these questions, if I may. On the question of China and the issue of India, ASEAN connectivity, if the United States has an interest in India ASEAN connectivity, if we have an interest being a little bit further away, China clearly has a great interest in this and the only thing that I would mention in addition to what's sort of been said is that we've been talking about these track two and track one triliterals just recently the US, Japan, India. There really should be a US, India, China dialogue trilateral. Secretary Clinton, I think in her Chennai speech, said that there should be a formal track one. There are some efforts being made at a track two, but that trilateral grouping should be talking about ASEAN and connectivity because this should all be, I said that connectivity is a term we're going to use a lot here. It also should be transparent. Transparency is important here. The Chinese have a great interest in what happens with connectivity between ASEAN and India. So I think this ought to be a discussion for the three countries as well. So on that score, I think that China should be inclusive and brought into this discussion. And the question of Pakistan, not too long ago I was invited by the Pakistani Embassy by Ambassador Rehman to come over and speak on the subject of where does Pakistan stand with respect to, where does it fit in in terms of the rebalancing, the US pivot to Asia, the rebalancing to Asia. And I said, it's a good question. I'd be glad to come over and speak. They never got back to me after I had agreed to speak, but it is a good question. It's a very good question. And the answer is where does Pakistan wish to fit in? Pakistan has decisions to make because in terms of connectivity, economic security, energy and the rest, Pakistan has a very important role to play. I think it's on Wednesday that Nawaz Sharif will formally become Prime Minister. I think that's correct. He will be the next Prime Minister. He has been Prime Minister before. He has a business background. I think he understands those issues. I hope that he will focus himself on the moving ahead with the India-Pakistan trade and commercial initiative, which was showing progress. Most favorite nation trading status to finalize that would be a great first step for Pakistan with India. A lot of things have been done to pave the way for that, but now it's time to actually finalize it and move on with it. There are a lot of things that Pakistan can do to better integrate itself. And the reason why South Asia is the least integrated region of the world is because India and Pakistan have never been able to sort of get themselves in a position to start taking advantage of all of the interconnectedness. And the smaller states have just sort of had to deal with the Sark Regional Forum, which has been quite weak. If India and Pakistan could get themselves working together, that opens up whether it be New Silk Road, Old Trunk Road, whatever you want to call it. It's there, waiting to be opened up. On the subject of Australia, I noticed the white paper and the references to Indo-Pacific. Think about this in terms of how to be more expansive. We always think about Northeast Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia. Nobody talks about West Asia except those in the region. West Asia is a more inclusive term. Look at a map. Asia extends all the way over. And I think that we ought to be thinking more in terms of that, particularly in terms of the whole issue of the Indo-Pacific, maritime security and the rest. We ought to be thinking West Asia in that regard as well. Just one or two quick comments. CSIS has been spending a fair amount of time in the Middle East. Our Asia team has been invited by Middle Eastern countries to come and talk to them about Asia and architecture and what their interests are there. So I will tell you that there's some interest there. I've been on these trips. I think that my own read on it is they're not sure whether they want to be engaged, how, and I think it's different for different countries. So it's sort of interesting. I think from a Southeast Asian point of view on the Chinese colleagues' comment, there's real interest in Southeast Asia in this new Indo-Pacific structure. I think you're right. Southeast Asia wants the involvement of China, of the United States, of India. I think the difference from a Southeast Asian perspective is that China is engaging. The Americans are sort of hot and cold and the Indians have sort of not lived up to rhetoric yet, if I can be pretty blunt about it. And I think that's the feeling in Southeast Asia. So if you talk about where to spend time encouraging countries, the Southeast Asians will sort of... they're sort of anxious about how China's handled its engagement, strong economics, but why test its neighbors on sovereignty issues so aggressively. The Americans have been sort of there and then back, so all the questions about the pivot and the Indians have said they're looking east and from a business perspective, it feels like that's happening and security maybe now starting to get more engaged, and I think they're looking for a fuller engagement. So I think that's sort of the way it looks from Southeast Asia. Jonah, I saw you had a question. Thanks. Actually, you're right upon the guidance of Ted, of Ambassador Singh, of Rick... And I started out this... I started out this project very bullish on India-Southeast Asia engagement, partly for reasons of personal career and that these are the areas that I focus in and want to see these connections. And I hope I end up being as bullish as I started. But right now, I'm a little more bearish. I get a lot of the sentiment that Ernie just mentioned. When I talk to people in India, the impression is good guns. We're going full speed ahead. Everything is wonderful. When I talk to people in ASEAN countries and the U.S. as well, people are much more reticent, much more, where is India? When is this going to happen? And my question is first, have you noticed the same gap in perceptions as well? And second, if you have noticed it, might part of the reason for it be that India is measuring itself against its past, where engagement was quite slow, and also India is measuring against a political system that has all the lethargy of democracy, shall we say? Lethargic democracies for 100, Ted? We have also detected a little less enthusiasm in our discussions with some of the ASEAN nations than we found in India. But I think this is a long-term discussion. So will this happen? Yes. At what speed? There's what the question mark is. One of the participants in our dialogue said, okay, let's acknowledge the capacity limitations of the Indian government, but the Indian private sector is everywhere. And I think that's also something to keep in mind, that even though sometimes governments don't proceed at the pace one might hope they would, that private sector is out there, how many Fortune 500 companies have their R&D centers in India? A huge number. That interests the ASEANs. The technological development that's taking place in India, that's of great interest to the ASEANs. So I think in the end, we just have to look at it a little more broadly, and we'll see that that interest is there, it's higher in some areas than in others. It's high in healthcare. It's high when it comes to high tech. But maybe a little less high when they're sort of waiting to see where's the beef on trade. But trade is growing, and it's growing pretty fast. Could it be faster? Yeah, could. ASEAN Center at American University. It's a free trade arrangement that ASEAN is pushing ahead, and of course Indonesia because of its consensus with TPP, China, because of its consensus with TPP, we'll look at RCEP. What is India's position on RCEP? The first round of talks have recently concluded how much India is putting, looking at RCEP as something that it can engage in more fully because of its connectivity and its concerns with ASEAN. Thank you. My name is Jeanine Wood. Good voice of Vietnamese Americans. I follow Dr. Pekun, but I also wanted to ask clearly about the position of Vietnam because you mentioned from the connectivity and the Indo-Pacific range, both very much important to Vietnam. And Ho Chi Minh City has been cited in the illustration to be the point that we connect between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China. And so with the support of the U.S. in the software and strategic advice and guidance and India supporting more of everything else that you suggested, right now we're having a lot of problems in the region as many have mentioned in the maritime security sovereignty with China. And if China is not included in the talk, if we don't have, if we have a significant strategic just deficit with China, how do you expect Vietnam to take position in everything? And what do you see from Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung recently at the Shangri-La keynote that he delivered? What do you observe? What is the advice for Vietnam in this position? Thank you. Okay. Thank you. Great questions. Trade, Vietnam connectivity. You want to start, Ambassador? There's a lot there and I hope I can cover all the ground. Forgive me if I miss out some points. Now, as far as ASEAN, whereas India is concerned, there is a perception that India has done a lot but perhaps it has not utilized all the opportunities with the speed and the rigor with which it should have over the last several years. And that perception is real. Indian policy makers also say that there should be more haste and there should be more focus on this part of India-ASEAN relations. But one has to notice now that with the conclusion of the FTA with the... Actually, it's not a... We haven't really concluded the services in investment chapters but we finalized what we are going to put in. Once these kick in and actually enter into force, you will see a substantially reinvigorated India-ASEAN relationship on the trade and investment side. The growth rates of India-ASEAN trade are higher almost than any other because last year the trade with ASEAN grew 41% to almost 80 billion, outstripping our trade with China. And if this projection and this kind of a framework continues, then we would be very much on track to put 100 billion by next year or later 2015 and expand 200 million short time thereafter as Ted had mentioned. So there is an urgency in this process and I think what is going to drive that urgency into opportunity is going to be the kicking into force of the services and investment chapters of the India-ASEAN FTA. Now, as far as the question on our set is concerned, India is very much a member of the negotiating group we welcome the start of the negotiations. We've argued for a nation economic community since virtually the first India-ASEAN summit in 2002 and I think that India will have to certainly step up its own act in terms of trade negotiations, in terms of liberalization in the domestic economy, which then goes on to reflect a more positive approach within the negotiations, the regional negotiations for RCEP. Interestingly, the Prime Minister for the first time mentioned TPP in his visit in Japan. And for the first time he said we're looking at, with great interest, what the Americans are doing with TPP and how this entire initiative plays out. So he didn't say that we are interested in joining the TPP, but still he said at the moment we are working on RCEP, but we are looking at TPP as well. On issues related to area map and the speed of the area map and the area map actually is, if you saw the Chennai to Ho Chi Minh city kind of a segment of that map, 50% of the entire projects of CADP-2, of which that map is a part, are just this India-ASEAN connectivity, which is 50% of the projects. And as far as converting them into bankable projects, into sub-projects is concerned, that work is very much going on. It's going on as far as our own conference in February is concerned. The feedback from area was that we're pretty much advanced on defining the parameters of actual projects to be undertaken very rapidly. We have the assurances of ADB support and there is wide regional support for making this east-west connectivity as impactful as the north-south connectivity between China and ASEAN already is. That is already very much a reality. Well, I'll leave it at that except for the United States and India and ASEAN, the possibilities in Myanmar. Sitwe is a port which India is now majorly investing in, something like $500 million to convert it into a deep sea port. Dawe is the other port which is directly in line of this CADP-2 Chennai-Mekong industrial corridor. And that is a project which currently is mainly Thailand and other investors. But India is certainly interested in trying to take a look at that. Just quickly on Vietnam, I think for both commercial and strategic reasons, Vietnam has been one of the most forward-looking of the ASEAN nations in strengthening ties to India. I don't think it has anything to do with the civilizational ties. I think it has everything to do with the strategic mindset of Vietnam's leaders. If you look, and this is partly an answer to Jonah's question, if you look at the ASEAN's, not as a whole, but break them up into those that are the most enthusiastic, they certainly fall along a spectrum. Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand, I think are the most enthusiastic about looking west, followed by Malaysian Indonesia. Indonesia is lagging a bit in this because Indonesia is further away from, but Indonesia is the economic heavyweight. So the enthusiasm, it's strategically, its strategists are very much interested in this. Its business people haven't yet focused on it. We'd be remiss, and Cameron, you don't know that I'm about to turn to you, but now you do. I think we'd be remiss if we didn't ask our most recent former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia to give us just a sense of what you have heard here, maybe a blink reaction, but I'd love to hear from Cameron for a few minutes. Thank you very much, Rick. Well, I think the first reaction is this obviously is a demonstration of an active amount of intellectual ferment and interest about looking, you know, the world is, it's a globe, but it depends how you spin it, what you look at, and where you think the boundaries are. And this is looking at an area which has not been conceived of so much as an area, despite the fact that for centuries it's been a nexus at least for 150 years, a nexus of shipping that grew the parts of the world together. So the first is ferment and interest. The second, and I think this is something that Americans should really think about, how can you have a strong foreign policy that doesn't really include trade? And I think in particularly when you look at the Trans-Pacific Partnership, I think it's good on the one hand that the administration is sort of rustling and awakening, oh, the trade has to be, we can't just have a strong partnership with Southeast Asia, let's say based on civilizational democracy things and military security, it has to include trade or it's like a stool with two legs. But it seems that the dialogue on trade internally in the United States is completely divorced from the strategic political considerations. Southeast Asia, these 10 countries, for reasons that are understandable, their first cut at foreign policy is how do they together deal with the rest of the world? And our answer on trade is we'll deal with half of you, but not the other half. And so our trade policy is if successful, this is not the way it's intended, but if successful would more likely than not have a negative impact on even our own security policy dealing with the region. And I wouldn't really invite the people in the administration to give some thought to that. You can't have like a pick and choose, right? You have to deal with all of the issues in a relationship with important partners, not say, I only want to deal with you on three of them and not the other five. It doesn't work. Any minute. You caught me unawares. Sorry if my thoughts are a little confused. Thanks a lot. This is very good, though. Congratulations to all of you. Ambassador, thank you. Some of us strongly agree with those remarks. I'd like to thank everyone for a comment. I'd like to thank Ted in particular for his leadership. You can all take the executive summary home. The full report will be out in, I think, three weeks, two and a half weeks, and will be up on the website. I'd like to thank Rick once, too. I may also amend an interview. A person not here, Raja Mohan. Ted has mentioned Raja. He was a contributing author to this report. He did the chapter on maritime security. Ted mentioned his book, Sumatra of Manthan, The Turning of the Seas, The Turning of the Oceans. I highly recommend that, but I did want to call attention to Raja's contribution to what we've done. I think, Ted, I mean, Rick, you've got an agent's job there. What's your commission on that? Thank you all for coming, and please look for the study. And if you have ideas and questions and input, please communicate with all of us, or any of us via email or by the website. So thank you for joining us. Thank you very much.