 Just about one year ago, Ambassador Singh was last in Washington, D.C., hosted him here, gave some bold predictions about what a foreign policy and domestic policy under Modi might look like, especially on the foreign policy. I think most of us hadn't been thinking about it in quite that same context, except would he ever talk to the United States after the visa withdrawal? So Ambassador Singh has promised to give us an update based on his predictions from last year and taking a look at what's happened so far and what we can expect to take place in the coming year. So this should be very interesting on the heels of so many great summits, so many great visits and many others that are just on the horizon here. So Ambassador Singh master's degree from Delhi University and taught at St. Stephen's College before joining the Foreign Service, served in overseas posts in Portugal, Mozambique, and Paul, former Yugoslavia, and the strangest of all in Washington, D.C., then inside Ministry of External Affairs covered the Americas, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Europe. So definitely given the toughest accounts inside MEA, as well as Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N. and Geneva. Later serving as Ambassador to Columbia, Indonesia, and his final posting was as Ambassador to Japan and now holds the Chair Professor for Strategic Studies at Iquir based in New Delhi. So Ambassador Singh, I welcome you up to the podium, sir. Thanks, Rick. Just bear with me a moment and we'll get started. Okay, if I slip up this afternoon, it'll be thanks to my extended holiday on the West Coast and the jet lag, but let me begin by making one or two things clear before I start. Sorry, before I start, Howie and Desi, hello. We go back to 1981, so that's a long, long time. And I see Sukhadasan sitting at the back there. He was, he's been trans-shipped out of Delhi and located in Washington, so I hope you will keep India in your mind while you serve here. Okay, what I propose to do is, well, we all know how complex democracy is and democratic decision making is. We don't need reminders, we are in Washington, D.C. So I just thought I'll flag that to you that sometimes there are complexities in democratic political dysfunction which sort of impacts policy making, but it's not something which is true only here or only in Delhi. It happens in all democracies. Second, I'm not going to give you a listing of great things done over the past year or what has not been done. That has been written about extensively in the last month or so, month or two. And I didn't think it would be useful because, yes, the government spokesmen have been here and they've spoken about it. And of course, you know what the media and the think tanks have been writing about. What I would like to do is to chart the progress of the domestic and foreign policy agenda against my own benchmarks. And these are benchmarks starting from June last year when I was here and spoke shortly after the Modi government had assumed office. And then again, the assessments and reviews which I made in November, December and January of 2014 and 15, kind of six-month reviews of what's been happening and where we are headed. And once again, trying to see if what originally I anticipated would happen is actually happening. So also, let me clarify that I have no government function. So I'm purely a think tank representative and in our think tank, like in all think tanks, you speak for yourself. There is no institutional validity to your views. So with that, I will address two broad elements. First is the domestic transformations in India. And the second is the redefined framework for strategic engagement. And with that, I think as you probably saw in the flyer and what Rick had asked me to do, just point out some of the convergences between the US rebalance in India's act east policy as well as the scenario in South Asia and future prospects. Okay, on democracy, one year ago, we had seen that there was a different kind of water consolidation in India based on development jobs, governance kind of a platform and a demand from the public for what was called attractively the politics of performance over the politics of vote banks and identity. And this was capitalized, this trend in the public was capitalized by Modi's promise of transformative leadership. And mainly this went through and hit directly into the aspirations of the neo-middle class or the new, it also signified the political rise of this new middle class for the first time, the young, urban, connected and aspirational. Now all these elements taken together are very much intact even today. And I will explain to you how and why and I also tell you a little bit about why things are changing and they're going to change a little bit more. The Modi wave continued throughout the last year as you know. So the BJP basically controls only eight states but a third of India's population in those states. With its allies, it controls about 13 states with about 40% of India's population. So it's becoming a bit of a poll in the national political scene. The Congress in contrast at the moment holds nine states, most of them are small states and 12% of the population of India in these states. So even though the BJP had successes, a run of successes over the year, there was a setback in Delhi and that setback told its own story. And that setback basically meant that political miscalculations and even momentary disconnect with the public opinion can spell a lot of disaster on the political front. The second story which it told was that India continues to advance towards post-identity-based politics because the BJP kept its vote share but all other votes went to the populist AAP party. So it wasn't again an identity-based switch. It was just two political parties and what the public wanted to see more of and what they were more impressed by the messaging. Overall, the trend in India continues to be towards post-Congress polity. The BJP is emerging as one of the polls around which elections are posited. And as you know, the Congress is not really a poll in the populist north, which provides for most of the parliamentary seats. You can expect a further evolution of a national alternative if you want to call it because if BJP is going to be a poll then you need a national alternative. It's not clear what it's going to be because at the moment there's a little bit of a trend to move this towards a revised caste-based Janata platform. And of course there's this new remodeled and non-identity populist AAP. So I mean these are the two prospects which are coming up and we'll see how the elections which are held this year and next year how things play out. So you see a broad trend towards the deepening of democracy which I had outlined last year and the growing complexity of political management. Because clearly the electorate is far more demanding of performance than ever before, demanding of results. There's an urbanizing landscape. There are 400 million people in the cities at the moment. This will become 800 million over the next 35 years or so. So you have a massive push into the cities and urbanization. But this segment is not a uniform segment. There's a vast spread among this urban segment, some still dependent on handouts, others more aspirational and wanting faster change. And meanwhile the majority in the rural areas will continue to demand urban amenities and a greater share of the progress pie. So the complexity is growing and democracy is deepening, competition is deepening. The BJP does have some memories of 2004 which it doesn't want to come back and haunt the party's political future because there was this shining India campaign in 2004 and went bust. So there is a pressure on the government to pursue reform, to raise growth, but there's also an equal pressure for the delivery of welfare gains. Now, you've noticed that over the last few months Prime Minister Modi's outlook is increasingly being molded by this public sentiment and so he does face these multiple challenges. He's got this aspirational class which talks about the future and their future. He's got a jobless growth present to deal with. And he's got distress in the rural economy to deal with. So you see this common man discourse coming out more and more in the last few months from Prime Minister and the members of the cabinet. And you'll see that this is again a reflection of how deep democracy has become and how governance is going to be directed by public opinion. BJP is also struggling a little bit with communication issues and everybody hopes that fringe elements are a public culture which is different from the mainstream Indian thought processes. These fringe elements don't derail the Prime Minister's main message of development, growth and progress. We all hope so. And so I predict that politically it's going to be a much more difficult road ahead for the BJP in coming months and years despite the Lok Sabha majority which it enjoys and Prime Minister Modi's unquestioned dominance over the national political scene. Little bit about national consolidation. That was another issue I spoke about a year ago. First, the Prime Minister's office has without any doubt been restored as the hub of decision making. Focus is much sharper on government performance. So we are making progress on that front. I don't go with the critics who say there's too much of centralization etc. Somebody has to lead the country of the size and take some decisions. So he is the head of the cabinet and he is the most popular leader in India. So I see no contradictions really of over centralization etc. These things will manage and balance themselves and they have to because if the things are going to click and his ideas are going to go down and get implemented then he will be working with his broader team. Second thing was about his messaging. And that messaging continued all the way for the first four or five months of his Prime Minister's ship. It was the one India, strong India, the team India with all development for all constitution as the only sacred document building a democratic consensus, instilling national purpose, harnessing social responsibility and promoting oneness. So this was a huge agenda which he outlined. And I would say that it requires continued and frequent reiteration. And I hope that that that will be more and more forthcoming because these are things which are essential for India's national consolidation. I'm talking about national consolidation as against fragmentation, political fragmentation, identity politics etc. which last 30, 40 years had been quite rampant. And my favorite theme, India as a country which believes in the equality of empowerment and not the partiality of fragmented entitlements. Now this is a very complicated issue for a traditional society which is also diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-religious etc. But progressing towards an overarching national identity and to a situation where rights are independent of identities and a common civil code. Well this is a real long shot but I do hope that gradually, slowly we will be able to build progress and I do think that Prime Minister Modi is well placed to drive further progress. This will depend entirely on three factors. His messaging of inclusiveness and tolerance, the revival of the economy and the delivery on the promise of jobs and greater prosperity. So if all these things start taking place, you will see further national consolidation. A little bit on his challenges, you know, high expectations. Well, let me say that the mood of despondency has gone from India but skepticism is rising. So you have these twin elements which he has to work on. We still await deeper structural reforms in the economy. I'll talk to that in a moment. Coalitions of convenience can appear just to thwart the BJP, which has been true in Parliament, outside. Let's see what happens with these elections which are coming. His biggest challenge, and he outlined this himself in November last year, reorienting the BJP into an inclusive nationalist party representing people from all segments of society. Now that is his huge challenge and that's where, you know, leadership really matters. And it's a question mark but we'll see what happens in the future. We must remember that in the best case scenario, there will be no majority in the upper house for the BJP till 2017 or 2018 in the best case scenario. So we've got to wait and see for that. But in the meanwhile, I'm almost certain that the BJP will need to seek more partners among regional parties to gain traction in the upper house. So these are fundamentally his challenges in the coming months. Okay, a little bit about the political economy. There's much said about what's been done, what reform not been done, etc. I think he's been absolutely spot on with his initial messaging and each stage of that messaging. His priority is nation building, expanding the BJP's political base and energized governance. And that has always, according to him, taken precedence over major economic overhauls. He has indicated preference for incrementalism, no quick fix approach, no reforms by stealth. Everything is still very much the way he had indicated in the first six months of his government. There's been no rollback of welfareist programs and subsidies. And that's related to the BJP's widening base across the country. I had described him as market pragmatic rather than market liberal. And that's true. There's some business friendly accommodation of market forces, but is focused on the rest of society and what he calls poverty elimination is very much there. He's done a little bit to dismantle the socialist framework. So we have a Niti-Iyog which is replaced the planning commission, but we yet to see how much teeth the Niti-Iyog will have and what kind of new structure it might have to act as a real think tank for the government and point in strategic directions for the economy for the future. What he has made progress on in dismantling previous centralized structures is cooperative federalism, where as a former chief minister he has taken, he's understood how important states are and what their role is. So he's moving that on the basis of this cooperative federalism platform. So desired outcomes, according to me, already clear, attracting more foreign direct investment, make an India manufacturing push and building momentum for more difficult reforms, whether it's GST or labor or land, these are his desired outcomes, but we haven't got all the instruments in place yet and we hope that gradually something will happen in that direction as well. Growth is not a switch or a button. So I mean I work in an economic think tank. So we're still looking for the cyclical revival of growth. Policy measures will take some time. In the meanwhile, of course, there's a big question among the critics that will incremental improvements actually amount to transformative gains in the economy? And there I would say that you know that the government is facing tough resistance to reforms, whatever it proposes, which is reflected in this shift to the common man discourse. Nonetheless, in macro terms, there has been a significant improvement in the economic outlook. What I would hope for the future and the immediate future would be that this year the government needs to project a clearer vision of a reformist orientation. It has to finish the 1991 agenda where it was left off. It's not good enough to say we did everything which we wanted to do in 1991 and nothing else, no other structural change is required. Pricing reforms, rationalization of subsidies already started, but has to be speeded up, privatization and something which I believe in, greater trade and investment liberalization. And that has to happen because if India is effectively going to participate in the regional comprehensive economic partnership or RCEP initiative that will really nearly be required as a part of this process. Okay, agriculture, something which I needed to talk about because again I'm in an economic think tank. This really requires priority attention. There is absolutely no connect between the agrarian distress at the moment and the land acquisition bill as the opposition has pointed out. We have systemic issues of low viability and high volatility in agriculture. Everything, 85% one hectare holdings, 50% rain dependent, 50% of rural households depend for 50% of their subsistence on non-agricultural work. So basically you have a situation which is crying out for change. If you want to move populations into more productive jobs through a pull factor into manufacturing and services and not a push factor of rural distress as you find the moment, you can't sustain a situation with 7.3% GDP growth and 0.2% agriculture growth. That simply is not going to be viable. So necessary reforms on agriculture, there's rationalizing subsidies, pricing, water, power, urea, fertilizer. Changing that into, reorienting that into investments in irrigation and R&D corrupt neutral incentives because we have some crops which are really mollycoddled, other crops which are very essential for survival like pulses are very importing more and more of those. And a common all India market for agriculture produce. These are fundamental in the coming months and years to bring about if this agricultural urban transition is going to result, is going to happen in a way of a pull factor rather than a push factor. So with that I think I'll move on to the strategic foreign policy framework. A broad recognition of Prime Minister Modi's success in the foreign policy domain and in a way India's back in play and after a few years of missed opportunities. There's been strangely some criticism of excessive travel on the part of the Prime Minister. So my colleagues and I, we did a rundown of the 10 top countries and how much their leaders traveled over the last year. And we found that the average travel was 20.4 countries per leader of the, say, G10. And the maximum was President Hollande of France, 27 countries followed by Abe of Japan, 26 countries, but several others more than 20. Our man did 18 and he's been criticized for that. I think it's just absolutely normal for a rising power aspiring to be a great power one day to energize involvement in global decision making and to assume responsibilities that must come along with that enhanced status. So basically it's a non-starter, this is really misplaced, this sort of thinking. If questions need to be asked of him, they will be asked over the coming year. They have to be related to the operationalization of commitments which he undertakes with foreign powers. So how much are you actually delivering on what you agree with foreign partners? That should be the question which should be raised, not how many countries you've traveled to. Let me stop here a moment and now just in a nutshell give you the four main factors which are the backdrop or the strategic scenario behind India's shift away from what I call strategic ambiguity of the past. And these four factors are pretty simple, all of you think tank world, you know them well. The first one is the global power transition to multi polarity, the geopolitical realignments and the fluid power dynamic in Asia without any question that's the top of the list. The second is a realization about China's rapid rise, its growing assertions in Asia, security challenges in India's periphery and transgressions along India's boundary as well. And the last one is realization that India needs strong and diversified relations with major powers, especially the U.S. as well as its immediate neighbors to make China more amenable towards India's concerns. So these are the factors which have changed the structure for thinking in terms of engagement at the international level. The modified framework for strategic engagement, this is coming into place and I've written about, I spoke about the possibilities last year, then I again started to define this towards the end of 2014. This is first ambition, credibility and strategic influence. There's no doubt that this is the direction he would like the country to move. The second is that we are not non-aligned. We are fully aligned with our own interests, India's economic goals, India's security interests, India's global aspirations and all the partnerships that enable India's rise. So in a certain sense one of my colleagues at the think tank describes this as an ultimate India first sort of an alignment but it was high time that this got enunciated as a national objective. What does this mean? This means that he's pragmatically engaging all major powers and he's differentiating the partnerships based on the bandwidth of their strategic components and he's clearly defining expectations from each partner and he has no ideological constraints or any misplaced fear of offending others when he goes into these, there's no zero sum game. So if India has got to be a pole in the international community it cannot work any other way. There's a very robust focus on expanding comprehensive national power, economic, technological, military. There's a revival of India's historical maritime interests across the Indo-Pacific. You saw how vigorously he's travelled from Fiji to Australia to Mauritius to Seychelles etc. So that's coming out. The projection of India's soft power, its democratic values, its culture and utilizing leveraging the diaspora. So that again is a very systematic direction of his foreign policy framework. Interjection of India's role and responsibility in shaping a balanced rule-based Asian security order. That is much stronger now than it was. I actually started around about 2013 this effort but he's brought it into being. He's got three types of engagement priorities. He's flexible on economic engagement. He shows resolve on meeting security challenges which India faces. And he shows firmness on India's core sovereign and territorial interests. So there again it's a very neat construct. And finally he's incentivizing foreign partners, better business environment, scope for defence-industrial cooperation. So he's got that framework also within the foreign policy dynamic. More or less his act-east-liquid approach is now complete. His strategy for engaging the Middle East and Africa is still awaited. Africa is going to happen very soon but there's a summit which is going to take place in India. Hopefully the Middle East leg will also come up. He's very boldly decided he will visit Israel etc. So let's wait and see what other places he's going to focus on. Now moving on to the challenges and convergences of the pivot and the rebalance and the act-east etc. Let me start with India and China. Now it's almost impossible to address this in two or three minutes. I will try my best. Basically what has happened is that the fault lines have deepened. They've not gone away. They've just deepened. We've managed since 1988 our differences. We've kept the borders tranquil. But there is without any doubt an uneasy peace as China has shifted its position on the boundary after 2005. So we have a trilogy of issues. The borders, boundary rivers and trade. All three are conflicted and they continue to be so. So what do he want to achieve when he visited China a month ago? First he wanted to achieve strategic communication with the Chinese leadership. And he wants more stable ties. He's made it very clear. And improved ambiance for managing difficult issues. Very good. And he wants mutually beneficial economic ties. So that was the basket with which he had gone to China. This was the first time during a visit to China that an Indian prime minister frankly articulated in public India's concerns. And frankly and forcefully. Clearly he engaged them, the leadership, but he also conveyed what India expects. The first is the need for China to reconsider its approach on the issues which hold back the relationship. Second is his advisory that Chinese plans to reconnect Asia would have to be a joint endeavor with India. And the third is that the recognition that there is the simultaneous reemergence of India and China has major powers in Asia that has to be there. And in fact this last one is actually written into the joint communique at the end of the visit. He proposed that for broader tranquility and reducing the threat of confrontations, more needs to be done to clarify the line of actual control on the border and to settle the boundary dispute. Now it's not clear how China is going to respond to that because there's been an initial low level response saying that no, no, we don't need to clarify the line of control. We need more CBMs, but we've been having CBMs since the early 90s. So this would be the fifth or sixth edition of CBMs. If you cannot clarify where the supposed line of control is, you don't know what CBMs you're going to follow. So let's see what happens. Importantly, the visit saw no endorsement of China's one belt, one road concept. Now, OBOR as it's called is basically, as I see it, a question of integrating China's fear of influence with China's friends benefiting the most from it. Did I get it right this time? Yeah, okay. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor across Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, as we call it, is a direct challenge to India's sovereignty. There's complete double standards in China's treatment of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. We know that. We also saw yesterday that they blocked in the Security Council efforts to ask a clarification on Pakistan is why the main mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks is scot-free. And the Chinese blocked that progress. So I just saw on the flash that Prime Minister's signal to China that this is not quite right. Why have you done this? So anyway, we'll get to know a little bit more because I couldn't see more of that flash before we started. There was no mention of a maritime security dialogue either because this has come up in the past. And of course, it's important for the two countries to look at the Indo-Pacific and engage in this dialogue. But perhaps I can only speculate. I have no way of knowing why this wasn't there, but probably because there's discomfort in China on the fact that India has joined many countries, Japan, Australia, the United States, others in referring to the South China Sea in recent joint statements. So I have no idea what happened, but I'll go back to India and try to get a little bit clearer idea. The question to my mind is, will China accept a new type of rising power relations in Asia, which means accepting India's role in Asia or not? And it's also equally clear to me that economic interdependence is no guarantee of respecting each other's core concerns. The Chinese have made it quite clear on many occasions. So I mean, basically, that's another limitation. What is India's response? And what's its likely response as of now? Pretty carefully modulated, but symmetrical response to China's actions affecting India's security. You can expect that. And a more clear-eyed view of what we can expect. So what was termed a few years ago as the strategic and comprehensive partnership is correctly resized and redefined as a development partnership. And that's where we stand. So now, India-U.S. just tour, I'm coming to the convergences of the rebalance and actees, but just a couple of points. There's no doubt in my mind that over the course of last year, the India-U.S. strategic partnership has been placed at the apex of India's foreign policy priorities. That is, you know, it's not just, it's a democratic values, strategic convergences, and joint actions kind of a framework which is being evolved to back it up. Conceptually, the act-based policy and the rebalance are moving closer. We do have some ways to go in fleshing out various things which have been discussed at the Summit's Civil Nuclear Deal, the Defense Trade Technology Initiative, et cetera, but we're getting there. There are issues related to the economic leg, which is the BIT, the Intellectual Property Rights Totalization, Climate Change, et cetera. To my mind, the BIT is essential for India because we are not a member of the TPP, and to avoid investment diversion as a negative impact on India of the TPP, we should have a BIT. I mean, it's a kind of a balancer, but we wait and see what is going to happen, and if later, if Rick allows me, I'll talk a little bit about IPRs. That's been the most contentious issue. Now, convergences. Convergences... Well, first, there is one shared strategic objective, a multipolar Asia where everyone rises, quote-unquote, and this is from the US Defense Secretary, Ash Carter, speaking at Shangri-La Dialogue a few days ago. And to back up this convergence, you have this 2015 Defense Cooperation Framework. This is a very, very interesting document. If you look at it, you've got strategic consultations, intensified exchanges, and bolstering defense capabilities. It's also defined in the press releases which accompanied these documents which were signed that the defense transactions are a means to strengthen mutual security and to strengthen the strategic partnership. Secondly, that the maritime security cooperation envisaged under the framework is intended to increase each other's capability to secure freedom of navigation. So you've got an intensified cooperative framework with three pillars, and then the reasons why you are going into it. There's certainly an element of support for democratic Asia. Myanmar is a point in this case. Then there is growing strategic relations with common partners across the Indo-Pacific. Japan, Australia come to mind. We have the prospect of upgrading the trilateral brick will shortly go to the India-Japan-US trilateral. We must think of upgrading it. I believe that we are moving in the direction of inviting Japan to the Malabar naval exercises between India and the United States. There's a new element which started a week ago, which is an India-Japan-Australia trilateral. The first meeting was held in New Delhi just last week, and this is at a much higher level than the India-US-Japan existing trilateral. So it's already at the undersecretary's level. It's a very good start, and it's the way to go. Now, what does this mean? In economic terms, what it means is that there's consonance on connectivity networks in Asia, whether it's the State Department's Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor or the Japan-led Mekong India Economic Corridor or India's trilateral highway going all the way across Myanmar to Thailand and beyond. The question is that will this trilateral, which he's going to lead to coordinated actions along India's Near East? Because what we need to do is to have actual concrete programs which counterbalance the OBOR of China with things which India, Japan and the United States are bringing to the table in terms of regional connectivity and promoting that, whether through ADB loans or through Japan's new $110 billion infrastructure fund for Asian development, I don't know. But I mean, this is the direction to go if they want to validate this trilateral partnership. And we, again, one more convergence is the shared concerns about freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes under international law. We're also equally supportive of ASEAN-centered, balanced, inclusive regional security order such as the EAS. My concern is that ASEAN's failure to clearly define a role for the EAS is becoming a matter of concern. It's really becoming something which, because that progress has stalled. There are divisions, obviously, in ASEAN and I think the CSIS has an excellent Southeast Asia department. They would know more about these things. But it is becoming a weak link, because we can't say that it's ASEAN-centered, but ASEAN doesn't come up to meet the challenge of the growing threats to regional order which are obviously there. The weak points of the Act East and Rebalance, I would say the first one is the economic integration basket. India is negotiating the RCEP. The US is pushing the TPP. India is not even a member of APEC. It has the US support and endorsement for it, but it's not a member. It also has difficulties with some elements of the TPP standards. But nonetheless, the messaging is different because as Prime Minister Modi said in Australia, he doesn't want these regional integration instruments to become the focus of competition and of rivalry. It's not necessary that these two will be contradictory, but of course they have to be then open-ended and open-ended in a way that the US can, if it wants, participate in RCEP. And India, if and when it wants, can be part of TPP. There are divergences of a similar nature which are evident in bilateral economic relations which flow into this convergence, divergence paradigm. And I think these do require better management and greater understanding between India and the US. Luckily, we've restarted the dialogues which underpin the possibility and prospect of this understanding. I hope we really have to persevere on that line. There are doubts about the US rebalance all over Asia. That won't go away. It won't go away simply because there was a transition from a G2 to the rebalance and there are budgetary issues with defence and there are US preoccupations as a major power elsewhere. So they will not entirely go away. So the regional players will be doing a lot of thinking and heavy lifting on their own because these doubts are not easy to just say, okay, wish them away, they're going to be lingering. India on its part, as I'm mentioning this as a weak point, India on its part has much to do to enhance its defence and security partnerships in East Asia. Expand its naval capabilities. Leverage the strategic advantages which India enjoys in the Bay of Bengal and build maritime cooperation with both South neighbours and ASEAN neighbours. And interestingly, India is very well placed to do that. It's got resolved boundaries with all neighbours except China and Pakistan. It's got resolved maritime boundaries with all neighbours, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia. So basically it's well placed to drive a maritime security initiative across the Bay of Bengal and that very strategic element of the Indo-Pacific waters. One more weak point. There's no shared roadmap to address AFPAC security concerns and Taliban efforts to destabilise Afghanistan. Now, quite clearly, I mean, it's okay because we are slowly improving our communication and our strategic communication and all these issues. But we don't have a shared roadmap what to do and how to tackle these issues. Deterioration in India's near west are definitely going to constrain India's ability to act as an Indo-Pacific security provider. But I think this progress has to be made by the two governments. And let me not say that nothing has been done. Things are looking better, but let's hope that we can do much more on this. And there's no question about one fact that there's a growing China-Pakistan nexus and that is going to be a challenge because Pakistan is poised to become an indispensable ally for China's regional and global power projection. A little bit of India-Japan. I think we, Sukhadasan is here, he knows. We're slipping a bit on the civil nuclear deal. We're slipping a bit on defence industrial ties. Hasn't made much progress. And of course, from India's side, we've got to do everything possible to make it, to facilitate the promise of $35 billion worth of public and private financing into the Indian economy over the next five years, which was promised at the last summit. I'll leave it at that. Just a little bit of South Asia. The Bangladesh land boundary agreement is absolutely path-breaking progress on an issue which has held relations back since Bangladesh was founded. And this has opened the way for land maritime connectivity. It's allowed the two governments to declare partnership over the blue economy, as well as maritime cooperation in the Bay of Bengal. And India's focus now would increasingly be on its critical hinterland, which is Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, linking all these countries through economic opportunity, connectivity infrastructure and energy corridors. And as far as SOC overall is concerned, SOC will be more or less a SOC minus X approach towards economic integration. Those who are part of it, good. Those who want to remain out, fine. We'll move on with those who are willing to go forward. There's been a little bit of a buzz about credible deterrence. And this is after the operation which the Indian military carried out just across the Myanmar border about 10, 15 days ago, and to destroy some bases of a northeast India insurgency. Now, well, I mean, I don't want... I just want to leave it at the fact that let's wait and see how this... This is not a doctrine. It's not a... We're not sort of... I don't... I would not like at the moment to say that this is some kind of a new development. But yes, the deployment and use of military instruments in support of national objectives. Now, you take the entire case of the Andaman-Nikobar Islands. We've got military assets. And those assets really need to be used to help build a maritime security and HADR cooperation complex with ASEAN neighbors and with the immediate neighbors there. And that would be a great addition to net security in the region. Final points. Future prospects, just a few things. I do think that there's been very substantial progress over the last year under Prime Minister Modi. Self-imposed constraints to India's foreign policy have been jettisoned. I see in the coming months and years a more effective foreign policy and national security framework emerging. And as this strengthens, it will definitely benefit India-US ties. We have a very solid base for shared objectives in Asia, whether it is the creation of a strategic environment which discourages unilateral assertions or it is the effort to promote balanced open regional security institutions to uphold international norms. I think that again will see further progress. And then I would conclude by pointing out that I said that India is now pursuing differentiated strategic partnerships depending on the bandwidth of the actual strategic element inside the partnership. So if you see it from a overall perspective, the India-US strategic partnership serves the fundamental economic and security interests of both countries and has the capacity to impact positively the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific to mutual advantage. Now, that is the real definition of a strategic partnership. I think we've laid the basis of getting there, but whether this will actually become progress from a natural partnership to a defining partnership will really depend on how the two countries, India and the US, follow through on their commitments. Thank you very much. Come back there. Great. Well, I think you covered pretty much every corner of the earth except Antarctica, so I guess that's the only question that I have left here. What's the policy on polar bears in Antarctica? Okay. Take a shot of that. But seriously, I think we all sort of appreciate the fact that India is now playing such an active role in the big game across Asia right now at the time that we're seeing increased stability, increased concerns. Also, hopefully, as you mentioned, trying to get some more economic issues into play here, get the transfers of partnership, start to more deeply integrate economically. So I think we're all excited to see what a robust foreign policy. None of us could have predicted, but you did a pretty good job of doing so a year ago. So good to hear the review on that. I'll start off by asking a few questions and then we're going to open it up. You talked a bit about China-Pakistan relations. What about what we see here is a bit of an emerging Russia-China relationship right now. Does that cause some concern? Are you able to differentiate the relations you've got with both? Or do you see it as not really something that you expected to really kind of take off? Well, this is something which really bothers the two major democratic partners in Asia, Japan and India. And it bothers us because a strategic Russia-China consultation, it really means that China has a free hand in Asia. And you have the SCO, which is like a security and oil and gas cartel. You have long-term $300-400 billion worth of commitments on gas and oil between Russia and China, et cetera. So this is certainly something which does come up as a point of concern among policymakers. But that said, I don't think I would say both. Neither India nor Japan are going to give up efforts at trying to build Japan in terms of trying to build relations with Russia. And the economic partnership with Russia, India, continuing what has been a very successful partnership over the last 40-50 years, we may not agree with some of the actions and trends which we see. And I wouldn't like to go into that because these are all live issues at the moment. We don't know how they will play out. But certainly, as far as India is concerned, we'll try to keep up our focus on maintaining some strength in the India-Russia partnership. It's not much of an economic partnership. Basically, at the moment, it's really primarily on defense-industrial cooperation. And we do have ongoing projects, and we probably have forthcoming projects as well, including the fifth-generation fighter project, which is ongoing. Getting back to Pakistan for a moment, I think one transition I've seen already in the Modi government from my engagement with Indian government and civil society. For six months, I felt a lot when I was going to India hosting here that America's continued support and relationship with Pakistan was causing a lot of consternation. I've heard a bit less about that, I think, in the most recent six months. But how does that play out? I mean, is that something that gets brought up? You know, still, we like America. We want to partner with America. But, or is there an understanding that this is a relationship that we have to continue or we will continue irrespective? How does that plan? Is it going to continue to be a wedge or less so? Well, no. I mean, whether it's going to be a wedge or no, as I said, depends on the nature of our strategic communication on some of these concerns. Yes, you may be partnering Pakistan, but there's absolutely no doubt about what a headache it is. So, similarly, I mean, India has major issues, security issues and concerns there. And we're open to a new relationship, but when they want it, because it has to be on the basis of normalcy in our economic interaction. It has to be on the basis of normalcy of regional integration and access to Afghanistan and beyond. And it has to be on the assurance that there is no support for extremist elements which can target India and bring back the horrors of the past. So, we are quite clear about that. As far as losing out, well, I mean, South Asian trade is a minuscule element of India's global trade. Our East Asian trade is 33% of our trade. So, the question, the imbalance there is quite marked, which is why I said that we'll move on on a sock minus X basis. And the countries which are willing to partner on energy networks, connectivity infrastructure, making use of the advantages of the large Indian economy and opening it up for these immediate neighbors, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar. I think we should do that. And by extension, need to work together with Japan and the U.S. on India's Near East Connectivities with Southeast Asia. I think one of my favorite lines from any event that I've hosted or chaired, Amitabh Kant from DIPP, is somebody asked him about the lack of economic integration. Why can't India be more like the United States which has such strong trade relations? And the response was we would gladly trade you Pakistan for Canada if you wanted that. One last question on my side before I open it up, which is kind of taking a mirror to those of us in Washington, D.C. So, you know, we talked a lot in the past about, you know, we kind of lost the narrative on the relationship on both the strategic and economic at about the same time, although, you know, I think the Pentagon did a pretty good job of keeping a pilot light on even during the difficult times. The strategic relationship is obviously running as fast as it can. Even on the econ front, I consistently bring up the numbers look pretty good. FDI is up 45 percent for numbers that were released yesterday. U.S. India trade is up. Institutional investments hitting records. But in Washington it still feels, you know, based on some things that happened in the last government and such, a lot of negativity is out there on the econ relationship. What's the perception in Delhi that Washington is still hard charging and angry or it's toned down a little bit? Can you give us a light on how Washington has seen on the econ front from Delhi? Look, you're quite right. I mean, in 2013-2014, it was really an unprecedented attack on India. On issues which have the least validity. India as a mercantilist power. We don't even trade enough to be... Our trade imbalance is $200 billion. It's come down to $136 billion this last year, but, you know, that's the last of the things which India is. So there was a little bit of concern that this kind of targeting of India is unfortunate, unfair. And it was coming at a time when our relationship had come to a standstill, which made it worse. So the impact was pretty deep. I think that we have re-engaged seriously. We've re-engaged in the trade policy forum. So that's good. But it's just been a initial re-engagement. We haven't really progressed the BIT yet. And the review, I guess, is more or less complete in our finance ministry on our revised BIT model. I said that it has to be in the interest of India to minimize investment diversion threats from TPP by going into a BIT with the U.S. I'm not really sure how fast that's going to happen, but hopefully we'll get there. We still have the issues of immigration and totalization and other things to work through. But if you allow me a couple of minutes, I would want to say something about the intellectual property rights issue, because that's been at the forefront and there's been so much of it all over the place. And I've just finished a rather long piece which has not yet been out in the public on IPRs. But fundamentally, let me say that there's two things which are important there on IPRs. Well, I mean, I fully understand that with 50% of the growth in the U.S. economy coming from innovation over the last 50 years, clearly IPRs are greatly important to America's competitive edge. What's not clear to me is this excessive adversarial tone on Section 3D of our Patents Act and the norms of patentability which it establishes. Because you must understand the historical context of India. It's not the same as advanced post-industrial economy which the United States is. And we certainly are not going to be able to replicate anything like the American model of $2.7 trillion healthcare economy out of a $16 billion economy or $17 billion economy. But the Indian Patents Act of 1911 gave monopoly rights to British manufacturers over the Indian market, monopoly rights. So we inherited the situation when we became free, we could not even produce penicillin and insulin which were at that time at the cutting edge of life-saving medicines. So it went through a huge process and in fact the British makers won case after case in Indian courts and continued the monopolies. So by 1970 we had done a new Patents Act which followed German and other examples on patenting, switching from product patents to process patents. And then once we decided that we're going to be a member of the WTO from the inception, we had to go along with the negotiations on trips and accept compliance with strip standards which was done through the 2005. Amendment of our Patents Act. Now, in a nutshell, there are two issues. Are the patentable standards new? Are they excessive and beyond WTO trips? And is India's approach towards compulsory licensing a difficult area? Just these two issues. First, the section 3D talks about enhanced therapeutic efficacy and we regard it as a refinement of the inventive step which trips lays down. Now trips lays down an inventive step but does not define it. Does not define it in legal terms, does not make an extensive definition of it. Because it creates a benchmark and it is up to each government to implement laws which broadly follow this parameter. Now, in US law we have non-obviousness as a patentable standard and that non-obviousness in the US law must show unexpected superior results. Now, how is unexpected superior results different from what India calls enhanced therapeutic efficacy in terms of medicines? And it's not. It's basically a national definition. In US system the results of whether this is good or no is post patent. So it's left to the courts to decide whether it was fairly granted or not. In the Indian case it's pre-grant of patent in terms of the law itself. And I think the US standards are pretty strong to avoid the danger of frivolous innovation and evergreening. So there is a similarity but the way the system works in practice is different in the two countries. And as far as balancing trips and public healthcare which was the next of our case in Indian compulsory licensing. Now, it's fine to say you've got trips, you've got intellectual property, you must protect it, etc. But the dissemination of an intellectual property in society with the twin pillars of affordability and accessibility. It's got to be a national determination. Now, in the case of next of our, it was available to 2% of the Indian patient population. At rates of course which are very high but even the supply was not insufficient. So there were several attempts to give a license to have it produced locally to rearrange the pricing structures etc. It didn't work. But well, I think you can be sure that what we are doing at the moment is a public debate going on on new intellectual property regulations in India. It's out on the net for the last 3-4 months. We've consulted with all foreign partners as well as the domestic industry and international, multinational industry on this issue. We hope to see much greater degree of reliability and predictability coming into the intellectual property space. We hope to see greater enforcement coming into the space. But you can be absolutely certain that public health concerns will go hand in hand with protections for innovation when it comes to medicines. Because it is this one area where the rest of the cost born by society of giving a patent is understandable. But the costs born by society on healthcare directly impact human life. And in the case of life saving medicines, it can become a dead weight loss in society if you don't do something about it. So basically that is an element which India will always balance. And we do believe that our current law is very much strips compliant and will hold up to any legal scrutiny. I'm sure it's going to be a topic for discussion either in Q&A or at happy hour afterwards when we gather for a drink. This really was one of the issues that drove a wedge along with as you mentioned some convulsor local manufacturing rules and some cross-border taxation. But it feels a little bit later now. So let's go ahead and start with Q&A. So let's start up at the front with Ambassador Schaffer. So if you could let us know your name, affiliation and keep the question fairly tight. I'd be much appreciated. Thank you Rick and thank you Hamant. I'm not going to take up Rick's invitation to pursue the IPR discussion. I'm afraid we'd be here all night. But I do want to come back to a couple of things that Hamant said in his presentation that look more generally at India's approach to trade and to economic diplomacy. Really one observation on which I'd love to have your comments and one quick question. The observation is this. You commented that South Asian trade is minuscule, which is true. But I thought that Mr. Modi's decision to use the Indian economy as a magnet to help leverage greater growth on the part of his smaller neighbors was one of the more far-seeing elements in his new foreign policy. And I wonder how you interpret that, whether this is just part and parcel of his view that economics is king or whether there's more to it than that. The question I had was, had to do with your statement that there are doubts about the U.S. rebalance to Asia all over Asia. What would India, what do you think would the Southeast countries like the United States to be doing? Thank you, Desi, for posing those important and difficult questions. On the consolidation of the neighborhood through economic integration, there's no doubt that he is going to pursue it. I have already said that it's an integration of the hinterland and those who are willing to be partners. It's going to be, at the moment, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, what is it, Nepal and Myanmar. But we hope that there'll be more. We hope Pakistan will join too at a certain stage when it feels comfortable. It's this interplay of how much economic independence they want to officially accept with India. So we're open to that. He does have a very special focus on the neighbors. But this focus is marching along, as I said, on a sock minus X basis. And it is marching along precisely on the lines which you indicated, which is economic opportunity and the attraction of large Indian economy and market. The focus on connectivity, which is not there. I mean, we are the most, in terms of regional economic integration, we are evidently the least integrated of all such attempts anywhere in the globe. That has to continue. And there's a very healthy focus now on energy networks and linking these countries. So these are solid. We need to translate much more of this into actual robust progress. And we need to complete the trilateral highway initiative all the way up to Thailand. And that's promised now in the next couple of years. We need to be able to progress the decisions which were taken at the recent summit with Bangladesh, which is land, rail and maritime connectivity and common activities across the blue economy and including maritime issues. So these are initiatives which definitely will carry on now. As far as the U.S., and I'm basically, I'm not saying these are in contradiction to the fact that we have a huge economic opportunity in the East. But you can't forget the fact that if you take the projections of the ADB or the World Bank or any investment bank, the bulk of the growth of the global economy over the next 30 years will come from India and these Eastern countries. That's in terms of actual value in dollar terms, etc. So the opportunity which we have in the East, the integrations which we, the RCEP and other integrations which we are going in for, they are an absolute imperative. And hopefully, since you asked about trade and economic diplomacy, hopefully these give opportunities for India to go in for greater liberalization of trade and investment. Because these are driven by the strategic imperative of being partners in this regional integration process. But they are adding to a domestic discourse and we've got to be part of that. We have to negotiate these rules to the advantage of India as well as all the partners in the region. But we can't do that without greater liberalization. So I think it's a very positive factor as well for Indian decision making to be a member of this negotiating process. Now as far as Asia is concerned, I was not making a point that America has to do more. I'm saying whether you do more or you don't do more, there will be questions because the region has benefited for the last 60, 70 years from American power. And the American hub and spoke system is still the backdrop and kind of a safeguard mechanism behind stability in the region. There's no doubt about that. But the question is, if you take a look at the military part of the rebalance, it doesn't really make a difference. There are seven ships going up to 60 ships by 2020. I mean, it's really that's not the number which really changes to any great degree. America will be having distractions and responsibilities elsewhere in the Middle East, in Ukraine, other parts of the world. There's no doubt about that. So there will be a kind of uneasy turn, etc., which is going on. And this is probably much more true among the smaller nations because then they realize that, look, things are changing very fast. This strategic flux is sort of happening in such a way. And I'm not saying that anybody in the region is asking America to come in in a way that is destabilizing or it's been a reassuring presence. It's been a very positive presence. It's led to greater prosperity across Asia. And we hope that this rebalance is strong and the commitments to the rebalance remain strong. But questions among partners in Asia will remain. So we will have to pick up wherever there is a perceived sense of disquiet. We have to pick up the issues. We've got to do things for ourselves and build those net additions to regional security which make the difference. We'll get that question good and answered too. As you know, we're working on, at CSIS, our Asia team is working on the external review right now of the rebalance. So we'll figure that out and make sure that we get it right from here on out. So no problems. Let's go up at the front right here. Got a microphone coming. Thanks. Again, let us know who you are, who you represent, and a fairly quick question if you're good. Thank you very much. I am Dr. Nisar Chaudhary with the Pakistan-American League. We contribute in the area of regional security issues and enduring US-backed relations. My question is pertaining to, since we have mentioned domestic policy as a foreign policy, in the US, even the elections are held and they hardly question about the foreign policy. When they are in national debate going on, there's hardly one or two questions on foreign policy. And mainly they are economy, jobs, infrastructure, quality of life, living conditions. And in case of India, how much foreign policy influences the people of India when they have to make a decision who should lead India? The main part is that you mentioned about the common man party, the armed party. They swept in Delhi. Is it a phenomenon or is it just a size-related incident? And the last thing is that India and Pakistan, they are in a race for developing tactical nuclear weapons. Technical? Tactical, tactical nuclear weapons. Both of them are in a race. My question is, is there any special recommendation you can make, pragmatic and achievable, that these two countries can restore a degree of trust, restore some degree of trust, and they not only work together, they also try to put some kind of, manage this kind of race. And at the same time, they can start trade. And as you mentioned, as Tessie mentioned about, and you mentioned about those countries about American role in that region, how do you think the neighbors of India would be feeling about the role of India in the region? India is also very big superpower like USA. Thank you. Okay. There are many parts to that question and try to remember each of them. The point is that, yes, of course, in large populist democracies, I tried to, why did I speak so much about domestic-evolving deepening of democracy scene? Because it is all about jobs, growth, governance, and politics of performance which deliver actual welfare gains for the public. And it's very complex because you have different segments of the public with different requirements. And different sectors of the economy which have very different requirements, too, in terms of policy making. So, unquestionably, whether it's in the United States or in India, it's really the domestic burden on issues which are at the forefront of voters when they think about national elections. And incidentally in India, I mean, it's quite clear that there is a slight difference in state elections and a slight difference in national elections because it continues to be a factor of somewhat of a divergent voting pattern as far as that goes. Now, the foreign policy, I prominently mentioned that because I think among the successes of this government over the last one year, the clearest focus which comes out, there is a lot of change in the domestic economy, in the domestic decision making, et cetera, which I outlined. But in foreign policy, the trend which was creeping in has finally been crystallized into a new approach of engaging the world, which is very pragmatic, very clear-headed. And very practical, it's how do you secure your best interests, how do you secure your economic interests, your security interests, which are your partners who help you along the way, et cetera. So, that's why I had dwelt a little bit on that. But it is not as – it's not a non-factor. It's a factor in the talk shops. It's a factor on the TV programs on a daily basis. But it's not essentially a factor which influences voting decisions as much as domestic issues do. You're quite right on that. The second aspect, I think – what was the second one? Well, there was Pakistan. How do you resolve India-Pakistan concerns? India-Pakistan concerns. So, we have a conference that's going to last for 16 hours tomorrow. We've been trying to address that for many years, and the Prime Minister made the first step as soon as he became elected. So, he called all the leaders of the neighborhood, personally called Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. And we were very gratified that he came, and he was present in response to that special invitation. The government repeatedly said, including in the recent past, that we are open to a relationship which has all elements in it – dialogue, economic ties. There are many things which we've been trying to progress over the last two, three years, which you would be aware of, which is dependent on Pakistan accepting most favored nation status as far as India goes. And that includes energy networks and others. There are things which have been agreed under the sarcage is because there are a basket of four or five things which the whole region needed to do, which were taken up at the last summit. And I think Pakistan, out of the four or five, agreed to do just one. The rest of the region said, okay, we'll go ahead with the other things. So, we're doing what is possible, but I think basically it needs two hands to clap and to move forward together. I wouldn't like to go into the national dynamics of Pakistan because that's not my main area of expertise. But, well, we have domestic limitations everywhere. On the nuclear front, I wouldn't like to speculate on that because you said that both countries are developing tactical nuclear weapons, et cetera, et cetera. I mean, let's leave it to the people who really deal with issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and things of that kind and strategic stability. But, without any question, we would like a greater and greater degree of trust, confidence, and strategic stability in the neighborhood. So, if we could reach progress and understandings on some issues, yes. We would love to do that. And may I remind you that every year we continue to exchange our lists of nuclear installations, et cetera, with each other, which is a very important CBM between India and Pakistan. So, we really would like to see a more and more stable region emerge and we wish Pakistan the best. Let's go get some in the back, gentlemen. Yeah. Third row up. Got time for one or two more, I think. Hi. My name is Rohan Daswani. I'm from the Wilson Center. So, Rohan Daswani. So, given India's strategic position in the Indian Ocean, you see the formation of a major security pact with Japan countering China's muscle flexing in the South and East China Sea. With Japan. Well, the first definitions of the Indo-Pacific came out of summits between India and Japan. And they came out from the present Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Abe, in his first term in office. And even before that, among the leading countries which welcomed India into the East Asia Summit, Japan was there. And that was the first time when India really became a part of this regional construct and possible future regional security organization. So, what we have been progressing with Japan has been a maritime security relationship. It really started in 1999, if you want to go back to it, because there was a major Japanese vessel which was rescued from hijackers and pirates by the Indian Coast Guard. And so this relationship really goes back now, 16 years. And it was building on the Coast Guard front now. It's also building on the Navy to Navy front. And we have annual exercises planned with Japan later this year. And I think our overall approach to bring stability to the region by engaging all of Southeast Asia is very similar. Our role in cooperating with each other in the antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, they're also very much there. And right from the beginning, our ships and the Japanese ships have exchanged information and tried to work together with each other. And hopefully I think these sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean are absolutely vital for Japan's economy, as they are for India's economy. So this is an important leg of our relationship which will remain. I don't have to wrap it up there, but I believe Hamot might be able to stick around for a couple minutes while we have a little reception here with some beer and wine. So if you have a burning question and opportunity there, but please join me in thanking Hamot for giving us his time on this trip. Thank you.