 R Flight The final item of business is members business debate on motion 11539 in the name of Mark Ruskell on civil contingency in nuclear weapon transport, and this debate will be concluded without any question being put. Would those members who wish to speak in the debate please press the request speak button and I call on Mark Ruskell to open the debate for around seven minutes please mr drunkels? Cysylltu'r ddifat yng Nghymru. Fel ddawr, ddawr iawn o szyf arnynno'n ddifatiau, wedi eu dim yn ei ddifat y cyfnod i'r marwain aethun neu ymddindol ddechrau cyd-drain yn y cyfnodol, ond hefyd, ymddindodd yn ei ddifat i'ch ddigonfniad gwasanaethau i ddifat i ddifat. Roedd y cyfnod yng Nghymru, llawer, yn ddifatio nad oedd geitig o cofnod o'i Cyfnodol i'ch ddifat yn Felly ingeniwch gweld angen gan arferfynfyrddau cwmwyngfaenol arno neu landfyniad, ac rwy'n parlyfynwch ei fod yn ei gwybod i chi'n addysg. Mae'n gwybod o arferfynfyrddau, ac mae'n bwysig i'r rhaglen a'r rhaglen a'r rhaglen i chi i gyd yw'r rhaglen i'r rhaglen i'r rhaglen i'r rhaglen i chi chynwysol. Mae cymryd wedi ei gweithredu i David Bakenzie, Jane Taillans, ac rwy'n meddwl i'r newid yn y nôr i'r Uneddoedd Unedog, ac yn ymwneud gyda gennychr y rhanfod meditation yw Robert Edwards, fel oedd yn fwy fwrdd cymryd i ddysgrifion gyda gweithio'i gweithio'r ffordd yn y gweithio'i erbyn. Felly, rydyn nhw'n ei ffór i'n gael i gael i'w Gêunon David i'w gael i gael i'r gweithio'i gael i'r gwyl gyda'r gwrthu o'r gaf yw'r cyfrannu cyfrannu yn ysgolwnt yn Gwyllustinol. Felly awdraeth y flynedd iawn ar gael Cwilport yn gyflawn a'r gwasanaethau diolch yn Barchshire oes 8 ym 1 ym 100. Fy gynnym ni'n meddwl yw'r gwrthu o'r gael cyfrannu cyfrannu cwilwyr nôl a'r gwrthu o'r cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu gyfrannu cwilwyr i gael cwilwyr ym 100. sutiondла thinlyn lei wneud ydy wahanol i gyrraeg o'u cerchau cyflogiり wych Benfr yn gwyebprinogl yw denoedd rainedid Rh입 dogol, ac roedd datblygu cyflogwag. Mae MOD mil feledd gymrydd em 이게id nag llwyngot wedi'r cyflogwag gydech industrial maerig cymaint cyflogwagDown. Mae y ddwy risoedd cyflogwag diw slightly'r pandyn mwy tyno fel llawer yn gael 5 km, potent y gydolsledd maen nhw ar gyfer gen glenc d הסbunol. Hefyd, cyflogwag yr gyfrid o'r panfail drwy ingin, ac mae'r ad font ddiwedd eithu mae'n gweithio i chi'n gweithio llwyll y Tyre. A oedda i ni'n bwrdd dan o'r dechrau wrth cyrffyr i gyfyddiaethai llwyll, i ei wider ringing o fynd thoughts yn ddiddordeb wathwn o Maison yma, mae gennym ni'n cerddol o'r dinadau a'r swinidol yn defnyddio yn ythgriffaith. Ac mae'n gweithio i chi'n gweithio i Gwylun i ni'n taithu летigol a'r rhai yn Crasol, ac roeddenno ar Ymgyrchu 11 oed o Arn Pryau a'r Bechlyfi. The risk of a catastrophic incident is mercifully small, but the impact of a serious accident or terrorist attack, should it happen, could be devastating. Even a low probability over many years and decades is a persistent risk. The consequences of such an incident are likely to be considerable loss of life and severe disruption both to the British people's way of life and to the UK's ability to function as a sovereign state. That sounds like hyperbole mae dweud â'r ffamilio'r lleigiaethau a'r ly roastingiau sydd yn yn cyfling. Felly, mae'r ffamilio'r lleigiaeth yn dda i'r cyfrifoldeb yn llyfr mwy, a dyn nhw'n bwysig ar y cyfrifoldeb i'w gymhaeg. Dw i'w gwmpasio'r polocir i'r Gwylionedd a Llywodraeth Cymru i'w cyfrifoldeb i'w gwmpasio'r pwy i'r gwaith ymlaen economiol yn ei cyfreodd Samsungau. joined effort, but managing the impact beyond the immediate vicinity of the convoy would primarily be the responsibility of councils and emergency services in their roles as category 1 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act and what Scottish Government holding responsibility for compliance under that act. Replacing the old civil defence act, the CCA brought in a new approach requiring several authorities to identify potential threats, examine the risks, and list them the Public Registers, while ensuring that the public has appropriate information to respond should contingency plans ever have to be enacted. There are two main opt-outs under the CCA that identify when the authorities don't need to inform the public. Firstly, if national security could be compromised, through sharing sensitive information, secondly, if information was likely to cause public alarm. Providing live information about convoy would of course be inappropriate, but as As I've already said, the existence of convoys is not a secret. They part next to anandos, and the culture of secrecy surrounding the convoys, and a failure to acknowledge and plan for the risks, is in itself caused for public alarm. The admission by Police Scotland officers under oath during the trial of a protester last year that they had no idea about what is contained in the convoys really alarms me. I want my emergency services to have a clear idea of what they would be dealing with. Felly, rwy'n sicrhau dwi'n meddwl i'r ddweud i gyfieithio cyd markets rydym iawn o gweithio clywedferol ar gyfer negolaeth ac yn lle ddechrau o gweithio cyd-feyl i g scenery a draithio cyfieithio cyd-feyl rhyw Opp, ac yn cyfrifoedd ddwyllfa y cyfieithio dim y cyfieithio cyryddon wedi oedd yn cael eiinhod i hyn. Gweithi'r cyfrif mwy nifer eu gobylch ymgylch local resilience partnership risk registers for naval bases and civil nuclear power stations. In 2016, I asked local authorities on convoy routes what risk assessments had been completed and the answer was none. Neither had any councils communicated with the public about the potential threat, so councils are clearly breaching the responsibilities that they have under the CCA to assess risk, plan and inform. Several of the council surveys did not even seem to be aware that they had convoys running through their areas. If councils are relying on generic risk assessments produced by resilience partnerships, then that is really concerning, because convoys pose a unique set of risk explosives and nuclear material travelling together. If they are relying on the MOD for risk assessment, again that should concern us, because those assessments, even if they exist, are not available and the MOD has no role beyond dealing with containment at a convoy incident site. A number of councils pointed to guidelines produced by the MOD about what to do in the event of a convoy incident, but it is clear that there are huge challenges for first responders to follow the guidelines on a range of issues from communications to cordon access. For example, no evacuation procedure on the scale of a 600m cordon has been planned or trialled in Scotland and the guidelines for providing shelter from radioactive material within five kilometres also pose major problems. They require people to stay indoors and for ventilation systems to be shut down. The hospitals know that, they require school children to be kept indoors and not picked up. Do schools know about that? Can I turn briefly in closing to the role of the Scottish Government? So far, the response to Unready Scotland report has been very disappointing. The position of the Government on Trident, although welcome, is largely irrelevant to this debate. The issue here is about dealing with the responsibilities that we have here and now under the current devolution settlement. I have hopefully demonstrated that resilience partnerships are woefully ill-prepared to deal with a convoy incident and are failing to discharge our legal duties under the Civil Contingencies Act. Only a review headed up by the Scottish Government involving the MOD, COSLA, Police Scotland and the Fire and Rescue Service, the NHS and expert stakeholders can start to address the failings. That is the call on the Government tonight and nothing less will do. May I say to those in the public gallery? I would prefer it if you didn't show appreciation or otherwise during the debate. Thank you very much. We moved to the open debate and quite a lot of requests to speak. So speeches of quite a strict four minutes please. Bill Kidd to be followed by Edward Mountain. Thank you very much, Presiding Officer. I won't even have to take four minutes because I've just got something that I think is important to say. First of all, I would like to congratulate and thank Mark Ruskell for achieving this important member's debate here today. I'd like to declare an interest in the subject of the debate as convener of the cross-party group on nuclear disarmament and internationally as a co-president of parliamentarians for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It was in that role that last July I was the only elected representative of anybody in the UK to attend the United Nations conference which passed the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Sadly, not even the UK's appointed ambassador attended the conference. 122 nations voted in favour of the prohibition of nuclear weapons with one against and one abstention, and while there I presented a statement of support for this historic treaty from our First Minister to the president of the conference, it reiterated the Scottish Government's call for a world free of nuclear weapons, with our contribution to be led by Scotland having tried and removed from our land and waters as quickly and safely as possible. Therefore, I'm confident that the Scottish Government takes the issue of nuclear weapons seriously, and I know that it takes the issue at hand of Ministry of Defence convoys transporting high explosives and radioactive materials along public roads very seriously. It's this very issue, the transport of the materials by the MOD convoys that needs to be addressed by both Holyrood and Westminster in assessing the preparedness of areas in Scotland and England through which those convoys travel, from Burkfield in the south of England to Faslain in Argyll. No one should be ignorant of what those convoys are carrying past their homes and communities or of the potential dangers posed by an accident or an incident. To that end, I would ask that the minister may look at the Scottish Government's setting up of a group with the specific remit of conducting an open review of the readiness of all those Scottish areas through which the nuclear weapons convoys travel in order to ensure civil contingency preparedness across the board. I believe that that should be done in order to ensure the defence of our population, our environment and the futures of our young people along every route of those despicable convoys, until that is we achieve the removal of Trident from our country. I call Edward Mountain to be followed by Claudia Beamish. Before I begin, I would like to declare that I was a soldier in our armed forces and I served in the 1980s and 1990s during the Cold War and in Germany when nuclear weapons formed part of the USSR's offensive plan and that had to form part of NATO's strategic defence plan. Before anyone asked if I was happy with that, my response is that I believe that the deterrents do work. I accept that many in this chamber, including Mark Ruskell, will probably not agree with me, but I respect their opinion and I hope that they will respect mine. I have listened carefully to the concerns raised by Mark Ruskell and questioned where he got his information from, because the information that I have is very different. I would like to run through that information, if I may, looking at the nuclear facts as I understand them. Fact 1, when nuclear weapons are transported, they are not armed and ready to explode. They are transported in a manner that means that they are fully contained and inert. Their transport containers are designed—I will finish this point before I go into fact to it—to be robust and sealed. The UK Government stated in 2015 that weapons are transported in a benign configuration and in secured custom design containers that it is tested in accordance with international atomic energy standards to protect against a range of scenarios, including impact on a motorway, at speed, drop from height and fuel fire among other threats. Mr Finnie, I am delighted to give you that. John Finnie. Thank you, Presiding Officer. I am grateful for the member for taking the intervention, unless I missed it. Are you able to say what the source of that information is? I remind members to always speak through the chair and I call Edward Mountain. That information came from a UK Government statement that was delivered in 2015, and there are various papers from the UK Parliament relating to the transportation of nuclear weapons. As far as fact 2—I should turn on to now—nuclear weapons are inherently stable as they are carried out. They are not like, as many people believe, old explosives like nitrogrycerine. They do not explode when subject to either heat, shock or flame. They are stable and, basically, benign when they are transported, as I have said. Providing that they are well-mattained—which our weapons are—there is no risk of exposure to the materials that they are made from. Fact 3—when nuclear weapons are transported, the physical security is extremely high. You and I will never know the extent of that security, nor should we. What I do know is that what you see is what you are meant to see, and what you do not see is what you are not meant to see until it is needed. That is based on the evidence that I have from when I was a soldier and I was involved in moving nuclear weapons in Germany. Fact 4—new contingency plans are extremely high and involve all the key services—military and civilian. I know they are in place and I know their practice. To be clear, all civil authorities are consulted before nuclear weapons convoys begin their journey. Fact 5—transportation of nuclear weapons through residential areas is rigorously assessed and governed tightly by international and national regulations. Transporting nuclear weapons and materials by road in the UK has been taking place for more than 50 years. In that time, there has never been an incident that has presented either a risk to the public or indeed the environment. Whilst I respect Mr Russell's opinion, I am afraid that I do not agree with it. What I say is that let us argue on the facts and let us argue on anything else, and let us stick to those facts while we are having this debate. I call Claudia Beamish to be followed by Claire Hoche. My thanks go to Mark Ruskell for bringing this issue to the chamber today and to Nuke Watch UK for its consistent work on the issue and also to Rob Edwards and to many others. I commend those members of the public for dedicating time to this issue. It is often civilian watchdogs that hold our governance to account. I also declare an interest as a member of the CPG for nuclear disarmament. While we still have weapons of mass destruction in this country and the requirement to transport them throughout, it would seem absolutely obvious that every aspect and every eventuality would be planned for robustly and consistently. Inconceivably, that has been revealed not to be the case. The Unready Scotland report shows that the routes and the warhead convoys take and many of the communities that I represent across South of Scotland are affected by this. I am disappointed to say that there are no nuclear-free local authorities at the moment in South Scotland. The Scottish Government has a responsibility for community safety and emergency planning. In my view, I have concerns, as have some of my constituents, about a failure to ensure compliance with the local authorities under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. It is a failure to put people at risk, both communities and the emergency services. While an accident is unlikely, there are a series of credible scenarios that could trigger fire explosions and the breach of containment with plutonium. I differ from my colleague Edward Mountain on that and the breach of containment and other radioactive materials that are possibly leaking from warheads. I do not want to be alarmist about that, but that is the case. There are these possibilities. Before the reports became entirely redacted in 2015, the Ministry of Defence reports were concerning. In 2006, it reported that convoy crew fatigue could cause hazards. In 2010, the risk of accident was getting progressively worse due to spending cuts and, in 2014, it reported a shortage of engineers as a threat to safety. Those are, of course, questions for the UK Government, but it seriously highlights the need for our Government in Scotland, the Scottish Government, to ensure that we are prepared. That is a unique threat for our emergency services, who would be the first to be likely to be on the scene. I fear the failure of transparency, as well as legal compliance, that the general information on those convoys is not made public. There are obvious reasons why that should not be made widespread and up to the information given. However, national security surely does not justify a failure to inform the public about the existence of convoys. We all have a democratic right to know. I welcome the comment from the Scottish Government on rail convoys, which also passed through my constituency. The Ministry of Defence says that the risk of nuclear weapons, and I quote, "...nuclear weapons convoys are tolerable when balanced against the strategic imperative to move nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons remain in the UK and across the world, those ugly judgments will have to be made. Nuclear weapons are not someone else's problem. They are utterly inhumane, militarily useless, as stated by many senior military figures, and morally acceptable and unacceptable and, in my view, illegal." Scottish Labour has recognised that in 2015, but that is not a debate about nuclear weapons. It is about the safety of their transportation. All with responsibility needs support, and the civil resilience partnerships need to be well interlinked. I ask the minister in closing remarks to highlight how that is being done, not in detail, for national security reasons. We all need to be able to reassure our constituents that, while nuclear warheads are trafficked through their areas, they are as safe as they can possibly be. I thank Mark Ruskell not only for his work but for his wise words and information. I call alongside him and many others in the chamber and beyond for the Scottish Government to consider the open review of the preparedness of Scottish civil authorities to deal with serious nuclear weapon convoy incidents. The Scottish Government must act on this and show the people of Scotland that it is acting. I call Clare Haughid to be followed by Gordon MacDonald. First, I would also like to add my thanks to Mark Ruskell for bringing this very important debate to the chamber today. It is also a pleasure to speak after my colleague Bill Kidd, who undoubtedly speaks with a greater authority than most on this subject. As Bill Kidd made clear, we in the SNP are resolute in our position that nuclear weapons are abhorrent, that they are financially unjustifiable and that they do not protect us against the modern threats that we face today. Those weapons of mass destruction have no place on our planet, they have no right to be housed in Scotland and they should in no way be transported on our busy roads. A little under three years ago, my previous Rutherglen Westminster colleague Margaret Ferrier held a debate on the transportation of nuclear weapons in the UK Parliament. As she outlined then from research conducted by Nuke Watch, nuclear warheads were transported through the Rutherglen constituency at least three times between January 2014 and January 2015. On those occasions, the weapons were moved in large convoys of around 20 vehicles travelling across the M74 through my constituency and then on to Glasgow City Centre. Trucks carrying nuclear material can be on our motorways or main roads at any time of the day or night, all without residents on the route ever knowing. Most recent figures collated by Nuke Watch show that the number of Trident warheads being transported to and from the Clyde has increased fivefold between 2015 and 2016. As such, it is very likely that nuclear weapons have continued to be moved within my constituency and at a more frequent rate than previously imagined. Members will be aware of the Ministry of Defence's document entitled Local Authority and Emergency Services Information, which outlines the many council areas across the UK that the nuclear convoys may travel through. That report names 21 of the 32 local authorities in Scotland, including South Lanarkshire, Glasgow City, Edinburgh City and North Lanarkshire. As Mark Ruskell's motion correctly points out, no information relating to an incident involving nuclear weapons is available to communities along the regular convoy route. It is frightening to think that if an incident does take place, then our authorities would be so poorly prepared to take swift action. We are incredibly lucky that in the 50 years nuclear weapons have been transported, no major incidents have occurred. However, there have been a number of near misses. For example, in 2007, several vehicles in a convoy were separated and became lost in the sterling area due to heavy fog. It was reported that it took several hours for the convoy to regroup, and in that time anything could have happened to their cargo. However, such problems are not new. Thirty years prior to this, in 1987, two vans, each driving with two nuclear warheads, came off the road after slipping on ice. Fortunately, the weapons were not damaged in that accident, but it took the authorities around 18 hours to recover the vehicles. Those weapons should not be in transit in the first place, and it is especially not during challenging weather conditions. The Ministry of Defence himself admitted in 2016 that in the three previous years, 43 safety incidents were reported to them. Accidents can and do happen, and the risk that the UK Government continues to take is not worth taking. In summing up, I wish to repeat the calls that are made by other members here today. The people of Scotland, Civic Scotland, the STUC, Scotland's churches, the Scottish Parliament and the majority of Scotland's MPs do not want to see the trident nuclear weapon system renewed. If we want our constituencies to be clear of nuclear weapons, then I suggest that we all urge the UK Government to scrap its nuclear obsession. Before I move on to Gordon MacDonald, I have noted that there are still quite a few members who wish to speak, so I am minded to accept a motion without notice under rule 8.14.3 to extend the debate by up to 30 minutes. Does the chamber agree that the debate should be extended? That is then agreed, and I call Gordon MacDonald to be followed by Maurice Corry. I thank Mark Ruskell for securing this important debate, and it is an important debate for the communities that I represent. As up to eight times a year, a convoy of army vehicles carrying nuclear warheads and weapon materials uses the Edinburgh bypass as they travel between Coolport, where the UK's nuclear weapons are stored, and Butterfield Atomic Weapons Plant in Berkshire, where they undergo maintenance, refurbishment or decommissioning. On Monday, March 26, the second nuclear convoy of this year travelled along the Edinburgh bypass through my constituency just yards from communities from the colders in the west past Barberton Mainz, Juniper Green, Bonale, Torffin, Collinton, Oxgangs, Swanson to Fair Milehead in the east, yet the people who live there have never received any information on what to do in the event of an accident involving transported nuclear weapons. The convoys carry radioactive material consisting of plutonium and uranium, and in the event of an accident has a potential dispersal range of at least three miles, requiring a total evacuation of almost all of my constituency of Edinburgh Pentlands, including schools, a college and two universities. That is not just some hypothetical issue that is raising unnecessary fears. Edinburgh Council was the lead authority in 2005, when exercise senator took place simulating damage to a convoy transporting a nuclear warhead on the Edinburgh bypass, resulting in a theoretical release of radiological material over a wide area of Edinburgh. The council again took part in a similar exercise in 2011 in North Lanarkshire, simulating an accident involving a nuclear convoy. In addition, a report by the international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons compiled using freedom of information requests into military convoys carry nuclear weapons, highlighted that 180 mishaps and incidents, including collisions, breakdowns and break failures, have occurred during the past 16 years. Thankfully, none of the incidents have resulted in a release of radioactive materials. Yet, despite the council taking part in two exercises and the reported potential dangers, the City of Edinburgh Council, in a response to a survey that carried out in 2016 by Mark Ruskell, admitted that it had, and I quote, "...not carried out an independent assessment of the risks to council residents specifically relating to the transportation of nuclear weapons and that they had not communicated with its public in regard to risks associated specifically with the transport of nuclear weapons." The Scottish Government has a resilience division that supports organisations to work together to build Scotland's resilience to emergencies with staff based in Edinburgh, Perth and Glasgow. Their website, Ready Scotland, explains that there are three regional resilience partnerships that are broken down at the 12 local resilience partnerships. Those groups bring together all organisations in an area to develop an effective approach to dealing with emergencies. They have robust plans in place to respond to all kinds of events. Those plans are regularly tested in joint exercises and during real emergencies. However, on searching the website, there was no reference to nuclear accidents involving MOD vehicles. Why is that? The UK Armed Forces Minister highlighted in a Westminster hall debate in 2015 that the Scottish Government and local authorities are not given advance notice of convoys and that the radiation emergency preparedness and public information regulations 2001 only apply to areas surrounding nuclear sites and do not apply to road transport. In addition, legislation passed by the UK Government back in 2004, the Civil Contingencies Act, places constraints on any authority's ability to keep the public informed. The first is to avoid conveying sensitive information, covering information that is deemed harmful to national security or public safety. The second is to avoid alarming the public unnecessarily. As the House of Commons Library stated in the briefing on nuclear convoys, the MOD is reluctant to give too much information about the transportation of nuclear material. That veil of secrecy and the UK Parliament acts and regulations make it virtually impossible, in my view, for any local authority or the Scottish Government to prepare for a nuclear accident. If we cannot prepare properly for a potential nuclear accident, let us ban the transportation of nuclear warheads as a first step towards removing weapons of mass destruction from Scotland. Just because we have an extra 30 minutes does not mean that it has to be all used up. Having said that, you can have a little bit extra time, Maurice Corry, in the interests of viewers. Thank you, Deputy Presiding Officer. I thank Mark Ruskell for bringing this member's debate to the chamber. It is an important issue and it is something that we need to discuss. Although I know that I will never agree particularly with Mark Ruskell on the wider issue of nuclear weapons and the vital role that they play in preserving world peace, I am sure that he knows that he will not get me to agree with his position on nuclear weapons either, but I do thank him for bringing forward this debate. I must declare an interest. I live in Helensborough, five miles from Fastlane, born and bred there, so I am fully aware of many of the comments that people have made on this debate so far. I will start by talking about something that I agree with him on, and that is that the local and civil authorities should consider the transporting of nuclear weapons on roads through their areas. Those bodies should risk assess the potential for danger to the public as part of their wider contingency planning procedures. I am sure that the response from that work would find the risk to the public to be low or negligible. I do not agree with Mark Ruskell's motion that the transporting of nuclear weapons is an inherent risk. If done safely, as it is done in this country, I know that the public have nothing to fear. It is important to note that there has never been an accident involving defence nuclear material in the UK that has led to or come anywhere near leading to the release of radioactive material into the environment. The member's contribution and that of Mr Mountain before him seemed to suggest that, because there has never been an accident, there will never be an accident. Does he not believe in the precautionary principle that we must make sure that communities are as well prepared as they possibly can be in the event of such a horrendous occurrence? I could not possibly disagree with that. It is important to note that Mark Ruskell's motion speaks of who would be responsible to respond to an accident. The motion gives the impression that local and civil authorities would be left to their own devices. Following on from my colleague Edward Mountain earlier, we should take note that embedded with every convoy is an immediate response force, or IRF, who are specifically trained to deal with these situations and also that the convoy commander would take over as the incident coordinator and would be in charge of coordinating the response. That means that at an incident there would immediately be sufficient equipment and trained personnel to alert and brief the police, fire and ambulance services, to assess whether or not there has been a release of radioactive material and to assist the police in establishing an initial safety and security zone. Additional measures that are to be put in place would include trained personnel for co-ordination with the police in providing information for the media and the public, and the media is very strongly here. Convoy personnel are also cross-trained to enable them to undertake other roles. That, of course, is just at the site itself. I thank the member for giving way on that point. I acknowledge the resources and expertise of the personnel that the MOD would have in connection with the convoy. However, the debate is about the Civil Contingencies Act and what happens beyond the immediate site of the convoy in the 600-metre cordon that would require evacuation in the five-kilometre zone where schools and hospitals would have to shut down. That is the bit that wishes to devolve responsibility. I appreciate that. I am just coming to that. That, of course, is just at the site itself. On a wider national level, every time a convoy is moving, a joint operation cell or jock monitors all-road movements of defence nuclear material and will activate any additional response needed to support the IRF. The jock would contact the police immediately in the event of an emergency and provide them with the precautionary public protection advice and to discuss any additional support requirements. That includes going further out in the boundaries that Mark Ruskell has just spoken about in his intervention to me just now. On the contingency planning by local and civil authorities, I think that the Ministry of Defence deserves some credit in this area. It has made information available on what actions should be taken by local authorities and emergency services in creating named documents such as the ones referred to earlier on, which is local authorities' emergency service information. In my hand, I also have an example when I was a councillor with Argyll and Bute Council, where we had a thing called the Clyde local liaison committee, which met annually. It had also a calendar emergency exercises, which are now going from 2018 to 2023. Those are addressing the areas that you are talking about beyond the Clyde base, for example, beyond five miles, beyond 10 miles. Having myself been trained as a nuclear instructor and defence instructor in the army, I am well aware of how those things can progress. There are exercises that go forward. In Argyll and Bute, in relation to HM naval base Clyde, they hold annually the exercise evening star and they also hold a larger-scale exercise called exercise short sermon, which is held every three years. Those include the local residents as well as local community councillors, councillors and indeed members of Parliament. Very quickly, please. Indulgence for giving way yet again. However, that is the point, though. Why do we not have that kind of approach to civil contingency that we have around the naval bases in relation to the convoys? We do not have that with the convoys. We do have it around naval bases in the Clyde. Maurice Corry That is a fair point. In Argyll and Bute, we have been very used to that. I would commend to the minister that he wants to go and look at what happens in those two exercises, because we address the question of incoming and outgoing convoys as well. The job will contact the peace immediately event of emergency and provide them with the precautionary public protection advice, which means the areas outwith the areas of that. If you take an incident to be convoys as well, apart from the base situation, for example, an overheated reactor on a nuclear submarine, which goes red, basically, and that is sometimes how the exercises are performed, then you could do the same process. There is no reason why you cannot transform Mr Ruskell that to the convoys, and I will certainly go along with that. In terms of contingency planning, as I say—sorry, a bigger fan, I am on the page there—in terms of the engagement that the document from the local and civil authorities, from my experience with the Ministry of Defence in supporting local government, will be open and willing to engage with contingency planning officers in the local authority areas, not just in this area of one place but also with convoys and also in addressing other planning issues. I think that one of the problems is that, as elected councillors move on, sometimes the collective memory is lost. A lot is imposed on the emergency planning officers in each local authority, and, as far as I am aware, they are the ones who really should keep the council up to date and provide the necessary planning. In conclusion, Deputy Presiding Officer, I do think that this is an area where local and civil authorities can improve, but I believe that the current arrangement of transporting nuclear defence material is actually safe and that the public should hold no fears about it, but I think that we need to look and progress on what are done in certain areas, like Argyll and Bute, which I know quite a lot about. Thank you, Presiding Officer. Unlike others, I would like to warmly congratulate Matt Ruskell for bringing this important debate to the chamber this evening. I would also like to thank Newquats UK for an interesting and important report on Steady Scotland, which highlights the dangers that communities are put in by those nuclear weapons convoys. Communities in places in my constituency, such as the city of Stirling, Gorgonachar and Pryor, Baclywy and Drummond. One of the reasons that I joined the SNP now too many years ago to remember was because of its strong ethos and opposition to nuclear weapons. Tonight, I could talk about the eye-watering amount that the UK Government has committed to spending on those status symbols at a time of austerity. I could talk about the moral absurdity of considering using nuclear weapons and the fact that today they are strategically more useless than they have ever been at any time in history. However, the debate is an opportunity to highlight the everyday danger that they present to the people who live in ordinary communities in Scotland, especially in my constituency, who, among others, have tried at weapons convoys passing through their area on a regular basis. Any accident or terror attack involving those warheads, particularly with a convoy through populated areas, poses a potential serious risk to public safety. It is not to mention the potential long-term health and environmental damage that the radioactive poison contained in a trident nuclear warhead could inflict. Of course, the presence of nuclear convoys through peaceful communities of the Stirling area encourages protest. Just last year, a man was fined £200 for lying underneath a trident truck in Stirling, so much for security. What a terrifying prospect a regular member of the public can actually get up and touch one of those and interfere with its progress. As the Nuke Watch report points out, no risk acceptability gap exists between civil transport and nuclear weapons convoys is vast. Mark Ruskell touched on this particular matter. Civilian vehicles are prohibited from carrying explosives in conjunction with radioactive material. The reason for those restrictions clearly being due to the level of heightened danger, yet the risk of an attack or accident in relation to a trident convoy does not prohibit them from being permitted to carry radioactive substances inside missile warheads. With an estimated eight nuclear convoys travelling through Scotland a year, the Nuke Watch report questions how ready our country is for a major incident involving them. My question is in this, how ready can we really be? Those things can never be safe as long as they travel through local towns and villages, they will always pose a potential threat to safety. As the report points out, assessing a risk means that we combine the likeness on event with the severity of its impact. Even if the likeness was to be reduced to an insignificant amount, the severity of an accident involving nuclear warheads is so great that the risk remains very high. Whether that has happened or not in the past, this is about the future and what could happen. Interestingly, the response from Stirling Council to a consultation, forming part of the report, suggested that nuclear convoys are arguably less at risk during times or rest-up at MOD4-side in Stirling City. To Mark Ruskell, never mind the Nandos and the View, my office is much, much closer to that base than those particular fantastic establishments are. It makes obvious sense that, if the MOD facility presents a far less risk of an attack than a public road does. However, the UK Government is set to close MOD4-side entirely in 2022. Where will those convoys be expected to rest-up thereafter? What will the findings of such a risk assessment be then? I am seriously concerned about nuclear convoys travelling through my constituency as well as other parts of the country. However, what does the future look like? Once the closure of MOD4-side takes place, how can those convoys continue to operate and include secure rest-ups? Will the go-posts be simply moved again to make the risk more acceptable in those circumstances? Those are very hard questions that I have put directly to the MOD ahead of today's debate, and I look forward to a detailed response from them as soon as possible on this important matter. There is one thing that is absolutely certain, though. The best way to reduce the risk posed by transportation of nuclear weapons is to rid ourselves of those obscenities once and for all. The last two contributions in the open debate are from Tom Arthur, followed by Ross Greer. Thank you, Presiding Officer. I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in this debate. I would like to begin by thanking Mark Ruskell for bringing an important issue to the chamber and, I do not think that I will ever look at a Nando's in quite the same way. Again, after this, it certainly does have a quality of a disaster movie, and I was particularly struck by Mr Ruskell making reference to being used to tourists. Clearly, we want to encourage as many people to come to Scotland as possible, but that is one tourist distraction that we can be doing without. I would like to pick up on a couple of points that have been raised previously over the course of this debate. I am sure that Mr Mountain will correct me if I misheard them, but I understood that he stated that all civil authorities are informed, but there is no, as I understand it, obligation for local authorities to be informed of nuclear transportations that are occurring. I say that because I was in contact with Renfisher Council this afternoon. My constituency of Renfisher South does not have a nuclear convoy pass directly through it, however, as it makes its journey west towards the Erskine bridge on the MA, it passes nearby. I have certainly been in touch with, as I say, Renfisher Council. I also want to commend Nucwatch on its work, but I do not think that they received a response from Renfisher Council in the report, if I recall correctly. I am sure that Mr Ruskell will correct me if I am wrong, but having spoken to Renfisher Council, it has been very clear to me that it takes its responsibilities as a category 1 responder very seriously, and it will indeed seek to work collaboratively with category 2 responders. However, I will take from the debate to look to engage directly with my colleagues in the local authority to make sure that they are up to date. I think that the question that is raised from this in regard to the devolved competencies is whether we have to have a refresh and a re-looker of a view of existing procedures. On the one hand, and also should members of the public be informed. I am a generation that was born close towards the end of the Cold War. I did not grow up with the persistent threat of the mushroom cloud in nuclear armageddon, although, given recent political developments over the past few months, my generation will experience that threat. For a piece of language, Mark Ruskell used civil defence, and he uses civil contingencies now. However, the idea of civil defence being aware of the risk of nuclear war and what to do in those particular situations is something that I would second nature to my parent generation, but not to mine. With that, there has been perhaps a commensurate decrease in awareness of the risks posed by nuclear weapons being housed in Scotland. Potentially, there will be steps going forward. I will be interested to hear what the minister has to say in responding. If there is a need to look and refresh civil contingency measures, certainly even just to increase awareness amongst parliamentarians and local authorities, I point that Mr Corry raised, which I think was very valid. Many of the councillors of my authority are probably closer to my age and may not have the same recollection of that particular threat to the bygone age. I would be keen to hear what the minister has to say if there is a need to refresh civil contingency measures, and if there is a question of making people more aware but without necessarily being alarmist. In concluding, on my own constituents, there are specific concerns, because clearly we have Glasgow airport on the doorstep in Renfrewshire. Clearly, any event at where to occur, which were to result in an extended period of closures of the AMA or surrounding roads, could have a massive disruption. I would be keen to hear what the minister has to say in response to those concerns and what action, if any, the Government seeks to take. I am more interested in how you are going to justify accusing me of being from a bygone age. Thank you, Presiding Officer. I thank my colleague Mark Ruskell and Newquatch for the work that they have done in preparing the Unready Scotland report. The report lays bare the danger that the nuclear weapons convoys pose to communities who the convoy routes pass through, but also to communities such as Tom Arthur's constituency that they pass close by to. It shows the inadequacies in preparation by local authorities who, in many cases, do not seem to realise, either through genuine misunderstanding or through a deliberate attempt to evade, that they have a clear responsibility, as Mark Ruskell has outlined. We should be absolutely clear what those convoys contain, why there is a risk and where the responsibility lies. They are transporting nuclear warheads, both the dangerous radioactive materials and the explosive required in combination to create a viable weapon of mass destruction. The immediate risk is not in the detonation of one of the warheads. Edward Mountain is right to highlight that it is exceptionally hard, almost impossible, to genuinely detonate a nuclear bomb by accident. The risk, though, is that, either as a result of accident or by attack on a convoy, we could face what equates to the most powerful and dangerous dirty bomb imaginable. An accident involving one of those convoys risks releasing radioactive material and dispersing it into the surrounding area. An immediate area of 600 metres could be contaminated. One could carry the radioactive particles of further five kilometres, and many people suggest that that is a conservative estimate of how far it would carry. Any release, any release at all of radioactive particles, would be devastating to local communities and Scotland and the UK as a whole. However, most people are not even aware that those convoys pass through our cities, towns and villages. They are entirely unaware that they drive down their own street. Upon leaving Fastlane naval base in Helensborough in my region, the convoys often travel to the A82. That takes them through Balloch, Alexanderhead and Barton all the way to the Erskine bridge on to the MA. From there, they travel along the MA passing by Paisley and Renfrew in the south side of Glasgow. We are talking about hundreds of thousands of people within the danger zones. They travel through a number of local authorities, such as Gail and Bute, Westin Bartonshire and Renfrewshire, as well as close to the border of Eastin Bartonshire, where they return to the MA. Those journeys take place half a dozen times a year, sometimes a couple more. What is worrying is the inconsistency in how prepared our local councils are to deal with an accident and the potential release of radioactive material. No local authorities have carried out specific risk assessments for the convoys, which they should. However, some seem unable to explain even generalised emergency response plans. Those convoys, of course, as has been said, are primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence in the UK Government, but being prepared for an accident involves local councils and other public bodies in Scotland. All public bodies who are category 1 responders should be prepared. Our Gail and Bute council did provide us with some information on its risk planning. That should be expected of the local authority, which houses the naval bases containing those weapons, and Maurice Corry provided the debate with some youthful information on the council's preparation in regard to the base. They have worked in partnership with other local councils at Eastin Bartonshire in their regional risk partnership, but that generalised approach still falls short of a satisfactory risk assessment for nuclear convoys. To make matters worse, as Tom Arthur highlighted, Renfrewshire Council, when they were not alone, Westin Bartonshire was another one, provided no information at all. Westin Bartonshire instead stated that it is the responsibility of others—the Ministry of Defence, Police Scotland and the Scottish Government. Yes, they are all responsible, so is the local authority. Under the relevant legislation, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, those councils are category 1 responders. They are obliged to maintain an emergency plan, and not a single local authority in Scotland has an emergency plan for those convoys. Given that the convoys cover a number of local authorities, the Scottish Government has a role to step in and co-ordinate a review of the preparedness of our civilian authorities. We must ensure that all responsible bodies are prepared in the event that the work should happen. That is not something that can or should be left to chance. It is not responsible to pass the buck to the Ministry of Defence when the Civil Contingencies Act places clear obligations on our civilian authorities. After all, what would happen in the event of an accident involving one of those convoys? Would the residents of Baloch or Alexander or Dumbarton or Erskine or any of the other towns and villages that they passed through be well served by those that they expect to serve them? My constituents should expect those responsible for their safety to be prepared. Given that the convoys are a known risk, there is no good reason for councils across the central belt in the south of Scotland to be so completely unprepared for that specific risk. I hope that by raising this today, we can prompt them to take the actions that they should have done some time ago and to live up to their responsibilities for community safety. I call Annabelle Ewing to respond to the debate for around seven minutes or so. I congratulate Mark Ruskell on securing this important debate tonight. The importance of the issue is well illustrated by the number of members who sought to make their contributions to the debate. I want to reiterate at the outset that the Scottish Government is firmly opposed to the possession, threat and the use of nuclear weapons. We are committed to the safe and complete withdrawal of Trident from Scotland and have repeatedly called on the UK Government to cancel plans for its renewal. As has been noted in the debate, the responsibility for the transportation of nuclear warheads lies with the Ministry of Defence. The Scottish Government, however, expects any such transportation to be carried out safely and securely and has made that expectation clear to the UK Government. Indeed, public safety is our absolute priority, and we have sought assurances from the MOD that robust arrangements are in place to ensure the safety and security of the nuclear convoys at all stages of the transportation process. Although there has, as members have said, never been a defence nuclear transport incident posing a radiation hazard, I can well understand the concerns expressed by members tonight, and the public concern about the convoys. I would like to take this opportunity to stress that we in the Scottish Government take the matter very seriously indeed, and that is why there is significant resilience planning in place. I perhaps would like to take this opportunity to clarify what that is, because there are certain misapprehensions about how that operates in Scotland. Members might wish to note that Scotland's three regional resilience partnerships, which include local authorities but, in fact, are led by Police Scotland and, indeed, the Scottish Van Rescue Service and supported by Scottish Government resilience co-ordinator teams. Those regional resilience partnerships are not in the position that no plans exist, rather that they undertake a risk and preparedness assessment process on a regular basis. In addition to that, resilience register work is, moreover, maintained on an on-going basis. That enables the resilience partnerships to identify and assess the main risk that is relevant to the region and to determine how they are prepared to deal with the consequences of those risks. Mark Ruskell? Can I thank the minister for outlining the work of the resilience partnerships? Does that work specifically include assessments and planning around nuclear convoys? Annabelle Ewing? My understanding is that that is indeed the case. The resilience partnerships look at a number of risks, including risks that are presented by nuclear convoys. Therefore, although I understand Mark Ruskell's determination to find out what is happening in Scotland, I think that relying simply on the response or otherwise to his survey perhaps is not giving him the full picture, but perhaps if I could continue. The UK national risk assessment and national risk register, as well as the Scottish risk assessment and resilience partnership community risk register arrangements all provide an evidence-based and priorities approach to risk at the UK, Scottish and local levels respectively. The national risk register produced by the UK Government is publicly available and seeks to inform the public about the range of risks that the UK may face. The community risk registers are published by the three regional resilience partnerships to communicate the key risks for the north, east and west regions of Scotland. Those are also publicly available and provide advice on what to do and who to contact in an emergency. In common with other countries, we in Scotland practice what is called the integrated emergency management. The concept recognises that the most effective preparation for any event rests on planning for a range of consequences rather than the characteristics of a specific event. The Scottish Government is satisfied that, through the use of integrated emergency management, Police Scotland, the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, as the lead agencies, organisations and working alongside local authorities, and other category 1 responders, are well prepared to deal with a diverse range of emergency events. As I have already advised, it is indeed the Police and Fire and Rescue Service that takes the lead on resilience planning for nuclear convoys in Scotland. Although it is the case that local authorities, as category 1 responders, as has been mentioned tonight, do indeed have a duty, along with Police Scotland and the SFRS, to warn the public and to provide information and advice if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred and is under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, contingency planning Scotland regulations 2005. However, as has been said, in performing this duty, it must take account of the importance of not alarming the public unnecessarily. As far as the MOD is concerned, it maintains wider arrangements to respond to any incident, including the nuclear emergency organisation and the necessary contingency plans to deal with any incident. The MOD has provided assurance that the routes that are adopted are carefully selected as part of a rigorous risk assessment process and are regularly reassessed for their continued suitability. Moreover, the MOD has also provided assurance that operational planning always takes into account such factors as road and weather conditions. Given that we are not privy to all the detailed information that the MOD bases those judgments on, we are not in a position to independently corroborate all of those assurances. As far as notice is concerned, the MOD provides this to Police Scotland and to the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, but refuses to share details more widely on what they say are grounds of national security. As far as operational planning and guidance is concerned, it should be pointed out that preparing Scotland provides guidance for any emergency, regardless of the particular cause. That guidance deals with preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies in Scotland and forms the basis of emergency arrangements. That takes cognisance of the MOD's publicly-available document entitled, The Local Authority in Emergency Services Information, which provides information for emergency services, local authorities and health authorities on contingency arrangements to be implemented in what the MOD views as the unlikely event of an emergency during the transportation of defence nuclear material. As far as surfing— John Finnie I thank you minister for taking the intervention. If you are seeking to reassure us that there is a huge gap between what you say and what is in the report on Ready Scotland, is that an issue that you would recognise as to be addressed by the Scottish Government, please? Always through the chair, please, Mr Finnie. Yes, in response to Mr Finnie, I am just going to get on to trying to see where we are at the moment and what we might be thinking of going forward. What I tried to say gently to Mr Ruskell was that I understand that he, in good faith, conducted a survey and got the replies or not that he did. What I am saying is that the actual resilience structure is not quite as—therefore that would suggest—the resilience structure is not headed by the local authorities. The resilience structure at the very top, as the member will be aware, is headed by Police Scotland, working very closely with the SFRS, alongside those resilience partnerships, co-first responders, such as the local authorities. I think that understanding the structure is very important to put that survey result in some context. As far as emergency response arrangements are concerned, emergency services in Scotland have plans in place for responding to any major incident regardless of the cause. They are well established resilience structures in place to manage the consequences of any emergency. Those structures have been and continue to be robustly tested and proven both by exercising and by real events. The Scory Farm Rescue Service has plans in place and has made pragmatic preparations to deal with incidents involving defence nuclear material, including convoys of such materials. Similarly, Police Scotland can give assurance that up-to-date plans are in place to deal with all major incidents, including nuclear incidents and its procedures relating to defence nuclear material are current. Its resilience staff lives regularly with the MOD police on a range of matters. As I said at the outset, the Scottish Government believes that nuclear weapons are a moral, illegal and a colossal waste of money. We wish to see the Trident replacement programme scrapped and we have called, as I said repeatedly, on the UK Government to do that. Absent reclaiming power here for this Parliament, we in Scotland are reduced to being lumbered with whatever the UK Government decides. That is the unenviable position that Scotland is in, but hopefully not for too much longer. In the meantime, we see the transportation of nuclear weapons on our roads continue because we have no power to stop it. What the Scottish Government can do and do ensure is that we take our resilience responsibilities with the utmost seriousness. That is witnessed in our police and fire and rescue services, on-going resilience work and indeed in the work of the three regional resilience partnerships. What I can confirm tonight and have listened very carefully to the concerns raised by members is that I will be writing to the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and to Her Majesty's Fire Inspectorate for Scotland to ask that they consider now conducting a joint review of such resilience work of Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service. That would also be able to look at the close working arrangements with local authorities and the other responders in Scotland's regional resilience partnerships to ensure that response arrangements are indeed up-to-date and current because we all want to have that assurance. I trust that that will indeed provide members who have participated tonight and are guests in the gallery with some reassurance of the very serious approach that the Scottish Government takes to those matters. In conclusion, I would say that, of course, and picking up a point that Bruce Crawford made, of course, as far as nuclear convoys are concerned, the only way to deal with the issue once and for all is, of course, to ensure that powers over such matters lie with this Parliament. That is to say, Presiding Officer, the powers of a normal independent country. Thank you very much. That concludes the debate. The meeting is closed.