 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Federalist Papers Anti-Federalist Number 6 Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican Letter Number 4 October 12th, 1787 Dear Sir, It will not be possible to establish in the federal courts the jury trial of the Vincentage so well as in the state courts. Third, there appears to me to be not only a premature deposit of some important powers in the general government, but many of those deposited there are undefined and may be used to good or bad purposes as honest or designing men shall prevail. By Article 1, Section 2, representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states, etc. Same Article, Section 8, The Congress shall have powers to lay and collect taxes, duties, etc. for the common defense and general welfare, but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniformed throughout the United States. By the first recited clause, direct taxes shall be apportioned on the states. This seems to favor the idea suggested by some sensible men and writers that Congress as to direct taxes will only have power to make requisitions, but the latter clause, power to lay and collect taxes, etc., seems clearly to favor the contrary opinion and, in my opinion, the true one, that Congress shall have power to tax immediately individuals without the intervention of the state legislatures. In fact, the first clause appears to me only to provide that each state shall pay a certain portion of the tax, and the latter to provide that Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, that is, to assess upon and collect of the individuals in that state, the state's quota, but these still I consider as undefined powers because judicious men understand them differently. It is doubtful whether the Vice President is to have any qualifications, none are mentioned, but he may serve as President and it may be inferred he ought to be qualified, therefore, as the President, but the qualifications of the President are required only of the person to be elected President. By article II, Section 2, But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of the departments. Who are inferior officers? May not a Congress disposed to vest the appointments of all officers in the President under this clause, vest the appointment of almost every officer in the President alone, and destroy the check mentioned in the first part of the clause and lodged in the Senate. It is true this check is badly lodged, but then some check upon the first magistrate in appointing officers, ought it appears by the opinion of the convention and by the general opinion, to be established in the Constitution. By article III, Section 2, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to law and facts, with such exceptions, etc., to what extent is it intended the exceptions shall be carried. Congress may carry them so far as to annihilate substantially the appellate jurisdiction, and the clause be rendered of very little importance. Fourth, there are certain rights which we have always held sacred in the United States, and recognized in all our Constitutions, and which by the adoption of the new Constitution in its present form will be left unsecured. By article VI, the proposed Constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary, notwithstanding. It is to be observed that when the people shall adopt the proposed Constitution, it will be their last and supreme act. It will be adopted not by the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, etc., but by the people of the United States, and wherever this Constitution or any part of it shall be incompatible with the ancient customs, writes, the laws or the Constitutions here to foreestablished in the United States, it will entirely abolish them and do them away. And not only this, but the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance of the federal Constitution will also be supreme laws, and wherever they shall be incompatible with those customs, writes, laws, or Constitutions here to foreestablished, they will also entirely abolish them and do them away. By the article before recited, treaties also made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law. It is not said that these treaties shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, nor are there any constitutional bounds set to those who shall make them. The President and two-thirds of the Senate will be empowered to make treaties indefinitely, and when these treaties shall be made they will also abolish all laws and state constitutions incompatible with them. This power in the President and Senate is absolute, and the judges will be bound to allow full force to whatever rule, article, or thing the President and Senate shall establish by treaty, whether it be practicable to set any bounds to those who make treaties I am not able to say. If not, it proves that this power ought to be more safely lodged. The federal Constitution, the laws of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution, and all treaties must have full force and effect in all parts of the United States, and all other laws, rights, and constitutions which stand in their way must yield. It is proper the national laws should be supreme and superior to state or district laws, but then the national laws ought to yield to unalienable or fundamental rights, and national laws made by a few men should extend only to a few national objects. This will not be the case with the laws of Congress. To have any proper idea of their extent, we must carefully examine the legislative, executive, and judicial powers proposed to be lodged in the general government, and consider them in connection with a general clause in Article I, Section 8, in these words. After enumerating a number of powers. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. The powers of this government, as has been observed, extend to internal as well as external objects, and to those objects to which all others are subordinate. It is almost impossible to have a just conception of these powers, or of the extent and number of the laws which may be deemed necessary and proper to carry them into effect, till we shall come to exercise those powers and make the laws. In making laws to carry those powers into effect, it is to be expected that a wise and prudent Congress will pay respect to the opinions of a free people, and bottom their laws on those principles which have been considered as essential and fundamental in the British, and in our government. But a Congress of a different character will not be bound by the Constitution to pay respect to those principles. It is said that when the people make a Constitution, and delegate powers that all powers not delegated by them, to those who govern, is reserved in the people, and that the people in the present case have reserved in themselves and in their state governments every right and power not expressly given by the federal Constitution to those who shall administer the national government. It is said on the other hand that the people, when they make a Constitution, yield all power not expressly reserved to themselves. The truth is, in either case, it is a mere matter of opinion, and men usually take either side of the argument as will best answer their purposes. But the general presumption being that men who govern will, in doubtful cases, construe laws and constitutions most favorably for increasing their own powers, all wise and prudent people informing constitutions have drawn the line and carefully described the powers parted with and the powers reserved. By the state constitutions certain rights have been reserved in the people, or rather they have been recognized and established in such a manner that state legislatures are bound to respect them and to make no laws infringing upon them. The state legislatures are obliged to take notice of the bills of rights of their respective states. The bills of rights and the state constitutions are fundamental compacts only between those who govern and the people of the same state. In the year 1788 the people of the United States make a federal Constitution, which is a fundamental compact between them and their federal rulers. These rulers in the nature of things cannot be bound to take notice of any other compact. It would be absurd for them in making laws to look over 13, 15, or 20 state constitutions to see what rights are established as fundamental and must not be infringed upon in making laws in the society. It is true they would be bound to do it if the people in their federal compact should refer to the state constitutions, recognize all parts not inconsistent with the federal constitution, and direct their federal rulers to take notice of them accordingly. But this is not the case as the plan stands proposed at present. And it is absurd to suppose so a natural an idea is intended or implied. I think my opinion is not only founded in reason, but I think it is supported by the report of the convention itself. If there are a number of rights established by the state constitution and which remains sacred and the general government is bound to take notice of them, it must take notice of one as well as another. And if unnecessary to recognize or establish one by the federal constitution, it would be unnecessary to recognize or establish another by it. If the federal constitution is to be construed so far in connection with the state constitutions as to leave the trial by jury in civil causes, for instance, secured, on the same principles it would have left the trial by jury in criminal causes, the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, etc., secured. They all stand on the same footing. They are the common rights of Americans and have been recognized by the state constitutions. But the convention found it necessary to recognize or reestablish the benefit of that writ and the jury trial in criminal cases. As to ex-post facto laws, the convention has done the same in one case and gone further in another. It is part of the compacts between the people of each state and their rulers and no ex-post facto laws shall be made. But the convention, by Article I, Section 10, have put a sanction upon this part even of the state compacts. In fact, the ninth and tenth sections in Article I in the proposed constitution are no more nor less than a partial bill of rights. They establish certain principles as part of the compact upon which the federal legislators and officers can never infringe. It is here wisely stipulated that the federal legislature can never pass a bill of attainder or ex-post facto law that no tax shall be laid on articles exported, etc. The establishing of one right implies the necessity of establishing another and similar one. On the whole, the position appears to me to be undeniable that this bill of rights ought to be carried farther and some other principles established as a part of this fundamental compact between the people of the United States and their federal rulers. It is true we are not disposed to differ much at present about religion, but when we are making a constitution it is to be hoped for ages and millions yet unborn why not establish the free exercise of religion as a part of the national compact. There are other essential rights which we have justly understood to be the rights of freedom as freedom from hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded on oath and not issued with due caution for searching and seizing men's papers, property, and persons. The trials by jury and civil causes it has said varies so much in the several states that no words could be found for the uniform establishment of it. If so, the federal legislation will not be able to establish it by any general laws. I confess I am of opinion it may be established but not in that beneficial manner in which we enjoy it for the reasons before mentioned. When I speak of the jury trial of the Vintage or the trial of the fact in the neighborhood I do not lay so much stress upon the circumstance of our being tried by our neighbors. In this enlightened countrymen may be probably impartially tried by those who do not live very near them. But the trial of facts in the neighborhood is of great importance in other respects. Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining witnesses and generally before the triers of the facts in question. The common people can establish facts with much more ease with oral than written evidence. When trials of facts are removed to a distance from the homes of the parties and witnesses oral evidence becomes intolerably expensive and the parties must depend on written evidence which to the common people is expensive and almost useless. It must be frequently taken, ex-part and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth. The trial by jury is very important in another point of view. It is essential in every free country that common people should have a part and share of influence in the judicial as well as in the legislative department. To hold open to them the offices of senators judges and offices to fill which an expensive education is required cannot answer any valuable purposes for them. They are not in a situation to be brought forward and to fill those offices. These and most other offices of any considerable importance will be occupied by the few. The few, the well-born, etc. as Mr. Adams calls them in judicial decisions as well as in legislation are generally disposed and very naturally too to favor those of their own description. The trial by jury in the judicial department and the collection of the people by their representatives in the legislature are those fortunate inventions which have procured for them in this country their true proportion of influence and the wisest and most fit means of protecting themselves in the community. Their situation as jurors and representatives enables them to acquire information and knowledge in the affairs and government of the society and to come forward in turn as the sentinels and guardians of each other. I am very sorry that even a few of our countrymen should consider jurors and representatives in a different point of view as ignorant troublesome bodies which ought not to have any share in the concerns of government. I confess I do not see in what cases the Congress can with any pretense of right make a law to suppress the freedom of the press though I am not clear that Congress is restrained from laying any duties whatever on printing and from laying duties particularly heavy on certain pieces printed and perhaps Congress may require large bonds for the payment of these duties. Should the printer say the freedom of the press was secured by the Constitution of the state in which he lived, Congress might and perhaps with great propriety answer that the federal Constitution is the only compact existing between them and the people. In this compact the people have named no others and therefore Congress in exercising the powers assigned them and in making laws to carry them into execution are restrained by nothing beside the federal Constitution any more than a state legislature is restrained by a compact between the magistrates and the people of a county, city or town of which the people informing the state Constitution have taken no notice. It is not my object to enumerate rights of inconsiderable importance but there are others no doubt which ought to be established as a fundamental part of the national system. It is worthy observation that all treaties are made by foreign nations with a confederacy of thirteen states that the western country is attached to thirteen states thirteen states have jointly and severally engaged to pay the public debts. Should a new government be formed of nine, ten, eleven or twelve states those treaties could not be considered as binding on the foreign nations who made them. However I believe the probability to be that if nine states adopt the Constitution the others will. It may also be worthy our examination how far the provision for amending this when it shall be adopted is of any importance. No measures can be taken towards amendments unless two-thirds of the Congress or two-thirds of the legislatures of the several states shall agree. While power is in the hands of the people or democratic part of the community more especially as at present it is easy according to the general course of human affairs for the few influential men in the community to obtain conventions alterations in government and to persuade the common people they may change for the better and to get from them a part of the power. But when power is once transferred from the many to the few all changes become extremely difficult. The government in this case being beneficial to the few they will be exceedingly artful and adroit in preventing any measures which may lead to a change and nothing will produce it but great exertions and severe struggles on the part of the common people. Every man of reflection must see that the change now proposed is a transfer of power from the many to the few and the probability is the artful and ever active aristocracy will prevent all peaceable measures for changes unless when they shall discover some favorable moment to increase their own influence. I am sensible thousands of men in the United States are disposed to adopt the proposed Constitution though they perceive it to be essentially defective under an idea that amendments of it may be obtained when necessary. This is a pernicious idea. It argues a servility of character totally unfit for the support of free government. It is very repugnant to that perpetual jealousy respecting liberty so absolutely necessary in all free states spoken of by Mr. Dickinson. However if our country men are so soon changed and the language of 1774 is become odious to them it will be in vain to use the language of freedom or to attempt to arouse them to free inquiries. But I shall never believe this is the case with them whatever present appearances may be till I shall have very strong evidence indeed of it. Yours and et cetera the federal farmer. End of Anti-Federalist Number 6. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Federalist Papers Anti-Federalist Number 7. Federal Farmer Number 5 Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican Letter Number 5 October 13th 1787 Dear sir, thus I have examined the Federal Constitution as far as a few days' leisure would permit. It opens to my mind a new scene. Instead of seeing powers cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators and many magistrates we see all important powers collecting in one center where a few men will possess them almost at discretion. And instead of checks in the formation of the government to secure the rights of the people against the usurpations of those they appoint to govern we are to understand the equal division of lands among our people and the strong arm furnished them by nature and situation are to secure them against these usurpations. If there are advantages in the equal division of our lands and the strong and manly habits of our people we ought to establish governments calculated to give duration to them and not governments which can never work naturally till that equality of property and those free and manly habits shall be destroyed. These evidently are not the natural basis of the proposed constitution. No man of reflection and skilled in the science of government can suppose these will move on harmoniously together for ages or even for fifty years. As to the little circumstances commented upon by some writers with applause as the age of a representative of the president, etc., they have in my mind no weight in the general tendency of the system. There are, however, in my opinion many good things in the proposed system. It is founded on elective principles and the deposits of power in different hands is essentially right. The guards against those evils we have experienced in some states in legislation are valuable indeed. But the value of every feature in this system is vastly lessened for the want of that one important feature in a free government, a representation of the people. Because we have sometimes abused democracy, I am not among those men who think a democratic branch a nuisance, which branch shall be sufficiently numerous to admit some of the best informed men of each order in the community into the administration of government. While the radical defects in the proposed system are not so soon discovered, some temptations to each state and to many classes of men to adopt it are very visible. It uses the democratic language of several of the state constitutions, particularly that of Massachusetts. The eastern states will receive advantages so far as the regulation of trade by a bare majority is committed to it. Connecticut and New Jersey will receive their share of a general impulse. The middle states will receive the advantages surrounding the seat of government. The southern states will receive protection and have their Negroes represented in the legislature, and large back countries will soon have a majority in it. This system promises a large field of employment to military gentlemen and gentlemen of the law, and in case the government shall be executed without convulsions, it will afford security to creditors, to the clergy, salarymen, and others depending on money payments. So far as the system promises just to send respectable advantages, in these respects it ought to be supported by all honest men. But whenever it promises unequal and improper advantages to any particular states or orders of men, it ought to be opposed. I have in the course of these letters observed that there are many good things in the proposed constitution, and I have endeavored to point out many important defects in it. I have admitted that we want a federal system, that we have a system presented which, with several alterations, may be made a tolerably good one. I have admitted there is a well-founded uneasiness among creditors and mercantile men. In this situation of things you ask me what I think ought to be done. My opinion in this case is only the opinion of an individual, and so far only as it corresponds with the opinions of the honest and substantial part of the community, is it entitled to consideration. Though I am fully satisfied that the state conventions ought most seriously to direct their exertions to altering and amending the system proposed before they shall adopt it, yet I have not sufficiently examined the subject, or formed an opinion how far it will be practicable for those conventions to carry their amendments. As to the idea that it will be in vain for those conventions to attempt amendments, it cannot be admitted. It is impossible to say whether they can or not until the attempt shall be made, and when it shall be determined by experience that the conventions cannot agree in amendments, it will then be an important question before the people of the United States whether they will adopt or not the system proposed in its present form. This subject of consolidating the states is new, and because forty or fifty men have agreed in a system to suppose the good sense of this country and enlightened nation must adopt it without examination, and though in a state of profound peace, without endeavoring to amend those parts they perceive are defective, dangerous to freedom, and destructive of the valuable principles of republican government, is truly humiliating. It is true there may be danger in delay, but there is danger in adopting the system in its present form, and I see the danger in either case will arise principally from the conduct and views of two very unprincipled parties in the United States, two fires between which the honest and substantial people have long found themselves situated. One party is composed of little insurgents, men in debt who want no law and who want a share of the property of others. These are called levelers, shaiites, etc. The other party is composed of a few but more dangerous men with their servile dependence. These avariciously grasp at all power and property. You may discover in all the actions of these men an evident dislike to free and equal government, and they will go systematically to work to change, essentially the forms of government in this country. These are called aristocrats, monarchites, etc. Between these two parties is the weight of the community, the men of middling property, men not in debt on the one hand and men on the other, content with republican governments and not aiming at immense fortunes, offices, and power. In 1786 the little insurgents, the levelers came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted to establish governments according to their wills. Their movements evidently gave encouragement to the other party, which in 1787 has taken the political field, and with its fashionable dependence and the tongue and the pen is endeavoring to establish in great haste a politer kind of government. These two parties, which will probably be opposed or united as it may suit their interests and views, are really insignificant compared with the solid, free, and independent part of the community. It is not my intention to suggest that either of these parties and the real friends of the proposed constitution are the same men. The fact is these aristocrats support and hasten the adoption of the proposed constitution merely because they think it is a stepping stone to their favorite object. I think I am well founded in this idea. I think the general politics of these men support it as well as the common observation among them. That the proffered plan is the best that can be got at present it will do for a few years and lead to something better. The sensible and judicious part of the community will weigh carefully all these circumstances. They will view the late convention as a respectable assembly of men. America probably will never see an assembly of men of a light number more respectable. But the members of the convention met without knowing the sentiments of one man in ten thousand in these states, respecting the new ground taken. Their doings are but the first attempts in the most important scene ever opened. Though each individual in the state conventions will not probably be so respectable as each individual in the federal convention yet as the state conventions will probably consist of fifteen hundred or two thousand men of abilities and versed in the science of government collected from all parts of the community and from all orders of men it must be acknowledged that the weight of respectability will be in them. In them will be collected the solid sense and the real political character of the country. Being revisors of the subject they will possess peculiar advantages. To say that these conventions ought not to attempt coolly and deliberately the revision of the system or that they cannot amend it is very foolish and very assuming. If these conventions after examining the system adopted I shall be perfectly satisfied and wish to see men make the administration of the government an equal blessing to all orders of men. I believe the great body of our people to be virtuous and friendly to good government. To the protection of liberty and property and it is the duty of all good men especially of those who are placed as sentinels to guard their rights. It is their duty to examine into the prevailing politics of parties and to disclose them while they avoid exciting undue suspicions to lay facts before the people which will enable them to form a proper judgment. Men who wish the people of this country to determine for themselves and deliberately to fit the government to their situation must feel some degree of indignation at those attempts to hurry the adoption of a system and to shut the door against examination. The very attempts create suspicions that those who make them have secret views or see some defects in the system which in the hurry of affairs they expect will escape the ye of a free people. What can be the views of those gentlemen in Pennsylvania who precipitated decisions on this subject? What can be the views of those gentlemen in Boston who countenance the printers in setting up the press against a fair and free investigation of this important system in the usual way? The members of the convention have done their duty. Why should some of them fly to their states almost forget a propriety of behavior and precipitate measures for the adoption of the system of their own making? I confess candidly when I consider these circumstances in connection with the unguarded parts of the system I have mentioned, I feel disposed to proceed with very great caution and to pay more attention than usual to the conduct of particular characters. If the Constitution presented be a good one it will stand the test with a well informed people. All agreed there shall be state conventions to examine it and we must believe it will be adopted unless we suppose it is a bad one or that those conventions will make false divisions respecting it. I admit improper measures are taken against the adoption of the system as well as for it. All who object to the plan proposed ought to point out the defects objected to and to propose those amendments with which they can accept it or to propose some other system of government that the public mind may be known and that we may be brought to agree in some system of government to strengthen and execute the present or to provide a substitute. I consider the field of inquiry just opened and that we are to look to the state conventions for ultimate decisions on the subject before us. It is not to be presumed that they will differ about small amendments and lose a system when they shall have made it substantially good. But touching the essential amendments it is to be presumed the several conventions will pursue the most rational measures to agree in and obtain them. And such defects as they shall discover and not remove they will probably notice keep them in view as the groundwork of future amendments and in the firm and manly language which every free people ought to use will suggest to those who may hereafter administer the government that it is their expectation that the system will be so managed by legislative acts and the government so administered as to render those defects as little injurious as possible. Our countrymen are entitled to an honest and faithful government to a government of laws and not of men and also to one of their choosing as a citizen of the country I wish to see these objects secured and licentious assuming and overbearing men restrained if the constitution or social impact be vague and unguarded then we depend wholly upon the prudence, wisdom and moderation of those who manage the affairs of government or on what probably is equally uncertain and precarious the success of the people oppressed by the abuse of government in receiving from it the hands of those who abuse it and placing it in the hands of those who will use it well. In every point of view therefore in which I have been able as yet to contemplate this subject the national mode of proceeding relative to it and that is to examine it with freedom and candor to have state conventions some months hence which shall examine coolly every article clause and word in the system proposed and to adopt it with such amendments as they shall think fit. How far the state conventions ought to pursue the mode prescribed by the federal convention of adopting or rejecting the plan in Toto I leave it to them to determine. Our examination of the subject hitherto has been rather of a general nature the republican characters in the several states who wish to make this plan more adequate to secure of liberty and property and to the duration of the principles of a free government will no doubt collect their opinions to certain points and accurately to find those alterations and amendments they wish if it shall be found they essentially disagree in them the conventions will then be able to determine whether to adopt the plan as it is or what will be proper to be done under these impressions and keeping in view the improper and unadvisable lodgment of powers in the general government organized as it at present is touching internal taxes armies and militia the elections of its own members causes between citizens of different states etc and the want of a more perfect bill of rights etc I drop the subject for the present and when I shall have leisure to revise and correct my ideas respecting it and collect into points the opinions of those who wish to make the system more secure and safe perhaps I may proceed to point out particularly for your consideration the amendments which ought to be engrafted into the system not only in conformity to my own but the deliberate opinions of others you will with me perceive that the objections to the plan proposed may a more leisure examination be set in a stronger point of view especially the important one that there is no substantial representation of the people provided for in a government in which the most essential powers even as to the internal police of the country is proposed to be lodged I think the honest and substantial part of the community will wish to see the system altered permanency and consistency given to the constitution we shall adopt and therefore they will be anxious to apportion the powers to the features and organization of the government and to see abuse in the exercise of power more effectually guarded against it is suggested that state officers from interested motives will oppose the constitution presented I see no reason for this their places in general will not be affected but new openings to offices and places of profit must evidently be made by the adoption of the constitution in its present form yours and etc. the federal farmer end of federalist number seven this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-federalist papers anti-federalist number eight letters from the federal farmer to the republican number six December 25th 1787 Dear sir my former letters to you respecting the constitution proposed were calculated merely to lead to a fuller investigation of the subject having more extensively considered it and the opinions of others relative to it I shall in a few letters more particularly endeavor to point out the defects and propose amendments I shall in this make only a few general and introductory observations which in the present state of the momentous question may not be improper and I leave you in all cases to decide by a careful examination of my works upon the weight of my arguments the propriety of my remarks the uprightness of my intentions and the extent of my candor I presume I am writing to a man of candor and reflection and not to an ardent, peevish or impatient man when the constitution was first published there appeared to prevail a misguided zeal to prevent a fair, unbiased examination of the subject of infinite importance to this people and their posterity to the cause of liberty and the rights of mankind and it was the duty of those who saw a restless ardor or design attempting to mislead the people by a parade of names and misrepresentations to endeavor to prevent their having their intended effects the only way to stop the passions of men in their career is coolly to state facts and deliberately to avow the truth and to do this we are frequently forced into a painful view of men and measures since I wrote to you in October I have heard much said and seen many pieces written upon the subject in question and on carefully examining them on both sides I find much less reason for changing my sentiments affecting the good and effective parts of the system proposed than I expected the opposers as well as the advocates of it confirm me in my opinion that this system affords all circumstances considered a better basis to build upon than the confederation and as to the principal defects as the smallness of the representation the insecurity of elections the undue mixture of powers in the senate the insecurity of some essential rights etc the opposition appears generally to agree respecting them and many of the ableist advocates virtually admit to them clear it is the latter do not attempt manfully to defend these defective parts but to cover them with a mysterious veil they concede they retract they say we could do no better and some of them went a little out of temper and hard pushed used arguments that do more honor to their ingenuity than to their candor and firmness three states have now adopted the constitution without amendments these and other circumstances ought to have their weight in deciding the question whether we will put the system into operation adopt it enumerate and recommend the necessary amendments which afterwards by three fourths of the states may be engrafted into the system or whether we will make the amendments prior to the adoption I only undertake to show amendments are essential and necessary how far it is practicable to engraft them into the plan prior to the adoption the state conventions must determine our situation is critical and we have but our choice of evils we may hazard much by adopting the constitution in its present form we may hazard more by rejecting it wholly we may hazard much by long contending about amendments prior to adoption the greatest political evils that can befall us are discords and civil wars the greatest blessings we can wish for are peace union and industry under a mild free and steady government amendments recommended will tend to guard and direct the administration but there will be danger that the people after the system shall be adopted will become inattentive to amendments their attention is now awake the discussion of the subject which has already taken place has had a happy effect it has called forth the able advocates of liberty and tends to renew in the minds of the people their true republican jealousy and vigilance the strongest guard against the abuses of power but the vigilance of the people is not sufficiently constant to be depended upon fortunate it is for the body of a people if they can continue attentive to their liberties long enough to erect for them a temple and constitutional barriers for their permanent security when they are well fixed between the powers of the rulers and the rights of the people they become visible boundaries constantly seen by all and any transgression of them is immediately discovered they serve as sentinels for the people at all times and especially in those unavoidable intervals of inattention some of the advocates I believe need to recommend good amendments but some of them will only consent to recommend indefinite, specious but unimportant ones and this only with a view to keep the door open for obtaining in some favorable moment their main object a complete consolidation of the states and a government much higher toned less republican and free than the one proposed if necessity therefore should ever oblige us to adopt the system and recommend amendments true friends of a federal republic must see they are well defined and well calculated not only to prevent our system of government moving further from republican principles and equality but to bring it back nearer to them they must be constantly on their guard against the address, flattery and maneuvers of their adversaries the gentleman who oppose the constitution or contend for amendments in it are frequently and with much bitterness charged with wantonly attacking the men who framed it the unjustness of this charge leads me to make one observation upon the conduct of parties etc some of the advocates are only pretended federalists in fact they wish for an abolition of the state governments some of them I believe to be honest federalists who wish to preserve substantially the state governments united under an efficient federal head and many of them are blind tools without any object the opposers also are only pretended federalists who want no federal government or one merely advisory some of them are the true federalists their object perhaps more clearly seen is the same with that of the honest federalists and some of them probably have no distinct object we might as well call the advocates and opposers tories and wigs or anything else as federalists and anti-federalists to be for or against the constitution as it stands is not much evidence of a federal disposition if any names are applicable to the parties on account of their general politics they are those of republicans and anti-republicans the opposers are generally men who support the rights of the body of the people and are properly republicans the advocates are generally men not very friendly to these rights and properly anti-republicans have the advocates left the constitution as they ought to have done to be adopted or rejected on account of its own merits or imperfections I do not believe the gentleman who framed it would have ever been alluded to in the contest by the opposers instead of this the ardent advocates begun by quoting names as incontestable authorities for the implicit adoption of the system without any examination treated all who opposed it as friends of anarchy and with an indecent virulence addressed M-N-G-Y-L-E and almost to every man of weight they could find in the opposition by name if they had been candid men they would have applauded the moderation of the opposers for not retaliating in this pointed manner when so fair an opportunity was given them but the opposers generally saw that it was no time to heed the passions but at the same time they saw there was something more than mere zeal in many of their adversaries they saw them attempting to mislead the people and to precipitate their divisions by the sound of names and forced to do it the opposers in general terms alleged those names were not of sufficient authority to justify the hasty adoption of the system contended for the convention as a whole was undoubtedly respectable it was generally composed of members of the then and preceding congresses as a body of respectable men we ought to view it to select individual names that is an invitation to personal attacks and the advocates for their own sake ought to have known the abilities, politics and situation of some of their favorite characters better before they held them up to view in the manner they did as men entitled to our implicit political belief they ought to have known whether all the men they so held up to view could for their past conduct in public offices be approved or not by the public records and the honest part of the community these ardent advocates seem now to be peevish and angry because by their own folly they have led to an investigation of facts and political characters unfavorable to them which they had not the discernment to foresee they may well apprehend they have opened a door to some juniors or to some man after his manner with his polite addresses to men by name to state serious facts and unfold the truth but these advocates may rest assured that cool men in the opposition best acquainted with the affairs of the country will not in the critical passage of a people from one constitution to another pursue inquiries which in other circumstances will be deserving of the highest praise I will say nothing further about political characters but examine the constitution and as a necessary and previous measure to a particular examination I shall state a few general positions and principles which receive a general assent and briefly notice the leading features of the confederation and several state conventions i.e. constitutions to which through the whole investigation we must frequently have recourse to aid the mind in its determinations we can put but little dependence on the partial and vague information transmitted to us respecting ancient governments our situation as a people is peculiar our people in general have a high sense of freedom they are high spirited though capable of deliberate measures they are intelligent discerning and well informed and it is to their condition we must mold the constitution and laws we have no royal or noble families and all things concur in favor of a government entirely elective we have tried our abilities as free men in a most arduous contest and have succeeded we now find the main spring of our movements with the love of liberty and a temporary arduous and not any energetic principle in the federal system our territories are far too extensive for a limited monarchy in which the representatives must frequently assemble and the laws operate mildly and systematically the most eligible system is a federal republic i.e. a system in which national concerns may be transacted in the center and local affairs in state or district governments the powers of the union ought to be extended to commerce the coin and national objects and a division of powers and a deposit of them in different hands is safest good government is generally the result of experience and gradual improvements and a punctual execution of the laws is essential to the preservation of life liberty and property taxes are always necessary and the power to raise them can never be safely lodged without checks and limitation but in a full and substantial representation of the body of the people the quantity of power delegated ought to be compensated by the brevity of the time holding it in order to prevent the possessors increasing it the supreme power is in the people and rulers possess only that portion which is expressly given them yet the wisest people have often declared this is the case on proper occasions and have carefully formed stipulations to fix the extent and limit the exercise of the power given the people by Magna Carta et cetera did not acquire powers or receive privileges from the king they only ascertained and fixed those they were entitled to as Englishmen the title used by the king we grant was mere form representation and the jury trial are the best features of a free government as ever yet discovered and the only means by which the body of the people can have their proper influence in the affairs of government in a federal system we must not only balance the parts of the same government as those of the state or that of the union but we must find a balancing influence between the general and local governments the latter is what men or writers have but very little or imperfectly considered a free and mild government is that in which no laws can be made without the formal and free consent of the people or of their constitutional representatives that is of a substantial representative branch liberty in its genuine sense is security to enjoy the effects of our honest industry and labors in a free government and personal security from all illegal restraints of rights some are natural and unalienable of which even the people cannot deprive individuals some are constitutional or fundamental these cannot be altered or abolished by the ordinary laws but the people by express acts may alter or abolish them these such as the trial by jury the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus etc individuals claim under the solemn compacts of the people as constitutions or at least under law so strengthened by long usage as not to be repealable by the ordinary legislature and some are common or mere legal rights that is such as individuals claim under laws which the ordinary legislature may alter or abolish at pleasure the confederation is a league of friendship among the states or sovereignties for the common defense and mutual welfare each state expressly retains its sovereignty in all powers not expressly given to congress all federal powers are lodged in a congress of delegates annually elected by the state legislatures accepting Connecticut and Rhode Island where they are chosen by the people each state has a vote in congress pays its delegates and may instructor recall them no delicate can hold any office of profit or serve more than three years in any sense each state may be represented by not less than two or more than seven delegates congress nine states agreeing may make peace and war, treaties and alliances grant letters of mark and reprisal, coin money regulate the alloy and value of coin regulate men and monies of the states by fixed proportions and appropriate monies form armies and navies emit bills of credit and borrow monies congress seven states agreeing may send and receive ambassadors regulate captures make rules for governing the army and navy institute courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and for settling territorial disputes between the individual states regulate weights and measures post offices and Indian affairs no state without the consent of congress can send or receive embassies make any agreement with any other state or a foreign state keep up any vessels of war or bodies of forces in time of peace engage in war or lay any duties which may interfere with the treaties of congress each state must appoint regimental officers and keep up a well regulated militia each state may prohibit the importation or exportation of any species of goods the free inhabitants of one state are entitled to the privileges and immunities of the free citizens of the other states credit in each state shall be given to the records and judicial proceedings in the others canada a seating may be admitted and any other colony may be admitted by the consent of nine states alterations may be made by the agreement of congress and confirmation of all the state legislatures the following I think will be allowed to be unalienable or fundamental rights in the United States no man demeaning himself peaceably shall be molested on account of his religion or motive worship the people have a right to hold and enjoy their property according to known standing laws and which cannot be taken from them without their consent or their consent of their representatives and whenever taken in the pressing circumstances of government they are to receive a reasonable compensation for it individual security consists in having free recourse to the laws the people are subject to no laws or taxes not assented to by their representatives constitutionally assembled they are at all times entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus the trial by jury in criminal and civil cases they have a right when charged to a speedy trial in the vincenage to be heard by themselves or counsel not to be compelled to furnish evidence against themselves to have witnesses face to face and to confront their adversaries before the judge no man is held to answer a crime charged upon him till it be substantially described to him and he is subject to no unreasonable searches or seizures of his person papers or effects the people have a right to assemble in an orderly manner and petition the government for a redress of wrongs the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained no emoluments except for actual service no hereditary honors or orders of nobility ought to be allowed the military ought to be subordinate to the civil authority and no soldier be quartered on the citizens without their consent the militia ought always to be armed and disciplined and the usual defense of the country the supreme power is in the people and power delegated ought to return to them at stated periods and frequently the legislative executive and judicial powers ought always to be kept distinct others perhaps might be added the organization of the state governments each state has a legislature and executive and judicial branch in general legislators are excluded from the important executive and judicial offices except in the carolinas there is no constitutional distinction among christian sex the constitutions of new york delaware and virginia exclude the clergy from offices civil and military the other states do nearly the same in practice each state has a democratic branch elected twice a year in road island and connecticut biannually in south carolina and annually in the other states there are about fifteen hundred representatives in all the states or one to each seventeen hundred inhabitants reckoning five blacks for three whites the states do not differ as to the age or moral characters of the electors or elected nor materially as to their property pennsylvania has lodged all her legislative powers in a single branch and georgia has done the same the other eleven states have each in their legislatures a second or senatorial branch informing this they have combined various principles and aimed at several checks and balances it is amazing to see how ingenuity has worked in several states to fix a barrier against popular instability in massachusetts the senators are apportioned on districts according to the taxes they pay nearly according to property in connecticut the free men in september vote for twenty counselors and return the names of those voted for in the several towns the legislature takes the twenty who have the most votes and gives them to the people in april choose twelve of them who with the governor and deputy governor form the senatorial branch in maryland the senators are chosen by two electors from each county these electors are chosen by the free men and qualified as the members of the democratic branch are in these two cases checks are aimed at in the mode of election several states have taken into view the periods of service age and property and et cetera in south carolina a senator is elected for two years in delaware three and in new york and virginia four in maryland five and in the other states for one in new york and virginia one fourth part go out yearly in virginia a senator must be twenty five years old in south carolina thirty in new york the electors must each have a freehold worth two hundred and fifty dollars in north carolina a freehold of fifty acres of land in the other states the electors of senators are qualified as electors of representatives are in massachusetts a senator must have a freehold in his own right worth one thousand dollars or any estate worth two thousand in new jersey any estate worth two thousand six hundred and sixty six in south carolina worth thirteen hundred dollars in north carolina three hundred acres of land in fee et cetera the numbers of senators in each state are from ten to thirty one about one hundred and sixty in the eleven states about one to fourteen thousand inhabitants two states massachusetts and new york have each introduced into their legislatures a third but incomplete branch in the former the governor may negative any law not supported by two thirds of the senators and two thirds of the representatives in the latter the governor chancellor and judges of the supreme court may do the same each state has a single executive branch in the five eastern states the people at large elect their governors in the other states the legislatures elect them in south carolina the governor has elected once in two years in new york and delaware once in three and in the other states annually the governor of new york has no executive council the other governors have in several states the governor has a vote in the senatorial branch the governor's have sent the governor's have similar powers in some instances and quite dissimilar ones in others the number of executive counselors in the states are from five to twelve in the four eastern states new jersey pennsylvania and georgia they are of the men returned legislators by the people in pennsylvania the counselors are chosen in delaware every fourth year in virginia every three years in south carolina and in the other states yearly each state has a judicial branch each common law courts superior and inferior some chancery and admiralty courts the courts in general sit in different places in order to accommodate the citizens the trial by jury is had in all the common law courts and in some of the admiralty courts the democratic freemen principally form the juries men destitute of property of character or under age are excluded as in elections some of the judges are during good behavior and some appointed for a year and some for years and all are dependent on the legislatures for their salaries particulars respecting this department are too many to be noticed here yours and et cetera the federal farmer end of anti-federalist section number eight this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-federalist papers anti-federalist number nine letters from the federal farmer to the Republican letter number seven December 31st 1787 dear sir in viewing the various governments instituted by mankind we see their whole force reducible to two principles the important springs which alone move the machines and give them their intended influence and control our force and persuasion by the former men are compelled by the latter they are drawn we denominate a government despotic or free as the one or the other principle prevails in it perhaps it is not possible for a government to be so despotic as to not operate persuasively on some of its subjects nor is it in the nature of things I conceive for a government to be so free or so supported by voluntary consent as never to want force to compel obedience to the laws in despotic governments one man or a few men independent of the people generally make the laws command obedience and enforce it by the sword one fourth part of the people are armed and obligated to endure the fatigues of soldiers to oppress the others and keep them subject to the laws in free governments the people or their representatives make the laws their execution is principally the effect of voluntary consent and aid the people respect the magistrate follow their private pursuits and enjoy the fruits of their labor with very small deductions for the public use the body of the people must evidently prefer the latter species of government and it can be only those few who may be well paid for the part they take in enforcing despotism that can for a moment prefer the former our true object is to give full efficacy to one principle to arm persuasion on every side and to render force as little necessary as possible persuasion is never dangerous not even in despotic governments but military force if often applied internally to fail to destroy the love and confidence and break the spirits of the people and to render it totally impracticable and unnatural for him or them who govern and yield to this force against the people to hold their places by the people's elections I repeat my observation that the plan proposed will have a doubtful operation between the two principles and whether it will preponderate towards persuasion or force is uncertain government must exist if the persuasive principle be feeble force is infallibly the next resort the moment the laws of congress shall be disregarded they must languish and the whole system be convulsed that moment we must have recourse to this next resort and all freedom vanish it being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws they must elect legislators and assign men to the different departments of the government in the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion informing this branch therefore several important considerations must be attended to it must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs a disposition to sympathize with the people and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and condition it must afford security against interested combinations corruption and influence it must possess the confidence and have the voluntary support of the people I think these positions will not be controverted nor the one I formally advanced that a fair and equal representation is that in which the interests feelings and opinions and views of the people are collected in such manner as they would be where the people all assembled having made these general observations I shall proceed to consider further my principal position vis that there is no substantial representation of the people provided for in a government in which the most essential powers even as to the internal police of the country are proposed to be lodged and to propose certain amendments as to the representative branch first that there ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives and secondly that the elections of them ought to be better secured one the representation is unsubstantial and ought to be increased in matters where there is much room for opinion you will not expect me to establish my positions with mathematical certainty you must only expect my observations to be candid and such as are well founded in the mind of the writer I am in a field where doctors disagree and as to genuine representation though no feature in government can be more important perhaps no one has been less understood and no one that has received so imperfect a consideration by political writers the euphoria in Sparta and the tribunes in Rome were but the shadow the representation in Great Britain is unequal and insecure in America we have done more in establishing this important branch on its true principles than perhaps all the world besides yet even here I can see that very great improvements in representation may be made in fixing this branch the situation of the people must be surveyed and the number of representatives and forms of election apportion to that situation when we find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive country possessing equality and a few or none of them oppressed with riches or wants it ought to be the anxious care of the constitution and laws to arrest them from national depravity and to preserve them in their happy condition a virtuous people make just laws and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a virtuous people a virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial to their characters may easily be gradually changed into servile and depraved creatures where the people or their representatives make the laws it is probable they will be generally fitted to the national character in circumstances unless the representation be partial and the imperfect substitute of the people however the people may be electors if the representation be so formed as to give one or more of the natural classes of men in the society and undue ascendancy over the others it is imperfect the former will gradually become masters and the latter slaves it is the first of all among the political balances to preserve in its proper station each of these classes we talk of balances in the legislature and among the departments of government we ought to carry them to the body of the people since I advanced the idea of balancing the several orders of men in a community informing a genuine representation and seeing that idea considered as chimerical I have been sensibly struck with a sentence in the Marquis Becarias treatise this sentence was quoted by congress in 1774 and is as follows in every society there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness and to reduce the others to the extreme of weakness and misery the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort and to diffuse their influence universally and equally add to this Montesquieu's opinion that in a free state every man who is supposed to be a free agent ought to be concerned in his own government therefore the legislative should reside in the whole body of the people or their representatives it is extremely clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in society which we call aristocratical, democratical, mercantile, mechanic, etc and perceive the efforts they are constantly from interested and ambitious views disposed to make to elevate themselves and oppress others each order must have a share in the business of legislation actually and efficiently it is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors and can choose their legislators if they cannot in the nature of things choose men from among themselves and genuinely like themselves I wish you to take another idea along with you we are not only to balance these natural efforts but we are also to guard against accidental combinations combinations founded in the connections of offices and private interests both evils which are increased in proportion as the number of men among which the elected must be are decreased to set this matter in a proper point of view we must form some general ideas and descriptions of the different classes of men as they may be divided by occupations and politically the first class is the aristocratical there are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this country the first is a constitutional one which does not exist in the United States in our common exception of the word Montesquieu it is true observes that we are a part of the persons in a society for want of property, age, or moral character are excluded any share in the government the others who alone are the constitutional electors and elected form this aristocracy this, according to him, exists in each of the United States where a considerable number of persons as all convicted of crimes under age or not possessed of certain property are excluded any share in the government the second is an aristocratic faction a junto of unprincipled men often distinguished for their wealth or abilities who combine together and make their object their private interests and a grandisement the existence of this description is merely accidental but particularly to be guarded against the third is the natural aristocracy this term we use to designate a respectable order of men the line between whom and the natural democracy is in some degree arbitrary we may place men on one side of this line which others may place on the other and in all disputes between the few and the many a considerable number are wavering and uncertain themselves on which side they are or ought to be in my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States I include about four or five thousand men and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of governors, of members of congress and state senators generally in the principal officers of congress of the army and militia the superior judges the most eminent professional men and etc. and men of large property the other persons and orders in the community form the natural democracy this includes in general the yeomanry the bordinate officers, civil and military the fishermen, mechanics and traders many of the merchants and professional men it is easy to perceive that men of these two classes the aristocratical and democratical with views equally honest have sentiments widely different especially respecting public and private expenses salaries, taxes and etc men of the first class associate more extensively have a high sense of honor they possess less ambition and general knowledge men of the second class are not so much used to combining great objects they possess less ambition and a larger share of honesty their dependence is principally on middling in small estates industrious pursuits and hard labor while that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large estates and the chief offices of government not only the efforts of these two great parties are to be balanced interests and parties also which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power and for fear of the consequences though they in fact mutually depend on each other yet such are their general views that the merchants alone would never fail to make laws favorable to themselves and oppressive to the farmers, etc the farmers alone would act on like principles the former would tax the land the latter the trade the manufacturers are often disposed to intend for monopolies buyers make every exertion to lower prices and sellers to raise them men who live by fees and salaries endeavor to raise them and the part of the people who pay them endeavor to lower them the public creditors to augment the taxes and the people at large to lessen them thus in every period of society and in all the transactions of men we see parties verifying the observations made by the marquee the taxes which have not their sentinels in the government in proportion to what they have to gain or lose must infallibly be ruined efforts among parties are not merely confined to property they contend for rank and distinctions all their passions in turn are enlisted in political controversies men elevated in society are often disgusted with the changeableness of the democracy and the latter are often agitated with the passions of jealousy and envy the yeomanry possess a large share of property and strength are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits the mechanics of towns are ardent and changeable honest and credulous they are inconsiderable for numbers weight and strength not always sufficiently stable for the supporting free governments the fishing interest partakes partly of the strength and stability of the landed and partly of the changeableness of the mechanic interest the merchants and traders they are our agents in almost all money transactions give activity to government and possess a considerable share of influence in it it has been observed by an able writer that frugal industrious merchants are generally advocates for liberty it is an observation I believe well founded that the schools produce but few advocates for republican forms of government gentlemen of the law, divinity, physique, and etc. probably form a part of the people yet their political influence perhaps is equal to that of all the other descriptions of men if we may judge from the appointments to congress the legal characters will often in small representation be the majority but the more the representatives are increased the more of the farmers, merchants, and etc. will be found to be brought into the government these general observations will enable you to discern what I intend by different classes and the general scope of my ideas I contend for uniting and balancing their interests, feelings, opinions, and views in the legislature we may not only so unite and balance these as to prevent a change in the government by the gradual exaltation of one part to the depression of others but we may deprive many other advantages from the combination and full representation a small representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances of the people the members of it must be too far removed from the people in general to sympathize with them and too few to communicate with them a representation must be extremely imperfect where the representatives are not circumstance to make the proper communications to their constituents and where the constituents in turn cannot with tolerable convenience make known their wants, circumstances, and opinions to their representatives where there is but one representative to 30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants appears to me he can only mix and be acquainted with the few respectable characters among his constituents even double the federal representation and then there must be a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general represented on the proposed plan the state of Delaware, the city of Philadelphia the state of Rhode Island the province of Maine the county of Suffolk in Massachusetts will have one representative each or but few communications between him and the people at large of either of those districts it has been observed that mixing only with the respectable men he will get the best information and ideas from them he will also receive impressions favorable to their purposes particularly many plausible shifts have been made to divert the mind from dwelling on this defective representation these I shall consider in another place could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and party efforts to raise some and oppress others the want of sympathy, information and intercourse between the representatives and the people and insuperable difficulty will still remain I mean the constant liability of a small number of representatives to private combinations the tyranny of the one or the licentiousness of the multitude are in my mind but small evils compared with the factions it is a consideration well worth pursuing how far this house of representatives will be liable to be formed into private gentos how far influenced by expectations of appointments and offices how far liable to be managed by the president and senate and how far the people will have confidence in them to obviate difficulties on this head as well as objections to the representative branch generally several observations have been made these I will now examine and if they shall appear to be unfounded the objections must stand unanswered that the people are the electors must elect good men and attend to the administration it is said that the members of congress at stated periods must return home and that they must be subject to the laws they make and to a share of the burdens they may impose that the people possess the strong arm to overaw their rulers and the best checks in their national character against the abuses of power that the supreme power will remain in them that the state governments will form a part of and a balance in the system that congress will have only a few national objects to attend to and the state governments many and local ones that the new congress will be more numerous than the present and that any numerous body is unwieldy and mobish that the states are only represented in the present congress and that the people will require a representation in the new one that in 50 or 100 years the representation will be numerous that congress will have no temptation to do wrong and that no system to enslave the people is practicable that as long as the people are free they will preserve free governments and that when they shall become tired of freedom arbitrary government must take place these observations I shall examine in the course of my letters and I think not only show that they are not well founded but point out the fallacy of some of them and show that others do not very well comport with the dignified and manly sentiments of a free and enlightened people yours and cetera the federal farmer end of antifederalist number nine this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the antifederalist papers antifederalist number 10 letters from the federal farmer to the republican letter number 8 January 3rd 1788 Dear sir before I proceed to examine the objections I beg leave to add a valuable idea respecting representation to be collected from Dalom and other able writers which essentially tends to confirm my positions they very justly impute the establishment of general and equal liberty in England to a balance of interests and powers among the different orders of men aided by a series of fortunate events that never before and possibly never again will happen before the Norman conquest the people of England enjoyed much of this liberty the first of the Norman kings aided by foreign mercenaries and foreign attendants obnoxious to the English immediately laid arbitrary taxes and established arbitrary courts and severely oppressed all orders of people the barons and people who recollected their former liberties were induced by those oppressions to unite their efforts in their common defense here it became necessary for the great men instead of deceiving and depressing the people to enlighten and court them the royal power was too strongly fixed to be annihilated and rational means were therefore directed to limiting it within proper bounds in this long and arduous task in this new species of contest the barons and people succeeded because they had been freemen and knew the value of the object they were contending for because they were the people of a small island one people who found it practical to meet and deliberate in one assembly and act under one system of resolves and who were not obliged to meet in different provincial assemblies as is the case in large countries as was the case in France Spain and etc. where their determinations were inconsistent with each other and where the king could play off one assembly against another it was in this united situation the people of England were for several centuries enabled to combine their exertions and by compacts as Magna Carta a bill of rights and etc. were able to limit by degrees the royal prerogatives and establish their own liberties the first combination was probably the accidental effect of pre-existing circumstances but there was an admirable balance of interests in it which has been the parent of English liberty and excellent regulations enjoyed since that time the executive power having been uniformly in the king and he the visible head of the nation it was chimerical for the greatest lord a popular leader consistent with the state of the government an opinion of the people to seriously think of becoming the king's rival or to aim at even a share of the executive power the greatest subjects prospect was only in acquiring a respectable influence in the House of Commons House of Lords or in the ministry circumstances at once made at the interests of the leaders of the people to stand by them far otherwise it was with the queens in Rome the leaders in England have led the people to freedom in almost all other countries to servitude the people in England have made use of deliberate exertions their safest and most efficient weapons in other countries they have often acted like mobs and been enslaved by their enemies or by their own leaders in England the people have been led uniformly and systematically by the representatives to secure their rights by compact and to abolish innovations upon the government they successfully obtained Magna Carta the powers of taxation the power to propose laws the habeas corpus act bill of rights and etc they insured secured general and equal liberty security to their persons and property and as an everlasting security and bulwark of their liberties they fixed the democratic branch in the legislature and jury trial in the execution of the laws and etc in Rome and most other countries the reverse of all this is true in Greece, Rome and wherever the civil law has been adopted torture has been admitted in Rome the people were subject to arbitrary confiscations and even their lives would be arbitrarily disposed of by councils, tribunes, dictators, masters and etc half of the inhabitants were slaves and the other half never knew what equal liberty was yet in England they have had king, lords and commons in Rome they had councils, senators and tribunes why then was the government of England so mild and favorable to the body of the people and that of Rome an ambitious and oppressive aristocracy why in England have the revolutions always ended in stipulations in favor of general liberty equal laws and the common rights of the people and in most other countries in favor of and in most other countries in favor only of a few influential men the reasons in my mind are obvious in England the people have been substantially represented in many respects in the other countries it has not been so perhaps a small degree of attention to a few simple facts will illustrate this in England from the oppressions of the Norman kings to the revolution in 1688 during which period of 2 or 300 years the English liberties were changed and established the aristocratic part of that nation was substantially represented by a very large number of nobles possessing similar interests and feelings with those they represented the body of the people about 4 or 5 millions then mostly a frugal landed people were represented by about 500 representatives taken not from the order of men which formed the aristocracy but from the body of the people and possessed of the same interests and feelings DeLome speaking of the British representation expressly found all his reasons on this union this similitude of interests feelings views and circumstances he observes the English have preserved their liberties because they and their leaders or representatives have been strictly united in interests and in contending for general liberty here we see a genuine balance founded in the actual state of things the whole community probably not more than two fifths more numerous than we now are were represented by 7 or 800 men the barons stipulated with the common people and the king with the whole had the legal distinction between lords and commons been broken down and the people of that island been called upon to elect 45 senators and 120 representatives about the proportion we propose to establish their whole legislature evidently would have been of the natural aristocracy and the body of the people would not have had scarcely a single sincere advocate their interests would have been neglected general and equal liberty forgot and the balance lost contests and conciliations as in most other countries would have been merely among the few and as it might have been necessary to serve their purposes the people at large would have been flattered or threatened and probably not a single stipulation made in their favor in Rome the people were miserable though they had three orders the consuls, senators and tribunes and approved the laws and all for want of a genuine representation the people were too numerous to assemble and do anything properly themselves the voice of a few the dupes of artifice was called the voice of the people it is difficult for the people to defend themselves against the arts and intrigues of the great but by selecting a suitable number of men fixed to their interests to represent them and to oppose ministers and senators and the people's all depends on the number of the men selected and the manner of doing it to be convinced of this we need only attend to the reason of the case the conduct of the British commons and of the Roman tribunes equal liberty prevails in England because there was a representation of the people in fact and reality to establish it equal liberty never prevailed in Rome because there was but the shadow of a representation there were consuls in Rome annually elected to execute the laws several hundred senators represented the great families the body of the people annually chose those tribunes from among themselves to defend them and secure their rights I think the number of tribunes annually chosen never exceeded ten this representation perhaps was not proportionally so numerous as the representation proposed in the new plan but the difference will not appear to be so great when it shall be recollected that these tribunes were chosen annually that the great patrician families were not admitted to these offices of tribunes and that the people of Italy who elected the tribunes were a long while if not always a small people compared with the people of the United States what was the consequence of this trifling representation the people of Rome always elected for their tribunes men conspicuous for their riches military commands professional popularity and etc great commoners between whom and the noble families there was only the shadowy difference of legal distinction among all the tribunes the people chose for several centuries they had scarcely five real friends to their interests these tribunes lived felt and saw not like the people but like the great patrician families like senators and great officers of state to get into which it was evident by their conduct was their sole object these tribunes often talked about the rights and prerogatives of the people and that was all for they never attempted to establish equal liberty so far from establishing the rights of the people they suffered the senate to the exclusion of the people to engross the powers of taxation those excellent and almost only real weapons of defense even the people of England possess the tribunes obtained that the people should be eligible to some of the great offices of state and marry if they pleased into the noble families these were advantages in their nature confined to a few elevated commoners and of trifling importance to the people at large nearly the same observations may be made as to the euphoria of sparta nearly the same observations may be made as to the euphoria of sparta we may amuse ourselves with names but the fact is men will be governed by the motives and temptations that surround their situation political evils to be guarded against are in the human character and not in the name of patrician or plebeian had the people of Italy in the early period of the republic selected yearly or biennially four or five hundred of their best informed men emphatically from among themselves these representatives would have formed an honest and respectable assembly capable of combining in them the views and exertions of the people and their respectability would have procured them honest and able leaders and we should have seen equal liberty established true liberty stands in need of a fostering hand from the days of adam she has found but one temple to dwell in securely she has laid the foundation of one perhaps her last in america whether this is to be completed and have duration is yet a question equal liberty never yet found many advocates among the great it is a disagreeable truth that power perverts men's views in a greater degree than public employments inform their understandings they become hardened in certain maxims and more lost to fellow feelings men may always be too cautious to commit alarming and glaring iniquities but they as well as systems are liable to be corrupted by slow degrees junius well observes we are not only to guard against what men will do but even against what they may do men in high public offices are in stations where they gradually lose sight of the people and do not often think of attending to them except when necessary to answer private purposes the body of the people must have this true representative security placed somewhere in the nation and in the united states or in any extended empire I am fully persuaded can be placed nowhere but in the forms of a federal republic where we can divide and place it in several state or distinct legislatures giving the people in these the means of opposing heavy internal taxes and oppressive measures in the proper stages a great empire contains the amities and animosities of a world within itself we are not like the people of England one people compactly settled on a small island with a great city filled with frugal merchants serving as a common center of liberty and union we are dispersed and it is impracticable for any but the few to assemble in one place the few must be watched checked and often resisted tyranny has ever shown a predilection to be in close amity with them or the one man give it from kings and it flies to senators to december's to dictators to tribunes to popular leaders to military chiefs and etc the loam well observes that in societies laws which were to be equal to all are soon warped to the private interests of the administrators and made to define the usurpations of a few the english who had tasted the suites of equal law were aware of this and though they were stored their king they carefully delegated to parliament the advocates of freedom i have often lately heard it observed that it will do very well for a people to make a constitution and ordain that at stated periods they will choose in a certain manner a first magistrate a given number of senators and representatives and let them have all power to do as they please this doctrine however it may do for a small republic as connecticut for instance where the people may choose so many senators and representatives to assemble in the legislature in an eminent degree the interest, the views, feelings and genuine sentiments of the people themselves can never be admitted in an extensive country and when this power is lodged in the hands of a few not to limit the few is but one step short of giving absolute power to one man in a numerous representation the abuse of power is a common injury and has no temptation among the few the abuse of power may often operate to the private emolument of those who abuse it yours and cetera the federal farmer end of antifederalist number ten this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the antifederalist papers antifederalist number eleven letters from the federal farmer to the Republican letter number nine January 4th, 1788 Dear sir the advocates of the constitution say we must trust to the administration and elect good men for representatives I admit that informing the social compact we can fix only general principles and of necessity must trust something to the wisdom and integrity of the administration but the question is do we not trust too much and to men also placed in the vortex of temptation to lay hold of proffered advantages for themselves and their connections and to oppose the body of the people it is one thing to authorize a well guarded legislature to make laws under the restraints of a well guarded constitution and another to assemble a few men and to tell them what and to tell them to do what they please I am not the more shaken in my principles or disposed to despair of the cause of liberty because some of our able men have adopted the yielding language of non-resistance and dare writers insult the people with the signatures of Caesar Mark Antony and of other tyrants because I see even more moderate and amiable men forced to let go of monarchy in 1775 still in love with it to use the simile of our countrymen when the political plot boils the scum will often get up or most and make its appearance I believe the people of America when they shall fully understand any political subject brought before them will talk in a very different style and use the manly language of freedom but the people must elect good men examine the system is it practicable for them to elect fit and proper representatives where the number is so small but the people may choose whom they please this is an innovation I believe made without due attention to facts and the state of the community to explain my meeting I will consider the descriptions of men commonly presented to the people as candidates for the offices of representatives we may rank them in three classes one the men who form the natural aristocracy as before defined to popular demagogues these men also are often politically elevated so as to be seen by the people and by the government of large districts they often have some abilities without principle and rise into notice by their noise and arts three the substantial and respectable part of the democracy they are a numerous and valuable set of men who discern and judge well but from being generally silent in public assemblies are often overlooked they are the most substantial and the best informed men in several towns who occasionally fill the grades of offices etc who hold not a splendid but a respectable rank in private concerns these men are extensively diffused through all the counties towns and small districts in the union even they and their immediate connections are raised above the majority of the people and as representatives are only brought to a level with a more numerous part of the community the middle orders and a degree nearer the mass of the people hence it is that the best practical representation even in a small state must be several degrees more aristocratical than the body of the people a representative so formed as to admit but a few or none of the third class is in my opinion not deserving of the name even in armies courts marshal are so formed as to admit subaltern officers into them the true idea is so to open and enlarge the representation as to let in a due proportion the third class with those of the first now my opinion is that the representation proposed is so small as that ordinarily very few or none of them can be elected and therefore after all the parade of words and forms the government must possess the soul of aristocracy or something worse the spirit of popular leaders I observed in a former letter that the state of Delaware of Rhode Island the province of Maine and each of the counties in Massachusetts et cetera would have one member and rather more than one when the representative shall be increased to one for each 30,000 inhabitants in some districts the people are more dispersed and unequal than in others in Delaware they are compact in the province of Maine dispersed how can the elections in either of those districts be regulated so as that a man of the third class can be elected exactly the same principles and motives and controllable circumstances must govern the elections as in the choice of the governors call upon the people of either of those districts to choose a governor and it will probably never happen that they will bestow a major part or the greatest number of their votes on some very conspicuous or very popular character a man that is known among a few thousands of people may be quite unknown among 30 or 40,000 on the whole it appears to me that when we call on 30 or 40,000 inhabitants to unite in giving their votes for one man it will be uniformly impracticable for them to unite in any men except those few who have become eminent for their civil or military rank or their popular legal abilities it will be found totally impracticable for men in the private walks of life except in the profession of law to become conspicuous enough to attract the notice of so many electors and have their suffrages but if I'm right it is asked why so many respectable men advocate the adoption of the proposed system several reasons may be given many of our gentlemen are attached to the principles of monarchy and aristocracy they have an aversion to democratic republics the body of the people have acquired large powers and substantial influence by the revolution in the unsettled state of things their numerous representatives in some instances use their powers and have induced many good men suddenly to adopt ideas unfavorable to such republics and which ideas they will discard on reflection without scrutinizing into the particulars of the proposed system we immediately perceive that its general tendency is to collect the powers of government now in the body of the people in reality and to place them in the higher order in fewer hands no wonder then that all those of and about these orders are attached to it they feel there is something in this system advantageous to it they feel there is something in this system advantageous to them on the other hand the body of the people evidently feel there is something wrong and disadvantageous to them both descriptions perceive there is something tending to bestow on the former the height of power and happiness and to reduce the latter to weakness insignificance and misery the people evidently feel all this though they want expressions to convey their ideas further even the respectable part of the democracy have never yet been able to distinguish clearly where the fallacy lies they find there are defects in the confederation they see a system presented they think something must be done and while their minds are in suspense the zealous advocates force a reluctant consent nothing can be stronger evidence of the nature of this system than the general sense of the several orders in the community that are being its tendency the parts taken generally by them proves my position that notwithstanding the parade of words and forms the government must possess the soul of aristocracy congress here to for have asked for moderate additional powers the cry was give them be federal but the proper distinction between the causes but the proper distinction between the cases that produce this disposition and the system proposed has not been fairly made we have seen some of our state representations too numerous and without examining a medium we run into the opposite extreme it is true the proper number of federal representatives is a matter of opinion in some degree but there are extremes which we immediately perceive and others which we clearly discover on examination we should readily pronounce a representative branch of 15 members small in a federal government having complete powers as to taxes military matters commerce the corn and et cetera on the other hand we should readily pronounce a federal representation as numerous as even those of the several states consisting of about 1500 representatives unwieldy and totally improper it is asked has not the wisdom of the convention found the medium perhaps not the convention was divided on this point of numbers at least some of its members urge that instead of 65 representatives there ought to be 130 in the first instance they fixed one representative for each 40,000 inhabitants and at the close of the work the president suggested that the representation appear to be too small and without debate it was put at not exceeding one for each 30,000 I mentioned these facts to show that the convention went on no fixed data in this extensive country it is difficult to get a representation that is evidently numerous necessity I believe will oblige us to sacrifice in some degree the true genuine principles of representation but this sacrifice ought to be as little as possible how far we ought to increase the representation I will not pretend to say but feel that we ought to increase it very considerably is clear to double it at least making full allowances for the state representations and this we may evidently do and approach accordingly towards safety without encountering any inconveniences it is with great difficulty that people can unite these different interests and views even tolerably in the state senators who are more than twice as numerous as the federal representatives as proposed by the convention even these senators are considered as so far removed from the people that they are not allowed immediately to hold their purse strings the principal objections made to the increase of the representation and the difficulty in getting the members to attend the first cannot be important the last if founded is against any federal government as to the expense I presume the house of representatives will not be in sessions more than four months in the year we find by experience that about two-thirds of the members of representative assemblies usually attend therefore of the representation proposed by the convention about 45 members will probably doubling their number about 90 will probably attend their pay in one case at $4 a day each which is putting it high enough will amount to yearly $21,600 in the other case $43,200 difference $21,600 reduce the state representatives from $1,500 down to $1,000 and thereby save the attendance of two-thirds of the $500 say three months in a year at $1.25 a day each $37,125 thus we may leave the state representation sufficiently large and yet save enough by the reduction nearly to support exceedingly well the whole federal representation I propose surely we never can be so unwise as to sacrifice essentially the all important principles of representation for so small a sum as $21,600 a year for the United States a single company of soldiers would cost this sum it is a fact that can easily be shown that we expend three times this sum every year upon useless inferior offices and very trifling concerns it is also a fact which can be shown that the United States in the late war suffered more by a faction in the federal government than the pay of the federal representation will amount to for twenty years as to the attendance can we so unwise as to establish an unsafe and inadequate representative branch and give it as a reason that we believe only a few members will be induced to attend we ought certainly to establish an adequate representative branch and adopt measures to induce an attendance I believe that a due proportion of 130 or 140 members will be induced to attend there are various reasons for the non-attendance of the members of the present congress it is to be presumed that these will not exist under the new system to compensate for the want of a genuine representation in a government where the purse and sword and all important powers are proposed to be lodged a variety of unimportant things are enumerated by the advocates of it in the second place it is said that the members of congress must return home and share in the burdens they may impose and therefore private motives will induce them to make mild laws to support liberty and ease the burdens of the people this brings us to a mere question of interest under this head I think these observations will appear on examination altogether fallacious because this individual interest which may coincide with the rights and interests of the people will be far more than balanced by opposite motives and opposite interests if on a fair calculation a man will gain more by measures oppressive to others than he will lose by them he is interested in their adoption with those who govern generally by increasing the public burdens increase their own share of them but by this increase they may and often do increase their salaries, fees and emoluments in a tenfold proportion by increasing salaries forming armies and navies and by making offices if it shall appear the members of congress will have these temptations before them the argument is on my side they will view the account and be induced continually to make efforts advantageous to themselves and connections and oppressive to others we must examine facts congress in its present form have but few offices to dispose of worth the attention of the members or of men of the aristocracy yet from 1774 to this time we find a large proportion of these offices assigned to those who were or had been members of congress and though the states choose annually sixty or seventy members many of them have been provided for but few men are known to congress in this extensive country and probably but few men will be to the president and senate except those who have or shall appear as members of congress or those whom the members may bring forward the states may now choose yearly ninety one members of congress under the new constitution they will have it in their power to choose exactly the same number perhaps afterwards one hundred and fifteen will be chosen once in two and six years so that in the course of ten years together not more than two thirds so many members of congress will be elected and brought into view as there now are in the confederation in the same term of time but at least there will be five if not ten times as many offices and places worthy the attention of the members under the new constitution as there are under the confederation therefore we may fairly presume that a very great proportion of the members of congress especially the influential ones instead of returning to private life will be provided for with lucrative offices in the civil or military department and not only the members but many of their sons, friends and connection these offices will be in the constitutional disposition of the president and senate and corruption out of the question what kind of security can we expect in a representation so many of the members of which may rationally feel themselves candidates for these offices let common sense decide it is true that members chosen to offices must leave their seats in congress and to some few offices they cannot be elected till the time shall be expired for which they were elected members but this scarcely will affect the bias arising from the hopes and expectations of office it is not only in this point of view the members of congress by their efforts may make themselves and friends powerful and happy all the people may be oppressed but there is another way in which they may soon warp laws which ought to be equal to their own advantages by those imperceptible means and on those doubtful principles which may not alarm no society can do without taxes they are the efficient means of safety and defense and they too have often been the weapons by which the blessings of society have been destroyed congress will have power to lay for the general welfare and if they misjudge of the general welfare and lay unnecessary oppressive taxes the constitution will provide as I shall hereafter show no remedy for the people or states the people must bear them or have recourse not to any constitutional checks or remedies but to that resistance which is the last resort and founded in self defense it is well stipulated that all duties imposed and excises shall be equal and that direct taxes shall be apportioned on the several states by a fixed rule but nothing further here commences a dangerous power in matters of taxation lodged without any regard to the balance of interests of the different orders of men and without any regard to the internal policy of the states congress having assigned to any state its quota say to new jersey $80,000 in a given tax congress will be entirely at liberty to apportion that some on the counties and towns poles, lands, houses, labor, etc and appoint the assessors and collectors in that state in what manner they please there will be nothing to prevent a system of tax laws being made unduly to ease some descriptions of men and burden others though such a system may be unjust and injudicious though we may complain the answer will be congress have the power delegated by the state by the confederation taxes must be quoted on the several states by fixed rules as before mentioned but then each states quota is apportioned on the several numbers and classes of citizens in the state by the state legislature assessed and collected by state laws great pains have been taken to confound the two cases which are as distinct as light and darkness this us shall endeavor to illustrate and to come to the amendment respecting internal taxes I shall only observe at present that in the state legislatures the body of the people will be genuinely represented and in congress not that the right of resisting oppressive measures is inherent in the people and that a constitutional barrier should be so formed that their genuine representatives may stop an oppressive ruinous measure in its early progress and the rules of it become in a degree fixed it has lately been often observed that the power or body of men entrusted with the national defense and tranquility must necessarily possess the purse unlimitedly that the purse and sword must go together this is a new doctrine in a free country and by no means tenable in the british government the king is particularly entrusted with the national honor and defense but the commons solely hold the purse have amply shown that the representation in congress will be totally inadequate in matters of taxation and et cetera and therefore that the ultimate control over the purse must be lodged elsewhere we are not to expect even honest men rigidly to adhere to the line of strict impartiality where the interest of themselves or friends is particularly concerned if we do expect it we shall deceive ourselves and make a wrong estimate of human nature but it is asked how shall we remedy the evil so as to complete and perpetuate the temple of equal laws and equal liberty perhaps we never can do it perhaps we never may be able to do it in this immense country under any one system of laws however modified nevertheless at present I think the experiment worth of making I feel an aversion to the disunion of the states and to separate confederacies the states have thought and bled in a common cause and great dangers too many attend these confederacies I think the system proposed capable of a very considerable degrees of perfection if we pursue first principles I do not think that DeLome or any writer I have seen has sufficiently pursued the proper inquiries and efficient means for making representation and balances in government more perfect it is our task to do this in America our object is equal liberty and equal laws defusing their influence among all orders of men to obtain this we must guard against the bias of interest and passions against interested combinations secret or open we must aim at a balance of efforts and strength clear it is by increasing the representation we lessen the prospects of each member of congress being provided for in public offices we proportionally lessen influence and strengthen his prospects of becoming a private citizen subject to the common burdens without the compensation of the emoluments of office by increasing the representation we make it more difficult to corrupt and influence the members we diffuse them more extensively among the body of the people perfect the balance multiply information strengthen the confidence of the people and consequently support the laws on equal and free principles there are two other ways I think of obtaining in some degree the security we want the one is by excluding more extensively the members from being appointed to offices the other is by limiting some of their powers but these two I shall examine hereafter yours and etc the federal farmer end of antifederalist number 11