 Gweithio ymlaen i gwaith i'r Llyfrgell Lleidwyr Cymru. Mae'n gweithio i chi i'r Llyfrgell, ac mae'n gweithio i'r Lleidwyr Cymru, Prof. Alan Vifals, sy'n gweithio i chi'n gweithio i'r Llyfrgell, mae'n gweithio i'r Llyfrgell Cymru, ac mae'n gweithio i'r Llyfrgell Hyodogtorid, ac mae'n gweithio i'r Llyfrgell Lleidwyr Cymru yn 1997. Prof. Vifals yn gymryd yn y fwyaf o gwaith i'r Llyfrgell i'r Llyfrgell i'r Llyfrgell, a'r Llyfrgell i'r Llyfrgell yn y Cyfnodau Llyfrgell, ac mae'n gweithio i'r Llyfrgell i'r Llyfrgell i'r Llyfrgell i'r Llyfrgell i'r Llyfrgell ar y gwrthwyng cyfan, ac yn ysgrifennu Llyfrgell, iawn, ac mae'n gweithio i chi i chi i chi i chi'i gael y twyd yn ymgyrch yma, the title which is on the screen and one civil lawyers and America gentiles commitment to legal scholarship and public governance. Ladies and gentlemen, Professor Vines. Thank you very much for your introduction. Thank you very much for the invitation. I'm gyda'r gweld mor i'n amser yn gwybod, a'r gweld yn fawr oedd yn gweithio'r ddau. Felly mae'n fawr dywed o'r fawr ydych chi'n gwneud ar y cenglwch gyda'r perthynag ydw i'n gweithio'r byd. Felly mae'n gweithio'r gweithio'r ddau. Mae'n gweithio, oherwydd mae'n gweithio'r ddau, ac mae'n gweithio'r gweithio'r ddau. mae'n amser oed yn benodol i gwybod i gyd yn bland. Rydym ni'n gwybod a chael gwiaith o'r tynfod, a'r amser oherwydd mae'n bwysig gyda'r sefydlu ddweud oherwydd, fel y gallwn yn canfig, mae'n i gael eu maen i'ch creu, a rydyn ni'n gael oherwydd yn enghreifft. Oherwydd, mae'n gweithio gyd yn cael ei eich ddweud. Yn ni'n gweithio'r ffrindig, mae'n cael ei ddweud, ac yn ei ddweud o'r llun o'r ffrindig, I thought, oh my goodness, this is really tedious and bland. Perfectly adequate. However, by the time I had been through the, what is it, Dartford crossing, I was not so sure. England and Cambridge have changed a lot since my days and perhaps also the expectations are greater. Now, let's see how this works. Right. I'm not going to present here a finished work. I'm going to present, well actually two things. First of all, it's something from my own experience over the past few years that I've noticed that I've come to think differently about many of the topics I've worked on for decades in legal history. Not so much because of the type of research work I've been doing, but because of external factors, being in different law faculties like any one in a law faculty. You've got to teach and you've got to do research in all sorts of committees, scientific committees, also with other faculties. And the perception of what are we doing with law studies? What purpose are we actually trying to achieve with our legal education and legal research that has changed over the past few years in my own perception? And to my surprise, because this was not, I hadn't expected it at all, this has also started to influence my own way of looking at my sources. There were a number of issues, questions which of course from doing the research had emerged, but which I started looking at in a very different way because of these external factors. So these external factors or synthesis of sort of how I'm re-questioning a number of these things will be the very general introduction, which has nothing to do with Gently as such. And then Gently will actually be a kind of case study, almost a pretext you could say, to see how I try to reinterpret, how I try to reread, how I try to re-understand my sources on Gently and try to reshuffle it. So that's more or less the programme I have in mind. When I was first taught about medieval Roman and canon law, there was no doubt that one was talking about law, very much in the same sense as one would refer to law today, modern times. The texts of Roman law, canon law may have been different from present day legal authorities. The ways of teaching by glossators, commentators may have been different from modern legal education, though I tend to believe that the standard presentation of late medieval law teaching, based on the corporate euros, still underrates the degree of fact induced reasoning, and therefore the importance of case study methods to be found in late medieval teaching and blood literature. And many more differences are pointed out in standard textbooks on legal history. But on the whole, the standard historical narrative suggests a great deal of continuity between the concept of law in that late medieval learning and our modern approach in legal science with regard to the general idea of what law is. My first research experience with late medieval civil and Roman law required some adjustment with regard to the legal methods applied by legal practitioners who had been educated in law faculties. And I soon found out that, not surprisingly, those methods were not fundamentally different from the methodical canons followed in the learned authorities those practitioners referred to. Even then, striking differences between those late medieval and modern legal methods did not preclude a fundamental identity of law in the late middle ages and in modern times. The change in narrative I've been struggling with now for some years, and which only reflects an effort to make more sense, to seek greater consistency, my own understanding and teaching of how late medieval jurisprudence developed, is mainly a change of emphasis. My own mind has probably been too much and too long formatted to recognise law in medieval learned law, the phrase I'm using, the better or the worse, for the more established phrases of Dois avant in French or Goliartesrecht in German. But while I still accept that medieval law was law, as one may understand it today, I have been increasingly convinced that such a view fails to bring out the essential features of medieval jurisprudence. The alternative I suggest is not that novel, but neither is it a central theme of the central and mainstream historiography of late medieval learned law and its effects on European history. The alternative I propose puts the emphasis of expertise on public governance. Law studies were primarily an education and training in the public and corporate governance of political bodies. The career prospects of law graduates in the medieval church and in councils of secular polities is well documented and widely acknowledged. Somehow, however, the link between how they were trained in reading and using law texts and the principles and practice of public governance remains underrated. The point of the argument is that law studies primarily stood for advanced management studies, a training aiming at expertise in the principles of public policies. The combination of policymaking or advising the making of policies and implementing public policies is what I understand here by public governance. The combination of policies and their implementation is all the more important because in a political culture where police and justice were not to be severe, the ideal of good governance was that it had to prove to be both efficient and just. A ruler who failed to meet those standards would fail into bad governance, which meant that he lost the legitimacy of his political authority. That is all well-trodden territory. However, I believe that historians of political ideas tend to underrate legal expertise as the core expertise required for counselling the good public governance. While legal historians may overall have been reluctant to acknowledge that in order to ensure that legal expertise would be relevant as an expertise in public governance, jurists had to widen systematically the scope of their legal authorities to a both theoretical and practical political normativity. There is also, and that is in my view the true sting of this somewhat alternative historical narrative, a present day relevance for raising the issue of the place of professional lawyers in public governance. Law graduates, in my perception, have lost and are losing ground at the heart of public governance, especially upstream of the political decision making process. As regards the efficiency expected from good governance, the expertise of social scientists now tends to be more valued. As regards the fairness of the policy which needs to be defined, democracy has in theory, at least in western societies, become the exclusive foundation of legitimacy. Therefore, only the electric politician is now qualified to decide what political priorities are deemed to meet the standards of justice. The lawyer's expertise in our democratic systems of separation of power is then confined to the administration of justice, which is mainly operating downstream of the political decision making process, except for the limited lawmaking role still played by high courts in some legal systems such as here in the United Kingdom. The essential question remains nevertheless, how should law studies contribute to regain a central position for jurists upstream in today's public governance? The question in my experience does not raise much enthusiasm among academic lawyers. Some would deny or minimise any decline of lawyers in public governance. Some would hesitate to reform legal studies, mostly because they would see it as a betrayal of their legal culture. Some simply cannot be bothered to contemplate the need to acquire fresh expertise beyond the law as they have learnt, taught or practised it for years. Such attitudes are not new. When I come to the background of Albertico Gentili's position towards legal humanism in the 16th century, I shall suggest that the unwillingness of many, if not most, lawyers to integrate legal humanistic expertise in addition to their traditional learning was probably inspired by similar attitudes. One of the obvious changes that legal education might introduce would be to incorporate a high degree of expertise in some of the social sciences in the lawyer's legal methods, that is, as part of their legal reasoning. This may sound far less anathema to English legal ears than it does to continental civil lawyers. After all, in the common law tradition, policy considerations, both in case law and in legal literature, are not uncommon. I would nevertheless question to what extent even those policy considerations, when anticipating the potential social and economic effects of introducing a new rule or changing in the existing rule, are sufficiently informed by the standards of social sciences. It is, moreover, a controversial question in the eyes of many lawyers whether social sciences, in the broad sense, may to some extent replace some of the core concepts and principles historically developed by legal science. The contract theory, which earned two economists a Nobel Prize in 2016, may seem far away from the legal notion of contract, but it is all the same possible to imagine that a balance of interest and mechanisms considered by such economic theories may start replacing the traditional legal parameters of contractual interests. Similarly, the common phrase of risk ownership in management studies. Now, I must admit this as a slide I inserted last Sunday. I had never heard about risk owners and risk ownerships until last Sunday, and I'm not alone. I was Monday, I had a workshop in Paris, I saw some very good lawyers, including business law, I asked them, do you know this phrase in English or in French, no? On Tuesday I was teaching in Leiden in Holland, so I asked some of the colleagues in Holland, do you know the phrase risk ownership or risk or agnum, so they thought it was something entirely different. Yesterday I was teaching in Belgium and I asked there in two faculties and I asked there again a few colleagues no one had, so maybe it's quite different here, I don't know, but I came across the phrase for a fluke last Sunday, I thought first it was a mistake, I checked on internet and I saw that management studies will find hundreds and hundreds of thousands of views of the term and I even found a few illustrations here for this slide. So, the common phrase of risk ownership in management studies may forebode a substantial erosion of the legal concepts of liability or property if they continue to be developed and applied in different contexts of corporate management and furthermore well beyond company law. It may be argued that such central legal concepts have already undergone substantive transformations inspired by models of social sciences but that argument does not address the issue whether a distinctive legal normativity is being substituted rather than supplemented by the normativity models of social sciences. When introducing this theme to an audience which is neither familiar with law and history, right opposite of the audience I suppose, for example in my annual introductory lecture on legal history to freshers during their first week at a law faculty, I tried to bring home how essential the concept of justice has been in late medieval and early modern artistic representations of public governance. Ambrodio Lorenzetti's wall painting in the town hall of Siena, which have attracted much attention from historians of political ideas, are a particularly good example because various representations of justice highlight the importance of justice both as the fairness of policies and as the justice administered by the courts for public governance. The allegory of the good government of Siena is literally framed on both sides by a different representation of justice. On the one hand is one of the nine virtues which gives strength and hence efficiency to the good government. On the other hand as a justice inspired by the wisdom of superior norms from which a court supported by the citizenship runs to the seat of power where it is attached to the right wrist of the supreme power, restraining the hand that holds the scepter, the symbol of the exercise of bad power, perhaps one of the strongest symbols in western art of how law can or should contain political power. On the wall showing the allegory of bad government justice is crushed and held by a leash. Whatever the vantage point of the artist's depiction of government justice is part of the message conveyed. In later times justice had sometimes been used as the figure representing the well-governed polity itself for which we have several examples in Venice or in more abstract terms the good public governance. That was the case on the title page of the volume published in Frankfurt on mine in 1578 in which the newly revised statute law of the self-governing city was presented. The same allegory of the Goudas Regiment was used for a painting commissioned for the counselling of the Imperial City of Regensburg. The central figure of that good government is justice, whose executive power is restrained by chains held by other virtues or qualities of a good government. One last example. From the series of seven allegorical paintings commissioned in 1595 by the Hanseatic City of Danzig which were also used to decorate the city council room and which depict the main qualities of good government ranging from human justice, the first picture of the series, to the divine justice of the last judgment, the last picture of the series. In all the other intermediary five pictures each focusing on a distinct essential quality of good government the figure of Lady Justice also appears, here for example in the picture where freedom is a central civic virtue. The painter, the Dutchman Hans Freydom and the Threes seems to have followed the same idea as Lorenzetti in 14th century Siena. Justice is to be all present in any picture of representation of public governments. Moreover, as the painting of freedom Libertas underscores, that good governance will seek support in the rule of law Yura et Leges. The implication is I suggest that a good governance will require legal expertise. Albertico Gentili, against the background of his own legal education and of the role played by university educated lawyers in Italian city states had been fully exposed to that legal tradition and culture of public governance in Italy which by his lifetime had spread to different other European countries. The argument of today's paper is that his work needs to be understood as an attempt to adjust civil law learning to the changes of early modern political reality when a new type of sovereign had emerged in political theory and in the political reality of some territories. In that new political environment his aim appears to have been to secure the central place of civil lawyers in the governance of the early modern polity. It was foremost a matter of adjusting rhetorical skills, the range of scholarship and the standards of reasoning. However, Gentili also had to face the question whether the legal culture which had permeated late medieval Italian city governance was compatible with the new early modern paradigm of government. Before we launch on that difficult question a scenic break and actually the only reason excuse for having a otherwise totally an exceptional and rather dull PowerPoint is the three or four slides that will follow with pictures of San Ginesio. So before we launch on that difficult question a scenic break Gentili was born and grew up in San Ginesio, a small town of the marches. In his latest currently work Gentili would occasionally refer to names or figures of speech from his childhood environment. The city lays inland beyond Macerata and from the city walls looking west one has striking views of the Sibyline mountains and I suppose for anyone who is interested in legal history anyone will have at least one or probably a few books published by Dr Djufre in Milano. Now where this picture is taken from just on the right there is the villa Isabella and I was told that Isabella was Dr Djufre's wife because she came from San Ginesio and so to Dr Djufre had his Pietater in San Ginesio with almost the same view as you can see now. The central square of the town is called Piazza al Berico Gentili and is adorn with a 19th century statue of the jurist, a monument commissioned when after the Dysorgimento the new Italian state was looking for inspiring figures from its historical past preferably not too closely associated with the Roman Catholic Church. Gentili's statue looks down on a street called after his younger brother, Scipiona Gentili who like his older brother became a law professor and a prolific scholar yet in the immediate vicinity of the central square the ruins of the former family home of the Gentili's is a reminder of a more sinister story and I'm afraid that's the end of the scenic part of the PowerPoint presentation. After his law studies in Perugia perhaps the university which produced the largest number of prominent late medieval Italian legal scholars al Berico Gentili started working as a local legal practitioner in his native region. That unremarkable start of a legal career was abruptly ended in 1579 when Gentili's father and his two sons had to flee from San Ginesio and Italy because inquisition suspected they were entertaining Protestant sympathies. We can follow a few stages of the Gentili's flight to northern Europe from San Ginesio to Lluwylianna to the Holy Roman Empire and the spring of 1580 Gentili was in Heidelberg a few days later in Neustadt from where he travelled to Cologne and from there to the Low Countries where he stopped in Antwerp which had become the most important centre of trade and finance in north-western Europe during the 16th century but which was then under threat as a result of the Dutch revolt. By the summer of 1580 al Berico Gentili had arrived in London he would soon, that's where he got misdirected I suppose he would soon move to Oxford where he appears to have been admitted to teach. Meanwhile his brother's shipyard had remained in the empire he was appointed to a chair in civil law at Aldorf and the two brothers remained in touch and one may assume that through his brother Gentili was informed about civil law studies in Germany. By the mid 1580s al Berico Gentili's prospects in England seemed unpromising. He was the victim of a cabal which may have been fostered by the French jurist Jean Hotman whose correspondence betrays a poison pen targeting Gentili in a wide circle of influential academic and public figures. That may have been one of the reasons behind Gentili's departure to Germany in 1586 however, thanks to effective political patronage he was appointed to the richest chair in civil law at Oxford in 1587 returned to England and never left the country again. During the latter years of his life he resided regularly in London where he died in 1608. A funeral monument was erected in St Helen's Bishop's Gate a few yards from the former striking monument for another Italian jurist who made a judicial career in late Elizabethan and early Stuart England, Sir Julius Caesar. Even after his appointment in Oxford Gentili found out that as an Italian exile he would face much suspicion and opposition in England. In his correspondence and other writings he complained how for futile reasons he was still being accused of Italian levity. More seriously, even his protestant credentials would occasionally be questioned. Whereas Sir Hotman's poison pen in the 1580s appears to have been targeting Gentili for betraying the cause of legal humanism The exchange of an intensive academic hate mail at Oxford in the 1590s seems to have been triggered by conflicts of interest opposing members of the university belonging to different areas of scholarship. To some factions, especially among the theologians Gentili was clearly not welcome in Oxford. One may suspect that the animosity was not merely personal but it also reflected a perception that Gentili's opinions and work at Oxford was contrary to the agenda pursued by those same theologians. Let us therefore have a cursory look at some of Gentili's published work. Selection I have made is not entirely representative as it leaves out several of Gentili's so-called minor yet characteristic works. A general remark that can be made is that several of Gentili's works appear to have originated from major experiences in his own life or from political events in his lifetime. All the same, it is possible to recognise some lines of development in his scholarship and, more importantly, a fairly consistent purpose in his published work even when his writing was triggered by specific circumstances. The Eurus Interpretygus, published at a stage when Gentili was still seeking a more permanent position in Oxford has been read as a strong stand for traditional legal learning and, in the case of a Perugian graduate, the phrase Bartolism may be especially appropriate and a denial of the need for lawyers to acquire a legal humanistic expertise and culture. The Allegationibus is one of those works which belong to the first generation of legal monographs on the status of ambassadors. Gentili was apparently inspired to write it after he and John Utman had been commissioned to write a legal opinion on the case of the Spanish ambassador involved in a conspiracy to kill the queen. De Belli Camentaciones, sorry, I went a bit too quickly, were a preliminary draft of what became, ten years later, Gentili's most famous book, The Eure Belli. It is hardly a coincidence that the earlier versions were published in the same year 1588, as that of the Great Armada which changed the protracted phone war which preceded it in a situation of fully fledged open warfare. Within two years, in 1605, within two years after James I's accession to the English throne, Gentili published a volume including three short treatises on topical issues. The absolute power of the king, the unlawfulness of any rebellion against the king and the union of England and Scotland. The same year another collection of treatises dealt with the sources of civil law and canon law. Gentili scholars have found it difficult to reconcile his strong language in condemning canon law books in contrast to his extensive use of canon law scholarship in his own work. And still in the same year, 1605, a piece addressing foremost an academic audience recalled Gentili's links with the university where he had been educated and the university where he had pursued his career as a teacher. The 1607 disputation of a title of the code are usually not counted among the canon of Gentili's major work. It is however representative of Gentili's use, probably stemming from his teaching on the disputatio format to deal with often less conventional topics in legal literature. Finally, two posthumous publications should be mentioned. The Hispanic Advocacy originated as legal opinions, concilia in the late medieval tradition, written by Gentili in different cases, some of which on behalf of Spanish interests after the Anglo-Spanish Peace Treaty of London of 1604. Gentili's manuscripts kept in the Budden Library showed that Gentili started reshaping the materials of his opinions by concentrating all the arguments and discussions of international law issues, in particular issues of maritime warfare, piracy, privateering, price law, in the first part of the book and other issues to a large extent procedural questions and evidence in the second book. The recasting effort was obviously unfinished at the time of his death. The Budden Manuscript contains evidence of three successive stages of the work's progress and that seems to be the state in which Avedicus Broderstripione had the work published. A somewhat more conventional type of legal literature was his commentary on the dangerous title the Verborum Significazione, possibly together with the title The Regulus Eurys Antiqui, one of the more often visited titles in some forms of teaching at Oxford and Cambridge at the time. Gentili's fame has long rested on his De Urebelli of 1598. To some extent, the title does not give full justice to the book, the third part of which deals specifically with the law of peace. In contrast, Gretjus, much more successful, the Urebelli Akpakis, does not have a separate part on the law of peace. Most of the topics related to the law of peace or posbellum are dealt with in a war-related perspective. The reception of Gentili's book seems to have taken place fairly quickly and even in the practice of international relations. For example, in a memorandum of early 1603, that is within five years of the publication, written on behalf of the German Antiqui League against the positions of the English merchant adventurers, I found more than 20 references to Gentili's De Urebelli. No doubt, however, that the fact that in that book Gentili had included a couple of explicit passages on the controversies between the Antiqui League and the English government was bound to draw the attention of continental lawyers acting for the hands' interests. The Urebelli has been translated into several languages recently in Italian, an addition which includes a notification of the many legal authorities quoted by Gentili. The best known translation is probably the English translation, which forms the companion volume of the reprint of the Urebelli and thearies of the Carnegie Foundation, since then also several times reprinted on the classics of international law. Yet Gentili's work has long remained on the fringe of mainstream legal historiography. His work on the law of war and other topics of international law, ambassadors, maritime warfare, was not entirely forgotten, but it was overshadowed by the European wide success of Grotsia's book first printed in 1625, and by the enormous literature and scholarship on international law and natural law which that book inspired. As for Gentili's other works, like so much of the civil law books produced at the time, they were quickly superseded by the new early modern more systematic legal literature, which more or less dispensed from any further need to rely on the old authorities, including the traditional authorities which were still very much present in Gentili's work. This is consistent with the observation that even the most authoritative works of that traditional late medieval scholarship ended being reprinted during the first quarter of the 17th century. A limited revival of interest for Gentili was launched by Thomas Erskine Hollands in awkward lecture in 1874. At the same time, Erskine Hollands' interest was practically entirely focused on Gentili's works on international law. In Erskine Hollands' days, the foundation of international law was sought at a time in history when, at least that seems to have been the perception, the early modern concept of exclusive state sovereignty was taking shape and when specialized monographs on international law topics started appearing. Whatever literature was not immediately recognisable as international law literature, for example medieval civil law commentaries or collections of Cassilia, where the materials on international law were scattered, was mostly ignored. The Gentilian trilogy on embassies on the law of war and on maritime warfare was duly reprinted with modern introductions and English translations in the classics of international law. This only further strengthened the reputation of Gentili as a writer on international law from the generation immediately preceding Grotsius. The most important all-encompassing study of Gentili's life and work was also published during the Interbellum by Gesina van der Morlen. As the title of the study makes clear, she was still mostly interested, perhaps understandably for a Dutch scholar, in Gentili's work on international law. But she also considered most of his other published work. Van der Morlen, who taught at a free University of Amsterdam, was also interested in Gentili's contribution as a Protestant legal scholar. Another study published on Gentili the same year by Gioastuti in Italy focused instead on Gentili's early book De Joris interpretibus. Relying on Gentili's plin favour of traditional late medieval legal scholarship, Astuti's work contributed significantly to a perception of Gentili as a somewhat conservative jurist with regard to legal methods. For about 20 years from the late 1980s until the commemoration of the fourth centenary of Gentili's death in 2008, a centre established in Gentili's birthplace San Ginesio started organising guest lectures, which eventually grew to impressive international conferences. The proceedings of those lectures and conferences now form a substantial collection of volumes dealing with an increasing wide range of historical approaches to Gentili's work. Indirectly, the centre's activities inspired an international project which resulted in 2010 in a new publication with an English translation and had a two somewhat neglected book by Gentili, The Armist Romanis, of which a first part had been published in 1590, and again with a second part providing in a mirror image the exact opposite argument of part one in 1599. The proceedings of an international conference which accompanied the preparation of that new edition form a companion volume of essays, many of which document different historical approaches to the Armist Romanis. This very cursory and complete survey of the increasingly broadening range of approaches in historiography on Gentili may nonetheless serve the purpose of pointing out some of the major shifts in Gentili's historiography since the late 19th century. First, the historical revival of Gentili's fortunes because of his contributions to the development of the early modern law of nations has been sustained and remains significant. In the second place, 20th century legal historiography on 16th legal literature has often been exceedingly haunted by a binary classification in Bartolism or Zitalicus and legal humanism or Mosgallicus. Those categories have not been jettisoned but legal historiography is now far more aware that those two terms are at most two vantage points of a gradual scale of methods and approaches. Thirdly, since the increase in interest for Gentili during the past quarter of a century a much wider range of features of his work has been subjected to scholarly scrutiny. At the same time, a degree of rivalry has developed between historians of political ideas who tend to view Gentili mainly as a political thinker without taking much into account his legal background and legal historians who insist on understanding Gentili first and foremost as a jurist. Current topics of interest have also inspired relatively novel research themes on Gentili. The controversy that opposed him to Oxford Hill Lotions has in recent years led to two publications which both have, as their main title, a famous quote from Gentili's work in Latin, Silleti Theologii in Munere Alliano, Keep Silent Theologians when you find yourself in a different field of expertise. Gentili's quip at the Theologians has often been taken in a more general sense. Perhaps even as one of those obitors which may reflect a much wider theme such as the push for secularisation in various fields of scholarship and their effects on public life. Not unlike, for example, the Etiamsy Deus Nondarrator of Grotsius. In this case, Gentili's citeswap is part of an argument on the fundamental and vexed issues of differences in religion as a cause of just war. A question which was not only relevant for relations between Christians and non-European polities but also for what was often at least concerned to lawyers such as Gentili and Grotsius for restraining the armed conflicts fuelled by religious diversity between Christians since the Reformation. In this passage of the Urebelli, however, Gentili was discussing the wars with the Turks. His position was to deny their difference of religion justified war, but he was also sufficiently aware of the need to be politically practical and therefore admitted that the constant and repeated attacks by the Turks on Christians were a sufficient cause to warrant a just war against them. His theoretical position may be seen as his attempt to take the religious sting out of the walls opposing Christians, a move which implied the need to exclude the unbridgeable divides fostered by the more radical or uncompromising religious factions on all sides. Nevertheless, I would recognise a wider concern beyond the argument about the Turks or even the underlying issue of religious wars between Christians. My argument is that the peak at the theologians expressed an essential concern of Gentili with regard to his conception of the civil law's place in public governments, and that that concern entailed a conception of law which he had inherited from his legal background in Italy and at Perugia. That argument begs, however, the question whether such a conception of law could still be maintained in the context of early modern sovereignty and the balance of political powers, which the polity of the new sovereign, a sovereign whose absolute powers gently himself emphasised. One of the great advantages of the shifts in historiography on Gentili, I refer to, is that Gentili is no longer a pigeonhole in a particular field of the law, that is, almost exclusively antonalei, international lawyer, or in a particular method, that is, either as a barterlist or as a legal humanist. For example, it is now widely acknowledged that over the years Gentili developed a much stronger legal humanistic register in his work without abandoning his traditional late Italian legal scholarship. One of the most puzzling features of Gentili's work is how he switches from one work to another from a predominant Mossitalicus register to a predominant legal humanistic register, or combines both registers in the same work. And although one can see that he mastered and used increasingly, as the years went on, the legal humanistic register, some of his later work could still rely more strongly on the traditional old register. I tend to believe that Gentili's choices can partly be explained by the type of audience he was primarily targeting in a particular work. Three examples may illustrate the point that the Eurebelli 5098 combines a strongly recognisable foundation in traditional learning and authorities, complemented by humanistic features, but also a breakthrough of systematisation by subject matter. Such a systematising effort was a feature of neither the Italian method nor legal humanism. The Ames Romanus in the 5099 version has all the hallmarks of a humanistic work with occasionally passages relying on the traditional scholarship. The Hispanic Advocatcio still displays the original register of the legal opinions from which it derives, which in accordance with the civil law court's practices at the time was still overwhelmingly following the traditional methods, though again adored with humanistic trimmings and in its unfinished stage the book also betrays an attempt at systematisation. The increasing interest of gentili for legal humanism should therefore not be understood as a full conversion to the humanist agenda. At the same time it shows that Gentili fell the need to proceed beyond the traditional learning an insight which may not be discernible in the interpretibles. A similar concern is also expressed in the works where he started reorganising the subject matter according to a systematic order. The key for understanding these alternations and combinations of different registers, thus at least the central thesis of my lecture is Gentili's concept of law, which was inherited from the late medieval civil and cannon war jurisprudence. It was a concept which envisaged jurisprudence primarily as a science of public governance. The jurisprudential expertise of the civil or cannon lawyer was first of all aimed at counselling and then implementing the political decision making process which in order to remain legitimate had to deliver policies which could be justified as both efficient and fair. The administration of positive law which could at least in the secular context of civil law largely be left to the domain of customary law or statutory law. The growing integration of legal humanistic features in Gentili's work should be recognised as a reflection of his understanding that in order to retain their credibility among political decision makers civil lawyers had to prove a command of legal humanistic themes and style and to incorporate it in their legal reasoning. I'm not sure whether Gentili ever adopted what may have been their political agenda but his work on international law fitted in a strategy aiming at capturing a crucial role for civil lawyers not only in the area of diplomacy where they had traditionally been active but in international governance as a whole at a time when the traditional ascendancy of the high nobility in foreign affairs required to be more strongly buttressed by the expertise of civil lawyers. That is probably also the background of Gentili's somewhat abrupt address through the theologians to keep clear from the civil lawyers area of expertise. One of the challenges Gentili faced apart from the formidable competition of the common lawyers entrenched positions in English public governance but that is an issue he appears to have sidesteped entirely in his scholarly work was to maintain some of the legal culture which had pervaded the ideology of late medieval civil law scholarship and arguably of the late medieval Italian polities. It is in that pervasive ideology of a legal culture in public governance especially in largely self-governing cities that I would recognise the origins and emergence of the civil law concept, though not the phrase, of a continental style rule of law. That Stato di Diretto avant la Letra was obviously the most fertile soil for the deployment of lawyers at the heart of public governance. Since Gentili appears to have accepted the shift to a political model where the sovereign's exercise of power could be more habitually absolute than the protestas extraordinaria in late medieval doctrine, it required a great deal of confidence in the virtues of civil law, jurisprudence, for expecting that it could still contribute to regulate the polity under an absolute monarch. Repositioning the civil lawyers in the early modern public governance may at any rate have appeared comparatively easier to achieve in the field of international governance than in the domestic order. That Gentili may nonetheless have entertained some hopes to promote his agenda even in English domestic affairs is perhaps expressed by the fact that one of the very few English phrases which exceptionally appear in his works in the 1605 regal predisputations, that of prerogative or prerogative power which Gentili seems to have equated with the civil law notions of extraordinary or absolute power. As religious issues were not only omnipresent in international relations but also in domestic policies, Gentili faced competition from theologians in the struggle for achieving a dominant position in counselling the sovereign with regard to permissible and designable policies. That appears to have been beyond the specific issues about which they cross swords or at least their pens, the backdrop of the at-a-time bitter controversy which appears Gentili and the theologian John Reynolds at Oxford during the early 1590s. The reference to the two tables of the decilote was used by Gentili as a metaphor which allowed him to argue that the theologian's domain was restricted to the matters governed by the first table. Which Gentili seems to define in a rather restrictive sense as divine law. While the potentially broad range of topics governed by the divine commands of the second table appear to be not divine law as defined by Gentili but for what he called law relating to human relations, use umanum. In the passage of his book on marriage, a characteristic leak subject which was coveted by both ecclesiastical and secular authorities and for which Protestant doctrines had facilitated a shift towards secular regulation. Gentili confirmed that not all that God says belongs to the realm of theologians. Nevertheless, when one looks at the questions hot to debate in Gentili's exchanges with Oxford theologians, they mostly refer only obliquely to central conflicts of interest between secular lawyers and the vines. Religious normativity was an area where Gentili clearly felt he had to be cautious. In his book on marriage, in order of his famous formulaic art birds in our day and age, he might have been quite adept at tweeting, condemned in violent terms the canon law books. Yet throughout his scholarship he would continue to use sometimes extensively canon law authorities and principles. Characteristically for a legal approach, Gentili's dealing with canon law was mostly formatted in terms of a conflict or competition of jurisdictions. Gentili somewhat bypassed the wrangle on the continent where counter-reformation jurists and theologians attempted to resist and counter the encroachments, as they saw it, by secular authorities on the turf they claim, by revitalising the notion of the forum concienciae and as the areas where the law of the church would prevail. Gentili was too respectful of tradition for rejecting the distinction with the realm of conscience and sin, and he therefore accepted an autonomous province of the forum concienciae, which was the proper terrain of theologians. But following his inclusive approach of use of humanum, he incorporated much of the canon law in the use of humanum and therefore in the field of expertise and prerogatives of the civil lawyers. The noopsies illustrates the point. In the Armist Romanes, which will be my last example, Gentili emulated the exercise operated in ancient Rome by Carniades and presented two sets of mere arguments, one supporting the view that all the wars of the Romans until the empire was established were unjust, the other the opposite view. The register here is almost exclusively humanistic, with comparatively few legal arguments. The question how to deal with dubious or contradictory historical evidence provides an exception. The book can be styled as a political historical adversarial essay on various issues which call for arguing whether war is just or unjust. My own interpretation, which I have, I'm borrowing here from my own article, which was published last year in the book, which is presented there on the slide. My own interpretation of how this book fits in Gentili's scholarly work in general and why it appeared in the immediate aftermath of his work on the law of war is that it shows the range of skills that a civil lawyer was able to display in counselling if need be either way a sovereign on war and thus on foreign policy. It shows, in other words, how useful a civil lawyer could be as a political counsellor. It therefore had to avoid technical legal discussions, two technical discussions, and express the arguments according to acceptable standards for political or diplomatic exchange. The general format is that of an axio, an adversarial trial which helps to give the jurist the edge. What really caught my attention are the final chapters in each part of the book. At that stage, one sees that the whole previous argumentation which broadly follows the history of Roman wars in chronological order culminates in an assessment of the end result of Rome's imperial policy and the establishment of its empire. The virtues attributed to that empire by the advocate of the Roman wars seem to come straight from a Lorenzetti-type fresco or from any late medieval treatise on one governor. Ultimately, the whole justification of the empire appears to be that it ensures a good public governance to its populations. And very much as in Lorenzetti's wall painting and in non-theological literature, that public governance is envisaged almost exclusively in secular terms, not with reference to any afterlife. There is an essentially worldly concern for the people's welfare, wholly focused on their life on earth. It is not concerned, what may be the churches and the philogians' concern, with establishing on earth a celestial Jerusalem. The whole argument brings the reader back to the essential skills that will be necessary to ensure the realization of such social welfare in peacetime. Once the empire has established its governance, through a just use of arms, the Romans conquered the empire and similarly from just laws, they maintained it. That seems firmly to secure the place of lawyers in the policy. Now, I've understood just before I started the lecture that I was going to talk about something just less than an hour. So, at the end of this, I'll have to prepare some more examples and more developments, which I will skip now. And looking at the time, I'll jump to the final conclusion. So, I'm leaving out, there are obviously far more arguments that can be given for the reading, but if you just bear with me, and then there are, I'm afraid, quite a lot of additional things, which I was not going to, no, no, no, don't worry. These are just things I took off. I had put at the end not to be shown. Oh, yes, that's a completely different argument. Wait a moment. The last few things you saw was just for a potential discussion. I wasn't taught whether there might be a discussion or not. So, if the reading of Gentile, I have outlined in this lecture, is basically correct. I believe that it may give a greater degree of consistency for understanding both many of the topics he tackled, even when many of those topics were inspired by contingent external factors, and also for understanding how we tackled them, why, for instance, he would emphasise at times the legal humanist register or at times keep to a clearly more traditional register of legal reasoning. At the same time, for all the modern features in his work, his very reliance on the Italian heritage or perhaps the fact he relied too explicitly and too directly on that heritage may also be an important factor explaining why his work failed to wield much influence in his own century. That's the part I've really skipped. This is how do you combine this culture of law, of government by law, with a belief in an absolutist regime? In that respect, Grotsch's technique in recycling older authorities may have been more effective for leaving his mark on 17th century legal developments. However, for a legal historian, understanding the failure of achieving influence may be just as significant as understanding a success. Thank you.