 Wel, wrth gweithio, dyfodol y gallwn mewn gweld. Gwyrdd yw yw'r ddebyrch, dyfodol yma. Mae'n gweld fawr yn ymgylchedd ar y dyfodol ar gyfer y Llywodraeth Ymddian yn Ymddian, y Llywodraeth Ymdian yw'r Llywodraeth Hwnnw. Hefyd yw Kenneth Armstrong, rydyn ni'n gweld y gweithfawr hefyd yn y Llywodraeth Llywodraeth yn y Llywodraeth Rydyn a'r ddefnyddio y Llywodraeth Ymddian yw'r ddefnyddio ymddian y Llywodraeth a'r ystafell yw'r 27 yma yn brydol yn y sgwrs. Mae'r Llywodraeth MacIntyll yn gweithio'r oed yn cyllsig o'r cyflwyno yma o'r ddechrau o'i Llywodraeth Llywodraeth Cymru o'r ysgwrs. A wedi'r Ysgrifennu Unigol yn 1973, mae'r Llywodraeth MacIntyll yn ymgyrchol that has been the president of that court. And tonight's lecture is the 20th to be delivered. And I'm delighted that we will be able to welcome tonight Pascal Llamées to give this year's lecture. Like the other speakers in the series Pascal Llamées has made an enormous contribution to public life. As you will all know, he served as an EU Trade Commissioner a?'r dyrectorion gympan o gweithio ddechrau. Pascala me is also someone who thinks and reflects deeply on what and who trade liberalisation is for and very helpfully he puts his thoughts on paper. His topic for tonight's lecture is globalisation faltering and it could hardly be more timely. Ie, mae'r bobl yn ysgolwch yn ein candliadau, yn cyfnodd gyda'r Cymru yn 2013, ac yn y bobl, Pascal, yn ystod y bydd yn fydig o'r cyfnodd gyda'r cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd, ac yn y ffondol cyfnodd cyfnodd gyda'r cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd. Ond yn ystod, mae'r bobl yn eich bod yn iawn oedd y gweld yn ardal yn ystyried. Felly ar gyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd cyfnodd, a'r redistribwysio fawr ac'n duddol. Mae'r brydol ysgolwch yn gallu lleidoli iawn, pleidoli iawn i'r rau lleidoli arnyn nhw'n ffermynol pethau o'r eisteddydd Cymru, ...wyddi'r Cymru weithio y Cymru iawn ar y union Europea. Rwy'r Brexit wedi gweld dromodau o'r bynnag... ...ac cyhoedd y dyfodol o'r fraennau paesgau Paesgau Llamau... ...aeth yn ddim yn bwysig i'r ddim yn ysgrifennu... ...fodd yw'r byn yn bwysig i'r ffaldradd. … pendantau'r ffaldradd yn cael eu lleiddiad... ...o bwysig i'r Pesgau Paesgau i gydag ystod... ...y 2017 o'n rhywbeth o'r lech chi, Paesgau. Well, good evening! Thanks for this introduction. Thanks for the invitation. It's an honour for me to have been invited for this annual MacKenzie Stewart lecture. I happened to have had the privilege of working with Lord Maconley Stewart at the time when I was chief of staff to Jacques Delor, which was the position I had between 85 and 94. Part of this coincided with the mandate of a late Maconley Stewart. It's also an honor because you just said you are celebrating the 25th anniversary of this Center for European Legal Studies, which in 2017 may be a bit of a paradox, because this year is the year where history will say it was the year when article 50 was triggered and the Brexit process started. You already kind of hinted at that as I'm well known for being among those who regret this vote. I thought it might not be academically quite given my total lack of objectivity to address this Brexit issue up front this year, which is why I retweeted to a somehow, although, and I'll come back to that in a minute, less contentious issue which is globalization. Now why are these two issues closely connected in my mind is obvious. It's because European integration and globalization have been the two big major transformations of which my generation have lived through and I've been lucky enough to be involved quite directly in the very machine room of these two transformations, which is why they are, in my view, connected with one another. Both of these transformations, which indeed have been grand of our times, at least for a few decades, are now under scrutiny, if not outrightly rejected by some, at least in the West. And I think we need to understand why and what this means for the future. So that's what they have in common. There is, of course, a major difference between EU integration and globalization. You can step down from the EU train at some cost, I believe, but I may be wrong, but you can't step down from the train of globalization and that's a major difference. And in these circumstances, my main point, which I will give it up tonight with you, is that given that you cannot step down from the train of globalization, the only option you are left with, at least for those who have issues with globalization, and I have issues with globalization, is to harness it in order to move it in the direction which we believe is right for those of us who believe that it doesn't naturally lead in the right direction. And this is where you're taken back to European integration because I think that for us, being a French, I think I would say the same if I was a German or an Italian or a Spaniard, EU integration is the only tool we have to try and move globalization in the direction we want. But let's first look at this issue whether or not we still have to look at the future with globalization in mind, and of course whether it's or not faltering. Now, there are some signals, rumors, interpretation, sort of market ideas. You can find traces of this notion that globalization is not only faltering, but halting or even moving backwards. There is a bit of that in economics, and assuming globalization is what you rightly said, I believe it is, which is a hysterical face of the expansion of market capitalism, and we've had others in preceding times, and we probably will have others in coming times. True, if you look at the numbers, and the numbers are, trade numbers are probably the best approximation of the speed, the force of globalization, I mean trade numbers, which is international trade measured in volumes. There are traces that the speed of growth of international trade measured in volume is not what it used to be 10 or 15 years ago. In other words, the ratio between the growth of trade volumes and the growth of GNPs, which is Pierce and Apple, GNPs being a sum of value addition, trade volumes being a sum of trade flows, and if trade Chris crosses several borders in the case of a global value supply chain of cars, for instance, you can have a huge volume of trade for the same car because things spare parts, which are assembled here or there, increase the volume of international trade. So by this standard, by this measure, there are signs that the acceleration of globalization understood as inter-penetration of production of goods and services, which you can also measure in measuring the import content of exports. All these numbers tell us that we are probably at a stage where the speed which we've had is not there anymore, so it's slowing. There are also obvious cultural signs, and I think the US election can be taken as an example of that. That speed, the force, past decades of globalization has led to a sort of cultural backlash. What Panca Mishra called the sort of title of his latest book, The Age of Anger, a sort of mutiny against modernizing elites, which triggers nativist, illiberal reactions, including on the form of religious fundamentalism. So there is a sort of new problem of us versus them, which finds a clear expression in what happened in the US, with what happened if you look at the growing support that these so-called populist movements received in Europe, and I put populist in brackets. It's a word I do not like to use because I think using it is in a way recognizing that the people are with them, which I don't. But let's agree that there is a sign of that, at least again in the western hemisphere. Although what happened in the recent season in the Philippines or in Turkey or even in India could be interpreted in the same manner. Now, there are signs in the economic side, cultural side. There are signs also in the difficulty, in global governance of this previous very high-speed globalization, addressing for instance in the story of the development agenda. Assuming the World Trade Organization is one of the prime governors of globalization because it is the prime governor of international trade. Obviously, the fact that from 2008 on until now, this agenda hasn't moved, although other treaties or trade-opening agreements have moved forward, is a sign of globalization, having a problem in terms of its governance. So, there are signals, but there are also signals in another direction from which one would consider that the news, as said Mark Twain, the report of legalizations are probably greatly exaggerated. And that's also stemmed from the observation of economics, cultural reactions, mood of times or even global governance. If you look at economics and if you assume, which is my case, that the main engine of globalization is technological progress, which itself stands for a large part, not the total part, the large part from science, the odds are that globalization will keep going on. The main reason why globalization will keep going on is that the capacity of technology to crush the cost of distance, which was what limited globalization during a long time, still has a lot of potential. So, brace for more of this international division of labour. It sometimes will reach the plateau, as it probably does for the moment, but assuming relative prices start changing for whatever reason, for instance, if one day we would have a price for CO2, then the shape of globalization will change, but it still will be globalization in different circumstances. The global supply chains will keep expanding, not least because a large part of what now is exchanged and which is not measured by the volumes of trade is data. A lot of what now is used to create value is not accounted in any statistic of international trade. And that, of course, creates a measuring issue, which we economists have known for a long time. It's not that we don't have a theory of how the thing works, that we can't measure it, at least for the moment, because we haven't put our observation in the right place. So, I personally believe that this sort of interconnection, which creates interdependence, will keep growing, notably in the digital age. This is also partly true in areas like cultures, like imagination, like mind projections or concepts. If you consider, for instance, the growing role of NGOs in public perceptions and the framing of public attitudes in this world, if you take issues like hunger or corruption or environment, there is a very large convergence all over this planet and stemming from systems of thought, traditions, spirituality, culture, very different. There is a huge process of convergence on a number of these issues. And, by the way, part of this convergence is triggered by this infrastructure. I'm not 100% Marxist, but enough to believe that infrastructure is still meta. If you look at the way, for instance, the expansion of trade leads to a necessity to agree on animal welfare standards, which is maybe not the first priority that we have for the global culture. Why start with animal welfare standards? Well, it has to start with animal welfare standards because meat is traded. And the moment comparative advantage works, the weight works now, it becomes an issue of major importance. When I was a digital reviewer, I had avoided, at the last minute, a litigation between Australia and Indonesia at a time where animal welfare activists in Australia tries the government to ban the export of life capital to Indonesia because there was slaughtered hal, which was a terrible thing for that. Now, one would normally react and say, aren't human rights a priority as compared to animal welfare standards, certainly on the moral point of view, but the way the world works and the way globalization expands leads to this sort of convergence, which probably would not have been intellectually the first thing to do. As far as signals on governance are concerned, true in some cases, there have been its own failures in recent time. We've also had reasonable successes. COP 21 was certainly a moment where global governance worked after many years of failures and probably a bit late as compared to some of our ambitions, but the G20 has done reasonably good work on taxation of multinationals. Not that we are there yet, at least in my view, but something is happening which never happened before and it's an area where, as you know, vested interests are extremely strong. One of the reasons why this global governance may be moving forward in some areas is probably that, because of globalization, what previously was in the hands of sovereign animals, sovereign Vespallians animal, as per the piece of Vespallia 1648, which had until now the monopoly of international relations of global governance are losing this monopoly, which now falls probably a bit more in the hands of non-state actors and I'm thinking of cities, for instance, when you look at the role major cities on this planet played to prepare the COP 21 and their presence at the event itself, it's pretty clear. Of course NGOs, of course multinationals, some of them now understand that as stakeholders of this globalization process, they have to take their own responsibilities in engaging. And those of us who attended COP 21 cannot not have noticed that there were three big wide pavilions, like an expo. One was for states and they had their logo and their name, Japan, etc. Another one was for NGOs, it was the same setting, it was another whole, the same setting, and the names had roughly the same characters. And a third one was with multinationals, we had General Electric and the Philips and the Alibaba in the same hall, with roughly the same name tags as the one you found in it. So that was visually extremely striking and I think this is moving forward in what I call polygovernance as opposed to multi-governance, which was the traditional system. So, bit of signals on the one side but also other signals on the other side, which lead me to believe that globalization is here to say. Now what does this mean for the time to come, and I will conclude in, of course, in mentioning Brexit, what does this mean? It means that we will have to keep coping with globalization as a force, with its good sides and its bad sides, like often said and written that this is a genus, you've got two faces, one was smiling, and one grimacing. The good side is poverty reduction, the good side is creating interdependences, creating links, which the distinction which is costly. And this is reality, especially if you look at the map of the world and if you look at where zones of hardship, conflict, tensions, wars are, they usually are the places of this planet which have remained outside of globalization. When I was a BGFWTO, I often discussed with a very good friend of mine who now has become SecGN of the UN, Antonio Bouterres, and we would look at our respective maps. I would have my map of the world with where I have members and where I don't have members. He would look at his map of the world where he had most of his clients, refugees, asylum seekers, displaced populations, and where I had most of my non-clients was in an art between Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and the eastern corner of Africa, plus North Korea, Algeria, a bit outside of these zones. That's where I had 80% of my non-members and that's where he had 80% of his clients. So that says something about this relationship. So there are good sides in globalization. There are also, as we know, less good sides, which is that why globalization has reduced poverty and created some stability. It has also increased inequalities. There's a big debate whether this is forever, whether this is intrinsically linked to the way market capitalism works. Others would say it's a transition period, a bit like in the 19th century, to which the reply would be, yeah, but in the 19th century it only was on a standard indicator because of social movements that then took a bit of control of the situation. The reality being that if globalization works, and it does, in my view, it is because it is painful. So globalization works to create economic efficiencies, which is a pretension for welfare. Economic efficiencies are not automatically welfare. There are a pretension for welfare, but this, of course, needs a series of conditions, which is, by the way, the reason why when I wrote this, when I recovered my freedom of speech, leaving WTO in 2013, I published this book, which the title of which is the Geneva Consensus. As opposed to the Washington Consensus, the Washington Consensus being roughly, you open, you liberalize, and God will take care of the rest. The Geneva Consensus being you open, but you have to observe a series of conditions for this trade-opening efficiencies to translate into welfare, and that's, in my view, to be easily understood what Mr Ricardo and Mr Schumpeter theorized at the time with that comparative advantage with work. If I do something better than you do, and you do something better than I do, we have a rational interest to trade and exchange, but of course the people with me who are producing what you do better than them won't be that happy. They will suffer a competitive shock, which is where Mr Schumpeter comes in, and of course the weakest in my truth will be hit by this as the weakest in your truth will be hit by my comparative advantage, and this is the reason why you need this efficiency creation to be, at least in my view, matched with proper social system, which is where I still am after a number of years in engagement and running such processes. That's roughly how I see the problem. The difficulty, of course, being that this process of globalization by definition with this technological engine is a global one, whereas what you have to do in order to harness it is mostly of a local nature. Most of what you have to do in order to harness globalization relies on redistribution, solidarity in one way or another, and solidarity is inevitably something much more local. I will accept to pay for people who belong to the same community as I do for a variety of reasons, but I have a limited sense of belonging. At some stage, I'm not going to accept, which is why this interaction between politics and economics becomes so crucial, and it's understandable that the moment you rely on solidarity, more or less, and you can detail this, the moment you rely on solidarity, you have an accountability issue, and accountability is something that goes with local. There is a lot of local accountability, and inevitably, and this probably will not change before a long time, a very limited global accountability. So that's the issue we have to struggle with in this complex articulation. As far as culture is concerned, I think we also have to invent something that is different from a sort of cosmopolitan identity. I don't think there is something like a cosmopolite identity, or at least there is nothing like a cosmopolitan identity that would substitute other identities. I think the way forward on this, and that's what I have observed, including through my train of lens, is that the way forward is to articulate different levels of identity, which is perfectly possible if you look, for instance, at the federal systems. And this takes back, before I conclude, this takes us back to this European question. And in many ways, I mean, the European integration process is key to this issue. A, because it is about economic integration and political integration. B, because in these cultural sphere, we have things in common, which in terms of values, which probably bind us together in a specific way. Now, not that the dream of the founding fathers, which was that economic integration would, by itself, produce political integration, has worked, I think, after 60 years of celebrating the treaty of Rome this month, after 60 years, we know that this belief they had, my boss had, when I was with the law, I had, including when I was a EU commissioner, that forging economic integration would, by whatever, a chemistry miracle lead to forging political union, we have to know it doesn't work this way. I'm not saying it doesn't work at all, but it doesn't work this way. There is something more that needs to enter in so that this chemistry works. And there's something more, in my view, is in the area of values, beliefs, of concepts, of imagination, of symbols, of narratives. And that's something in a way I realized much more clearly when I left Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg to join Geneva at the WTO, where I had the occasion during many years to observe EU from outside with the eyes of non-Europeans. And this is a fantastic experience because what you quite rapidly realize is that what European identity is about is much clearer in the eyes of non-Europeans than it is in the eyes of Europeans. If you ask an average Chinese or British or Nigerian or Indonesian, what's Europe about? What's the definition? They will probably give you a rather clear definition. The shortest probably being it's a place where it's nice to live. That's a very short one. And I think it still remains the very short one, although some are starting to have a few doubts, given the relatively low level of economic and social performance of the EU for the last 10 years. If you dig a bit more, people will tell you it's a place where there is a specific mix balance between individual freedom, collective social security systems. It's a place where people are less intolerant to inequalities than in other places. It's a place where environment sensitivity is higher. It's a place where access to culture is more widespread in the population, especially depending of your level of resources. So there is something like a European civilization model which is, I believe, what needs to be realized a bit more in the future than it has been in the past. I mean Jean Monnet never said what he was said to have said, which is if I had to restart, I would restart with culture. He never said that. And I'm not saying that's proper way forward, but there is something true in the fact that in between this economic integration and this political integration, you need this glue which is about values. And that leads me naturally to my conclusion, which is that, of course, if EU, if Europe is about values, UK is part of that. There is no way you could, if you look at European identity this way, distinguish the EU omelet on the one side and the UK egg on the other, which is the whole problem of Brexit, which is getting this egg out of the omelet, which is a very complex issue. And this is the big question mark for people like me and I'm working quite a lot on trying both to understand and to think of a Brexit something that would limit what I believe are damages for us all. Going back to my introduction, I believe that long-term globalization remains a process where economics will, at the end of the day, trump politics. Have they done it for the last 30, 40 years? Not, obviously, in a very convincing way for the last two or three years, but long-term I think the fundamental reasons remain there. On Brexit, I think only time will tell whether what happened last June and which, in my view, again, I'm not objective at all, but which, in my view, is a moment where politics trumped economics, whether this will be the case three years, five years, eight years, ten years from now. I don't know and I'll be looking at that extremely carefully, not least because for us remaining the continental EU 27, the Brexit is also a test case. The fundamental ideological fuel of European integration is that we will do better together than single. What's at stake with Brexit is exactly this experience. We have to take it as it is. After all, most of us would not have wished it to happen, at least on the continent, which is where we probably differ from the British public. But this experience is going to have a huge impact on the UK, of course, but it would also have a huge impact on the EU, notably when the jury will be there ten years from now, not before, in my view, will tell you whether it's a good choice or not. Thanks for your attention.