 Well, thank you. Thank you very much. Can everyone hear me? Okay. Okay. Thank you very much It's really it's a distinct pleasure and a privilege to both have taught for this trimester with wonderful students and and a great great place Naval War College Under the auspices of Toshi and his chair and it's a great great Privilege to also have the opportunity to to to provide a lecture to all of you as well and the topic is going to be It's kind of a mishmash of things, but it's really about assessing the ever elusive military balance between the United States and and China but Put it into the context of competing Political objectives grand strategies of the two nations as well as some of the Internal politics and and weaknesses and challenges both face at at at home or or externally so that At least in Washington, DC It may be a bit of a corrective from going right into things like the Air Sea battle doctrine or offshore Control and and these other sort of operational doctrines that seem sometimes a bit divorced from Larger questions of strategy and politics and so on and so forth. So hopefully I can provide some of at least my own take on on the context of where these various operational concepts and maybe even military strategies are coming from So in terms of I mean grand strategy is a very popular term and maybe overused But it's not going to stop me from using it anyway right now Yeah, in terms of the United States and the Asia Pacific You know, I I look back to World War two the end of World War two and see a fair amount of consistency. I think at the largest kind of Level of abstraction of the macro level, which is the US decided That it was going to be the prime player primacy the prime actor in in the international politics of the world, but also Specifically of the Asia Pacific and that was for all kinds of reasons for for reasons of Setting of agenda setting politically of building a kind of liberal world order that the United States thought would be the most consistent with its way of life as a term was used back back in the 1940s in order to prevent a Hostel hegemon from emerging once again on the eurasian man land mass on the eastern parts of it and Just to basically shape shape the environment as it was taking over from from the UK Whether it liked to or not is taking over from the last prime player. So the US US grand strategy has been has been primacy and primacy has required Primacy in the service of the goal some of the goals that I that I mentioned the US wants protection as as Far forward as possible particularly after the war with imperial Japan. So doesn't want to have to slog its way back through the Pacific ever again The US didn't want another threat to emerge in the first place the US Wanted unfettered commercial and military access to the region a very dynamic region The US wanted to contain communism back then that obviously Disappeared but but in general the the idea of of a favorable balance of power was viewed as all very much within US US vital interests You know that being the prime power has required a set of military capabilities and strategies in order to Maintain that primacy and of course it's a US chose also to set up an alliance structure in the Asia Pacific Also as a means to maintaining its its position And so with that alliance structure has come other military obligations of helping defend and reassure and so on and of course the US wants to prevent a major power war and the spread of Weapons of mass destruction throughout the Asia Pacific now certainly now since since a lot of the countries that were once weak or colonized or Not autonomous certainly have the capability to To develop weapons of mass destruction so primacy has been I think the consistent goal. I think it's been sometimes talked about in More explicit terms sometimes talked about more implicit terms presidents use things like Indispensable nation Presidents use things like only the United States has the capacity to organize The kind of leadership and coalitions and I think many some presidents want to shy away from that term But then they come to see that the United States is still the only player in the world that can Effect the kind of changes that that we always seem to want to to affect So the the grand strategy is primacy and there's military capabilities that I'll talk about next That that are required to maintain your primacy The People's Republic of China and and I use that as as You know very specifically Today, you know since they won the war the Chinese common civil war the Chinese Communist Party 1949 is is Ruling China and has a has a distinct set of political goals that would be separate from Probably someone else who is a ruling regime or the way the regime is set up in inside China So the Chinese Communist Party, I think has its own set of of grand strategic objectives and and again the reason that I use that term is because Is is is almost pedantic in a sense, but it is the Chinese Communist Party We're talking about it's not you know the kind of democratic system where parties compete even over different foreign policies and grand strategies and and so on and and This specific nature of the Chinese Communist Party from this implicit intrinsic nature drives much of its Objectives and desires and so on and the main desire Is is an obvious one is is to stay in power now that you know may be easy to see You know it's simple every party wants to stay in power, but in this case You know it needs to stay in power without You know it needs to stay in power There's no competitive elections, but what is going on is staying in power means that once you have an economically dynamic System you've kind of had an economic Revolution in China since the reform and opening up period you haven't had a political revolution So you have a one-party state sitting atop of very socially and economically dynamic society So it's getting harder to stay in power for the Chinese Communist Party also So we talked about domestic instability often in China now some of that instability is just Chinese people with more wealth middle classes and so on just aspiring to more political participation and and different kinds of Of aspirations that that can't necessarily be met under the current system So the Chinese cut from the Chinese Communist Party perspective That's a threat, you know, that's really something they have to deal with in terms of their national security Same thing with keeping the motherland together very important in Chinese thinking which in the motherland Both definitions of it are somewhat fluid But certainly Tibet and Xinjiang Taiwan is considered part of the motherland Hong Kong is considered a part of the motherland sometimes parts of India are considered part of the motherland sometimes Sometimes Parts of Mongolia are considered part of the motherland, but but at least you know Tibet Xinjiang Hong Kong Taiwan You know are considered part of the motherland the problem there of course in terms of Chinese CCP survival and and Grand strategy and again the CCP has made National rejuvenation and and the greatness returned to greatness of of the Chinese Party State the Chinese civilization the Chinese country synonymous with It's basically arguing that only the CCP can bring China back into this This this level of national greatness and only the CCP can hold China together Is the argument that it makes if not explicitly than implicitly to its people the problem Of course as we see is you know the motherland can be somewhat restive. I mean we see what's going on in Hong Kong We see that Taiwan is not exactly a willing participant in unifying with the motherland. We see that Xinjiang is not all that happy with the motherland You know we see on and off again that Tibet is not all that happy with with the motherland so the CCP has You know has its challenges of staying in power, but in terms of its external behavior What what does it mean to to have as your main goal? To stay in power well it also means the continued dynamic economic growth of China and and what that means is now that growth requires a Lot of maritime transit and shipping a lot of natural resources Increasing dependencies in fact on the rest of the world not decreasing as China is is growing Stronger and richer it's actually more dependent on the United States and other countries than it was You know 20 years ago, so from natural resources to to agriculture to things that China can't grow because of water mismanagement and environmental degradation to to export markets very dependent upon the international economy and therefore Really needs to think through its maritime Future and its maritime interests. I don't have to tell people the naval war college What happens when a country? Is rising to power and has to think about its maritime commercial interests and protecting it So that's one element of Chinese political objectives keep the economic growth going part of that now means how do you protect your economic interests worldwide? Closer to home. I would argue that China and this is a Still disputable point. I concede But I would argue that all behavior indicates that China is Is is looking to become the hegemon as it would say in in the Asia Pacific So it has a grand strategy of an aspiring Hegemon, and it has a set of military capabilities that are that are tied to that Tied to that as well, and I would say that in the contemporary period The the People's Republic of China the GCP has faced three real turning points in the contemporary period That is the reform and opening up by Deng Xiaoping In the 1980s and and 79 which kind of started this economic revolution and Economic growth and did great things for the Chinese people and for the world But also created this interest in maritime affairs That's turning point number one turning point number two. I think was Tiananmen Square in 1989 Which kind of demonstrated to the CCP leadership that once you start the economic revolution The political revolution kind of follows and and and people may want more than just material goods And the party could split which almost happened in Tiananmen Square could have gone a very different way So that's turning point number two very Learned a lot of lessons from that turning point number three I would say is the 1990s in the beginning of the 21st century the PRC viewed the world as fairly hostile You know, this was the democratic age. You know, this was the age Of post Cold War US unipolar moment Talks about you know the end of history history ending in and liberal democracies Clinton administration grand strategy being democratization and market Market economies the Bush administration not until you know 9-11 when the focus was on terrorism, but basically the same Attitudes as much as they wouldn't care to admit it as President Clinton that the world was moving in Excerptly into a democratic age and China was the last standing Major-leninist party in the world and the world became a pretty uncomfortable place for China You know for the CCP in in the 1990s. I mean Regimes were being toppled. They had to face the color revolutions in central Asia They had to face the fact that the US could do what it wanted in Kosovo in Iraq and and you name it the US US could essentially act under Humanitarian for humanitarian reasons for national security interests, but it just it just very much that the US presidents would talk about things like China being on the wrong side of history President Obama has said it President Bush has said it President Clinton said it meaning history is moving in a certain direction And you guys in the CCP are on the wrong side of it. So find new jobs basically, you know get out of power How much time I'm sorry. I don't have my okay, okay? So you need you need certain military capabilities. So so that's another turning point the 1990s. I think in the early 2000s the world became an uncomfortable place to be a Powerful-leninist regime. It really did 2008 was probably the next turning point and again too early to tell What that's going to mean, but that that's where it really seemed like during the financial crisis where this was China's chance to hasten The rise to hegemony a bit more than in the past. It just seemed like the US had screwed up royally In the financial crisis and it did and US was on its heels and depended on China for Financial stability and and China just saw in my view an opportunity to hasten hasten its slow and gradual rise to hegemony in the Asia Pacific and started to be More assertive about its maritime claims and and more assertive about the way it uses its military coercively and so on and so forth So those to me are the major turning points that bring us to today Now let's talk quickly about the the capabilities I don't want to get too much into that because I know where I am and many people here know the capabilities better than I do but My take at least on the capabilities necessary for these two grand strategies So for the United States, it's command of the commons I mean everyone sort of heard that you know argument before but to be the prime player in international fairs You don't just need access to the commons. You need to be able to take command of the commons In order to project your power Anywhere anytime That you want to that's how the US has operated particularly since the end of the Cold War In any number of conflicts and there's been quite a few conflicts the US has entered into since that time But you know forward deployed bases forward deployed fixed wing aircraft and and and ships, but no way to actually Win a war or or really show deterrence without commanding the commons So you can bring in as much reinforcement of power of combat power as as is possible in Asia That's been that's been the strategy arguably So it's been we have a couple of big bases and facilities in japan and korea But when needed for deterrent or reassurance purposes quickly reinforced to those places and certainly in thinking about Warfighting capabilities, uh, you know, there's no way without the command of the commons for the us to Protect its allies and protect itself at its national security interests without Being able to get more use out of the commons and denying it to anyone else So military military strategy for a prime for primacy is is command of the commons. What about china? well two two kind of main military strategies, right one is Um, you know could be looked at as very defensive in nature from a chinese perspective, which is if if you're if you're um in beijing looking out into the pacific you see Uh, us forces everywhere you see us forces and uh in japan you see them in korea You see exercises and and displays of force in the south china sea So if you are going to be able to Have your way politically over time in the age of pacific you have to be able to To show The region in peacetime that us forces actually cannot come into those areas where they're used to coming as well as Show that you can use your coercive power now You know i'm not You know i'm not passing value on this strategy because every rising power that i've seen has used it In the past i mean the united states wasn't exactly Thrilled with european powers in the western hemisphere Uh, but just because i'm not passing value on it doesn't mean that it's you know It's still destabilizing from a u.s perspective. I mean you know it's it's it's kind of uh, it's kind of getting to the point of These aren't really misunderstandings between the us and china. These are actually conflicting national interests, right? I mean, you know the the the chinese don't want the us to operate Inside the near seas which which are the south yellow And south china sea the yellow sea in the east china sea Or to be able to defend taiwan and china and the united states wants to be able to do those things You know, so that's kind of a clash that that you know has to be managed rather than It's not really a misperception. I don't think I think we're perceiving each other very well in this sense and China has has created the you know the the contested zones Inside these areas, so it's used It's it's it's relied heavily on the vaunted missile force short range and medium range. It's it's uh heavily on undersea warfare diesel submarines and and and mining and and so forth As well as air power fourth generation, maybe even fifth generation air power Uh with the primary purpose of being able to follow on In a course of campaign against taiwan after a missile salvo but for other purposes as well and a whole slew of of various kinds of ships with anti ship cruise missiles about which you probably know a lot about Now, of course, these are are are aimed these capabilities are aimed both at The centers of gravity of u.s power in the pacific as well as coercively against Against uh against countries with whom china has disputes Just you know good old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy, you know, we have a dispute and we have the power to back it up so it can It china can project power in its own way Into those contested zones into those near seas. It can't necessarily control them yet But it can project power more so than most other asian nations absent u.s power in in those areas so You know that's been its strategy of of rising to regional hegemony You know coercive power being able to use coercive diplomacy if needed if if if other things fail being able to raise doubts about About u.s ability to operate in those areas and I think successfully to some extent They have been able to do that and of course to counter u.s ability to command the commons and that would include using cyber and space and other kinds of capabilities to to To to make sure that the u.s. You know couldn't use space or or Information networks and the ways that the u.s has become so used to um Using them now none of this is probably new to all of you. I just the the context is you know If you're china in the 1980s and 1990s, how do you think about becoming a regional hegemon? Well, these capabilities make make a lot of sense now china will face Other dilemmas very soon here, which is how do you defend forward? You know, how do you defend the maritime interests? These are these are coercive Regional tools, but how do you defend out to africa? Had you how do you project power out there and And again, I'll get to that as I come into the sort of weaknesses and questions But that's that's the military strategy for a regional hegemon. Okay Trends exercises that kind of thing. So the u.s You know the u.s policymakers won't say it in these terms I always argue that They're a lot smarter than I am because we announced a pivot And we're trying to convince china that it's not about china And we're trying to convince convince all the other allies that it is about china And I don't have the diplomatic skills to do that But so to me It seems very much like and of course we have to put it in like diplomatically in which we put it in It seems like this is our counter response To the effects of this coercive military buildup that I discussed given that we are still Have a a grand strategy of primacy and want to be able to operate in those zones that are now contested so So the the pivot the the the talks from the service chiefs about air c battle The agreements with the philippines the movement of Marines rotationally into into darwin not that that's exactly a military capability that may be more symbolic, but let's say Missile and air defense based in australia Lcs is in singapore so on and so forth um, you know the the uh, you know the basic idea Between behind the department of defense thinking as far as I can tell and I don't mean to attribute one Thinking to a department like the department of defense, but the basic idea is that China has created these capabilities in the contested zones. We have to be able to operate in them So the answer is let's figure out ways of operating Now that that that operate in contested areas of that use of the commons that used to not be You know, so it's kind of a symmetrical response you know the the How are we going to operate in areas that? Missiles can fly and hit surface ships. You know, how can we operate in areas where cyber? Attacks can be Used against us so that we can't see where we're going. How are we going to operate in an environment of of anti satellite weaponry? How are we going to you know, how are we going to show and reassure now that our carrier strike groups have to be? Pulled back a little bit, you know, so it's a symmetrical response. It's showing that we have an answer to Chinese coercive capabilities You know, we've done things in exercises like I don't know how we came up with this term this term for an exercise But operation chimichanga that I just came across which was you know, large penetrating bombers and standoff weapons Demonstrated in the Pacific to show that we can that China you know would not have A safe haven should they Execute these kinds of missile solvos and so on and so forth. So, you know, we're demonstrating, you know, our answer is well We're demonstrating that Okay, you've developed all these a2a Decapabilities, but we can still operate in these zones, you know, maybe at more risk and maybe the operation You know, but that's our answer, you know reassure allies deter China And and so on and so forth now the critics Of this and I guess on one of them Is to a certain extent is Well, you know, you're talking this is a symmetrical response. I've got to think about that but also You know escalation. I mean, you know, we're talking about a nuclear power here and and and I just I think my own critique is It's getting harder to talk about conventional us capabilities against conventional chinese capabilities without thinking through the nuclear piece And and where we want to go with that because We are talking, you know, this would require a lot of strikes You know a lot of strikes on the mainland even if they're military targets and we don't fully understand Kind of the the nuclear questions like we did at later stages of the cold war other critics You know come up with offshore balancing say well, why go right into the contested zones? Why not? You know, why not? And i'm simplifying. I realize I don't have that much time so why not just stay out and and and do a protected conflict and and do maritime exclusion zones and and And hit at the center of gravity, which is the chinese economy and its dependencies as I said beforehand On maritime trade and and do distant blockades. Now, you know You know, i'm glad we're having this debate. I think it's it's healthy. It's I think It's actually to avoid conflict the more you think through it but You know, I i'm not necessarily convinced that an offshore control strategy is is any less escalatory than airspace balance doctrine. I mean just because airspace battle doctrine just because You know cutting off chinese trade might you know get a few people in china angry as well so We should have these debates, you know The presidents should have as many military strategies As possible open to them both for peace time and wartime but but first of all You know, we got to think through okay, if the grand strategy is primacy And and and china actually goes to war with us. I don't I don't believe we'd start a war But china goes to war over something that we Define as a vital national interest to us You know It probably would be a big deal with with all kinds of questions about nuclear Thresholds as well as what would be our desired end states. I mean this, you know It doesn't seem to me that we would just kind of want to slap slap, you know back and forth It seems like we may want to punish and retaliate and and degrade and and all these other things And you know, so some of these doctrines put out there are a good start, but As I said before You got to always think back to what your political objectives are, you know If you want to retain your primacy, then then you have different political objectives Then if you're going to give up give up that fight and give up the candle china China's obviously been demonstrating its force, you know, so just this past year Let's just take one, you know the maneuver five exercise in 2013 last year and and that was You know china coming through with all its fleets It's getting together its fleets to to pass through what it calls and what we call the first island chain through Luzon Straits and and through important commercial transit points in japan And and you know came around japan and and kind of announced to great fanfare inside the PLA and inside china that They've dismembered the first island chain. They've broken out You know whether they Did so or not and i'm sure in a piece of exercise they did The point is that that this is something very much on the chinese mind How how can we break this chain and how can we get out and and it's not just on their mind anymore? They're exercising you know joint capabilities and and and with with Getting the fleets together concentrating the fleets and and and coming through down into the south chinese state And those exercises, you know for the united states, they may seem Not as important as they do to the rest of the region that's saying japan in particular for the philippines. It's saying Okay china just Transited these straits came across came into the pacific You know, this is this is getting a little scary, you know, what do we what are we going to do? This is this is a change, you know, this is a change to the status quo So, you know that matters that matters certainly to our allies in terms of reassurance So passage through those those straits, you know experimenting with Longer longer distance projections of power or defense You know passage into the malacca straits by nuclear submarines You know these these kinds of these kinds of exercises including exercises continual exercises with russia that have more to do with reminding Themselves and us that they're also a continental power with some continental interests as well okay challenges and challenges and weaknesses to the grand strategies and and so on well As we were Thinking through a response to what we viewed as more assertive chinese power and what we viewed as Some much more capable chinese military We announced the pivot we announced Make these announcements in 2012 about the new defense guidance We make these announcements about about what's going to go into asia and so on And we decided to cut our budget defense budget at the same exact time you know first First bob gates did so to get efficiencies then president obama added to that in 2011 and then came the sequester which was a bipartisan you know bipartisan decision to to You know to to really take take the budget into pieces about 1.5 trillion dollars now projected cuts and In the next 10 years and you know, it's it's not as if People are being secretive about how this is affecting our presence in asia Even the peacetime presence so I would put that in the category of weakness of the united states And and I wouldn't put it in a category necessarily of a fiscal weakness. I put it into the category of a political weakness because what's coming out more and more is Just as sort of the headline grabbing news is is that china has gdp is surpassing the united states People who actually look at the the variance and wealth Between china and the united states are seeing united states is actually getting wealthier than china So by measures of of private and you can You know you can talk to all kinds of economists who have long debates gdp measuring of course the production You know per year so you can in china you can build a whole bunch of buildings and turn them down and get gdp credit for both activities Versus the actual holding of private wealth You know you subtract that a little bit by how much public debt you have and all the rest of it and that Is estimated that the gap is growing us has about 46 trillion dollars more 46 trillion dollars more than china and growing so it's not a question of Of now it's one thing to say that it's another thing to have politicians actually believe that and and so on And yes, we have big fiscal problems and we have a debt and and all the rest of it But you know it's to me and i'm not going to get into the sort of fiscal debates and all the rest of it But the reason i say it's not necessarily economics It's it's politics and it's really a question a bipartisan question in washington of whether We will still Play the role of the prime power and international affairs And if not Then we have to I think not make these commitments to asia and then not resource them but you know And obviously i'm for making the commitments to asia and resourcing them, but we can't have this kind of Gap that's forming between the commitments and the resources and that's a that's a political weakness right now That's that's a that's a national discussion about how we want to go forward as as as a country So you know that to me is is the biggest question the biggest weakness that the united states has right now In terms of meeting it's stated or unstated grand strategy objectives Now i'd still rather be in washington than in beijing because china You know Let's just cut to the chase the number one weakness is just political legitimacy And and it's increasingly the case so You know the the To the extent that economic growth slows in china over the next few years To the extent that the aspirational classes either protest more or leave china or take their money out of china To the extent that the Areas of china's governing you know are becoming more restive More and more resources have to be poured into domestic Internal problems, you know then then china would like i think And and you know as a matter of national strategy whether the united states What the united states decides to do with that whether it's somehow Take advantage of take advantage of that in a peacetime competition And kind of demonstrate to china that you know competing or getting into a conflict with the united states is not worth it Or whether the united states just wants to kind of let that play out and make sure china doesn't externalize its internal problems You know is is is another decision, but political legitimacy is the biggest weakness now There are all kinds of operational weaknesses as well obviously which are you know bad geography You know the fact that china is Surrounded in a maritime Way by countries mostly democratic countries that are allied with the united states China is also It's rising at the same time As as a lot of other countries in asia are rising so it's not it's not like europe You know it's you know you have countries like indonesia and vietnam and and the philippines and and india that are rising powers you know that there are Are finally kind of seeing the economic growth and you know late late bloomers compared to northeast asia, but they're rising You know the u.s. japan alliance And you know so china kind of suffers from that political arrangement as well as The fact that it's a hybrid continental maritime power With more interests on the continent now given Its dependencies on oil and gas from the middle east increasingly so while the us becomes less so as well as You know as well as concerns about radicalization Foreign fighters from ices coming back into shenzhen and and all the rest of it now To some extent laying out these weaknesses is a bit of an abstraction because so much of it is about perception And so much of it is about what politicians actually do with the resources that they perceive they have so One of the greatest dangers right now is despite what i just said about weaknesses and strengths Is that china is over estimating its own power and underestimating Uh the united states and the us is doing exactly the same thing And i kind of think that is what's going on So you know it's it's nice to have you know a guy like me come here and say well, you know, they're all wrong You know the the the wealth gap is growing The the strategic environment is favorable to us But if we don't actually do anything with that it doesn't really matter the perception, you know becomes reality So You know i i i suppose that the best you can do with that is is is you know to continue to You know demonstrate and show You know our own political leaders that that while this is a tricky tricky proposition If we put some national effort into it if one doesn't have to turn into a conflict and two We could compete on terms that are favorable to us And i'll open it up to questions and of any kind Questions or comments Uh with the shift to the Asia the Asia has changed From one that seems to be focusing on on meeting national interests to now to meeting more economic interests And that economics is dictating policy And it seems that we're now moving towards more of appeasement Than containment And uh do you see it maybe we can be going down a slippery slope kind of like what was prior to World War two with with the appeasing Germany and the The territorial disputes in the south trying to see and like what we saw with Czechoslovakia Well, so I I think you know I'll give you the way things are like the 1930s and 20s and the way things are not like the 1920s and 30s the way things are like the 1920s and 30s is Is political elite, you know bipartisan political elite kind of um You know weariness of of international affairs in general And and you know and and obviously the the public Has better things to do than follow, you know these things to to to the every last detail So is you know waits for leadership to explain to them why the u.s Still needs to be playing this kind of role particularly with a competitive Issue in China and elsewhere in the world. So You know the number one I think way we are Seeing ourselves a little bit like the 1920s and 30s is at least what I'm back in washington is is the the large amount of kind of naval gazing about where you know where we want to go as a country and can we afford it and and and uh Sometimes bipartisan neo isolationism and and and just why are we doing these things and and that kind of thing The way it's not like so, you know political, you know political elites, you know lacking, you know sort of The energy to to keep this keep this game going The way I don't see it like the 1920s and 1930s is we're in a far more favorable strategic position. So even if The us is in a retrenching mood or an appeasing mood, you know, we still in the asia pacific have these allies and forward postures and and you know, no matter what everyone is still is still looking to us. I mean, you know, so For china to really supplant us They'd have to they'd have to actually Show leadership, you know, this is the kind we don't like the kind of world that the united states created We have our own way, but then they'd have to take care of things like providing public goods and You know for everyone and and and providing regional security and and you know dealing with you know Things like isis and in iraq which affects them just as much as it affects us But they're not doing that. So it's still, you know, it's not so The pivot in many sense in many senses was you know china created for us a favorable atmosphere It was that the allies were pressing on us to do more for reassurance purposes in the asia pacific and and You know so so, you know, so it's not really making gains in that sense politically now your question of okay, but What are we actually doing in terms of policy? Concrete policy issues and I think that's a very legitimate question I think a lot of people are raising that you know, show me the money show me where's the beef, you know, whatever You know metaphor you want to use, you know, what is the pivot? Is it this? Is it that? You know Is it, you know the famous You know supreme court justice talking about pornography saying, you know, you'll know it when you see it that kind of thing You know, so now to some extent it with a couple years left in this administration At least it is the trans specific partnership this massive multinational trade agreement I mean that's what administration officials point to as And again only the united states can organize these groups of countries into that kind of economic liberalization grouping And in that sense, yeah, it's very economic and and that's also because of the defense Budget cuts that I just mentioned It's harder to do some of the even peacetime missions out in the pacific that we were once, you know, really really able to do So but I don't know if I would call it appeasement. I would say that You know, I would say that there's probably more we could do You know, if if I were king for a day, you know in terms of demonstrating Both to asia and to china that our interests there endure and we're going to defend them and we take them seriously and we protect them But I don't think I I don't think I'd call it appeasement I I think what I would call it is an administration that is like all administrations at the end of their term that is Got a full plate and not looking not spoiling for a fight with another country right now But you know, it's not it's not giving in too much to chinese demands. It's more Not reversing things that china has done, which is admittedly very difficult to do. I hope that answers your question That was kind of long-winded, but yeah Yeah I just i'm looking at some of my colleagues who I know might disagree with me so This is a bit of a point in my in my circles, but anyway going I'm joking. I'm not trying to put anyone on the spot When I look at the statements from political officials, yeah Yeah, it seems pretty clear. Yeah Yeah, it seems clear to me Um, I you know, I think I think the counter argument would be and again, I don't mean to put anyone on the spot But the counter argument would be um that Well, you know china, what do you think they're going to do? They have to react. This is defensive their their economic I'm a trained lawyer so I can make the opposing argument as well, you know that that the Um cities and coasts, you know are where the maritime activity is of course the chinese will push back us attempts To to encroach upon it, you know wouldn't you didn't you as a as a power? So it's not somewhat it's it the counter argument is more You know, isn't it vietnam and all these other countries that have been more provocative in starting these disputes? And why are they starting these disputes and getting us and so that's the that's sort of the counter argument Which is let's look at the whole picture and it's not as as simple as as this grand strategy of of having course of power now What I would say to that is is um as well, you know These chinese attempts and military modernization program have been going on since the 1980s, you know well before um, what they see as provocations by Um, you know by by the southeast asians or others and and part of that is yes An understandable desire. I mean this is what some people call the tragedy of international politics An understandable desire to do exactly what the united states did or not exactly but You know to to it has more power. It has more ambition. It has more interest. It's going to protect them But that's where we get into Is this about china u.s. Misperception and mistrust or is this about conflicting national interests now And if if i'm right and it's about conflicting national interests Even if we perfectly understand why china is doing what it's doing Um, you know, how do you manage that to make sure that doesn't become a conflict? You know and and you know So so I think that's where the debate now lies a little bit which is Um, is it just is it and I think this still does go on in the military as well You know, let's just take the mill to mill relationship with china You know, there still are the same arguments that I used to hear when I was at dod, which are We need more and more mill to mill to shape them to to help them understand to make sure there's not misunderstanding You know, I think that argument is still out there. You know, my argument is they understand very well, you know, um You know to the extent we want a military to military relationship. It's to manage crisis and manage conflict You know, so I think that's sort of where the fault lines are are being drawn Sorry lile. I did not mean to misrepresent your position. That's it I mean just a couple comments and you know in the spirit of good repartee and I do have a question but I mean on the on the issue of hegemony. I mean, I think Really the interesting part of the debate is what constitutes hegemony, right? I mean sure great powers like to have influence, you know, who doesn't So and I think you know an instructive example there I think is a situation that developed in Myanmar where that was the you know A lot of us were we'd almost call that a client state at a certain point, you know in the early 2000s of china Um, where china, you know, it was kind of overstepping in all bounds and it got really burned I mean which by the way, I think raised the question of whether This quote hegemony project is somewhat kind of self-equilibrating. That is Guess what locals get pissed off when when big powers and I rode their weight around too much But you know, I would also take your point that you've made which I think is quite right that China is rising in a thicket of great power So whether they will seek to be a regional hegemon or not and whatever that means Is a really hard project, right when you got vietnam And japan right there and then australia further repealed in india. So that's You know in some ways. I think it's just Is beyond their reach and I think they actually do understand that One other comment I don't really agree though with your economic analysis to me measuring kind of wealth whatever that means Is it very you know I guess you don't leave in new york neither do I but apparently, you know All of those fancy cars and all the rest of it and those overvalued, you know Real estate and all that that counts for wealth, you know an extraordinary wealth But of course it has no strategic value really it's hard to convert into military power And you know further, you know a better metric. Let's look at shipyard You know you tell me how many let's compare how many large size sophisticated shipyards the united states has and how many china has and you know From my understanding we've looked at this some Some of the chinese shipyards not only do they have you know Several orders of magnitude more but they're also in some ways more sophisticated More capable. So that you know that is okay. Here's a question Taiwan you just finished teaching a course So I'm sure you've been thinking much about this and you know, what is your prognosis for the election in 2016? You know, is this kind of Mayin joe's Strategy is a kind of some sort of weird aberration And some have called We're trying to locate taiwan inside the air sea battle strategies on how do you Read with that Yeah, let me let me take your comments first because they're all you know They're very you know important ones, you know, I think I think china itself has to work out what it means by Let's let's take a non-loaded term Let's let's say it's unhappy with A us dominated, you know world order that is you know Or unhappy with pieces of it that is very liberal You know small l and so on then it it does have to define what the alternative would be and probably really itself and others Around it. So that you know, that's that's and I and I agree with you that they have not have not done that You know and and right now it's kind of Build up capabilities and be able to have these coercive capabilities to back up your claims It's pushed back the United States and all the rest of it Which may be a de facto hedge of money on the wealth question My point is this and this is you know You know, this is like an esoteric Arcane debate among economists, which I unfortunately have waited into For all kinds of purposes In terms of strategy and war fighting What you produce on a yearly basis matters much less Than the excess and surplus wealth that you own Inside the United States the shipyard example would would I think reinforce my point about political Priorities and will versus wealth So if the united states to woke up one day and decided oh my goodness china is a big problem And we need you know to rebuild our shipyards and so on and so forth It has far more wealth in store Then china does and it could probably spend china into you know And then given the fact that china is building shipyards, but ignoring things, you know I'll just take one example. We think we have pension problems here in the united states If china even You know lift it up the cover a little bit to look at their unfunded liabilities The wealth issue would would would be much more clarified. I think so it's it to me That's a question of where our political their political will and political priorities Have happened to happen to do with national power You know ours We're kind of sitting on inertia because we don't you haven't faced a strategic competitor in a while Under question about taiwan Um, you know I taiwan is a you know to me, you know That there are a lot of kind of intellectual fads that go through washington, you know in the First part of the 21st century. It was all about india You know and and and the last few years it's been all about berma me and mar You know at the end of the day, it's always it's always been you japan You know, I mean, you know japan may be boring and and and so on but the key strategic ally as japan and taiwan fits in very much into into that so Taiwan and korea are the perennials in terms of great power conflicts We may not we may pay attention to other things, but in terms of major areas of great power conflict. It's taiwan and korea partly because of the japan alliance partly because of of the way the rest of the country's view Uh, even if we didn't mean it to be this way our commitment to taiwan partly because it's a democracy partly because it does sit on island chains that matter to the philippines and to japan Partly, you know partly partly partly we're just viewed as you know, it's patron and so, uh, I think uh, you know It's still the major power flashpoint Mine joe, uh, I'll just answer that question with this. So here you have a much more conciliatory president, right? so who really reached out to china and and and and got somewhere on the economic issues, but here's where the taiwan polity is Specifically after hong kong Mine joe makes an announcement on on taiwan national day In a in a repost in a response to shijin pings saying that one country two systems is the system for for taiwan as well as hong kong and says I don't think so. I think that we could talk about unification the day that china turns into a constitutional democracy my point being That that's where the taiwan polity is with respect to issues on on china Here's a guy from the kmt who's had to give up a unification You know, here's a guy who can't get anything else passed even on economic issues Point being is that the taiwan polity has moved in this direction And even if you're if you want to win as a kmt leader, you have to move with them So I you know, I think that's good for democracy, but in terms of china's views about taiwan and and conflict stability It's probably bad for conflict stability The world tries to understand what the rebalance is all about Do you think it makes any difference, especially in the international community That the rebalance was published in a defense guidance, not a national security strategy The president was telling the best part of you about the rebalance He wasn't telling the state of treasurer Yeah, I mean, you know, it's it's it's sort of like become too easy in some ways to criticize You know, it got it got kind of all mushed up together because President Obama and secretary Clinton made their their speeches and statements in in 2011 about what it should look like Should have came from the secretary of state and and the president But then president but then the next move was to show up at the pentagon in january 2012 The president next to you know, secretary panetta and announced new defense guidelines, you know, essentially saying You know, we're done with iraq and afghanistan and it's time to move forces to To the asia-pacific and then at the same time some of the air c battle doctrine Issues start to leak out and and get talked about more So there's no surprise that all of a sudden the pivot and the rebalance become synonymous with US military posture in the pacific. I don't think that was the intent But so often as is so often the case in just the bureaucratics of managing washington, that's what happened And there hasn't been a national security strategy to explain exactly I mean, the probably the best and most articulate explanation has been hillary clinton's peace and foreign and foreign policy So, you know and and that creates all kinds of problems from my point of view One is as I mentioned before that was happening as soon as the congress decided to cut the budget even further To you know, so all these questions started to arise about well, you're going to send more of what into the pacific and do what? to it took away from some of the Let's call the more positive dynamic secretary secretary clinton was trying to set which was we Are doing this and joining these political organizations and shaping this economic organization so that US can be tied to the dynamic political and economic life of the asia-pacific It set expectations very high for for allies in terms of who is going to be part of this great pivot and rebalance and how So I think it we ended up in a lot of confusion at the end of the day again You know, I it wouldn't be a shock to to the white house to hear this, you know, I think And then of course, you know Other countries have a have a vote in in where the us is going to spend its time and attention So, you know, then russia ukraine and the middle east and then all the rest of it and I I don't think Administration at the end of its term, you know with all these crises is really going to sit down and Try to explain to everyone what what the pivot actually actually is so You know, there's going to be a lot of work to do to try to Sift through this and and and make it work if it's going to work Yes You can imagine Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, sure sure that's why there's a lot was loath to step into it, you know Take that So you mentioned oh geez have we thought about the china's? Yeah, that's the other question. It's Yeah Yeah, that's a critical critical point And I'm not you know, I'm not saying that I wasn't even arguing that That we take any options off the table whatsoever. I mean, I think in my own experience the more options Um, you know from any level of competition or warfare the better, you know, so Um, you know making the china there's competitive strategy aspects to her see battle too, which is You know trying to get the chinese to to come back and defend more, you know, there's all kinds of good things about it Um And and my biggest criticism is more Kind of to this point. Well, what's the national security strategy that the air sea battle is is supposed to further right, you know And and that's not not exactly what you were saying, but you know, it's kind of you know And and maybe we don't want to say it, you know, maybe maybe, you know We just we said it too loudly in the in the in the bush administration and we just don't want to say it anymore but um You know, but your point is is essential I mean, you know the the and this goes to to my concluding remarks about What I think is the biggest risk is the perception In china over estimating capabilities and underestimating washington's capabilities and the same thing actually in washington and part of that is You know, what is important to the united states? So, you know, you know, if you hit a carrier if you hit guam if you if you hit hawaii You know, you know, the u.s. Has a lot of nuclear weapons still and and you're hitting you're hitting a nuclear power and to me that just adds to deterrence now how to Send that message Is difficult it's very difficult except to state, you know Repeatedly that we're talking about u.s. Territory. We're talking about thousands of sailors and and and all the rest of it But it's also, you know, um, if you recall, you know, we're sort of At least our stated strategy now is is more towards nuclear disarmament Right and trying to get china to sign up to that which further complicates the issue So, uh, you know, we're talking about, uh, some pretty You know forward leaning conventional stories, which i'm not i'm not against, you know, as we're as we're talking at least about you know, uh, disarm nuclear disarmament and and and and and even within the pentagon talking about using more conventional versus nuclear deterrence so If i was trying to i'd be very confused first of all, you know as as to what the us is talking about but but and maybe you know That's how the us works and that's how we somehow stumble into victory, you know No matter what we just confuse our enemies so much that or i shouldn't say enemies are competitors so much um, but uh, but yeah, no, that's i mean, you know, look at this point. It's to me it's Let's talk in tough terms. They're ready to in china and candid terms to avoid these things So we don't learn about them as they're happening, but that's a critical point Yes Neighbors Right, so the question is Particularly from a japanese point of view, but i'm sure our filipina friends and and vietnamese newfound friends would would uh, would see it the same way which is um Well That's fine that you know that that's that's fine that you say the us has all this wealth and power if it wants to use it But today, you know china has decided to press us in the east china sea And what are you going to do about it or today china still and the tom ashull just kind of More or less sitting there. I don't know what they're doing today, but You know, so what about today and and the and the department of defense announced twice That they had this counter course of toolkit and it was in the new york times and other places And then it kind of went away, you know, you know, so You know, what are counter course of toolkits? You know to me they would be things like You know china is not through force going to change this task force. So if filipinos have to get to Uh fisheries, you know the u.s. Can help them get there, you know It just showed that this task force not going to be changed through force Um, you know Demonstrations of that sort and that also gets back to this point Which is demonstrating your seriousness about how seriously take your interests and if you state That your policy is peaceful resolution You know, what are you going to do to make sure that your policy is peaceful resolution? And that's a today issue And not a long term issue But you know the other thing is you know in some ways China got prime minister abe elected in my view and and You know, he's showing some real leadership On his own and and there's a lot of things that Japan's going to be able to do that that the chinese are going to be quite taken aback by in terms of japan's latent power Uh, and you know at this point it's sort of is the u.s. Going to Catch up, you know and or not but So, you know, I I think I think there are things in a lot of cases where the southeast asians There's just not the capacity To stand up to china in japan's case. It's it's a little different Yes Sign in shanghai they also conduct some serious or military exercise So I personally believe the russia is going to play a very important role in the us rc relationship No mapping economics or in military and how you oversee is any possibility they will have further Operative relations other than military or something else and how this will affect well you know the You know ever since I started in china policy the russia everyone I always ignore russia and someone always asks about it and and and uh You know, I don't know if it's like a psychological thing with me or what but I would say it just hasn't panned out yet And and and the russians and the and the chinese May have a common aversion to us activities and dominance and that's manifested mostly in the un Uh in terms of real cooperation. They just really distrust each other quite a bit The one area that I would say to keep an eye out is if this the sanctions on russia continue then Um, you know, then they really will have to sell gas at much lower prices to to the chinese I think probably the japanese benefit the most though at the end of the day right now It seems like pie in the sky just because of the lack of infrastructure that russia has put forth in those areas around china But you know that it can turn into an oil and gas relationship more than anything else If I could exercise my right to to ask the last question Yeah And this is to take the conversation back up to the level of grand strategy which is to provide the context for understanding the military balance you've talked about China's biggest weakness is political legitimacy. You've also talked about the importance of perceptions Versus real sort of tangible hard power and that raises a larger question about grand strategy Which is the ideological component of the grand strategy You know, what would you say would be sort of america's Grand strategy from an ideological perspective You know, is there a role for it and if there is a rule for it How should the u.s. Leadership articulate it in a way that allows the united states to lead as the primary power Well, uh, the clinton administration used to talk about it openly, which was peaceful evolution The the grand strategy for the united states was to help China peacefully evolve into, you know, a more moderate liberal democratic regime and and It kind of disappeared from lexicon. I think it's still very implicit in our grand strategy if you ask Administration officials of all type, you know, how does this end? Well, taiwan or whatever they say democratic china democratic china democratic china But you know in terms of and and I think that's probably the case now But that's a that can be you know, but what tools of statecraft do we have To to to see that, you know, and you can say to you know, we learned in taiwan about taiwan's uh We learned our taiwan class about taiwan's democratic transition, which may Proved to be a good model And you know, we can say to our ccp friends. Hey look the kmt is back in power You know, they didn't they didn't disappear altogether. You guys can get your act together and uh You guys can get your act together and compete in elections You know jim lily one of my mentors who who was an ambassador to china among other things Used to tell the chinese, you know, what's wrong with peaceful evolution? It's peaceful and everybody wants to evolve So, you know, I think that you know, I think that We have to get that back on the agenda somehow the question is What are the prudent tools of statecraft that we have available to us? to to You know to actually actuate that Well, thank you very much dan if you could help me thank dan for his Thank you very much