 Chapter 4, Part 1 of Principia Ethica. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by Fredrik Karlsson. Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore. Chapter 4, Metaphysical Ethics. 66. In this chapter I propose to deal with a type of ethical theory which is exemplified in the ethical views of the Stoics, of Spinoza, of Kant, and especially of a number of modern writers whose views in this respect are mainly due to the influence of Hegel. These ethical theories have this in common, that they use some metaphysical proposition as a ground for inferring some fundamental proposition of ethics. They all imply, and many of them expressly hold, that ethical truths follow logically from metaphysical truths. That ethics should be based on metaphysics. And the result is that they all describe the supreme good in metaphysical terms. What then is to be understood by metaphysical? I used the term, as I explained in Chapter 2, in opposition to natural. I call those philosophers preeminently metaphysical, who have recognized most clearly that not everything which is, is a natural object. Metaphysicians have therefore the great merit of insisting that our knowledge is not confined to the things which we can touch and see and feel. They have always been much occupied not only with that other class of natural object which consists in mental facts, but also with a class of objects or properties of objects which certainly do not exist in time, are not therefore parts of nature and which in fact do not exist at all. To this class I have said belongs what we mean by the adjective good. It is not goodness but only the things or qualities which are good, which can exist in time, can have the duration and begin and cease to exist, can be objects of perception. But the most prominent members of this class are perhaps numbers. It is quite certain that two natural objects may exist, but it is equally certain that two itself does not exist and never can. Two and two are four, but that does not mean that either two or four exists, yet it certainly means something. Two is somehow although it does not exist, and it is not only simple terms of propositions, the objects about which we know truths that belong to this class. The truths which we know about them form perhaps a still more important subdivision. No truth does in fact exist, but this is peculiarly obvious with regard to truths like two and two or four in which the objects about which they are truths do not exist either. It is with recognition of such truths as these, truths which have been called universal and of their essential unlikeness to what we can touch and see and feel that metaphysics proper begins. Such universal truths have always played a large part in the reasoning of metaphysicians from Plato's time till now, and that they have directed attention to the difference between these truths and what I have called natural objects is the chief contribution to knowledge which distinguished them from that other class of philosophers, empirical philosophers to which most Englishmen have belonged. But though if we are to define metaphysics by the contribution which it has actually made to knowledge, we should have to say that it has emphasized the importance of objects which do not exist at all. Metaphysicians themselves have not recognized this. They have indeed recognized and insisted that there are or may be objects of knowledge which do not exist in time or at least which we cannot perceive. And in recognizing the possibility of these as an object of investigation, they have, it may be admitted, done a service to mankind. But they have in general supposed that whatever does not exist in time must at least exist elsewhere if it is to be at all. That whatever does not exist in nature must exist in some super sensible reality whether timeless or not. Consequently they have held that the truths with which they have been occupied over and above the objects of perception were in some way truths about such super sensible reality. If therefore we are to define metaphysics not by what it has attained but by what it has attempted, we should say that it consists in the attempt to obtain knowledge by processes of reasoning of what exists but is not a part of nature. Metaphysicians have actually held that they could give us such knowledge of non-natural existence. They have held that their science consists in giving us such knowledge as can be supported by reasons of that super sensible reality of which religion professes to give us a fuller knowledge without any reason. When therefore I spoke above of metaphysical propositions, I meant propositions about the existence of something super sensible, of something which is not an object of perception and which cannot be inferred from what is an object of perception by the same rules of inference by which we infer the past and future of what we call nature. And when I spoke of metaphysical terms, I meant terms which refer to qualities of such a super sensible reality which do not belong to anything natural. I admit that metaphysics should investigate what reasons there may be for belief in such a super sensible reality. Since I hold that its peculiar province is the truth about all objects which are not natural objects. And I think that the most prominent characteristic of metaphysics in history has been its profession to prove the truth about non-natural existence. I define metaphysical therefore by a reference to super sensible reality. All there think that the only non-natural objects about which it has succeeded in obtaining truth are objects which do not exist at all. So much, I hope, will suffice to explain what I mean by the term metaphysical and to shoe that it refers to a clear and important distinction. It was not necessary for my purpose to make the definition exhaustive or to shoe that it corresponds in essentials with established usage. The distinction between nature and a super sensible reality is very familiar and very important and since the metaphysician endeavors to prove things with regard to super sensible reality and since he deals largely in truths which are not mere natural facts it is plain that his arguments and errors, if any, will be of a more subtle kind than those which I have dealt with under the name of naturalism. For these two reasons it seemed convenient to treat metaphysical ethics by themselves. 67. I have said that those systems of ethics which I propose to call metaphysical are characterized by the fact that they describe the supreme good in metaphysical terms and this has now to been explained as meaning that they describe it in terms of something which they hold does exist but does not exist in nature in terms of a super sensible reality. A metaphysical ethics is marked by the fact that it makes the assertion that which would be perfectly good is something which exists but is not natural that which has some characteristic possessed by a super sensible reality. Such an assertion was made by the Stoics when they asserted that a life in accordance with nature was perfect for they did not mean by nature what I have so defined but something super sensible which they inferred to exist and which they held to be perfectly good. Such an assertion again is made by Spinoza when he tells us that we are more or less perfect in proportion as we are more or less closely united with absolute substance by the intellectual love of God. Such an assertion is made by Kant when he tells us that his kingdom of ends is the ideal and such finally is made by modern writers who tell us that the final and perfect end is to realize our true selves a self different to both from the whole and from any part of that which exists here and now in nature. Now it is plain that such ethical principles have a merit not possessed by naturalism in recognizing that for perfect goodness much more is required than any quantity of what exists here and now or can be inferred as likely to exist in the future and moreover it is quite possible that their assertions should be true if we only understand them to assert that something which is real possesses all the characteristics necessary for perfect goodness but this is not all that they assert they also imply as I said that this ethical proposition follows from some proposition which is metaphysical that the question what is real has some logical bearing upon the question what is good it was for this reason that I described metaphysical ethics in chapter 2 as based upon the naturalistic fallacy and that our knowledge of what is real supplies reason for holding certain things to be good in themselves is either implied or expressly asserted by all those who define the supreme good in metaphysical terms this contention is part of what is meant by saying that ethics should be based on metaphysics it is meant that some knowledge of super sensible realities necessary as a premise for correct conclusions as to what ought to exist this view is for instance plainly expressed in the following statements the truth is that the theory of ethics which seems most satisfactory has a metaphysical basis if we rest our view of ethics on the idea of the development of ideal self or of the rational universe the significance of this cannot be made fully apparent without a metaphysical examination of the nature of self nor can its validity be established except by a discussion of the reality of the rational universe the validity of an ethical conclusion about the nature of the ideal it is here asserted cannot be established except by considering the question whether that ideal is real such an assertion involves the naturalistic fallacy it rests upon the failure to receive that any truth which asserts this is good in itself is quite unique in kind that it cannot be reduced to any assertion about reality and therefore must remain unaffected by any conclusions we may reach about the nature of reality this confusion as to the unique nature of ethical truths is, I have said, involved in all those ethical theories which I have called metaphysical it is plain that but for some confusion of the sort no one would think it worthwhile even to describe the supreme good in metaphysical terms if for instance we are told that the ideal consists in the realization of the true self the very words suggest that the fact that the self in question is true is supposed to have some bearing on the fact that it is good all the ethical truths which can possibly be conveyed by such an assertion would be just as well conveyed by saying that the ideal consisted in the realization of a particular kind of self which might be either real or purely imaginary metaphysical ethics then involves the supposition that ethics can be based on metaphysics and our first concern with them is to make clear that this supposition must be false 68 in what way can the nature of super sensible reality possibly have a bearing upon ethics I have distinguished two kinds of ethical questions which are far too commonly confused with one another ethics as commonly understood has to answer both the question what ought to be and the question what ought we to do the second of these questions can only be answered by considering what effects our actions will have a complete answer to it would give us that department of ethics which may be called the doctrine of means or practical ethics and upon this department of ethical inquiry it is plain that the nature of a super sensible reality may have a bearing if for instance metaphysics could tell us not only that we are immortal but also in any degree what effects our actions in this life will have upon our condition in the future one such information would have an undoubted bearing upon the question what we ought to do the Christian doctrine of heaven and hell are in this way highly relevant to practical ethics but it is worthy of notice that the most characteristic doctrines of metaphysics are such as either have no such bearing upon practical ethics or have a purely negative bearing involving the conclusion that there is nothing which we ought to do at all they profess to tell us the nature not of a future reality but of one that is eternal and which therefore no actions of ours can have power to alter such information may indeed have relevance to practical ethics but it must be of a purely negative kind four if it holds not only that such an eternal reality exists but also as is commonly the case that nothing else is real that nothing either has been is now or will be real in time then truly it will follow that nothing we can do will ever bring any good to pass for it is certain that our actions can only affect the future and if nothing can be real in the future we can certainly not hope ever to make any good thing real it would follow then that there can be nothing which we ought to do we cannot possibly do any good for neither our efforts nor any result which they may seem to affect have any real existence but this consequence though it follows strictly from many metaphysical doctrines is rarely drawn although a metaphysician may say that nothing is real but that which is eternal he will generally allow that there is some reality also in the temporal and his doctrine of an eternal reality need not interfere with practical ethics if he allows that however good their eternal reality may be yet some things will also exist in time and that the existence of some will be better than that of others it is however worthwhile to insist upon this point because it is rarely fully realized if it is maintained that there is any validity at all in practical ethics that any proposition which asserts we ought to do so and so can have any truth this contention can only be consistent with the metaphysics of an eternal reality under two conditions one of these is one that the true eternal reality which is to be our guide cannot as is implied by calling it true be the only true reality for a moral rule bidding us realize a certain end can only be justified if it is possible that that end should at least partially be realized unless our efforts can affect the real existence of some good however little we certainly have no reason for making them and if the eternal reality is the sole reality then nothing good can possibly exist in time we can only be told to try to bring into existence something which we know beforehand cannot possibly exist if it is said that what exists in time can only be a manifestation of the true reality it must at least be allowed that the manifestation is another true reality a good which we really can cause to exist for the production of something quite unreal even if it were possible cannot be a reasonable end of action but if the manifestation of that which eternally exists is real then that which eternally exists is not the sole reality and the second condition which follows from such a metaphysical principle of ethics is to that the eternal reality cannot be perfect cannot be the sole good for just as the reasonable rule of conduct requires that what we are told to realize should be capable of being truly real so it requires that the realization of this agile shall be truly good it is just that which can be realized by our efforts the appearance of the eternal in time or whatsoever else is allowed to be attainable which must be truly good if it is to be worth our efforts that the eternal reality is good will by no means justifies in aiming at its manifestation unless that manifestation itself be also good for the manifestation is different from the reality its difference is allowed when we are told that it cannot be made to exist whereas the reality itself exists unalterably and the existence of this manifestation is the only thing which we can hope to effect that also is admitted if therefore the moral maximum is to be justified it is the existence of this manifestation as distinguished from the existence of its corresponding reality which must be truly good the reality may be good too but to justify the statement that we ought to produce anything it must be maintained that just that thing itself and not something else which may be like it is truly good if it is not true that the existence of the manifestation will add something to the sum of the good in the universe then we have no reason to aim at making it exist and if it is true that it will add something to the sum of good then the existence of that which is eternal cannot be perfect by itself it cannot include the whole of possible goods metaphysics then will have a bearing upon practical ethics upon the question what we ought to do but the most characteristic metaphysical doctrines those which profess to tell us not about the future but about the nature of an eternal reality can either have no bearing upon this practical question or else must have a purely destructive bearing for it is plain that what exists eternally cannot be affected by our actions and only what is affected by our actions can have a bearing on their value as means but the nature of an eternal reality either admits no inference as to the results of our actions except insofar as it can also give us information about the future and how it can do this is not plain or else if, as is usual, it is maintained to be the sole reality and the sole good it shows that no results of our actions can have any value whatever 69 but this bearing upon practical ethics such as it is is not what is commonly meant when it is maintained that ethics must be based on metaphysics it is not the assertion of this relation which I have taken to be characteristic of metaphysical ethics what metaphysical writers commonly maintain is not merely that metaphysics can help us to decide what the effects of our actions will be but that it can tell us which among possible effects will be good and which will be bad they profess that metaphysics is a necessary basis for an answer to that other and primary ethical question what ought to be, what is good in itself that no truth about what is real can have any logical bearing upon the answer to this question has been proved in chapter 1 to suppose that it has implies the naturalistic fallacy all that remains first to do is therefore to expose the main errors which seem to have lent plausibility to this fallacy in its metaphysical form if we ask what bearing can metaphysics have upon the question what is good the only possible answer is obviously and absolutely none we can only hope to enforce conviction that this answer is the only true one by answering the question why has it been supposed to have such a bearing we shall find that metaphysical writers seem to have failed to distinguish the primary ethical question what is good from various other questions and to point out these distinctions will serve to confirm the view that their profession to base ethics on metaphysics is solely due to confusion 70 and first of all there is an ambiguity in the very question what is good to which it seems some influence must be attributed the question may mean either which among existing things are good or else what sort of things are good what other things which whether they are real or not or to be real and of these two questions it is plain that to answer the first we must know both the answer to the second and also the answer to this question what is real it asks for a catalog of all the good things there are in the universe and also which of them are good upon this question then our metaphysics would have a bearing if it can tell us what is real it would help us to complete the list of things which are both real and good but to make such a list is not the business of ethics far as it inquires what is good its business is finished when it has completed the list of things which ought to exist whether they do exist or not and if our metaphysics is to have any bearing upon this part of the ethical problem it must be because the fact that something is real gives a reason for thinking that it or something else is good whether it be real or not that any such fact can give any such reason is impossible but it may be suspected that the contrary supposition has been encouraged by the failure to distinguish between the assertion this is good when it means this sort of thing is good or this would be good if it existed and the assertion this existing thing is good the latter proposition obviously cannot be true unless the thing exists and hence the proof of the things existing is a necessary step to its proof both propositions however in spite of this immense difference between them are commonly expressed in the same terms we use the same words when we assert an ethical proposition about a subject that is actually real and when we assert it about a subject considered as merely possible in this ambiguity of language we have then a possible source of error which regard to the bearing of truths that assert reality upon truths that assert goodness and that this ambiguity is actually neglected by those metaphysical writers who profess that the supreme good consists in an eternal reality maybe soon in the following way we have seen in considering the possible bearing of metaphysics upon practical ethics since what exists eternally cannot possibly be affected by our actions no practical maxim can possibly be true if the sole reality is eternal this fact as I said is commonly neglected by metaphysical writers they assert both of the two contradictory propositions that the sole reality is eternal and that its realization in the future is a good too Professor Mackenzie we saw asserts that we ought to aim at the realization of the true self or the rational universe and yet Professor Mackenzie holds as the word true plainly implies that both the true self and the rational universe are eternally real where we have already a contradiction in the supposition that what is eternally real can be realized in the future and it is comparatively unimportant whether or not we add to this the further contradiction involved in the supposition that the eternal is the sole reality that such contradiction should be supposed valid can only be explained by a neglect of the distinction between a real subject and the character which that real subject possesses what is eternally real may indeed be realized in the future if by this we only meant the sort of thing which is eternally real but when we assert that a thing is good what we mean is that its existence or reality is good and the eternal existence of a thing cannot possibly be the same good as the existence in time of what in a necessary sense is nevertheless the same thing when therefore we are told that the future realization of the true self is good this cannot most only mean that the future realization of a self exactly like the self which is true and exists eternally is good if this fact were clearly stated instead of consistently ignored by those who advocate the view that the supreme good can be defined in these metaphysical terms it seems probable that the view that a knowledge of reality is necessary to a knowledge of the supreme good would lose part of its plausibility that that at which we ought to aim cannot possibly be that which is eternally real even if it be exactly like it and that the eternal reality cannot possibly be the soul good these two propositions seem sensibly to diminish the probability that ethics must be based on metaphysics it is not very plausible to maintain that because one thing is real therefore something like it which is not real would be good it seems therefore that some of the plausibility of metaphysical ethics may be reasonably attributed to the failure to observe that verbal ambiguity whereby this is good may mean either this real thing is good or the existence of this thing whether it exists or not would be good End of chapter 4 part 1 Chapter 4 part 2 of Principia Ethica this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Fredrik Karlsson Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore 71 by exposing this ambiguity then we are enabled to see more clearly what must be meant by the question can ethics be based on metaphysics and we are therefore more likely to find the correct answer it is now plain that a metaphysical principle of ethics which says this eternal reality is the supreme good can only mean something like this eternal reality would be the supreme good we are now to understand such principles as having the only meaning which they can consistently have namely as describing the kind of thing which ought to exist in the future and which we ought to try to bring about and when this is clearly recognized it seems more evident that the knowledge that such a kind of thing is also eternally real cannot help us at all towards deciding the properly ethical question is the existence of that kind of thing good if we can see that an eternal reality is good we can see equally easily once the idea of such a thing has been suggested to us that it would be good the metaphysical construction of reality would therefore be quite useful for the purposes of ethics if it were a mere construction of an imaginary utopia provided the kind of thing suggested is the same fiction is as useful as truth for giving us matter upon which to exercise the judgment of value though therefore we admit that metaphysics may serve an ethical purpose in suggesting things which would not otherwise have occurred to us but which when they are suggested we see to be good yet it is not as metaphysics as professing to tell us what is real that it has this use and in fact the pursuit of truth must limit the usefulness of metaphysics in this respect while then extravagant as are the assertions which metaphysicians have made about reality it is not to be supposed but that they have been partially deterred from making them wilder still by the idea that it was their business to tell nothing but the truth but the wilder they are and the less useful for metaphysics the more useful will they be for ethics since in order to be sure that we have neglected nothing in the description of our ideal we should have had before us as wide a field as possible of suggested goods it is probable that this utility of metaphysics in suggesting possible ideals may sometimes be what is meant by the assertion that ethics should be based on metaphysics it is not uncommon to find that which suggests a truth confused with that on which it logically depends and I have already pointed out that metaphysical have in general this superiority over naturalistic systems that they conceive the supreme good as something differing more widely from what exists here and now but if it be recognized that in this sense ethics should far more empathetically be based on fiction metaphysicians will I think admit that a connection of this kind between metaphysics and ethics would by no means justify the importance which they attribute to the bearing of the one study on the other 72 we may then attribute the obstinate prejudice that a knowledge of super sensible reality is a necessary step to a knowledge of what is good in itself partly to a failure to perceive that the subject of the latter judgment is not anything real as such and partly to a failure to distinguish the cause of our perception of a truth from the reason why it is true but these two courses will carry us only a very little way in our explanation of why metaphysics should have been supposed to have a bearing upon ethics the first explanation which I have given would only account for the supposition that a thing's reality is a necessary condition for this goodness this supposition is indeed commonly made we find it commonly presupposed that unless a thing can be shown to be involved in the constitution of reality it cannot be good and it is therefore worthwhile to insist that this is not the case that metaphysics is not even necessary to furnish part of the basis of ethics but when metaphysicians talk of basing ethics on metaphysics they commonly mean much more than this they commonly mean that metaphysics is the sole basis of ethics that it furnishes not only one necessary condition but all the condition necessary to prove that certain things are good and this view may at first sight appear to be held in two different forms it may be asserted that merely to prove a thing super sensibly real is sufficient to prove it good that the truly real must for that reason alone be truly good but more commonly it appears to be held that the real must be good because it possesses certain characters and we may I think reduce the first kind of assertion to no more than this when it is asserted that the real must be good because it is real it is commonly also held that this is only because in order to be real it must be of a certain kind the reasoning by which it is thought that a metaphysical inquiry can give an ethical conclusion is of the following form from a consideration of what it is to be real we can infer that what is real must have certain super sensible properties but to have those properties is identical with being good it is the very meaning of the word it follows therefore that what has these properties is good and from a consideration of what it is to be real we can again infer what it is that has these properties it is plain that if such reasoning were correct any answer which could be given to the question what is good in itself could be arrived at by a purely metaphysical discussion and by that alone just as when Mills opposed that to be good meant to be desired the question what is good could be and must be answered solely by an empirical investigation of the question what was desired so here if to be good means to have some super sensible property the ethical question can and must be answered by a metaphysical inquiry into the question what has this property what then remains to be done in order to destroy the plausibility of metaphysical ethics is to express the chief errors which seem to have led metaphysicians to suppose that to be good means to possess some super sensible property 73 what then are the chief reasons which have made it seem plausible to maintain that to be good must mean to possess some super sensible property or to be related to some super sensible reality we may first of all notice one which seems to have had some influence in causing the view that good must be defined by some such property although it does not suggest any particular property as the one required this reason lies in the supposition that the proposition this is good or this would be good if it existed must in a certain respect be of the same type as other propositions the fact is that there is one type of proposition so familiar to everyone and therefore having such a strong hold upon the imagination that philosophers have always supposed that all other types of propositions must be reducible to it this type is that of the objects of experience of all those truths which occupy our minds for the immensely greater part of our waking lives truths such as that somebody is in the room that I am writing or eating or talking all these truths however much they may differ have this in common that in them both the grammatical subject and the grammatical object stand for something which exists immensely the commonest type of truths then is one which asserts a relation between two existing things ethical truths are immediately felt not to conform to this type and the naturalistic fallacy arises from the attempt to make out that in some roundabout way they do conform to it it is immediately obvious that when we see a thing to be good its goodness is not a property which we can take up in our hands or separate from it even by the most delicate scientific instruments and transfer to something else it is not in fact like most of the predicates which we ascribe to things a part of the thing to which we ascribe it but philosophers suppose that the reason why we cannot take goodness up and move it about is not that it is a different kind of object from any which can be moved about but only that it necessarily exists together with anything with which it does exist they explain the type of ethical truths by supposing it identical with the type of scientific laws and it is only when they have done this that the naturalistic philosophers proper those who are empiricists and those whom I have called metaphysical part company these two classes of philosophers do indeed differ with regard to the nature of scientific laws the former class tend to suppose that they mean only this has accompanied, does now and will accompany that in these particular instances they reduce the scientific law quite simply and directly to the familiar type of proposition which I have pointed out but this does not satisfy the metaphysicians they see that when you say this would accompany that if that existed you don't mean only that this and that have existed and will exist together so many times but it is beyond even their powers to believe that what you do mean is merely what you say they still think you must mean somehow or other that something does exist since that is what you generally mean when you say anything they are as unable as the empiricists to imagine that you can ever mean that 2 plus 2 equals 4 the empiricists say this means that so many couples of couples of things have in each case been 4 things and hence that 2 and 2 would not make 4 unless precisely those things had existed the metaphysicians feel that this is wrong but they themselves have no better account of its meaning to give than either with Leibniz that God's mind is in a certain state or with Kant that your mind is in a certain state or finally with Mr. Bradley that something is in a certain state here then we have the root of the naturalistic fallacy the metaphysicians have the merit of seeing that when you say this would be good if it existed you can't mean merely this has existed and was desired however many times that may have been the case they will admit that some good things have not existed in this world and even that some may not have been desired but what you can mean except that something exists they really cannot see precisely the same error which leads them to suppose that there must exist a super sensible reality leads them to commit the naturalistic fallacy with regard to the meaning of good every truth they think must mean somehow that something exists and since unlike the empiricists they recognize some truths which do not mean that anything exists here and now these they think must mean that something exists not here and now on the same principle since good is a predicate which neither does nor can exist they are bound to suppose either that to be good means to be related to some other particular thing which can exist and does exist in reality or else that it means merely to belong to the real world that goodness is transcended or absorbed in reality 74 that such a reduction of all propositions to the type of those which assert either that something exists or that something which exists has a certain attribute which means that both exists in a certain relation to one another is erroneous may easily be seen by reference to the particular class of ethical propositions for whatever we may have proved to exist and whatever to existence we may have proved to be necessarily connected with one another it still remains a distinct and different question whether what thus exists is good whether either or both of the two existence is so and whether it is good that they should exist together to assert the one is plainly and obviously not the same thing as to assert the other we understand what we mean by asking is this which exists or necessarily exists after all good and we perceive that we are asking a question which has not been answered in the face of this direct perception that the two questions are distinct no proof that they must be identical can have the slightest value that the proposition this is good is thus distinct from every other proposition was proved in chapter 1 and I may now illustrate this fact by pointing out how it is distinguished from two particular propositions with which it has commonly been identified that so and so ought to be done is commonly called a moral law and this phrase naturally suggests that the proposition is in some way analogous either to a natural law or to a law in the legal sense or to both all three are in fact really analogous in one respect and in one respect only that they include a proposition which is universal a moral law asserts this is good in all cases a natural law asserts this happens in all cases and a law in the legal sense it is commanded that this be done or left undone in all cases but since it is very natural to suppose that the analogy extends further and that the assertion this is good in all cases is equivalent to the assertion this happens in all cases or to the assertion it is commanded that this be done in all cases it may be useful briefly to point out that they are not equivalent 75 the fallacy of supposing moral law to be analogous to natural law in respect of asserting that some action is one which is always necessarily done is contained in one of the most famous doctrines of Kant identifies what ought to be with the law according to which a free or pure will must act with the only kind of action which is possible for it and by this identification he does not mean merely to assert that free will is also under the necessity of doing what it ought he means that what it ought to do means nothing but its own law the law according to which it must act it differs from the human will just in that what we ought to do is what it necessarily does it is autonomous and by this is meant among other things that there is no separate standard by which it can be judged that the question is the law by which this will acts a good one is in its case meaningless it follows that what is necessarily willed by this pure will is good not because that will is good nor for any other reason but merely because it is what is necessarily willed by a pure will Kant's assertion of the autonomy of the practical reason thus has the very opposite effect to that which he desired it makes his ethics ultimately and hopelessly heteronymous his moral law is independent of metaphysics only in the sense that according to him we can know it independently he holds that we can only infer that there is freedom from the fact that the moral law is true and so far as he keeps strictly to this view he does avoid the error into which most metaphysical writers fall of allowing his opinions as to what is real to influence his judgment on what is good but he fails to see that on his view the moral law is dependent upon freedom in a far more important sense than that in which freedom depends on the moral law he admits that freedom is the ratio ascending of the moral law whereas the latter is only the ratio cognoscendi of freedom and this means unless reality be such as he says no assertion that this is good can possibly be true it can indeed have no meaning he has therefore furnished his opponents with a conclusive method of attacking the validity of the moral law if they can only show by some other means which he denies to be possible but leaves theoretically open that the nature of reality is not such as he says he cannot deny that they will have proved his ethical principle to be false if what this ought to be done means this is willed by a free will then if it can be shown that there is no free will which wills anything it will follow that nothing ought to be done 76 and Kant also commits the fallacy of supposing that this ought to be means this is commanded he conceives the moral law to be an imperative and this is a very common mistake this ought to be it is assumed must mean this is commanded nothing therefore would be good unless it were commanded and since commands in this world are liable to be erroneous what ought to be in its ultimate sense means what is commanded by some real super sensible authority with regard to this authority it is then no longer possible to ask is it righteous its commands cannot fail to be right because to be right means to be what it commands here therefore law in the moral sense is supposed to be analogous to law in the legal sense rather than as in the lasting sense to law in the natural sense it is supposed that moral obligation is analogous to legal obligation with this difference only that whereas the source of legal obligation is earthly that of the moral obligation is heavenly yet it is obvious that if by a source of obligation is meant only a power which binds you or compels you to do a thing it is not because it does do this that you ought to obey it it is only if it be itself so good that it commands and enforces only what is good that it can be a source of moral obligation and in that case what it commands and enforces would be good whether commanded and enforced or not just that which makes an obligation legal namely the fact that it is commanded by a certain kind of authority is entirely irrelevant to moral obligation however an authority be defined its commands will be morally binding only if they are morally binding only if they tell us what ought to be or what is a means to that which ought to be 77 in this last error in the supposition that when I say you ought to do this I must mean you are commanded to do this we have one other reasons which has led to the supposition that the particular super sensible property by reference to which good must be defined is will and that ethical conclusion may be obtained by inquiring into the nature of a fundamentally real will seems to be by far the commonest assumption of metaphysical ethics at the present day but this assumption seems to owe its plausibility not so much to the supposition that ought expresses a command but a far more fundamental error this error consists in supposing that to ascribe certain predicates to a thing is the same thing as to say that that thing is the object of a certain kind of psychical state it is supposed that to say that a thing is real or true is the same thing as to say that it is known in a certain way and that the difference between the assertion that it is good and the assertion that it is real between an ethical therefore and a metaphysical proposition consists in the fact that whereas the latter asserts its relation to cognition the former asserts its relation to will now that this is an error has been already shown in chapter 1 that the assertion this is good is not identical with the assertion this is willed either by a super sensible will or otherwise nor with any other proposition has been proved nor can I add anything to that proof but in face of this proof it may be anticipated that two lines of defense may be taken up one it may be maintained that nevertheless they really are identical and facts may be pointed out which seems to prove that identity or else two it may be said that an absolute identity is not maintained that it is only meant to assert that there is some special connection between will and goodness such as makes an inquiry into the real nature of the former an essential step in the proof of ethical conclusions in order to meet these two possible objections I propose first to show what possible connections there are or maybe between goodness and will and that none of these can justify us in asserting that this is good is identical with this is willed on the other hand it will appear that some of them may be easily confused with this assertion of identity and that therefore the confusion is likely to have been made this part of my argument will therefore already go some way towards meeting the second objection but what must be conclusive against this is to show that any possible connection between will and goodness except the absolute identity in question would not be sufficient to give an inquiry into will the smallest relevance to the proof of any ethical conclusion 78 it has been customary since Kant's time to assert that cognition, volition and feeling are three fundamentally distinct attitudes of the mind towards reality they are three distinct ways of experiencing and each of them informs us of a distinct aspect under which reality may be considered the epistemological method of approaching metaphysics rests on the assumption that by considering what is implied in cognition what is its ideal we may discover what properties the world must have if it is to be true and similarly it is held that by considering what is implied in the fact of willing or feeling what is the ideal which they presuppose we may discover what properties the world must have if it is to be good or beautiful the orthodox idealistic epistemologist differs from the sensationalist or empiricist in holding that what we directly cognize is neither all true nor yet the whole truth in order to reject the false and to discover further truths we must, he says, not take cognition merely as it presents itself but discover what is implied in it and similarly the orthodox metaphysical ethicist differs from the mere naturalist in holding that not everything which we actually will is good nor if good completely good what is really good is that which is implied in the essential nature of will others again think that feeling and not will is the fundamental datum for ethics but in either case it is agreed that ethics has some relation to will or feeling which is has not to cognition and which other objects of study have to cognition will or feeling on the one hand and cognition on the other are regarded as in some sense coordinate sources of philosophical knowledge the one of practical the other of theoretical philosophy what that is true can possibly be meant by this view 79 first of all it may be meant that just as by reflection on our perceptual and sensory experience we become aware of the distinction between truth and falsehood so it is by reflection on our experiences of feeling and willing that we become more aware of our ethical distinctions we should not know what was meant by thinking one thing better than another unless the attitude of our will or feeling towards one thing was different from its attitude towards another all this may be admitted but so far we have only the psychological fact that it is only because we will or feel things in a certain way that we ever come to think them good just as it is only because we have certain perceptual experiences that we ever come to think things true here then is a special connection between willing and goodness but it is only a causal connection that willing is a necessary condition for the cognition of goodness but it may be said further that willing and feeling are not only the origin of cognitions of goodness but that to will a thing or to have a certain feeling towards a thing is the same thing as to think it good and it may be admitted that even this is generally true in a sense it does seem to be true that we hardly ever think a thing good and never very decidedly without at the same time having a special attitude of feeling or will towards it though it is certainly not the case that this is true universally and the converse may possibly be true universally it may be the case that a perception of goodness is included in the complex facts which we mean by willing by having certain kinds of feeling let us admit then that to think a thing good and to will it are the same thing in this sense that wherever the latter occurs the former also occurs as part of it and even that they are generally the same thing in the converse sense that when the former occurs it is generally part of the latter End of Chapter 4 Part 2 Chapter 4 Part 3 of Principia Ethica this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Freder Karlsson Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore 80 these facts may seem to give countenance to the general assertion that to think a thing good is to prefer it or approve it in the sense in which preference and approval denote certain kinds of will or feeling it seems to be always true that when we thus prefer or approve there is included in that fact the fact that we think good and it is certainly true in an immense majority of instances that when we think good we also prefer or approve it is natural enough then to say that to think good is to prefer and what more natural than to add when I say a thing is good I mean that I prefer it and yet this natural addition involves a gross confusion even if it be true that to think good is the same thing as to prefer which as we have seen is never true in the sense that they are absolutely identical and not always true in the sense that they occur together yet it is not true that what you think when you think a thing good is that you prefer it even if you're thinking the thing good is the same thing as your preference of it yet the goodness of the thing that of which you think is for that very reason obviously not the same thing as your preference of it whether you have a certain thought or not is one question and whether what you think is true is quite a different one upon which the answer to the first has not the least bearing the fact that you prefer a thing does not tend to show that the thing is good even if it does show that you think it so it seems to be owing to this confusion that the question what is good is thought to be identical with the question what is preferred it is said with sufficient truth that you would never know a thing was good unless you preferred it just as you would never know a thing existed unless you perceived it but it is added, and this is false that you would never know a thing was good unless you knew that you preferred it or that it existed unless you knew that you perceived it and it is finally added finally added, and this is utterly false, that you cannot distinguish the fact that a thing is good from the fact that you prefer it, or the fact that it exists from the fact that you perceive it. It is often pointed out that I cannot at any given moment distinguish what is true from what I think so, and this is true. But though I cannot distinguish what is true from what I think, I always can distinguish what I mean by saying that it is true from what I mean by saying that I think so. For I understand the meaning of this opposition that what I think true may nevertheless be false. When therefore I assert that it is true, I mean to assert something different from the fact that I think so. What I think, namely that something is true, is always quite distinct from the fact that I think it. My assertion that it is true does not even include the assertion that I think it so. Although of course whenever I do think a thing true, it is as a matter of fact also true that I do think it. This tautology's proposition that for a thing to be thought true, it is necessary that it should be thought, is, however commonly identified with the proposition that for a thing to be true, it is necessary that it should be thought. A very little reflection should suffice to convince anyone that this identification is erroneous. And a very little more will show that if so, we must mean by true something which includes no reference to thinking or to any other physical fact. It may be difficult to discover precisely what we mean to hold the object in question before us so as to compare it with other objects. But that we do mean something distinct and unique can no longer be a matter of doubt. That to be true means to be thought in a certain way is, therefore, certainly false. Yet this assertion plays the most essential part in Kant's Copernican revolution of philosophy and renders worthless the whole mass of modern literature to which the revolution has given rise and which is called epistemology. It is told that what was unified in a certain manner by the synthetic activity of thought was ipso facto true, that this was the very meaning of the word. Whereas it is plain that the only connection which can possibly hold between being true and being thought in a certain way is that the latter should be a criterion or test of the former. In order, however, to establish that it is so, it would be necessary to establish by the methods of induction that what was true was always thought in a certain way. Modern epistemology dispenses with this long and difficult investigation at the cost of the self-contradictory assumption that truth and the criterion of truth are one and the same thing. 81. It is, then, a very natural, though an utterly false, supposition that for a thing to be true is the same thing as for it to be perceived or thought of in a certain way. And since, for the reasons given above, the fact of preference seems roughly to stand in the same relation to thinking things good in which the fact of perception stands to thinking that they are true or exist, it is very natural that for a thing to be good should be supposed identical with its being preferred in a certain way. But once this coordination of volition and cognition has been accepted, it is again very natural that every fact which seems to support the conclusion that being true is identical with being cognized should confirm the corresponding conclusion that being good is identical with being willed. It will, therefore, be in place to point out another confusion, which seems to have had great influence in causing acceptance of the view that to be true is the same thing as to be cognized. This confusion is due to a failure to observe that when we say we have a sensation or perception or that we know a thing, we mean to assert not only that our mind is cognitive, but also that that which it cognizes is true. It is not observed that the usage of these words is such that if a thing be untrue, that fact alone is sufficient to justify us in saying that the person who says he perceives it or knows it does not perceive or know it. Without our either inquiring whether or assuming that his state of mind differs in any respect from what it would have been had he perceived or known. It is not observed that the usage of these words is such that if a thing be untrue the fact alone is sufficient to justify us in saying that the person who says he perceives it or knows it does not perceive or know it. Without our either inquiring whether or assuming that his state of mind differs in any respect from what it would have been had he perceived or known. By this denial we do not accuse him of an error in introspection. Even if there was such an error we do not deny that he was aware of a certain object nor even that his state of mind was exactly such as he took it to be. We merely deny that the object of which he was aware had a certain property. It is however commonly supposed that when we assert a thing to be perceived or known we are asserting one fact only and since of the two fact which we really assert the existence of a physical state is by far the easier to distinguish it is supposed that this is the only one which we do assert. Thus perception and sensation have come to be regarded as if they denoted certain states of mind and nothing more. A mistake which was easier to make since the commonest state of mind to which we give a name which does not imply that its object is true namely imagination may with some plausibility be supposed to differ from sensation and perception not only in the property possessed by its object but also in its character as a state of mind. It has thus come to be supposed that the only difference between perception and imagination by which they can be defined must be a merely psychical difference. And if this were the case it would follow at once that to be true was identical with being cognized in a certain way since the assertion that a thing is perceived does certainly include the assertion that it is true and if nevertheless that it is perceived means only that the mind has a certain attitude towards it then its truth must be identical with the fact that it is regarded in this way. We may then attribute the view that to be true means to be cognized in a certain way partly to the failure to perceive that certain words which are commonly supposed to stand for nothing more than a certain kind of cognitive state do in fact also include a reference to the truth of the object of such states. 82. I will now sum up account of the apparent connections between will and ethical propositions which seems to support the vague conviction that this is good is somehow identical with this is willed in a certain way. 1. It may be maintained with sufficient show or truth that it is only because certain things were originally willed that we ever came to have ethical convictions at all. And it has been too commonly assumed that to show what was the cause of a thing is the same thing as to show the thing itself is. It is however hardly necessary to point out that this is not the case. It may be further maintained with some plausibility that to think a thing good and to will it in a certain way are now as a matter of fact identical. We must however distinguish certain possible meanings of this assertion. It may be admitted that when we think a thing good we generally have a special attitude of will or feeling towards it and that perhaps when we will it in a certain way we do always think it good. But the very fact that we can thus distinguish the question whether though the one is always accompanied by the other yet this other may not always be accompanied by the first shows that the two things are not in the strict sense identical. The fact is that whatever we mean by will or by any form of the will the fact we mean by it certainly always includes something else beside the thinking a thing good. And hence that when willing and thinking good are asserted to be identical the most that can be meant is that this other element in will always both accompanies and is accompanied by the thinking good. And this as has been said is a very doubtful truth. Even however if it were strictly true the fact that the two things can be distinguished is fatal to the assumed coordination between will and cognition in one of the senses in which that assumption is commonly made. For it is only in respect of that other element in will that volition differs from cognition whereas it is only in respect of the fact that volition or some form of volition includes a cognition of goodness that will can have the same relation to ethical which cognition has to metaphysical propositions. Accordingly the fact of volition as a whole that is if we include in it the element which makes it volition and distinguish it from cognition has not the same relation to ethical propositions which cognition has to those which are metaphysical. Volition and cognition are not coordinate ways of experiencing. Since it is only insofar as volition denotes a complex fact which includes in it the one identical simple fact which is meant by cognition that volition is a way of experiencing at all. But three, if we allow the terms volition or will to stand for thinking good although they certainly do not commonly stand for this there still remains the question what connection would this fact establish between volition and ethics? Could the inquiry into what was willed be identical with the ethical inquiry into what was good? It is plain enough that they could not be identical though it is also plain why they should be thought so. The question what is good is confused with the question what is thought good and the question what is true with the question what is thought true for two main reasons. One of these is the general difficulty that is found in distinguishing what is cognized from the cognition of it. It is observed that I certainly cannot cognize anything that is true without cognizing it. Since therefore whenever I know a thing that is true the thing is certainly cognized it is assumed that for a thing to be true at all is the same thing as for it to be cognized. And two it is not observed that certain words which are supposed to denote only peculiar species of cognition do as a matter of fact also denote that the object cognized is true. Thus if perception be taken to denote only a certain kind of mental fact then since the object of it is always true it becomes easy to suppose that to be true means only to be object to a mental state of that kind and similarly it is easy to suppose that to be truly good differs from being falsely thought so solely in respect of the fact that to be the former is to be the object of evolution differing from that of which an apparent good is the object in the same way in which a perception on this supposition differs from an illusion. 83. Being good then is not identical with being good or felt in any kind of way any more than being true is identical with being thought in in any kind of way. But let us suppose this to be admitted. Is it still possible that an inquiry into the nature of will or feeling should be a necessary step to the proof of ethical conclusions. If being good and being willed are not identical then the most that can be maintained with regard to the connection of goodness with will is that what is good is always also willed in a certain way and that what is willed in a certain way is always also good. And it may be said that this is all that is meant by those metaphysical writers who profess to base ethics upon the metaphysics of will. What would follow from this supposition? It is plain that if what is willed in a certain way were always also good then the fact that a thing was so willed would be a criterion of its goodness. But in order to establish that will is a criterion of goodness we must be able to show first and separately that in a great number of the instances in which we find a certain kind of will we also find that the objects of that will are good. We might then perhaps be entitled to infer that in a few instances where it was not obvious whether a thing was good or not, but was obvious that it was willed in the way required the thing was really good. Since it had the property which in all other instances we had found to be accompanied by goodness. A reference to will might thus just conceivably become of use towards the end of our ethical investigations when we had already been able to show independently of a vast number of different objects that they were really good and in what degree they were so. And against even this conceivable utility it may be urged one that it is impossible to see why it should not be as easy and it would certainly be the most secure way to prove that the thing in question was good by the same methods which we had used improving that other things were good as by reference to our criterion and to that if we set ourselves seriously to find out what things are good we shall see reason to think as will appear in chapter 6 that they have no other property but common and peculiar to them beside their goodness that in fact there is no criterion of goodness 84. But to consider whether any form of will is or is not a criterion of goodness is quite unnecessary for our purpose here. Since none of those writers who profess to base their ethics on an investigation of will have ever recognized the need of proving directly and independently that all the things which are willed in a certain way are good. They make no attempt to show that will is a criterion of goodness and stronger evidence could be given that they do not recognize that this at most is all it can be. As has been just pointed out if we are to maintain that whatever is willed in a certain way is also good we must in the first place be able to show that certain things have one property goodness and that the same things also have the other property that they are willed in a certain way. And secondly we must be able to show this in a very large number of instances if we are to be entitled to claim any assent for the proposition that these two properties always accompany one another. Even when this was shown it would still be doubtful whether the inference from generally to always would be valid and almost certain that this doubtful principle would be useless. But the very question which it is the business of ethics to answer is this question what things are good? And so long as hedonism retains its present popularity it must be admitted that it is a question upon which there is scarcely any agreement and which therefore requires the most careful examination. The greatest and most difficult part of the business of ethics would therefore require to have been already accomplished before we could be entitled to claim that anything was a criterion of goodness. If on the other hand to be willed in a certain way was identical with being good then indeed we should be entitled to start our ethical investigations by inquiring what was willed in the way required. That this is the way in which metaphysical writers start their investigations seem to show conclusively that they are influenced by the idea that goodness is identical with being willed. They do not recognize that the question what is good is a different one from the question what is willed in a certain way. Thus we find Green explicitly stating that the common characteristic of the good is that it satisfies some desire. If we are to take this statement strictly it obviously asserts that good things have no characteristic in common except that they satisfy some desire. Not even therefore that they are good. And this can only be the case if being good is identical with satisfying desire. If good is merely another name for desire satisfying. There could be no plainer instance of the naturalistic fallacy and we cannot take the statement as a mere verbal slip which does not affect the validity of Green's argument. For he nowhere either gives or pretends to give any reason for believing to be good in any sense except that it is what would satisfy a particular kind of desire. The kind of desire which he tries to show to be that of a moral agent. An unhappy alternative is before us. Such reasoning would give valid reasons for his conclusions if and only if being good and being desired in a particular way were identical. And in this case as we have seen in Chapter 1 his conclusions would not be ethical. On the other hand if the two are not identical his conclusions may be ethical and may even be right. But he has not given us a single reason for believing them. The thing which a scientific ethics is required to show namely that certain things are really good he has assumed to begin with in assuming that things which are willed in a certain way are always good. We may therefore have as much respect for Green's conclusions as for those of any other man who details to us his ethical convictions but that any of his arguments are such as to give us any reason for holding that Green's convictions are more likely to be true than those of any other man must be clearly denied. The prolegomena to ethics is quite as far as Mr. Spence's data of ethics from making the smallest contribution to the solution of ethical problems. 85. The main object of this chapter has been to show that metaphysics understood as the investigation of a supposed super sensible reality can have no logical bearing whatever upon the answer to the fundamental ethical question what is good in itself. That this is so follows at once from the conclusion of Chapter 1 that good denotes an ultimate unanalyzable predicate but this truth has been so systematically ignored that it seemed worthwhile to discuss and distinguish in detail the principal relations which do hold or have been supposed to hold between metaphysics and ethics. With this view I pointed out one that metaphysics may have a bearing on practical ethics on the question what ought we to do so far as it may be able to tell us what the future effects of our action will be. What it cannot tell us is whether those effects are good or bad in themselves. One particular type of metaphysical doctrine which is very frequently held undoubtedly has such a bearing on practical ethics for if it is true that the sole reality is an eternal immutable absolute then it follows that no action of ours can have any real effect and hence that no practical proposition can be true. The same conclusion follows from the ethical proposition commonly combined with this metaphysical one namely that this eternal reality is also the sole good. Two, the metaphysical writers as where they fail to notice the contradiction between any practical proposition and the assertion that an eternal reality is the sole good seem frequently to confuse the proposition that one particular existing thing is good with the proposition that the existence of that kind of thing would be good wherever it might occur. To the proof of the former proposition metaphysics might be relevant by showing that the thing existed. To the proof of the latter it is wholly irrelevant. It can only serve the psychological function of suggesting things which may be valuable a function which would be still better performed by pure fiction but the most important source of the supposition that metaphysics is relevant to ethics seems to be the assumption that good must denote some real property of things. An assumption which is mainly due to two erroneous doctrines the first logical the second epistemological. Hence three I discussed the logical doctrine that all properties assert a relation between existence and pointed out that the assimilation of ethical propositions either to natural laws or to commands are instances of this logical fallacy. And finally four I discussed the epistemological doctrine that to be good is equivalent to being willed or felt in some particular way a doctrine which derives support from the analogous error which can't regarded as the cardinal point of a system and which has received immensely wide acceptance the erroneous view that to be true or real is equivalent to being thought in a particular way. In this discussion the main points to which I desire to direct attention are these a that volition and feeling are not analogous to cognition in the manner assumed. Since so far as these words denote an attitude of the mind towards an object they are themselves merely instances of cognition. They differ only in respect of the kind of object of which they take cognizance and in respect of the other mental accompaniments of such cognitions. B. That universally the object of a cognition must be distinguished from the cognition of which it is the object and hence that in no case can the question of whether the object is true be identical with the question how it is cognized or whether it is cognized at all. It follows that even if the proposition this is good, where always the object of certain kinds of will or feeling the truth of that proposition could in no case be established by proving that it was their object far less can that proposition itself be identical with the proposition that its subject is the object of volition or feeling. End of chapter 4. Chapter 5 Part 1 of Principe Ethica. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Fredrik Carlson. Principe Ethica by G. E. Moore. Chapter 5 Ethics in Relation to Conduct. 86. In the present chapter we have again to take a great step in ethical method. My discussion here too has fallen under two main heads. Under the first I try to show what the objective good means. This appeared to be the first point to be settled in any treatment of ethics that should aim at being systematic. It is necessary we should know this. Should know what good means before we can go on to consider what is good. What things or qualities are good. It is necessary we should know it for two reasons. The first reason is that good is the notion upon which all ethics depends. We cannot hope to understand what we mean when we say that this is good or that is good until we understand quite clearly not only what this is or that is which the natural sciences and philosophy can tell us but also what is meant by calling them good. A matter which is reserved for ethics only. Unless we are quite clear on this point our ethical reason will be always apt to be fallacious. We shall think that we are proving that a thing is good when we are really only proving that it is something else. Since unless we know what good means unless we know what is meant by that notion in itself as distinct from what is meant by any other notion we shall not be able to tell when we are dealing with it and when we are dealing with something else which is perhaps like it but yet not the same. And the second reason why we should settle first of all this question what good means is a reason of method. It is this that we can never know on what evidence an ethical proposition rests until we know the nature of the notion which makes the proposition ethical. We cannot tell what is possible by way of proof in favor of one judgment that this or that is good or against another judgment that this or that is bad until we have recognized what the nature of such propositions must always be. In fact it follows from the meaning of good and bad that such propositions are all of them in Kant's phrase synthetic. They all must rest in the end upon some proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected which cannot be logically deduced from any other proposition. This result which follows from our first investigation may be otherwise expressed by saying that the fundamental principles of ethics must be self-evident. But I am anxious that this expression should not be misunderstood. The expression self-evident means properly that the proposition so called is evident or true by itself alone that it is not an inference from some proposition other than itself. The expression does not mean that the proposition is true because it is evident to you or me or all mankind because in other words it appears to us to be true. That a proposition appears to be true can never be a valid argument that true it really is. By saying that a proposition is self-evident we mean empathetically that it's appearing so to us. It's not the reason why it is true. For we mean that it has also absolutely no reason. It would not be a self-evident proposition if we could say of it I cannot think otherwise and therefore it is true. For then its evidence or proof would not lie in itself. But in something else, namely our conviction of it, that it appears true to us may indeed be the cause of our asserting it or the reason why we think and say that it is true. But a reason in this sense is something utterly different from a logical reason or reason why something is true. Moreover, it is obviously not a reason of the same thing. The evidence of a proposition to us is only a reason for our holding it to be true. Whereas a logical reason or reason in the sense in which self-evident propositions have no reason is a reason why the proposition itself must be true, not why we hold it so to be. Again that a proposition is evident to us may not only be the reason why we do think or affirm it it may even be a reason why we ought to think it or affirm it. But a reason in this sense too is not a logical reason for the truth of the proposition, though it is a logical reason for the rightness of holding the proposition. In our common language, however, these three meanings of reasons are constantly confused whenever we say I have a reason for thinking that true. But it is absolutely essential if we are to get clear notions about ethics or indeed about any other, especially any philosophical study that we should distinguish them. When therefore I talk of intuitionistic hedonism I must not be understood to imply that my denial that pleasure is the only good is based on my intuition of its falsehood. My intuition of its falsehood is indeed my reason for holding and declaring it untrue. It is indeed the only valid reason for so doing. But that is just because there is no logical reason for it. Because there is no proper evidence or reason of its falsehood except itself alone. It is untrue because it is untrue and there is no other reason. But I declare it untrue because its untruth is evident to me and I hold that that is a sufficient reason for my assertion. We must not therefore look on intuition as if it were an alternative to reasoning. Nothing whatever can take the place of reasons for the truth of any proposition. Intuition can only furnish a reason for holding any proposition to be true. This however it must do when any proposition is self evident when in fact there are no reasons which prove its truth. 87. So much then for the first step which established that good is good and nothing else whatever and that naturalism was a fallacy. A second step was taken when we began to consider proposed self evident principles of ethics. In this second division resting on our result that good means good we began the discussion of propositions asserting that such and such a thing or quality or concept was good. Of such a kind was the principle of intuitionistic or ethical hedonism. The principle that pleasure alone is good. Following the method established by our first discussion I claim that the untruth of this proposition was self evident. I could do nothing to prove that it was untrue. I could only point out as clearly as possible what it means and how it contradicts other propositions which appear to be equally true. My only object in all this was necessarily to convince. But even if I did convince that does not prove that we are right it justifies us in holding that we are so but nevertheless we may be wrong. One thing however we may justly pride ourselves. It is that we have had a better chance of answering our questions rightly than Bentham or Mill or Siegwick or others who have contradicted us. For we have proved that these have never even asked themselves the question which they professed to answer. They have confused it with another question. Small wonder therefore if their answer is different from ours. We must be quite sure that the same question has been put before we trouble ourselves at the different answers that are given to it. For all we know the whole world would agree with us if they could once clearly understand the question upon which we want their votes. Certain it is that in all those cases where we found a difference of opinion we found also that the question had not been clearly understood. Though therefore we cannot prove that we are right yet we have a reason to believe that everybody, unless he is taking as to what he thinks, will think the same as we. It is as with a sum in mathematics. If we find a gross and palpable error in the calculations we are not surprised or troubled that the person who made this mistake has reached a different result from ours. We think he will admit that this result is wrong if his mistake is pointed out to him. For instance if a man has to add up 5 plus 7 plus 9 we should not wonder that he made the result to be 34 if he started by making 5 plus 7 equals 25. And so in ethics if we find as we did that a desirable is confused with desired or the end is confused with means we need not be disconcerted that those who have committed these mistakes do not agree with us. The only difference is that in ethics owing to the intricacy of its subject matter it is far more difficult to persuade anyone either that he has made a mistake or that that mistake affects his result. In the second division of my subject the division which is occupied with the question what is good in itself I have hitherto only tried to establish one definite result and that a negative one namely that pleasure is not the soul good. This result if true refutes half or more than half of the ethical theories which have ever been held and is therefore not without importance. It will however be necessary presently to deal positively with the question what things are good and in what degrees 88. But before proceeding to this discussion I propose first to deal with the third kind of ethical question the question what ought we to do the answering of this question constitutes the third great division of ethical inquiry and its nature was briefly explained in chapter 1. It uses into ethics as was there pointed out an entirely new question the question what things are related as causes to that which is good in itself and this question can only be answered by an entirely new method the method of empirical investigation by means of which causes are discovered in the other sciences. To ask what kind of actions we ought to perform or what kind of conduct is right is to ask what kind of effects such action and conduct will produce not a single question in practical ethics can be answered except by a causal generalization all such questions do indeed also involve an ethical judgment proper the judgment that certain effects are better in themselves than others but they do assert that these better things are effects are causally connected with the actions in question. Every judgment in practical ethics may be reduced to the form this is a cause of that good thing. 89. that this is the case that the question what is right what is my duty what ought I to do belong exclusively to this third branch of ethical inquiry is the first point to which I wish to call attention the moral laws I wish to show are merely statements that certain kinds of actions will have good effects the very opposite of this view has been generally prevalent in ethics. The right and the useful have been supposed to be at least capable of conflicting with one another and at all events to be essentially distinct it has been characteristic of a certain school of moralists as of moral common sense to declare that the end will never justify the means. What I wish first to point out is that right does and can mean nothing but cause of a good result and is thus identical with useful. Once it follows that the end always will justify the means and that no action which is not justified by its results can be right. That there may be a true proposition meant to be conveyed by their surgeon the end will not justify the means I fully admit but that in another sense and a sense far more fundamental for ethical theory it is utterly false must first be shown. That their surgeon I am morally bound to perform this action is identical with their surgeon this action will produce the greatest amount of good in the universe has already been briefly shown in chapter 1 but it is important to insist that this fundamental point is demonstrably certain. This may perhaps be best made evident in the following way. It is plain that when we assert that a certain action is our absolute duty we're asserting that the performance of that action at that time is unique in respect of value. But no dutiful action can possibly have unique value in the sense that it is the soul thing of value in the world since in that case every such action would be the soul good thing which is a manifest contradiction and for the same reason it's value cannot be unique in the sense that it has more intrinsic value than anything else in the world since every act of duty would then be the best thing in the world which is also a contradiction. It can therefore be unique only in the sense that the whole world will be better if it be performed than if any possible alternative were taken. And the question whether this is so cannot possibly depend solely on the question of its own intrinsic value. For any action will always have effects different from those of any other action. And if any of these have intrinsic value their value is exactly as relevant to the total goodness of the universe as that of their cause. It is in fact evident that however valuable an action may be in itself yet owing to its existence the sum of good in the universe may conceivably be made less than if some other action less valuable in itself had been performed. But to say that this is the case is to say that it would have been better that the action should not have been done. This again is obviously equivalent to the statement that it ought not to have been done, that it was not what duty required. Fiat justizia ruat kaelu can only be justified on the ground that by the doing of justice the universe gains more than it loses by the falling of the heavens. It is of course possible that this is the case but at all events to assert that justice is a duty despite of such consequences is to assert that it is the case. Our duty therefore can only be defined as that action which will cause more good to exist in the universe than any possible alternative. And what is right or morally permissible only differs from this as what will not cause less good than any possible alternative. When therefore ethics presumes to assert that certain ways of acting are duties it presumes to assert that to act in those ways will always produce the greatest possible sum of good. If we are told that to do no murder is a duty we are told that the action whatever it may be which is called murder will under no circumstances cause so much good to exist in the universe as its avoidance. 90. But if this be recognized several of the most important consequences follow with regard to the relation of ethics to conduct. 1. It is plain that no moral law is self evident as has commonly been held by the intuitional school of moralists. The intuitional view of ethics consists in the supposition that certain rules stating that certain actions are always to be done or to be omitted may be taken as evident premises. I have shown with regard to judgments of what is good in self that this is the case. No reason can be given for them. But it is the essence of intuitionism to suppose that rules of action statements not of what ought to be but of what we ought to do are in the same sense intuitively certain. Possibility has been lent to this view by the fact that we do make immediate judgment that certain actions are obligatory or wrong. We are thus often intuitively certain of our duty in a psychological sense. But nevertheless these judgments are not self evident and cannot be taken as ethical premises since as has now been shown they are capable of being confirmed or refuted by an investigation of causes and effects. It is indeed possible that some of our immediate intuitions are true. But since what we intuit, what conscience tells us is that certain actions will always produce the greatest sum of good possible under the circumstances it is plain that reasons can be given which will show the deliverance of conscience to be true or false. 2. In order to show that any action is a duty it is necessary to know both what are the other conditions which will conjointly with it determine its effects to know exactly what will be the effects of these conditions and to know all the events which will be in any way affected by our action throughout an infinite future. We must have all this causal knowledge and further we must know accurately the degree of value both of the action itself and of all these effects and must be able to determine how in conjunction with the other things in the universe they will affect its value as an organic whole. And not only this we must also possess all this knowledge with regard to the effects of every possible alternative and must then be able to see by comparison that the total value due to the existence of the action in question will be greater. But it is obvious that our causal knowledge alone is far too incomplete for us ever to assure ourselves of this result that an action is our duty. We can never be sure that any action will produce the greatest value possible. Ethics therefore is quite unable to give us a list of duties but there still remains a humbler task which may be possible for practical ethics. Although we cannot hope to discover which in a given situation is the best of all possible alternative actions there may be some possibility of showing which among the alternatives likely occur to anyone will produce the greatest sum of good. This second task is certainly all that ethics can ever have accomplished and it is certainly all that it has ever collected materials for proving since no one has ever attempted to exhaust the possible alternative actions in any particular case. Ethical philosophers have in fact confined their attention to a very limited class of actions which have been selected because they are those which most commonly occur to mankind as possible alternatives. With regard to these they may possibly have shown that any alternative is better, that is produces a greater total of value than others. But it seems desirable to insist that though they have represented this result as a determination of duties it can never really have been so. For the term duty is certainly so used that if we are subsequently persuaded that any possible action would have produced more good than the one we adopted we admit that we failed to do our duty. It will however be a useful task if ethics can determine which among alternatives likely to occur will produce the greatest total value. For though this alternative cannot be proved to be the best possible yet it may be better than any course of action which we should otherwise adopt. 92. A difficulty in distinguishing this task which ethics may perhaps undertake with some hope of success from the hopeless task of finding duties arises from an ambiguity in the use of the term possible. An action may in one perfectly legitimate sense be said to be impossible solely because the idea of doing it does not occur to us. In this sense then the alternatives which do actually occur to a man would be the only possible alternatives and the best of these would be the best possible action under the circumstances and hence would conform to our definition of duty. But when we talk of the best possible action as our duty we mean by the term any action which no other known circumstance would prevent provided the idea of it occurred to us. And this use of the term is in accordance with popular usage. For we admit that a man may fail to do his duty through neglecting to think of what he might have done. Since therefore we say that he might have done what nevertheless did not occur to him it is plain that we do not limit his possible actions to those of which he thinks. It might be urged with more plausibility that we mean by a man's duty only the best of those actions of which he might have thought. And it is true that we do not blame any man very severely for omitting an action which as we say he could not have expected to think. But even here it is plain that we recognize a distinction between what he might have done and what he might have thought of doing. We regard it as a pity that he did not do otherwise. And duty is certainly used in such a sense that it would be a contradiction in terms to say that it was a pity that a man did his duty. We must therefore distinguish a possible action from an action of which it is possible to think. By the former we mean an action which no known cause would prevent, provided the idea of it occurred to us. And that one among such actions which will produce the greatest total good is what we mean by duty. Ethics certainly cannot hope to discover what kind of action is always our duty in this sense. It may however hope to decide which among one or two such possible actions is the best. And those which it has chosen to consider are, as a matter of fact, the most important of those with regard to which men deliberate whether they shall or shall not do them. A decision with regard to these may therefore be easily confounded with a decision with regard to which is the best possible action. But it is to be noted that even though we shall limit ourselves to considering which is the better among alternatives likely to be thought of, the fact that these alternatives might be thought of is not included in what we mean by calling them possible alternatives. Even if in any particular case it was impossible that the idea of them should have occurred to a man the question we are concerned with is which if it had occurred would have been the best alternative. If we say that murder is always a worse alternative we mean to assert that it is so even where it is impossible for the murderer to think of doing anything else. The utmost then that practical ethics can hope to discover is which among a few alternatives possible under certain circumstances will on the whole produce the best result. It may tell us which is the best in this sense of certain alternatives about which we are likely to deliberate. And since we may also know that even if we choose none of these what we shall in that case do is unlikely to be as good as one of them it may thus tell us which of the alternatives among which we can choose it is best to choose. If it could do this it would be sufficient for practical guidance. End of chapter 5 part 1