 or I suppose about four or five miles north of the junction on Highway 2, up in the corner there. And it was very far the pipeline across Blackdale Creek. It did impact the creek itself as well as the Little Muddy River, which flows down towards the last one. Okay, so here's my, my best visual representation. The smeller on some of the extreme's Marlin Gallery system, you can see the extent of the system. The system collects both oil and saltwater, although the release was only on the saltwater line. The gathering system collects saltwater from south of the point of release center and moves everything up north and northeast to the saltwater disposal wells. As far as the saltwater system goes, it is a cold system with no other connections in or out other than the wells contributing. Construction on the marlin system started in 2013. Some of the system became operational in the early summer of 2014. The release occurred in August of 2014 and was reported in January of 2015. I'll talk about why that is. All right, so what happened? What caused this bill? There's a number of failures that led to this bill release. First off, there were problems with the installation of the pipe. And that is a picture of the actual pipe and the release point there. Secondly, there were problems with how the pipe was tested following installation. There were problems with the leak protection system, and there was definitely a problem with the reporting of the... Here's a close-up of the marlin release on the pipe. I'll come back to that in a second. So the pipe is a polyethylene inner core, which is wrapped in a fiberglass, which is an encrypted protective layer. So the polyethylene contains the fluid. The fiberglass provides structural integrity to allow higher pressures than the regular polyethylene pipe would. Some of the requirements of this pipeline include two main manufacturer's installation instructions. The first on the cover has to be no large rocks, no frozen chunks. Cover gently. And they require a manufacturer to represent them on site during installation. While they can vouch for the first item to do, there was not a manufacturer to represent them on site during installation. And so it's questionable whether there's other conditions for that as well. You can see what happened here is with the rocks or lumps or chunks, anything that impacts that pipe can damage that fiberglass layer. Once that happens, the inner pipe will still be intact. In fact, the outer cover could be intact as well, which is the case here. And you can see that it grew open once that was released. That tells me that that outer coating will still get intact when the pipe on that goal. And so if you just have that polyethylene pipe, it won't leak right away. What happens is that polyethylene will expand and stretch with the change of the pressure, because it doesn't have the fiberglass backing to back it up and eventually it'll heal. And that's when the pipe lets go off. One of the other failures was with the testing of the pipe. Again, manufacturer has some specific requirements for how the pipe will be tested. I call it a recommendation, but actually requirements under their manufacturers warranty. As it will be tested with water at 1.2 to 1.5 times were rated by pressure, not the maximum level of operating pressure. In this case, the pipe was only tested to 750 PSI, instead of then 900 to 1125 PSI. And it was tested with nitrogen gas to that lower pressure and not to the higher pressure. And even at that lower pressure, they had multiple pipe failures during that testing process, but they would fix that individual point of release without recognizing that there was an influx. Second failure was the leak detection system. Originally as this gathering system was designed, there was a line balancing system. There was line balancing system defined. Line balancing system records the amount of fluid into the line and out of the line on an ongoing basis, on almost a continuous basis. The problem was while the inlet meters were installed at each well leading into the pipe line, there was no help in the meter that had been installed. Inlet meters had both flow and pressure, but there was nothing on the outlet side to allow for that line balancing. At least until Christmas Eve, we'll talk about that. The EMP company, a company that owned both the production wells and the disposal wells, noted that there were discrepancies because they do. They were reporting how much fluid they were sending into the pipeline system. They also could see at the injection wells. While that also included some chart volumes coming to the injection wells, they could see there was a discrepancy there and they noted that and formed the pipeline. In addition to the leak detection system, there's also aerial and ground inspections of the pipeline were conducted, one per month during the times that they wanted to detect the leak. And the question is, would they have detected the leak? Well, the top picture there is an aerial photo taken on October 1, 2015, and you can see, I think, pretty clearly the point of release, the flow path of oil and surface and the entry into black-tailed reach. One of the problems was the folks that were looking at the pipeline from the air and the ground weren't actually informed that there was any leak suspected. Secondly, there was no evidence that the people on the ground, not the vehicle to do any on the ground inspection, they drove by, they did not walk the line. And so that went undetected yet. There's a number of warning signs. There should have been indicators that were the problem in the pipeline system. First off, on the date of the release on E17, the pressure sensor on the well nearest to the point of release reported a pressure drop from 500 PSI to less than 100 PSI at the same pumping rate. That should have been indicated here. Pumping the same volume through the same pipe had a much lower pressure, something to change. Second is that, again, the E17 company noted the volume discrepancy starting in October at 37,000 pounds a day. From whether they were pumping into the pipe, that increased from October through December, but you have to have 4900 per day. The data on Christmas Eve, the pipeline company finally installed an outlet meter at the disposal well, along with the new conduct problem line balance. Or they didn't, they didn't look at that data from that meter until January 1st of 2015. And by January 6, the company again reported to the pipeline company is discrepancy that have grown to 5,700 per day by that. Finally, on January 6, somebody walked the line and they discovered the point of release. It was reported the next day, North Dakota, North Dakota Plants reporting system as a part of the National Response Center. Same day, both reports indicated unknown quantity, report to the NRC, indicated no scheme, notice the quality. Those reports were updated. The North Dakota on the 13th, on the NRC on the 21st, around 70,000 barrels. However, the actual release volume was greater than 700,000 barrels. The estimates of the volume and the duration of the lead going back to August were known and discussed by some that on the 6th of January, and that was not disclosed anyway. I heard questions of why they boomed at the penalty, but there was a penalty to bring that, that is really what triggered that. At that point, this became a criminal matter, and that's why I couldn't even talk about any of this information up somehow when that whole matter had been basically settled because of that. It was relying on the spill report to disclose that relevant information as part of the spill report that triggered criminal investigation. Ultimately, in the end, the settlement was reached with some of that stream and included $15 million in these criminal penalties, primarily for the lack of reporting of relevant information. 20 million in civil penalties, which was split between the EPA or, again, this is discharge of waters in the U.S., because it did reach all the way to the Missouri River, and also violations of the North Dakota DEQ rules and the North Dakota Industrial Commission rules. Also included $1.25 million for damage restoration for natural resource damages, which is to make up for the damage to the ecosystem in that time frame between when the leak was repaired and when the remediation was completed. And the response and the regulation that's over here. This was a sizable spill, and that's what prompted the sizable settlement that was included here. So shortly, take-home message or, I know most of you are in the environmental field, you're probably not the operations folks. Please take this back, the operations folks, because if this happens, it'll make your life hell. Because you've got to pay attention here to protection. On all of these, it was not a technology failure. It was a human failure, where people did not follow either recommended practices or did not believe what the data was telling. So with that, I will turn it over to Harold. Harold has been in charge of this release and remediation and restoration since about July of 2015. And he has been one of the bright spots of this release is that I get to work with Harold and he's done a lot of innovative stuff. So as Carl mentioned, my name is Harold Rhodes. I've worked with Summit directly, almost exclusively for several years on Summit's remediation activities at Blacktail. I think that our response has evolved over the last several years. And as Carl mentioned, I think that there are different, or definitely ways that things are done differently now and lessons that have been taken to heart, not only from an operation standpoint and ensuring that something like customer occurs again, but also more specifically how our actual remediation efforts have evolved over the last several years. One of the focuses that I have and our group that we work with out in the field each day is the identification of what tools and resources we have to use. Some of the discussions that we had earlier this morning regarding publicly available resources. Whether that be NRCS obviously, satellite imagery is extraordinarily helpful but there's a wealth of knowledge that's out there and available at your fingertips that actually help to guide and ensure that your response, wherever it may be can not only be site specific but also be effective. I think the available tools, one of the things that we've come to rely upon a tremendous amount is the available field screening methods and parameters whether that be simple hatch chloride titration strips to be able to sample for the presence of chlorides quickly in the field is extraordinarily helpful. We use a YSI water quality example and various other meters and tools that actually provide a immediate field screening indication. Obviously, they're not analytical quality but they do get us in the ballpark where we need to be to be able to make that immediate decision. In addition to that we have emphasized throughout the project the value and critical nature of analytical data. We have we call it the flat file but we have a data file that has 340,000 individual samples that doesn't include trip blanks lab duplicates anything but literally we've got 380,000 samples one of the last things that I think we've really begun to realize over the last couple years is that having the right resources and having the right tools is absolutely essential but without the right people and the right group that you're working with then really it's hard to be successful. I think that that is probably one of our biggest takeaways from BlackTale is that we really have a diverse group of people that have helped us not only with the ongoing response at BlackTale and how we approach the various form mediation activities but also how that group or that team has been able to respond in the event that an incident were to occur somewhere else and we've had several opportunities unfortunately to have that. When we look at that we're looking at BlackTale now site specific nature to it. I think that because the remediation activities at BlackTale did extend or are ongoing and have extended for such a long period that it's allowed us the opportunity to gather a wealth of information a wealth of data and that data is actually allowing us to create site specific approaches or has given us the opportunity over time to gaining site specific understanding of how we can approach it and that goes down to the micro level whether that be ecosystem specific or the historical uses how we actually interact with with various landowners the regulators could be the Army Corps of Engineers everybody that that unique nature of where that spill occurred is absolutely critical. Future uses public health, wildlife, livestock all of those play into a matrix from to create, develop a plan that can be executed but also a plan that we can communicate to the people who are literally working with and for. When we look at some of those initial site specific variables as we approach a site or as we're coming up obviously we've already had the opportunity to gather what available public resources whether that be the internet or some historical knowledge but we're also actually looking at the topography. How far is this going to move? What are some of the unique characteristics of that specific soil type that would potentially favor or result in an overland flow or depending on where the leak occurred are we looking at a specific soil type and the permeability or the hydraulic conductivity of those subsoils could actually result in that actually moving below grade topography, soil type environmental receptors when we look at that also it's primarily surface water and what the uses are you know at that moment and that time. Surface water is one of our primary focuses now I think our ultimate objective from a response perspective is that we don't believe there should ever be an instance where surface water is impacted. When we look at those surface receptors and how they potentially are impacted then we're looking at that from the entire scope from the chronic to acute impacts to various aquatic species in the instance of black tail that initial impact or at the point where it was reported that initial impact was catastrophic. I think one of the takeaways we've had at this point is how encouraging it is to see how resilient nature is if the correct control measures and remediation plans are put in place to where it can actually begin to repair and restore and repopulate itself. But that goes to the macro fish repairing as a whole how that's all interconnected. Same thing with the surface soils I think the understanding of what specifically in this case a produced water spill would result in I think that's understood I think that as a result of black tail we've been able to look at that differently. I think that in 2015 on a significant spill we approached it similar to EMS or an ambulance approach in the car accident but rather than trying to see what we could actually help what we could save who needed assistance is that historically the accident investigation took priority and took place first. I think over time now our response is completely transitioned to where we're looking at what can we actually save. We don't feel that loss of vegetation is a given that in fact we believe that the opposite. We don't feel that negative significant prolonged beyond our actual response phase to the environment is a given. We feel that we can actively approach that. The subsurface impacts at black tail specifically were difficult. The spill did occur over an extended period reached the surface but because of its proximity to black tail creek and the hydraulically conductive soils right in the area near the creek a significant amount of that spill traveled parallel to or in the subsoils that perched shallow aquifer alongside the creek. This was compounded to a certain extent by the meaning and losing nature of the ephemeral or intermittent streams that impacts to the surface from the spill itself and its impact to the groundwater evaporation as a result of our disturbances evaporation became a huge issue. The initial surface disturbances as a result of our initial response were far larger than the actual surface disturbances as a result of the initial spill. I think that's one of the things also that's kind of led us to try and look towards different ways that it could be approached. Soil types they're through black tail creek are dominated by the Harriet steer which are a alternating flame sand with thin lenses kind of envision a soil column that's put together like a lasagna to where you have semi permeable clay and silky layers interspaced with thin lenses of highly permeable sand or even in some cases well washed rocks and grout that actually would flow at hydraulic conductivities approaching pike philosophers that they were super hydraulic going back to the delineation and how we focus now on the delineation and gathering that data that that delineation process is not a phase it's not something that we delineated at the beginning and based upon that we develop a response remediation plan that's going to extend over the entirety of the project in fact that delineation is always being updated always being refocused and it becomes a process that we continually gather data we continually track that and based upon based upon that data that actually drives how we actually approach it so I think that's another thing as far as the approach wise that we've been able to do a black tail is that our day-to-day activities are in response to our day-to-day data I think what we've we've seen also this is not only a black tail but other recent spills is that our response interactions and how they were those interactions are with the environment or the ecology of the site is that it becomes self each one feeds the other so if we can make an improvement in soil quality we automatically will result in automatically results in that improvement in vegetative health vegetative health improves surface water quality and it continues on if we can improve surface water quality or groundwater quality it'll improve soil quality soil quality, improve vegetation vegetation improves soil health it just continues moving so anywhere where we had an opportunity to improve soil health increase the areas that have been restored or re-vegetated increase or enhance water quality and localized area we've always looked at those independently and taken advantage of that so our goal isn't once again isn't fixed rather than as various opportunities present themselves that we're always looking to grab and try and take the utilization of available tools and resources are response tools and how various activities are performed I think have evolved tremendously over the last several years initially we had several different groups come out with geoprobes and the quality of the data the information that was going from that that activity was extraordinarily helpful what we thought there was room for improvement for or with is that we need that data continuing we need to be able to update it continuing we need to have access to that this is one of the systems that we developed we wanted a tool that could be attached on a skidger or an excavator that would actually perform those functions do we need to geoprobe then we can geoprobe if we're doing air sparging or infiltration or recovery that we wanted some multi-flexible tool equipment platform that would do every one of the various remediation tasks or processes potentially we would do to be able to have that mounted upon something that was going to be so heavy that it was going to result in a tremendous surface disturbance and that's one of the examples I think that's it I think our response initially at Blacktail was purely reactionary nobody had even at 70,000 barrels nobody had experienced or responded to something like that I think over the course of the next 12 to 18 months free personally that 70,000 barrel number was difficult to support with the data because we did have so much in the field but even at that point then that what the scope of it was that we started to focus on actually what we could do and actually what we were seeing in the field I think our response today is a result of that number one that we do focus on the receptors and we do focus on the initial delineation and in doing so it allows us to target those areas where we can have the greatest effect if that's recovery of surface water if that's using a soils washing process within 48 to 72 hours in an existing environment that actually is how we approach it I think our response tomorrow is where where the promise is I think there is an extraordinary amount of knowledge and understanding that is out there right now over the next I believe within the next couple of years we'll start coming to bear and I think there will be a tremendous amount of advancements in how we approach remediation not only in response to a spill or an incident such as Blackdale but how potentially we look at restoration and remediation of rod formation completely unrelated to spills potentially still within the industry but I think there's a lot of promise