 Now, I think we've got one of the hardest jobs in Davos this morning with the panel anticipating the Middle East in 2024. I'm pretty excited for our guests, and I think we're going to have a lively discussion. To the left of me, I have Barack Ravid from Axios. Thanks so much for joining us. We have Jane Harmon, chair of the Freedom House in the US, and then we have Mum Mood, Sariela Garland from the Middle East Institute and the Atlantic Council. There's plenty of news this morning, so I think we can get straight into it. Barack, I want to start with you. Throughout the week, we've heard collectively from Arab nations and others that there is no way to peace except with a Palestinian state. From what it appears, the Israeli government has no appetite for that at the moment. What is going to change Netanyahu's mind? What will change his mind, or what's his end game? Nothing. It's, look, we're, you know, the guy's in office for quite some time, right? He's in politics for 30 years, prime minister for 15 years, and over the years, including in places like this, there was this perception of him as, you know, he might be conservative, but he's sort of a middle-of-the-road conservative, okay? I don't know. Trying to find a good comparison, I don't know, Mitt Romney of Israel or the, I don't know, something like that, John McCain, okay? But that's not true for almost, I think, seven years. And he's been going through a process of radicalization that I think started in the election in 2015 when he won against all odds. This process of radicalization continued when his criminal investigations started and slowly but surely he became more and more politically dependent on the radical right in Israel, including in recent years the most Jewish supremacist and racist elements who were on the fringes of Israeli politics but were normalized by Netanyahu. We've seen this happening in other countries, including very major countries in the world. It's a phenomenon we see everywhere. But Netanyahu normalized those people, and today those people are basically holding his government and his coalition, and he's totally dependent on them. Therefore, he cannot move an inch, okay, without their permission. And I don't see people like, I don't know if everybody here knows the names, Itamar Ben-Gvir, a guy who was convicted for supporting a terrorist organization. He's now the minister in charge of the police, okay? It's Balcalil Smotrich, a person who said that Israel should burn the village of Hawara in the West Bank on its inhabitants. He's the minister of finance. He's also a minister in the Ministry of Defense in charge of the West Bank, okay? And those two people who have 14 seats in a coalition of 64 are basically the ones who are calling the shots in Israel. And Netanyahu's alternative to those people is to go to prison because he's on trial for quite some time now. And so when that's the case, I don't see him agreeing to anything that even resembles a Palestinian state. Jane, I see you nodding your head. I mean, do we start to see a shift in Israeli politics? What do you think before we can get to a point of recognition of the Palestinian state by Israel? Well, first, I read in, I think, the Wall Street Journal two days ago that the coalition is becoming shakier, that there are some people on both... Well, there's no one on the left in his coalition, but that Abeni Gantz, for example, is thinking about whether he really needs... wants to be in this war cabinet anymore, et cetera. So just maybe this government will shatter from within. But I'm sitting here agreeing with this. I think Bibi Netanyahu's agenda is survival, personal survival. And I don't think U.S. policy should be hinged to Bibi Netanyahu. I mean, we have to be respectful that he's the elected leader of Israel, but that doesn't mean that our policy has to be to help him survive. And I am really strongly against that. I think we should be more aggressive right now. I'm talking about the U.S. in terms of embracing the pathway to two states. And I think what's going on in the Sunni Arab world is constructive. We've played a role in that. And I don't think we should, you know, let them decide everything that we're for. But I think the pathway to two states is the best guarantee of Israel's security. I listened carefully to Bougie Herzog yesterday, who I really like in respect. His brother is the current Israeli ambassador to the U.S., another lovely man, and his family history is storied in Israel. And he was saying how terrified all the Israelis are. I agree, and I think the trauma of October 11th, which happened to be my son's 50th birthday, is never going away. However, if you want to protect Israelis, find a path to a two-state solution where the neighbors of Israel have hope and are represented by a capable government. That's another piece that has to be put in here. And the pledge of that government is to protect the security of their own citizens, but the security of Israel. What Israel is doing now, what I would call excessive carpet bombing of Gaza, is just radicalizing the population that remains there. And that's worse for its security. I want to bring you in here. I mean, from your perspective, is Israel winning or losing this war? We've heard what the end game is. It is to crush Hamas. Is that what we're seeing? Are we seeing Hamas being crushed? And where are we in that process? I guess it will all depend on the survival of the prime minister in Israel. And one thing that we are witnessing is the radicalization of the Palestinian society. And I think it's far-fetched that the two-state solution is around the corner. So the topic that we're discussing, I think clearly indicates that we're here for long-term levels of conflict in the region. And Israel obviously is in the mood of self-preservation and hedging and national security. And that's very different than the purposes of other countries like Iran. Iran is in a mood of conflict protraction. The United States is in the mood of conflict management. GCC countries, Jordan and Egypt, they have an interest in conflict settlement. Russia is interested in promoting conflict entanglements for the United States. So we have a geopolitical, geostrategic landscape where interests barely converge on a regional solution to the conflicts that are ongoing. I mean, so do we see an escalation in 2024 or do you think there's any chance of a pause? Where are we going? That's to all three of you, so you're going to have to jump in first. Juan, do you want to start? Well, at the moment, things don't look very good. And I was listening to that phrase, conflict management. I would say if the U.S. wants to manage the conflict in the U.S. in the Middle East and pivot to Asia, I think we've maybe discredited that term by now. It needs to embrace a pathway to two states. I didn't say tomorrow, but I think that without doing that, there will never be conflict management. And if that happens, the outlier is Iran. I don't have anything good to say about Iran's foreign policy at the moment. It is emboldening a variety of terror groups and training them and equipping them. And we have to face that. But if the entire neighborhood other than Iran is on the other side and has a vision of peace, Iran will be more contained. And if the Arab street is less inflamed, that could happen. I mean, maybe I'm, I have to be an optimist. Why would I have run for Congress, served in Congress for nine terms? But my point is, if the Arab street is less inflamed and the rhetoric is different and the narrative changes, that makes it harder, I think, for Iran to radicalize all the young people that it's radicalizing now. Mamoud, I see you smiling. Do you think that Iran will remain isolated throughout the next, throughout 2024? It won't need to be brought into the tent in any way for us to say peace. If I may share this work that I did with this audience. Exactly 25 years ago, I wrote a book on Iranian foreign policy and I argued, that was in Farsi, I argued that Iran is under the illusion that it can be a political or a military power in the region. No Arab country will accept Iranian political or military dominance in the region and I think that also includes the Shia Iraq. So even before the revolution, the Shah's foreign policy was misguided. Post-revolutionary foreign policy is miscalculated and I think Iran is wasting its national resources in promoting this kind of a foreign policy. And my estimate would be that it's going to take at least 10 years from my observations of the country for Iran to realize that the real ingredients of power are not military, rather capital markets, you know, platform companies and development of national infrastructure and integrating with the rest of the region economically. So I think as long as Iran is interested in economic integration, the region will welcome it. But if Iran is pursuing a military dominant policy in the region, I don't think any country in the region and that includes Turkey and the Caucasus region will welcome it. But at the same time, regarding your question, I think Iran has a devastated economy and one of the reasons why Iran has this reactive kind of a approach to regional conflicts is because of the implications on its economy. But Iran also has a history of foreign policy with a lot of U-turns. I mean, look at what happened in the Caucasus region. Total Iranian silence with the geopolitical changes in the Caucasus. So Iran will intervene as long as it can manage it in the short term, but if it damages its economy, I don't think it will escalate. And this also coincides with American kind of larger global outlook that I think the U.S. is so interested in kind of making sure that Iran is not provoked into weaponizing its nuclear program. And I think that's the main stream American policy towards Iran. And as long as that is not activated, I think that will satisfy the larger geopolitical interests of the United States. So do you think the Saudi Iran detente can hold? Barack, I'm going to come to you on that. What's the red line for that? A Kenneth fracture? Again, I don't think it's connected to other things in the region. I think both Saudi Arabia and Iran had a lot of shared interests that they, especially I think Yemen, maybe number one, both countries wanted just to sort of end it or at least reach a long-term truce, as we've seen the last more than a year. And economically, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have a lot of interest to promote trade and things like that and to try and at least cool down the tensions between the Saudi access if there is one and what the Iran calls the access of resistance. And I think they managed to do it pretty well. And I don't think, or at least I think the Saudis don't see necessarily, for example, not that they see it anytime soon, but they don't see their rapprochement with Iran contradictory to their efforts to normalize relations with Israel. I think they think both can live in the same time. Jane? I don't see it that way, at least not in the short term. That would be a dream. Why wouldn't it that Iran and the rest of the Middle East could be integrated economically? It makes all the sense in the world, especially since their economy is in tatters because of our sanctions and their repressive policies. But I think the Qataris are interested in this rapprochement with Iran and have been for a long time, and that is why they were boycotted a few years back by the rest of the Sunni Arab world, which was very worried about it. I think this deal, if it ever happens, excludes Iran for the moment. And I think being excluded and being isolated will, I hope, cause positive change in Iran, not negative change. But I think they are empowering the Houthis. They can deny that. All these terror groups that they have spawned now have agendas of their own, and they're lethal in their own rights. But basically, this would not have happened. And I think that was the view of the Sunni Arab states that the conflict in Yemen would not have happened if Iran had not provoked the Civil War. I was in Yemen, I don't know, 10 or 15 years ago as a member of Congress. It had four functioning political parties. I wouldn't say it was great. It had a huge shortage of water because everybody uses water to make cotton, which is this narcotic and all the men wear these ropes of cotton around their necks and then they have their little swords. I mean, it was quite an amazing place to go. But that's all shattered now. There's no political capacity. And the Civil War, I think, started by Iran is being fueled by Iran. We've just talked about the Houthis, but let's bring up another group in this axis of resistance. Do you think we've seen enough restraint from Hezbollah that we won't see them enter? Mahmoud? Can I also say something about the Iranian Saudi? I prefer to use transactional agreement. I wouldn't use rapprochement. I think that's too strong. And I wouldn't be surprised if the relationship breaks down because I think it's just an understanding. And I think the introduction to the kind of a renewed relationship had a lot to do with what happened last year in Iran with the protests. And I think Iran learned that Saudi Arabia is in touch with the Iranian opposition and it is feeding the Iranian opposition and that's why they try to kind of accommodate Saudi Arabia in return for Iranian understanding that they're not going to kind of galvanize the Houthi movement and operations in Yemen. But already I think we're seeing some signs of breaking down. So I'm not sure if it's going to be sustainable. But on Lebanon, I think it is very clear that Iran is not interested to escalate because this time around is not going to be like 2006. And there is a great chance that Hezbollah might be devastated through not only Israeli operations but also American involvement in the operation. And Lebanon is an extremely vulnerable country in society. So I think Iran would like to kind of send messages to its enemies in the region and also the United States. But I don't think they're interested in escalating. And we also need to understand that Iran is a country that does not believe as its first priority in economic development. So it is more or less a security species. It's like China in the 1950s and early 1960s. So because they don't have those economic sensitivities, any large-scale involvement of Iran in the region will even break down its economy. So I think they will do everything to de-escalate. Is that the view you're saying from Israel? I think what we saw at the very early stage of the war is that Hezbollah realized that they don't need to go on an all-out escalation against Israel in order to have a lot of impact. And they managed through, let's say, pretty limited military operations, basically most of it focused on the line of contact on the border and on firing anti-tank missiles or mortars on Israeli outposts at the border. They managed and Israeli villages along the border. They managed to create sort of what Israel used to call 30 years ago the security strip, but it was on the Lebanese side of the border. Hezbollah managed to do it on the Israeli side of the border and basically led to the evacuation of almost 100,000 Israelis from their homes. And with very, again, very limited military action. And at least at the moment, it seems that they want to keep it that way. Just after the assassination of Hamas official in Beirut, Saleh Ha'uri, a lot of people in Israel thought Hezbollah will launch rockets as far as Haifa and on Israeli civilian targets and not only military targets, and they did not do that. They focused on military targets and also, again, very limited military action. So it seems that at least at the moment, Hezbollah wants to keep it that way because they think it's working. If I could just comment on the comment on the economic view of the regime in Iran that they're happy to have the 1950s. Oh, my God. My congressional district is in Los Angeles. I grew up there. I still live there part-time. It's called Tererangelis, where most of the Iranian diaspora lives. They're bright. They're engaged. They still have relatives in Iran and they despair about that. They're totally anti-regime. But my sense of, and you're much closer to this than I am, my sense of the population in Iran is that they don't want to be in the 1950s. They view they have a repressive government. Women and girls obviously just rebelled, sadly, the rebellion has not gotten as far as it should. But I can imagine the society being violently opposed to the view of the Ayatollahs who obviously have a continuing control. And similarly, in Lebanon, Lebanon, Beirut was the Paris of the Middle East. It was a glorious place. The government functioned. And now it doesn't function. It's a coalition including Hezbollah. And so I think the region's a tinderbox and I think managing that region is going to be very difficult. None of us imagined October 7th, even though Israel, it turns out, had the intelligence, had the plans for the invasion, didn't believe them, and had been quietly telling, at least according to reports, telling Qatar to continue to send payments to Hamas. So we didn't imagine that. I think we're not imagining adequately what else could go wrong in the short term. Just one more. I totally agree that even though we're in this thing for more than 100 days, it is totally possible that the worst is still to come. And I mean, we spoke about Hezbollah and how things are limited there at the moment, but it's not sustainable. Meaning if those skirmishes along the border will continue, it will not stay just those skirmishes, because at the end of the day, Israel needs to allow its citizens to go back to their homes. If that's not going to be possible, they will escalate their military action against Hezbollah. Hezbollah will escalate its own military action and then very fast, you can go into an Israel-Hezbollah war, which will make the war in Gaza look like a walk in the park. We're looking at if that's going to be the case, we're looking at the regional war. It's not that this is going to be something that, again, everything we see now from Syria, the Houthis, it all looked to us like, you know, like we will miss it. And just one add to that. In 2006, I was actually there on the border on a congressional delegation. Don't ask. My children didn't know. But those were dumb rockets. They did not have sophisticated guidance in them. Now the rockets are precision-guided and have the reach to hit Jerusalem. So this could be a huge threat to Israel if they change their strategy. And of course, Reuters lost our journalism when they were on the border during this sort of fighting. So I just want to make sure that we acknowledge that here. One last question on Hezbollah. Is there an upside? Is there a possibility that the negotiations over Israel returning citizens to that area could provide a diplomatic negotiation that we haven't seen so far in other places? I think there is a potential. The US is trying to do that. President Biden's adviser, Hamas Hoekstin, is dealing with this thing. I have to say I think the pace and the intensity of the US diplomatic efforts on containing the situation between Israel and Hezbollah are not in line with how concerned the White House is about the regional war. And those efforts, in my opinion, should be much more robust than they are right now. And again, they are taking place, but the US needs to put much more pressure on both sides and on regional partners more than it does right now. And I'm not saying they do nothing, but they need to do more because if we don't... If the border between Lebanon and Israel does not come down within weeks, it can really blow up. I want to just bring in some of the other regional players that you've talked about. How long can the economies of Egypt, Jordan... I mean, look at Egypt's debt. How long can they sustain this? And how bad is this going to be for not only Iran's economy, but the entire Middle East's economic outlook for 2024? I mean, I want to start with you, Jane. How much of a factor will that play in diplomatic relations as well? Well, it's a huge problem. Let's remember that Egypt and Jordan have made peace with Israel. Does anyone remember that? And Egypt is terrified that the refugees from Gaza are all Muslim brotherhood, and that's part of their enormous resistance to taking them in. Jordan is a different case. Jordan has taken in, I think, Jordan's population is now about $7 million, a million people. Maybe their economy, too. But they have taken in over a million-and-a-half Syrian refugees and assimilated them. I mean, I give that country highest marks for stepping up and being a good citizen, but a majority or a huge part, I don't think it's a majority of the population, are Palestinian. And if this thing goes on and if there is a major uprising in the West Bank, that blows easily east to Jordan, and Jordan's government is threatened. There's also a suggestion by some. In fact, I understand it was one of Henry Kissinger's last suggestions that the West Bank just be an X to Jordan. I'm a great fan of Henry Kissinger, but that idea, I think, is a really bad idea. And he's not here to push back. But at any rate, seriously, I think the economies are being hit now. I think Israel's economy is being hit in a major way. Foreign investors are pulling out. And a lot of international companies are getting pressure because the narrative is in favor of the Palestinians. I'm not defending that, but that's how people are hearing it. I'm defending the attacks on innocent... I mean, I'm condemning the attacks on innocent civilians, but I am also condemning the outrageous, brutal, unprecedented attack on Israel on October 7th. So I want to just let the audience know we are going to be able to take audience questions. So if you have one, please raise your hand. Before we go to those, here's one that I think is important for us to discuss. The Chances of a Saudi Israel Pact in 2024. That seems like one of the most important political questions. Makhmut, do you want to jump in on that first? Just a few ideas about Egypt and Jordan. I think if we look at the landscape in the Middle East, most likely Jordan and Egypt are going to be preoccupied with their internal issues, particularly economic and social. And Egypt stands out with over 100 million population and deep economic problems. I think GCC will continue to thrive and Iran will be embroiled in its domestic kind of illusion about being a military and political power in the region. And I think on the Gaza Lebanon issue, to some degree it will also depend on the American election. As much as we know, there is this understanding between Iran and the United States that Iran will be able to sell a bit more oil in return for policies of de-escalation in the region so that it can manage its economy. So I think the region is going to have, in parallel, on the one hand continuing conflict and at the same time staggering economic progress. So that's the interesting thing about the Middle East that over the last four decades, the two trends have occurred simultaneously. On the Israeli-Saudi question, I think it's an open kind of a formula for the Saudis. They have not finalized it yet. It will all depend on regional developments. It will depend on Israeli domestic politics, on American election, on how people in Gaza will be resettled and how Palestinian politics is going to play out over the next year or so. So I don't think it's around the corner. It's going to take a longer time than that was perceived before. Is that your view coming from Israel? Yeah, I think if you look at Muhammad bin Salman and the way his thinking on this issue evolved since, let's say, 2018, okay? I think every year that passed with the events that took place, I think he realized that even if for him personally he's not attached to policies of the past, the reality is stronger, and he cannot ignore the Palestinian issue. And before October 7th, the Palestinian issue was supposed to be an element inside a deal, a mega deal with the U.S. and Israel, but was supposed to be a modest one, okay? And definitely nobody was going to condition anything on Palestinian statehood or path toward statehood. It maybe, maybe, maybe it was supposed to be do no harm to the prospect of statehood. And now after October 7th, I think Muhammad bin Salman realizes much more that this is that pathway, not only a pathway, but an irreversible pathway towards Palestinian statehood is a basic condition, and it's going to be the case for at least as long as the Biden administration is in office. I don't know what's going to happen when Donald Trump comes if he comes, if he comes. So fast. But, but, but, you know, I'm telling you, and I had this conversation with Donald Trump for several hours on the Saudi issue, and he's convinced, and I have to say that I think he's right, okay, that if he had a second term, okay, in the first six months of his second term, Saudi Arabia would have normalized relations with Israel. I think that's an accurate assessment, okay? I know people have strong, strong convictions about Donald Trump, but I think that on this one, he was right. So will we say that, Jane, and really let's focus on that Trump thing. Trump comes into office just a scenario. Theoretically. Theoretically. Theoretically. Theoretically. Does the Saudi-Israel deal go through faster with him in office? Okay, I commend Trump for the Abraham Accords. I think that was a gutsy and correct thing to do, and I don't think a Democratic president would have been able to do it. So let's start with that. Having said that, I think that the difference is that Biden, I think Biden needs to push now for this deal, including embracing a pathway to a Palestinian state that's irreconcilable. I think that that's the piece that's crucial, and Biden doing this now will prevent, should there be a Trump term, Trump from not doing it. I think Trump will be interested in the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and he won't care about the Palestinians. Let's remember he cut off the aid for the Palestinians. And to be fair, and you said it too, Barak, that there hasn't been much interest in the Sunni Arab world until now in a Palestinian state. Yeah, but I just want to add something about Donald Trump because I think there's something that got sort of, you know, he's responsible that people didn't notice because he was focusing on other stuff. But Donald Trump has put a plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the table. You can say that it's good, you can say that it's bad, but he put a plan on the table. Joe Biden did not, okay? That's a fact. And I think from, again, from speaking to Donald Trump a long time about this, I think that if Donald Trump comes in for a second term, it will be very hard for Benjamin Netanyahu to deal with Trump on the Palestinian issue. Trump is going to be much, much, much tougher on this thing because, as you know, he wants the deal that nobody was able to get, okay? He's the man of the deal, whatever. But, but his Donald Trump's conclusion from four years of dealing with Benjamin Netanyahu was the same conclusion Bill Clinton had and the same conclusion Barack Obama had and that Netanyahu doesn't want peace. So if Donald Trump comes back, BB is in a big problem. So do you want to give the audience a chance to ask a question? If you have one, please raise your hand. But I also want to come back to this discussion. Could you just say your name? That is Murad, peak value. My question is the following. Israel, from my point of view, is a racist country that is following apartheid policy. Abolishing this stance and this policy, wouldn't it lead ultimately to a one state in which the Israelis and the Palestinians live together? Thank you. So I'm going to, I'm going to give you that. I'm going to take that question first. Okay. Is there any chance of a one state solution, Barack? Give us your view on that. First, you know, I, sir, I have to say that I, with respect, I totally disagree with the premise of your question. And I'll tell you why. And many people in places like this don't realize that. The majority of Israelis right now in Israel feel like orphans. You know why? Because their whole world view was shattered on October 7th. Okay? Because they're liberal. Okay? And the people who were massacred on October 7th, those who were raped, those who were beheaded, those who were tied together and burned in their homes, they're the most progressive and liberal people in the country. Okay? Those who they took Palestinians from Gaza and drove them to hospitals in Israel. And those are the people who were massacred. Those are the victims. Okay? And there's a big constituency for that in Israel. Okay? There's also a constituency that is very anti-Palestinian and is Jewish supremacist and is racist. I'm not denying that at all. But this big part of society, which I think is the majority, feel orphans because they look at people in places like this and they see that people that they thought had the same world view like them now are telling them that they're murderers, that they're committing genocide, that they're doing this, that they're doing that. And on the other hand, when they look at their leadership, it's the leadership that they don't believe in. Right. So I think this is something that needs to be in, not in the back of your mind, but in the front of your mind when you try and look at the situation in Israel. Okay? And about one state. I agree that at least for now, I do not see a prospect, again, at least if there's no political change, both in Israel and in Palestine. Okay? There's not going to be a two-state solution. We are on the highway towards a one-state, it's not a solution, it's a one-state reality. Okay? If anybody thinks that it's a solution, look at what happened on October 7th. In a one-state reality, October 7th will happen every day. Okay? And good luck to us all. So, but we're going there. And in the West Bank, okay? It's a, we see the one-state reality in the West Bank right now. When you have settlers and Palestinians, settlers have rights, Palestinians don't. Okay? And this is where this thing is going. So, Jane, you want to? I don't think we're going there. And I know we don't have to go there. I think words like racist, genocide, apartheid are inflammatory and not helpful to the discussion. And I do remember, and my dear friends, Stu Eisenstadt, sitting right there, will remember that Jimmy Carter wrote a book and used apartheid in the title, which was unnecessary to the points he was making. And many of us made that point at the time. He didn't listen. But the one-state solution could go the other way. Let's think about that. I met with Momar Gaddafi, I'm sorry to tell all my war stories, but I was there in his tent insert in the early 2000s. And he gave me a book, which I can't find. I could find it. I could make a fortune on eBay. But I can't find it. The name of his book was Israel time. His argument was the landmass of Israel is way too small for two states. And therefore, we should have a democracy small d there. And certainly at the time, the Arab birth rate was much higher with the Orthodox Jews, the Israeli birth rate is getting higher. But let's imagine that the state of Israel is wiped out. Now, for me, just personally given my own family history, I think that's a horror to imagine. What I want to imagine is two states living side by side in security and peace. And I do think we can get there and I urge the Biden administration to move faster and put pressure on BB now. And if the coalition dissolves, oh dear. But I think the right course for Israel, the right course for Israel is to embrace a two state solution. So let's... We've spoken a lot about BB and Netanyahu, but there is the other side of this. The pathway to a Palestinian state is going to come with strong leadership out of Palestine. Are we seeing someone who could play that role? How do we get to a point where Hamas is not the party you need to negotiate with? First, you don't... You finish... You end the situation where you have a president who is in his, I don't know, 18th year of four year term. Okay, I'm speaking about President Abbas. And the biggest mistake the Biden administration did in its first year when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the fact that it allowed Abbas to postpone the elections once again. There is a massive political change that needs to happen on the Palestinian side, that it needs to go through elections. You have 5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza that did not choose their leadership for years. So how would we... How would we expect any change if people cannot... People are so disenfranchised and have no ability to determine their own leadership? I want to bring you in here. Who can take the Palestinians in terms of leadership? Who do we see coming up? I think in the short to medium term, it's a total stalemate. And the two-state solution is not on the horizon. So we will continue to see a breakdown of conflict resolution in the region. And that will postpone the enlargement of the Abraham Accords. That will put pressure on the GCC countries to expand relations with Israel. So as I said, I think that does not interfere with economic growth of GCC. That's going to thrive. But on the Palestinian-Israeli issue, I think in the foreseeable future, we have a stalemate. Okay, we've only got a minute left, so I'm going to get you each to say very quickly, do we see a ceasefire in 2024? If we have moved, let's start with you. I think it will depend on the American election and dynamics within Israeli. So we're not really. But again, I think the U.S. will do its best to achieve this. But it is unlikely. Calling it a ceasefire probably won't get anywhere with Israel, but calling it a humanitarian pause and a change in strategy, again, if the U.S. pushes harder, could happen and it gets to the same place. I mean, if we could find a way, and maybe I'm still the optimist to begin this pathway, not tomorrow morning, to a two-state solution, I think we could also find a pathway to demilitarizing the West Bank. And I don't think Israel is going to be able to do that with bombs. Okay, Barack, last word to you. If you want a ceasefire, and I really hope that there will be, you need to release the hostages. And this thing will end the war, okay? And everybody knows this in Israel. Netanyahu knows this. He's not admitting it. But if there is a deal on the hostages, the war will end. And therefore, I think this is where everybody needs to push right now. I wanted to say one word. I think one variable we need to incorporate into our analysis is the Israeli economy. And will there be pressures in Israel to come to terms with this issue because it is hurting the Israeli economy? So that's going to be an area that we need to look at. Okay, well, we're out of time, but I do want to thank all three of you. And I also want to thank you for having such a civil dialogue. I think it really helps. Thanks a lot.