 Secretary Rusk on one. He would like to put in their reply to Utat before Guam so it would not look as though it was a big deal to fill him at Guam. Their reply accepts Utat's proposal and principle. And then it makes two suggestions. One, that a military truce ought to be worked out by the military commanders past meeting in the demilitarized zone between north and south. And secondly, that they suggest that we just go on to an international conference among the interested governments. They don't reject the idea of preliminary talks but they say why don't we just have a conference. Now this is consistent with various things that we have said about there is some point in there going ahead and putting in their reply before Guam. On our own reply, there's nothing in it that we have not said many times before. And if Arthur Goldberg will make clear to the Secretary General that we've made many diplomatic approaches to Hanar without success and they failed to agree to discussions. And we should not suppose that we're going to take further preconditions which Hanar might seek here. And we're not prepared to accept Secretary General's proposal and negotiate down front. I think there is some advantage in getting these things off. There's nothing in our reply that we haven't said publicly on number of occasions. So everything we ought to go ahead and make it clear to the Secretary General that he mustn't try to negotiate us down without anything from Hanar in his hand. Well, I just have this thought. I proceed from one negotiation to the other constantly waiting for something that never comes. And usually I find myself in worse shape at the end of the proposal than I do at the beginning. And I think that the time after all these attempts, 15, 20 that we have agreed to, time ought to come sometime when one of these proposers, these guys that like to get into these acts all time, would at least be told that you bring us something and you'll find a pleasant and favorable response. But you don't take anything from us until you get something from them. I just think we ought to. Because if we don't, I'm very, very fearful that you'll be in here next week and say, and I just don't think we ought to be doing this this week on the counter so-and-so. Now we constantly do that. And three years of it, and we on borrowed time now just a few months here before the judgment day. And I think when, I don't think Utah is our friend. I don't think he'll do much for us except embarrassments. I think the whole outfit up there is a potentially very embarrassing thing. So I just want to meet him as frankly as I can to begin with and say, now you go and show us what you can deliver and your problem will not be with us. We'll be reasonable, but I don't want to be saying that we are willing to do so-and-so-and-so until we know what they will do. Here before we've been doing this, but that hasn't produced anything. And I wish we could just one time say to him, tell us what you'll do. That's my feeling. I'm afraid that you and Bob will be in next week saying, well now we agreed to this, we told him to go ahead and we would do so-and-so. And I'm terribly afraid of these negotiations at this stage because I don't think they want them and I don't think they're ready for them and I don't think they're prepared to give a damn thing. And if they were prepared, I'd be more frightened than I am, because I don't think they're prepared to give what we must have. And I think the time, we have a limited time to go ahead and get ourselves in condition. And I don't want anybody interfering with it, with the Ronnings or with the British Prime Minister or with Cusigan or any of these folks, if we can. I think I'm prepared to pay the price with public sentiment to go in against me if Utah does this. But I know this, that when Utah makes a proposal or Bobby Kennedy makes one or somebody else one, although we are ready to do our part, it just costs us five or ten points next week. We'll get their hopes up and then the people say, oh, good God, here it is. And then they failed again. Each time we strike out, it's just like Mickey Matt will come to the bat and we strike out. And I don't want to give them enough hope. I think it's going to be a strike out and I think it's going to cost me another five or ten points. And a lot of criticism, so I'd like to put them off till the atmosphere is a little better, until there's some chance. I think with this constitution that comes through out there, and if we can get an election in 90 days and have that work out well, I think we're going to be in a lot better condition than we are now. And I don't want to just say no, we will not. But I think we could say we are ready and willing if you can show us anything from them, period. Now, what we'll do depends on what they ask. But if they bring us another pope's letter, you know what the answer is going to be. Now, is he in a position to get much better thing than the pope? If he did, I'd be frightened because I might have to say no. No, I think our problem here is the extension of the fact that Bhutan is not helpful to us. And that he would parlay this thing into appeal over our heads to public opinion here and abroad unless we put something in. They would just cut across that. Now, the substance of what is in our proposed reply is simply something that we've said many times before. We had different conditions before, though, Green. We had 80% before and we're down to under 40 now. And we're getting weaker all the time. And we've said before we'd have pauses and we've had three of them. The situation's a lot different now. And we just finished the last big negotiation with Wilson and Koslegen. And I think we came out of it worse than we went into it. And we just played with the mothers of this country indicating there's some chance. And then there's just one little eyelash and it would have been a piece in the world according to Wilson. And I think that's going well. I backgrounded the press yesterday. Unless you've got an answer to that question. That's right. And that's what I want to tell you, Don and Goldberg, because they're not up to any good purpose. They just think it's problem with the Hawks and Johnson and Rusk and the generals and so on and so forth. You would have no problem about South Vietnam going into the fight. Well, I want to give them any leadership that you think you can consistent with my feeling. I just don't want you to get grabbed by the nap of the neck, hauled into some kind of a meeting, and go repeat Korea all over. And I think it's your plan and explosive mind field. And I don't trust these people that lead us into it. I don't think their motives are pro-johns. Is there a hint at any special points wrong in the science of the government? Yes, I want that to chart. I want to take that, and I want to take this attitude I'm taking now. I want you to take the position that I got it from you. Usually I just repeat what you've said a week before, but I want you to point out that they don't hang up there. They'll answer you on the phone. And you've said it, and you've said it, and you've said it, and time comes that when you get out and you make your public pleas and you get on your knees and you walk, there comes time on a proud country. Just think that they ought to keep their men standing and waiting again for these things, and until they show some seriousness. You see no reason why we ought to jump in and say peace, peace, peace. We want peace more than anybody, but the best way to get peace is to be a little bit firm and have a little dignity and support these men out there. And you do that very well, but I would really go awfully strong on it, and I would show your charts, go over them, and say, now here are 17 nations, and we did it, and one day we met our security counsel and our president. We said yes, sir, and they said no, no, no. Now they said no to 17 up. And here's the last thing they've said. This is the Pope. Now I want you to read these, and I want all of you to remember. It's four things. They told us we had to get the hell out of there. We had to stop our bombing. We had to turn it over to the Vietcong Congress. Now we just can't do those things, and that's the last thing they said. Now all this private stuff, we don't have to depend on Weinstein or Bill Bags or any traveling people. We can talk directly to this man. This is his attitude, and he confirmed it to us, and he confirmed it to the Pope. Now on the Goldberg thing, you're a judgment that I want to follow, but I sure want you to know, and making your decision, I want you to know my instincts.