 Welcome to this panel where we're going to discuss the role of middle powers in a multipolar world. My name is Cecilia Malmström. I have the huge honour to be moderating this stellar panel. And we will, well, without further ado, I think we will start. Today in the world, and we've just reading the papers and listening to the seminars here, of course, we see increasing fragmentations, the big competition between the superpowers, the emergence of new groupings, new alternative organisations, the role of middle powers seems to be growing. The world is facing enormous common challenges, climate, health, inequalities, security-wise, but yet, even if we do need more than ever global cooperation, international organisations are weaker than in decades. And this paradox is, of course, very, very sad. But how can we find a way forward? If this competition between the big superpowers is increasing, can middle powers play a role? Can they act to strengthen multilateralism and to find new tools forward to address the common challenges that we have? This is what we will discuss in this panel with excellent members from all corners of the world. And if there's time, we'll have some questions from the audience as well. I wanted to start with you, Professor Allison. We talk about multipolar world or a bipolar world and middle powers. What is this? Is this a correct description of the world? Are there any definitions? What is a middle power? So good question. And I think that if I make an academic point briefly to start with, that I think the fact that we use such simplistic terms that cover so much actually complexity in the reality leaves us often talking at a fairly vague level. So there are 100 or 1,000 dimensions of power. And try to, what multi essentially emphasises is it's not uni and it's not bi. So there was a so-called bipolar world in 40 years after World War II in the Cold War. That collapsed with the end of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in what was called a unipolar 1990s in the first decade of the 20th century. And now as that's eroded, multi has become the kind of the phrase. But I think we should always remind ourselves it's way more complicated than that. And this is almost a reflection of the conceptual or theoretical poverty of most of our international relations conversation. If I make this one more point, I think there is something real about the desire for at least not uni and not bipolar. So we need something if I just have to choose multiple joys. And I think to try to put it in a historical perspective, we should remember three numbers 50 or a half, 25 or a quarter and a seventh. And if you know the questions to which those are the answers, you've got a picture about what's happened in the last 75 years. So 50 or a half is U.S. share of global GDP in the World War II. Most of the world had been collapsed. A quarter is U.S. share of GDP at the end of the Cold War. And a seventh was today. That's in purchasing of our parity. If you do manufacturing, a half, a quarter, a seventh, you do trade, roughly similar. So what's happened is a diffusion of power globally. And then for the ones that are sort of bigger lumps, we call them middle for the time being, but they're no specific criteria. And I think the result of it is the feeling that, well, you wait a minute, this appears that nobody's in charge, which answers, excuse me, welcome to the real world, nobody is in charge. So they're many separate independent actors who without permission and without faring consequences of their action decide if they're Saudi Arabia, we would like to establish relations with Iran. They didn't ask for permission. Or if we're individuals even. So nobody gave Iran much permission to put up Starlink or SIM to have GPT 3.5. So even individuals at the level. So the sense that there's a lot of a lot more independent activity that's having a big impact on all of us is certainly right. And that then just defines the problem that you said, which is how do are the institutions that we have fit for service? Absolutely not. And then what kind of new institutions or new arrangements or others can be made to deal with the problems as they come up, whether they're war in Ukraine or whether they're Gaza or whether they're AI or whether they're economic development or whether they're COVID. Well, if nobody is in charge, it could mean that everybody is in charge in a way and it could also be instead of lamenting, we could see there might be possibilities for other actors to step forward and to take responsibility. Minister Hassan, your deputy prime minister of Ethiopia and foreign minister, thank you for being here. Thank you. How do you see this from your horizon, from Ethiopia and from the African perspective? What role can Africa and Ethiopia play in this multipolar world? Yeah. Thank you very much, Guilard, to be here in this really prestigious gathering and platform. The contemporary world is emerging. The global geopolitical competitions and the whole dynamism's leads to different multiple actors, for that the middle powers development and middle powers engagement is really becoming a reality. In this regard, when you look at about the powers, we can look at from security perspective, from economic perspective and from digital capability perspective. So the multiple actors today, some of them have strong capacity in security areas and others in economy and others also on digital capability and the like. In this regard, today Africa is a rising continent with a huge potential and also emerging economies in Africa. Because within the South-South cooperation, the development of this dynamism, the emergence of middle powers and the multiple actors, Africa has to play its proper role in the upcoming times. For that, technology capability and economic development is very crucial. And the contemporary world invites for such kind of dynamism and Africa has to be ready enough to compete in this landscape. And do you think Africa is ready? I think there are different challenges in Africa. The challenges induced from climate change sources, underdevelopment, technological capability problems, skill development and others, debt burden and others. And all these challenges, there are promising and emerging economies in Africa also. So I think comparing to the previous time, now the continent is rising, some countries are evolving and able to compete in this global landscape. We come back to that in a moment. Minister Ed Stadler, you are Minister for European Union and Constitution in Austria and Austria is also a member of the European Union. And European Union is in a way a big power, but not if you compare to US and China, maybe in economy, but not politically. And also from Austria. Austria is a small country, but a country with a long tradition of being neutral and having a strong international engagement. How do you see this new world and the challenges and what role could Austria and the European Union play? First of all, I would say Austria is not a small country, Austria is a middle-sized country. Yes. Coming from Sweden, we were really big, and I call myself also a small country. But yes, you're right. Compared to the countries in Europe, if we compare to Russia, Indonesia or India, of course we are a small country and we know it quite well. But I used to say we are a middle-sized country. And I think we are a country with a very long tradition, as you mentioned, when it comes to being a neutral ground, when it comes to be a seat of the United Nations. And this is something which is also important, and especially in times where we see a lot of challenges ahead of us, where we see that we can solve these problems only together, not one by one. And where we also see that there is the need, not taking the moral high ground and raising the finger and tipping on others, but discussing and negotiating things on the same height, then we also have to engage with middle powers, whatever middle powers are. And I'm very grateful for the explanation of you, Professor, because I was also wondering, is there a definition of middle powers? And if not, then I would say Austria could also be a middle power, a middle power as a bridge builder for, you know, within the European Union to the Eastern countries. We did it in the past. But also regarding, for example, Turkey, at a certain moment, Turkey is a very important partner when it comes to illegal migration, when it comes to also the situation in Ukraine. And they tried also to negotiate, and they were successful, for example, with the Sea Grain Initiative. So Austria could play a certain important role within the European Union, sized in the middle of Europe, middle sized country, and being a neutral ground also. Thank you. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to. No, no, it wasn't. I didn't put it as an offence. One country that is definitely not small is Indonesia. And you, Mr. Jadial, you've been in government, but you're now head of a think tank, a founder and chairman of foreign policy community of Asia, where you work with different projects on democracy and on sort of the citizenship, active citizenship. Indonesia is obviously a huge country, but still a middle power, if we can define it. What role could Indonesia play when it comes to sort of being a little bit balancing between the global south and the global north? Okay. Well, first, let me make the big point that I think in the 21st century, the world order will be shaped not by the great powers or major powers, but by the proliferation of middle powers. I think what is significant in this century is that there are more middle powers in all the regions on the world than ever before. And each of these middle powers have the size, have the ambition, have the resource fullness to play a greater role. And what is interesting, a lot more of these middle powers are establishing relations among one another. So that's on global context. Responding to your question, Cecilia, I think what is interesting is that middle powers are playing a very significant role in defining the regional architecture. Now, I refer to Indonesia and ASEAN. If you look at the regional order that's taking place in Southeast Asia, do you think that's shaped by the United States? No. Yeah. All the elements of the regional architecture, the Threat of Amity of Cooperation, ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Declaration, the East Asia Summit, and it's initiated by a local regional country, which is Indonesia and also with Vietnam and all the others. But I think that is a very unique feature of middle powerhood is that they can fill space and create architecture that major powers can't do within that region. And I think also one very interesting phenomenon that we are seeing at the moment is that we are trying to define middle powers. I would at least point to the dichotomy of two categories. One is the middle powers of the global north that belongs to the West. Austria, Canada, Australia, Korea, Japan, they have 3D alliances with the West and so on. And the global middle powers of the global south, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, and so on. And I think what is interesting and not seem much in the news is the emerging alignments and relationships and content, diplomatic and economic contents that are being established by the middle powers of the global south and those in the Western countries. In Asia alone, Indonesia and Korea, two middle powers are really doing a lot now to shape regional relations. And Australia and India, two middle powers from both global south and the West are also doing a lot significantly to elevate that relationship. And we're going to continue to see this trend. And as I said again, it's not being monitored enough by the conventional media, but it is a hugely significant geopolitical development. Maybe that's a good thing that is not monitored by media because it can allow different initiatives to grow a little bit and finding a way forward. Yeah, Professor Alia? So just to pick up on what my Indonesian friend said, I think it's absolutely right but again, I apologize, but it's more complicated, okay? So if you think of different dimensions of order, for example, the international security order in Southeast Asia or in the Western Pacific is largely defined by a U.S. military presence that has been there since the battle of Midway. And the way you can tell how significant that is in creating the order is imagine it's withdrawn and now look at the politics, similarly the order in Europe that for Austria, the international security order is essentially defined by NATO, but NATO is basically a U.S. military backbone and some other components, okay? And again, to try to see how important is that, imagine that was withdrawn and I would bet, for example, if that were withdrawn, I would wish you would see a European superpower. I would like to, but I would bet you would see a re-nationalization of militaries with much more stress among the parties. So that's why I think that we have to take it in different domains in the energy business and let's take, for example, oil. Saudi Arabia, which if there were no energy, if there were no oil, Saudi Arabia would is, I mean, it would be a sandbox, who would be interested, okay? But oil being what it is in the global economy in the dimension of energy, Saudi Arabia and even the other suppliers are big players. In the population world, I think again, you see a large population as the governments are harnessing or providing, enabling their citizens to build their own economies, they become bigger. If they have a bigger GDP, lo and behold, that translates into power in other domains. We look at the AI discussion going on. There's basically only two countries that have advanced AI, the U.S. and China. So everybody else can talk about it and the Europeans can regulate it, but can regulate what they, or try to regulate what they want to regulate, but where's anybody there inventing anything? The answer is there's not, okay? Now, I wish there were. There's a lot of extremely capable, so I don't like the fact that there's just two, okay? And I think the Europeans, I imagine, will become part of the, so I think if we took different slices of the dimension, you would find the relative power of the parties, but where you see everywhere is that Indonesia or take Ethiopia. Ethiopia did not ask remission from the U.S. or from maybe even your African Union colleagues if you're going to join the BRICS. You think about it, you think what's good for us, we can act, we can act. This is a slightly different world because you would, if every independent actor can do, the hoodies, the hoodies are interrupting global trade routes. This is 50,000 guys running around with a, you know, a few missiles and a few drones, can interrupt the global, my God, there's too many actors in too many different divisions and nobody's again telling them, no, this, we have rules, here's the rules, here's the order, that's good, stop. Now in fact, an effort is being mounted and fortunately a multilateral effort and I think it'll be successful, but I think if we take, take international security, the piece that I look at the most, but if you look at the international money and the money markets or currencies, again, you'll only find two or three that end up being playing the reserves or playing the world of the currencies for trade. If you look at trade, if you look at China, it's a huge factor and the fact that the things have been changing so rapidly lately, I think means that it all seems even more confusing, which it, which it is. There were a lot of issues here. Let's come back on a few of them. Minister, Ethiopia has a very important role in Africa. You are the seat of the African Union in Addis Ababa and the, the African Commission sits there and you also recently as a country joined BRICS. BRICS. Yes, as Professor alluded to. So that gives you a lot of clout as a country, both on the continent, but also as a country. How do you see that? What role can you use these two organizations for to sort of advance global and international cooperation as well? Or is it mainly regional and intercontinental? Yeah, thank you. It's true. Ethiopia is a founding member of the United Nations and the founding member of African Union, OAU, African Union, and the leading, one of the leading country for the establishment of the African Union. And again, the hosts were proud of that. And again, currently we joined the BRICS, we're also very happy to be one of the pivotal player in the BRICS community. BRICS is a really emerging platform. Look, the global landscape, the challenge, the competitions, and a lot of problems. And the global setup is not the much responsive to the developing countries, especially for underdeveloped countries and for emerging economies. In this regard, I think the establishment of BRICS is a good opportunity to strengthen multilateralism and again, to have more opportunities for partnership on economic development and related areas. I think BRICS is not a new setup just by shifting from one block to another block. Instead, it's a new initiative and a new establishment to create more access for partnership and to strengthen multilateralism. In this regard, Ethiopia, as we're managing emerging economy with huge demand, I think it is a good opportunity, additional opportunity to have more partnership and more access for economic cooperation and the like. That's very important. Again, the African Union is addressing different issues for that beyond the continent. Africa has to play a pivotal role across the globe for multilateralism and the international arena on trade, on investment, on other economic activities. So this setup is really a good opportunity within these challenging times and platforms. Thank you. Your opinion likes to operate in a world where there are rules and norms and some sort of predictability and all that is falling apart now. What new tools do you see? Can there be new alliances? New kind of corporations? What's the way forward on a short-term basis but also a little longer? I would like to come back to what Professor Ellis has already said, because I think it's the need now for Europe to really become a superpower, to become a power in the world, to be seen as a geopolitical power. And this is, of course, not easy. You know it better than me having been a member of the European Commission and also you Cecilia, that it is a very complex thing, the European Union. By now we are 27 member states and we are not a United States. And we don't want to be United States. In a world like we face now, we have to hold together. And I think we already showed that we can show strengths, especially if I'm thinking of the sanctions after the Russian aggression on Ukraine. They were all decided unanimously. And this also showed the real strength of the European Union, 27 member states. And it wasn't easy because everyone has other interests and everyone comes from another political point, political point, historical point. But in the end there were 12 sanction packages. And this is the good thing. The bad thing is that we lost the battle of the narrative. Because large parts of the world and also many, many Europeans say that the high prices are there because of the sanctions. Forgetting that they are there because of the Russian aggression. And this was only the reaction. And of course the sanctions are hitting Russia. But of course also partly Europe. But this is the price we have to pay. So what do I think what we do need to do in the next five years, maybe if we take the next time of the new commission. Then I think we have to develop a strength together. We have to care for the big things. We have to negotiate with other superpowers and middle powers. We have to find ways to cooperate more closely. And I think in this regard it is also good that we resumed the negotiations with India for a free trade agreement. We see bricks. Bricks is expanding. Bricks is getting stronger. So we should not fall behind. If this is the case we are losing and this is really something we have to do urgently. And I myself have to say I was born at the beginning of the 80s. I'm a child of peace. I'm a child of prosperity. I never thought that I have to sit on a panel and discussing about a war in the middle of Europe. Now we have to threat from outside. Now we really should use the opportunity to hold together. So Europe, I was in another panel listening to panacea. Europe is a superpower and maybe it's getting superpowers as well. But we're not there yet. So if I make just one footnote point to this point. Just where the Europeans work are capable of acting together, they have superpowers. They have superpowers. So in economic relations with the U.S. when the European Union decided that GE, when it was one of the great American companies, couldn't conduct a merger. That was a merger for the U.S. for GE between two companies. The European Union said no this is contrary to our any monopoly understanding. And the merger didn't happen. So I think there's a latent power of the 27 members of the EU that are expanding. We want to grow up to 30. It is in principle, if you add it all up, if we're all acting in some more or less uniform fashion, actually does end up having superpowers. Can I? Yes. I wanted to ask you, please. I define superpower as a country that can project its military force anywhere in the world, right? And that is the United States. And so far there's only one superpower. I don't think Europe wants to be that. And I don't think I want Europe to be that. And I think we talk about middle power. There are two or three classifications in my view. One is just a normal middle power, not major, not small, but half enough size and half enough economy to be counted and population as a middle power. Another one is an active one, right? So punching above its weight. And the third one is pivotal middle power, right? India is really having a strong ambition to lead the global south and showing that during the last presidency of the G20. I would hope that Europe's ambition is not to become a superpower, but to become a pivotal middle power. A superpower in which we got, we can ask. As I said, the definition was a country that can project its force anywhere in the world. That is the textbook definition. And so far that's only the United States at the moment. I meant that the European Union should become a superpower economically. I think we are already a superpower when it comes to values. And we have to stop our foreign policy with the raised finger. Because there was the Indian foreign minister, for example, who said recently that Europe should grow out of the mindset that Europe's problems are the world's problems. But the world's problems are not Europe's problems. And that is what I mean. We should see also the others. There was somehow a starting point also during the very hard pandemic phase in Europe. First they said, okay, we got all vaccines because we could afford to buy them. But then we were the only power, let's put it like that, in the world who cared also for other regions. For example, for the Western Balkan countries. Also for the countries of North African countries. And this is what I think can also define a superpower. Care for others, but be stable in your values and show that you are a geopolitical player in the world. And I think this is what we have to develop in Europe. I think to define middle power and the like might have some academic perspective and standard. For me, as I mentioned before, the military capability, economic power and digital power together will lead to that comprehensive capability and position. In this regard, I think there are multiple actors. Those who are able to really achieve these three fundamentals together will lead to that power level. I think we are optimists. In the upcoming times, Africa would be a pivotal power force in the globe. Mr. Jeral, I want to ask you as well. We talked about different alliances being formed. Some a little bit under the radar. Some are still in an emerging stage. Is there not a risk that with all these regional organizations and new corporations, that it contributes to more fragmentation of the world and not to some sort of common agenda where we actually address the problems that every country, big or small, wherever north or south are facing with climate and poverty and inequalities, security issues? How do you see that sort of tension? Well, you know, multilateralism is sick now. It's in ill condition. It's in bad shape. Because of the Ukraine war and all the other things. So a lot of countries, including middle powers, are thinking, look, if the multilateral process, a pathway, it's not promising. Maybe a more promising path is these things that we are creating with fellow middle powers and countries of the region. Indonesia, for example. We are a member of ASEAN. We are a non-aligned country. And we are a member of AYORA. I mean, so many different organizations and we're establishing a different relationship with different middle powers. It doesn't make the world more fragmented, but I think it adds more content to the world order in our view here. I think the more middle powers are less attached to great powers. In my view, the texture of world affairs will become better. If it's as rigid as during the Cold War, the bipolar order, I think that's not good for the world. But I see how, you know, Australia, as a member of Western Alliance, conducts itself close relationship with Indonesia, with India, and so on. That changes the condition of geopolitical rivalry that we are experiencing at the moment. I ask the minister a question. So I think it's a way of helping us understand the middle power conversation. Could you say just a word about the deliberations in your country about joining BRIC and why do I do this? I mean, what's the advantage for my becoming a... Tell us what was the considerations, yes. Yeah. Joining BRICS from our point of view is a good opportunity. A good opportunity to have more global partners and more emerging platform for that. You know, for Ethiopia, currently managing emerging economies with different challenges, debt burdens, other technological capability, challenges and others. We need more partners and we need more effective and strong multilateral partnership and that BRICS would create a good opportunity, even for bilateral engagements with other developed countries and to strengthen South-South cooperation. Currently, we are not satisfied and happy with the existing institutions like the World Bank and IMF response today. Our economy is demanding and the challenges are a lot. In this regard, having such additional opportunity is really very timely and important to increase our engagement and to address our outstanding problems. These are the rational behind to join the BRICS. We have really measured expectations from BRICS and we are also committed to play strong and positive roles to be as expected and as planned to address such outstanding challenges for developing countries. Thank you very much. I have a question. There's a microphone. We have time for a couple. Start with you. Thank you so much. I just wanted to follow up with Professor Allison's question. You highlighted the benefits or potential benefits from joining the BRICS. Have you considered any potential costs or unexpected consequences from the decision that you might be able to share with us? Thank you. We evaluated and we looked at different scenarios the pros and cons but joining BRICS today is really a timely and a good opportunity. We're talking about partnership. We are talking about economic partnership and engagement. In this regard, we move forward as planned and based on the vision and roadmap of the BRICS, that is a good opportunity and we are committed to move in that way and to explore that platform potential and again to play our side also to be as a good membership and a good partner for the community. Thank you very much. We have one question there and then we'll have two. Thank you. We've talked about what potentially middle powers can do. Can I ask the panel if they have a vision about why we want middle powers to play a role? Do we think middle powers will do a better job than the great powers? Can we say our part of the world is now a superpower? Why do we want middle powers to play a role? Coming from Singapore, an important middle power. Yes. Anybody want to jump on that? I think that, as you know, we're both from Southeast Asia. And, you know, middle power can be one of the solution providers for problems of the region and of the world. Many of the conflicts are resolved among themselves or by middle power, but not by superpower. For example, in a Cambodian conflict, it was Indonesia, right, working with France. Now there's a negotiation for court of conduct in the South China Sea. The only game in town on the South China Sea is between China and the ASEAN countries, which is a huge dispute. It was dropped not because of China or the United States, but because of their own efforts. And at the moment we're dealing with Rohingya and, as you know, ASEAN is taking that role. So my point is there are a lot of occasions where in fact, super power or major power follows the lead of middle power, right, as I have mentioned. So we can, we can become a solution provider and, believe it or not, we can develop our own sense of exceptionalism. Before we thought it was just American exceptionalism, but you talk to the Chinese, you talk to the Indian, even the Indonesian and Brazilian, they're developing their own sense of exceptionalism. One quick question there. Thank you, Feb. Thank you, Febrian from Indonesia. We're living in a world. Where all of the world system, based on the thing that we inherited from the World War II, barely we see any revitalization on the global governance. So, putting this in mind, so what do you think the middle power can do in democratizing and revitalizing the multilateral system? You know, in many countries, there are a lot of people who have the right to do it. You know, in many countries, democratization starts by the middle class. So, I want to put this, the middle power within the context of the global governance. How the middle power can play a role, because if we see middle powers not yet taken up this job, do you think we should take it up or not? Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador, and let me feel it, because even if we see different initiatives and cooperation booming in a positive way, we still need some global rules, right? And that's why we had the multilateral system, because if we don't have, in the end, it will be the smaller middle powers losing. So, how can we, building on the question also by the ambassador, and with the final words here, if you could quickly just give a few comments on that, how can the middle power and the different emerging corporations contribute to stabilizing or modernizing the global rules as well? I think this is a great question. So, the default from the international order that was created after World War II, that's basically provided 78 years without any great power war, and greater improvements in lives of people around the world than ever before, the default from that is the jungle. Yeah, exactly. The normal condition is the jungle. So, the struggle to figure out given that the objective conditions for the essentially a U.S.-led international order no longer exist, the need and we don't want the default to become the jungle, therefore what? It means that those that have any power to do anything need to be doing it. And if I make one second point about the Lee Kuan Yew thing, Lee Kuan Yew was always a wonderful example that for great intellectual power we don't need a license for offering great ideas about the strategic conditions of the world and what to do about it. You just stand up and offer an idea. So, that's true for all the countries and all the countries a little to a small country like Singapore could have a giant of an intellectual contributor to helping us understand the strategic order. Thank you. Very short answer from a European perspective I would say we should engage with them and we should try to put our shoes in their shoes to understand each other and to help and to show that our rules-based world is really something we built up in the last decades and which is working which does not mean that we raise the thing and say you have to do it like that but engaging and try to understand each other. Can I? I hope I'm wrong on this but my observation is that much of the global south is losing faith in the liberal international order and what happened in Middle East and Gaza reinforced that point. The problem is this the global south not comfortable with the global south they want to change it but they don't have an idea an answer on how what is the new model that should replace that liberal international order if you ask 100 countries in the global south what is their prescription majority would say I don't know except India has one perception which is India must join the UN Security Council and China is definitely going to shoot that down and the others also so I think the fact that we're not happy with the global order but we don't have a clear answer on how the new global order should be like I think that's the challenge you have the last the international order has to be fair and reasonable we don't want to see unipolar and we don't want to see and encourage this rivalries instead multiple actors who are able to look and address the structural problem of the world especially the poor societies under developed countries is really a very timely and important time for that the involvement of multiple actors and the creation of this reasonable and fair globe to be very crucial instead of looking for one or two or around that players in the globe that's really the concern of Africa and under developed countries will look for more strong and multiple players to hear the voice of different deprived societies and communities thank you very much I think we have heard different ideas different initiatives different ambitions exactly where this will land when it comes to new global rules will be a seminar for next year so we'll be back thank you and join me in thanking this fantastic panel