 I wanted to offer a couple of points about the unconventional revolution specifically from a national security vantage point, which is generally how I look at the world. I think in the broadest sense it's very difficult to draw a straight line between the unconventional revolution and specific national security implications at least to date. But it does raise a number of interesting questions and potential challenges. Even before the events of the last month to six weeks, it was clear unconventionals complicate Russia's economic and therefore domestic political situation. And that raises the question of how strong or weak does the U.S. want Russia to be and to what degree do unconventionals affect our ability to influence that outcome. I think the rise of unconventionals also likely complicates economic development in some already unstable areas of the world. That's most significantly in areas that we have less direct national interest and so that suggests that there'll be increased pressure on policy makers to potentially respond to unrest in areas where we may be disinclined to do so. As the study points out, the shale gale does not fundamentally change our national interests but it has made people both domestically and overseas believe that our interests are different or will become different in the future, which has in turn created a significant challenge for U.S. policy makers. From a purely defense perspective, I think broadly speaking the unconventional revolution is consistent with the policy of Asian rebalance but the competitiveness problems that it poses for Europe suggests that European countries will continue to face greater economic strains or great economic strains and that in turn will affect their military capabilities and capacity. Unconventionals do little to affect the alleviate existing strains in the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, some have asked whether American unconventional riches should affect the defense department's thinking about the need for greater energy efficiency and pursuit of alternative energy supply sources. The biggest imperative for that policy priority obviously lies in the challenges of logistics and ensuring vulnerable long supply lines, which domestic supply does little to influence, so that challenge remains. But those are just a few of my broad thoughts about some of the work we've done over the last year. I want to turn it over to Sarah for some additional things and then hopefully have time for some brief questions before moving on to the rest of the program. Yeah, thanks, Martin. One of the things we thought we would do in sort of batting clean up after our presentation is respond to some of the comments that we sort of didn't get to put into our presentation, but we do think are really important and very much highlighted in a lot of the rest of the work. The first is not to dampen our own parade here, but I think at the outset of this project lots of folks thought that unconventional oil and gas, both in terms of its impact on the energy space, which is definitely hugely impactful, would have a very similar sort of impact on the geopolitical and national security space. And we found that while a lot of what's happening in the energy space is very important, it isn't having sort of overwhelming impacts. There's no region of the world where it is fundamentally upended sort of the geopolitical dynamics that were already there. But what has happened is that it's a very concrete, interesting and unexpected vector that has come into a very geopolitically fluid environment, where people are looking for structure, they're weighing and balancing relative power against one another. And so we found through all of the regional studies that we did and the work we were doing with a lot of our colleagues, which is very challenging for me because I'm more an energy wonk than a foreign policy person, that people were sort of clinging to energy as evidence of something changing. And really sort of asking that question about whether something was changing. And in this kind of environment, that's a very important thing, right? And so we found even in places where we could readily explain why the energy balance really hadn't shifted too dramatically in geopolitical terms, in perception terms, that it was very important in sort of reshaping people's thinking. And so that's something that for me is sort of one of the main takeaways of this study. The second, and now I will be sort of an energy wonk of sorts, is oil is different from gas. And a lot of the reports that we looked at that sort of did this look at what happens with the onset of tide oil production and shale gas production, looked at one or the other and sort of applied a geopolitical lens to one or the other. These are very different resource trends and they are working on different timelines and sort of geophysically they're different things as well, but geopolitically they're also different things. And so we spend a good bit of time in the report trying to talk a little bit about how gas is different in oil and then what that actually means for the potential geopolitical implications. And then finally, I think that it's probably accentuated because of, as Martin said, the discussion that we're having about the Ukraine crisis and what's happening with the United States relationship with Russia. We're getting lots of questions again about whether this surge in U.S. gas production can be used as a tool of foreign policy in our current situation. And as a result, we basically in the report argue that energy is not a very well-directable tool of foreign policy and you're very likely to overplay your hand if you try and use it as such, but it is a fundamental tenant of energy security, which when you think about sort of international structures, free and fair and functioning markets is one of the things that could lead to a great deal more stability. And so we think that we're not trying to be critical of the administration or Congress or anybody else and we think it's a very valid point that this is an energy revolution that has happened in the United States over a very short period of time. We are absorbing what it means and trying to construct a policy response, but that takes time as well. And we think that that's also a very sort of important point as we sort of talk about what we should or shouldn't be doing sort of in the current day context. So if I could just offer one last point that I think is important. One of the things as a non-energy wonk that having spent the last year looking hard at this that I hadn't appreciated was the degree of uncertainty about the future trajectory of the unconventional revolution not only here but globally. And that I think is something that is not very well reflected in the broader policy conversation. I think certainly not when it gets translated through to the national security conversation. There's an expectation that there's a fairly linear trend to be expected. And the degree of uncertainty around that again was something I hadn't appreciated. But I think it's hugely important as we think about how we might want to go forward in this space. So that was a major learning point for me during the course of this work. We may have time for just maybe one or two questions if there are any. David are all reading your report. We have Mike. The technology of the unconventional oil production the tight oil production and what you're talking about I think you're talking about a relationship to price the economics that what happens if the price doesn't stay at a hundred dollars what happens if it goes to 80 or what happens if it crashes to 40. And contrast to the conventional oil which is produced pretty steadily once you find it. And if I can ask another question to put on the table I'm curious whether thinking of Keystone XL and the inability of two NATO allies in North America to reach a resolution over five years whether just this process defect as I see it has geopolitical significance. Over to the energy wonk. We talk a bunch about about sort of price and sort of technology evolution within the unconventional space. Again I think this is one of those areas where we're learning about the cost curve improving efficiency improving recovery rates all that kind of stuff. And we you know separately and apart from this study we've done other studies that are looking just at the resource base the productivity of the economics of it. And you know we did a study two years ago it's out of date today. Right. I mean it's moving so fast and people are doing things in different ways and the economics are changing. And so that's a it's a it's sort of a day to day you know exercise on on on that question. I do think there is a lot of confidence that we've got a lot of gas. It is producible at you know at a very reasonable price threshold. The question for us is you know the learning curve on tide oil is is a little bit further behind than it is on on shale gas. And all I can say is we we're certainly revising upward those estimates every single year just like we did shale gas. Though it looks like it might be a little bit you know more complicated to get out of the ground. It's a somewhat technical discussion. The place where there's you know ample amounts of uncertainty is in other countries around the world that also have you know these three source base and and quite frankly other countries that have conventional resource bases that they weren't producing in the most economically optimistic optimal way. Right. And so so how countries respond and what they do with their own resource base and what they're capable of doing is a huge question. On the Keystone one we didn't take it on directly only because for my vantage point we're talking about it all the time. What I would say though is there are lots of sound arguments that we make that talk about you know where security comes from energy security comes from the United States and it has a lot to do with being able to get infrastructure permitted in a timely fashion being able to spend money investing in projects so they come online on time when you're going to need them. And we also say that you know the unconventional revolution doesn't solve the climate change crisis which quite frankly you know there's a view that most of the what's holding us up on sort of the Keystone XL question is a climate change question. So unconventionals doesn't solve that for us either so it probably doesn't solve that sort of you know very narrow debate. Thank you that was a great presentation. In the late 1990s Putin did a late PhD dissertation where he described how Russia could use its energy resources to link and compel countries in the near abroad to more or less conform to his view and worse we've seen recently an example of this in Ukraine but the Swedish Defense Ministry about five years ago detailed dozens and dozens of instances where Russia has in fact used its energy to intimidate and and force political concessions from its the near abroad. What if anything can be done about this broader problem? We might want to punt that one to our to our regional experts that are coming next. I think obviously that's the topic of the day but I do think it's better to left to some of our regional experts but yeah I you know one will be very humble in the room where we've got some some real expertise on the question of you know what Russia is doing why it does it and how you manage that. I will say though there is a question of whether or not you know Russia is in a fundamentally different position today one because of their interdependence on markets with Europe right there is there is there is a cost-benefit analysis that comes with cutting off energy relationships with Europe there is a cost-benefit analysis that comes to doing simply what they've done thus far and realizing that the investors around the world look at them differently right I mean they're not an economically the best position in the world it's not you know terrible either and and there's lots of people better capable here of answering whether that matters to them or not but you know there there is also an argument to be made that being linked in you know to the rest of the world with economic ties energy being one of them gives more pause than it does leverage when it comes to over you know actions of strength and and and bullying so I I have a very unpopular view that maybe something that's keeping Ukraine safe these days is energy but maybe it's causing us all to focus on it in in sort of a new and different way because we realize those trade ties are so important. We'll take one more from Petro. Petro Norov from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The key question as far as a number of us are concerned is is this an American revolution or is it a global revolution and that's that really will define a lot of what we are talking about. Sarah was actually touching on this but to what extent have you has your study really gone into this particular issue because suddenly if you have a shaled revolution or in in China suddenly their parameters of Chinese foreign policy will change pretty dramatically as as one possible consequence and there are lots of others. Can you comment on this briefly please. Yeah we actually in this is a thank you there was a very good opportunity for me to thank another person in particular Tatiana Mitrova from the Russian Academy of Science who very graciously allowed us to utilize some scenario planning that she had done on different scenarios what would happen if there was a shale gas it was more unconventional which is a broader term but an unconventional breakthrough or failure around the world or a status quo position right and what it allowed us to do was not really dive into the question of who's going to produce how much how fast and those kinds of things there's very good studies basin by basin studies that people are sort of looking at and that do that however what it did allow us to do is have some scenarios to play with that looked at what the geopolitical implications would be if you were very very optimistic or you were you know not necessarily as optimistic and we thought you know you know by far and away the country that sort of benefits from a geo strategic standpoint the most is the United States obviously right because it you know in those situations we look like we are you know to be advantaged from our other you know the position we were previously in in a failure scenario we sort of looked like we were we were back in sort of a tough spot China does well in in in in sort of the high case scenarios as well it's not a game changer for their foreign policy though right and when you look at their trajectory of energy demand going forward more supply of anyone's source is a great thing but it isn't necessarily a game changer right and so but it does sort of matter sort of you know how these things happen in which country they happen first and and whether it's oil versus gas and things like that so there are we do go through that to a great deal of detail in in the report but did you want to I would just add that I think one of the other things that was important in terms of how this is reflected today is again getting back to this point of uncertainty it's and interestingly most of the implications I would I would characterize most of the implications to date have not so much been based in the reality of the unconventional revolution today but about expectations about what's to come in the future and those opinions are so diverse that's what's in large part fueling some of the additional uncertainty and so people can pick their scenario based on whatever data they choose to to think is most relevant and lots of people are picking different ones and so that's creating instability and lack of clarity that's the characterization of today and and I think as the technology develops as the reality starts to play out that will tighten the shot group so to speak with with a much you'll be able to predict much more clearly what the implications specific implications might be I know there's a lot more questions but we've basically set up the rest of the day to be able to dig deep into each one of these aspects so but I just before before we sort of turn it over back to Ambassador Hills I just wanted to say thank you very much to the Smith Richardson Foundation who made this work possible you have a lot of people to thank you'll see our entire panel of regional scholars later today that we want to thank we want to thank our our contributing authors Michelle Melton Jane Nakano Frank Verastro and Andrew Metric and I know everyone always says gee this report would not have been possible without you know somebody it actually would not have happened without Molly Walton who's standing in the back right there so just want to say thank you to everybody who puts all the sort of the sweat into a year-long effort and we really appreciate it and hope you enjoy the rest of the day