 My name is Ferley Rincon, I'm happy to be here and to present this joint project with Cesar Mantilla. This project is about the relationship between labor mobility rules and productivity in a control setting. We define labor mobility as the possibility of changing contracts, in other words, the possibility that workers could pass from one low wage sector to another high wage sector. In dual labor markets, the probability of transition between low and high wage sectors sometimes is different between workers with the same productivity. Do not depend on workers, but it is due to external constraints. We designed this online experiment to measure difference in productivity resulting from perceptions of labor market in a control settings. Let's imagine, let's imagine a dual labor markets where the only works is the same between sectors and the unique difference is the peace rate in both sectors. We call these sectors contract A and contract A and contract B and the difference is that the peace rate in contract A is twice contract B peace rate. We found that workers could be low productive because their effort does not improve their chances of getting good jobs. Out of the peace rate implies that more effort increase the worker pay off. We contribute to literature about relative payment and sorting in competitive environments. The main finding here in this literature is that workers' effort provision depends on wages, but also in the information that workers have about their co-workers' wages. And we explored the effort provision in a controlled environment where contract relocation depends on this provision. So in other words, we are, in this work we try to understand how the rule for wage changing is affecting productivity. Natural and field experiment have provided evidence that perform based payment affects effort provision and in this project we show that labor mobility leads to productivity-based sorting when rules involves effort provision. To understand what is the effect of mobility rules between two sectors of a well-made labor market on participants' supply of effort, participants were randomly allocated to tournament whose mobility rules define the contract allocation for five rounds. In this experiment, we write two types of mobility rules. The first one is the initial allocation rule, is how the first contract is allocated, and we also write the reallocation rules for contracts from round two to round five. And this capture labor mobility. Contracts for round one are allocated randomly or based on participant productivity during the practice round. We have two conditions. In the first condition is the lack treatment. Contract A and B are assigned randomly to the participants and in the merit condition, participants after the practice round are sort by their productivity and participant with the best productivity receive the contract A, that is the contract with high payment, and participants with lowest productivity receive contract B. Then we organize a participant if group of four players two of them with contract A and two of them with contract B. This we use a stratified group rematching to ensure that the group is always composed in this way to contract A and to contract B. At the end of each round, participant within a group where lexicographically rank using two arguments. The first argument is the contract type. It means that workers with contract A will be ranked first and second, and workers with contract B will be ranked third and fourth. We also use the numbers of tasks to rank in the contracts groups and workers from rounds two to five can be promoted or demoted according to these three conditions. In the first conditions, all contracts are reallocated randomly. It doesn't depend on the initial contract or on the number of complete tasks. And in the other two, participants in the second and third position in the ranking of the group compete for contract A. And this competition depends on productivity in two different ways. In the perfect condition, the contract A, the best contract is allocated to the participant who do more tasks in the round. But in the noisy condition, more tasks implies a higher productivity, a higher likelihood of receive contract A. In this round, participants have 120 seconds to complete as many tasks as possible. We use our randomization mechanism to minimize learning between rounds. In this table, we randomize the correspondence between the numbers and the letters, and we also randomize the order in the numbers of this code. People have to see this key table to complete the encoding of the numbers to letters. This, in this slide, I present some details of the experiment. We use an online protector experiment with two populations, students and non-students. We separate this in workers, paid and unpaid, and students who only study or unemployed people who are studying. If the age between the groups are similar, and this experiment was conducted with 207 participants in 18 sessions. Okay. In this table, I'm going to present the main results of this experiment. We found that an increase of 0.3, complete task when the reallocation rules depends on the workers' productivity. This increase in productivity is driving by workers, when the reallocation rule is perfect, and by students when the reallocation rule is noisy. When we do this OLS analysis for the pool sample, we don't find any effect of the initial allocation rule, but when we do this analysis for workers, we found that when a worker is, when the first contract of a worker is allocated by merit and in the other rounds, the reallocation rules, it's random, these workers reduce his productivity. But when we combined a merit initial allocation with reallocation rule with perfect or noisy, the workers' productivity increase. We also analyzed the transition probabilities by treatment conditions, and we found no difference between the transition of perfect and noisy treatments. So these results are driven by the perception of mobility that makes aliens ish of the treatment. The conclusion is this experiment tried to contribute to this question about labor, mobility, and productivity. We find that both treatments with playoff encourage participants to provide more effort. However, the effects are driven by perfect treatment for workers and noisy treatment for students. And we also find difference between the interaction of initial allocation and reallocation rules for workers, but not for the students. Maybe students are more, the competitive environment is more natural for the students, but for workers, we could think that the initial allocation is really important, and it is affecting all the rounds. And finally, I would like to say that if exclusion parties playing the system of dual labor market signals that this exclusion can be overcome, are fundamental to encourage efforts. Thank you.