 everyone, and welcome to this last session of the day. I'm Kim Ratas. I'm a BBC correspondent covering international affairs and politics for the BBC. I will be your moderator for this session. Thank you for joining us and for attending the first day of the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy. This panel is about the Iran deal and the international perspective, and I'll be introducing our excellent panelists in just a second. But first, a couple of housekeeping notes. Just a reminder that immediately after this session, you're all invited to the opening reception in the ballroom. It's just across the hall, same location as where you had lunch earlier today. It's from 6 PM to 8 PM. We're going to have a moderated conversation between the panelists for about 30 to 40 minutes, and after that, we'll take questions. To ask your question, there'll be microphone stands in the audience, so you can get up to the stands and state your name, organization, for the question. Keep it brief. We'll try to get as many as possible into the session. So without further ado, let me introduce our panelists for this discussion, which I think will be very lively and interesting and timely as well. Sitting next to me is Director General Yukio Amano. He's the IEA Director General since the 1st of December, 2009. Next to him is Baroness Catherine Ashton. She served as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2009 to 2014, and she led the Iran negotiations for four and a half years. She's also a Woodrow Wilson Center visiting fellow. Next to her is His Excellency Yusuf Al-Auteba. He's the ambassador for the UAE to the United States. He's been here since 2008. He's seen quite a lot unfold in this capital. And last but not least, Eli Levite. He's a non-resident senior fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program and Cyber Policy Initiative at the Carnegie Endowment. Now, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known for short as the Iran deal, is seen by many, perhaps most people, as a consequential, the most consequential development for nuclear diplomacy in decades. But of course, it faced a lot of criticism, a lot of opposition while it was being negotiated, and we'll get into that just a little bit. But the opposition, the concerns, the worry were from Arab countries, from Israel, and others in the region, and of course, from the Republican Party here in the United States. But while so far, its implementation has proceeded smoothly, and we'll get more on that from the Director General, its future is to some extent uncertain. As a candidate, President Trump described the deal as disastrous. He's also threatened to dismantle it or renegotiate it. And police, it's so tough, he has said that they don't have a chance. He's tempered some of those statements more recently. The new Congress is also likely to impose additional sanctions on Iran. We'll have to see how that unfolds. And if they do so, Tehran will say that these new sanctions are possibly a violation of the deal. And then of course, we have the possibility of non-compliance by Iran itself. For technical reasons, but also because we have elections coming up in Iran, and we'll have to see whether President Rouhani gets another term or not. Now, I want to say that we're not here to relitigate the details of the deal, but to look at the future. How confident are regional parties about how well this is being implemented? What are the deal's prospects? What is the best way to manage its implementation and the pressures facing it? And how will it fare over time, including under this administration? So I'd like to start with you, Director General, and ask you a question about your latest visit to Washington just before this one. You met with the Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson at the State Department on March the 6th, and you came out sounding quite positive. You said that you were expecting very good cooperation on the implementation of the nuclear deal. And your assessment so far is that Iran is complying with the terms. But as I just mentioned, the Trump administration has also been very critical, very strict, saying that they wanted this deal to be implemented with great strictness. That, of course, is better than saying it's the worst deal ever negotiated, which we heard on the campaign trail last year. But what are the challenges when it comes to the interpretation of saying great strictness? How does the IAEA work to verify and implement this agreement when there could be different interpretations? So thank you very much for inviting me to this very important conference. Yes, I had a meeting with Mr. Tillerson some time ago, early in March, and we had a discussion on Iran nuclear issues and others. First, let me start from basic things. The IAEA has a role to play and the role given to the IAEA with respect to the JCPOA is to verify and monitor the nuclear-related commitments made by Iran under the JCPOA. We are serving as ears and eyes and ears of the international community. We are on the ground 24-7 and we can state that the JCPOA is being implemented. That said, I would like to make it clear that this JCPOA is an agreement among E3, EU plus three and Iran eight parties. And therefore, in the end, it is the responsibility of such a party or parties to provide them implementation, interpretation or enforcement and the same rule applies, same principle applies to the judgment whether or not in compliance. Whether the interpretation is strict or not is not a problem for the IAEA. The problem for us or important thing for us is to be communicated a view, a consensus view, clear view to the IAEA so that we can verify and monitor. And the IAEA monitoring and verification continues to be careful, impartial and factual. The verification regime that we have in Iran now consists of three elements. One is the standard safeguard agreement which is called comprehensive safeguard agreement and additional protocol, which is a more powerful verification tool and transparency measures unique to the JCPOA. This is the strongest verification regime existing now in the international community. Under the JCPOA Iran also accepted many restrictions. For example, maintaining the stockpile of LEU below 300 kilograms and maintain the centrifuges at 5,060. This is a clear and significant gain from verification perspective because we have the strongest verification regime to monitor and verify the smaller nuclear activities by Iran. Turning our eyes to the future, we can identify number of potential risk elements. For example, the stockpile of heavy water or the low enriched uranium merits closer attention. Access may be a sensitive issue for Iran, but Iran needs to continue to provide access to the IAEA. And another very important issue is the funding. Without the regular budget and without voluntary contribution, it is not possible to implement the Iran related activities under the JCPOA in Iran. We are requesting a modest increase about 2% this year. And we would like to see that countries accept this. In conclusion, I can say that JCPOA is a clear and significant gain from verification perspective. JCPOA is being implemented. Eight parties to the JCPOA have a role to play, continue to have a role to play. And risk can be overcome if all the parties discharge its responsibilities. The IAEA is firmly committed to discharge its responsibility to verify and monitor the nuclear related commitments by Iran under the JCPOA. Thank you very much. We'll come back to some of these points. Thank you, Director General. I know you said, I don't claim the verification system is perfect, but it is the best that we can expect under these circumstances. You've just described it as the strongest regime possible. I will get back to some of those points that you've just made during the conversation. But Marinus Ashen, I want to come to you because you were there as well at the very beginning and almost to the very end, to the very bitter end, or the joyful end, depending on which side you sat on. There was a lot of satisfaction amongst the parties who were able to negotiate this. But the Iran deal happened in a very difficult regional context as well. There were a lot of fears, a lot of opposition, criticism that it did not take into consideration that context, Iran's role in the war in Syria didn't take enough into consideration Israel's concerns or concerns of Gulf countries. Was there too much emphasis being put on that context to the detriment of the achievement that it did represent, which is take this massive issue off the table, this big concern off the table? I mean, the most important thing for me was that the mandate we had came from the Security Council. And the mandate was to find a way to demonstrate confidence in the purely peaceful nature of what Iran was doing. It was no more, it was no less. And we were very mindful of many other issues of great concern about what Iran was doing, not least for colleagues in the region, but also for the whole of the international community. It was a deal that was what it was. It wasn't designed to do more than. It would, in my personal view, have been wrong for it to have strayed into different issues because there were concerns that needed to be addressed with the support and with the inclusion of countries who were directly affected. But this was a permanent five plus Germany because it had started from a European initiative many years before that was designed to do what it said on the tin, to provide that confidence if at all possible. And it was by no means in all of the years I was involved, and there are colleagues here who've been involved at least as long, if not longer, in trying to do what we said we would do. Were we mindful of the regional context? Yes, we were. We were mindful of it in two different ways. One was of course what Iran was doing, but you should also remember that we were negotiating in a period of time when our relationship with Russia was quite complex with the problems and crisis in Ukraine. The negotiations that I was involved in coordinating and working with the political directors from the six countries was at a time when we were also deeply worried about what was going on in the context of Ukraine. And yet Russia was a key partner inside the room. And so context was important, but our focus and our mission was absolutely clear. Our hope was that if we were able to resolve this one issue, that it would maybe give a bit of confidence in the proposal or proposed ideas that were kind of floating around to be able to then talk to Iran about other issues, not by us, but by those who needed to. But by conducting these negotiations without necessarily taking into consideration the context, when you look back at how these negotiations unfolded, do you think that was the right approach or was it a mistake? I don't think it was that we weren't taking into account the context because there's a lot of traffic and discussion going on with all sorts of important partners and key interests in what the negotiations were and were not doing. But for my part, I felt that it was important to do what we were told to do within the mandate. I don't think you can go beyond it and expect to get support for what you're doing necessarily, but also it felt to me to be wrong to do that. So that's why I think it's important that we stayed within it. Ambassador Ateba, let me draw you into the conversation about the regional context. Last year you wrote in the Wall Street Journal that although the deal was holding, Iran remained hostile, expansionist, and violent. This year you wrote in a peddlet said Gulf states are ready for peaceful coexistence with Iran and that the UAE believes that the nuclear deal should be strictly enforced. Today, is your key concern Iran's regional behavior or the continued implementation and verification of the deal? Thank you, Kim. And first let me thank George and Bill Burns and everybody from the Carnegie team for having us. Our concern has always been and I think will continue to be Iran's behavior. The Iran threat for us in our part of the world breaks down into two categories. First, the nuclear program and what that means over the long term, but also Iran's behavior. And Iran's behavior has been a threat way before there was a nuclear program or before there were talks or before there was a JCPOA. So if I were to prioritize my threats, no, by far the biggest issue for us is Iran's support for Hamas and Hezbollah, missile tests, subversive activity, the rhetoric that we hear, the increased sectarianism. That threat is far more significant for countries in the geographic proxy of Iran. So while I can't dismiss the nuclear program, I'm concerned about what happens while there is a nuclear program that's being monitored by the IAEA. Let me take this opportunity to also clarify the IAEA's position because it has been often mischaracterized. We supported the ACPOA because we felt it took a major set of issues off the table. But if you ask me whether it matters whether they keep 2000 centrifuges or 4000 centrifuges is irrelevant. What I care is that this deal allows us to theoretically focus on pushing back Iran's behavior in the region. So to the extent the policy towards Iran pushes back Iranian behavior, expansionist policy, support for terrorism, we will judge this as a good deal. To the extent we are held hostage by this deal and look the other way when Iran continues to behave this way, then we will judge it as not a very good deal. And that's the IAEA position and a largely Gulf position on the deal. We supported it so we can continue to deal with the other set of challenges that has been largely ignored. Okay, and we want to come back to that. But first, Dr. Alifid, can I ask you about the position in Israel? The Israeli government was very critical of the Iran deal at the time. You're a bit more nuanced, perhaps, on this. You don't speak for the Israeli government, but what's your understanding of what Israel today would like to see coming out of this administration when it comes to verification and implementation of the deal and policy towards Iran, taking into consideration the comments that Ambassador Al Tehba just made. Well, let me put it this way. I think that the Israeli government was not oblivious to some gains inherent in the deal. It may have been less explicit about those publicly, but there was not a failure to recognize that there were some positive elements. That being said, I think on balance, the deal left us concerned, and I think over time, even more concerned than we had been when it was actually signed. The reason that Israel was concerned was that many of the gains were either temporary and would lapse over time. Some were looked uncertain or even elusive. Implementation of the UN Security Council components on missile tests and arm sales and so on were thought to be weak. The resolutions were weakened and have proven to be even weaker than that in terms of the implementation. And the gains in terms of trying to promote domestic change in Iran was seen as uncertain and remains uncertain. So notwithstanding all of the benefits in terms of the gains, you could say that some of the gains are temporary and others are uncertain. And at the same time, the risks are very real in terms of what happens when most of the elements phase out. And even more importantly, what the deal had done was essentially to the link between legitimate requirements of Iran where to claim that it has peaceful nuclear energy and what it actually does in terms of its nuclear behavior. And Iran has not met any of the major milestones associated with legitimate nuclear energy pursuits that most other countries engaging in this domain do. And at the same time, was allowed to keep that activity and scale it up at the end of the process. And finally, the discourse, and here I want to build on what advanced World Tiber had said, was that in practice, Iran has gained immunity to engage in highly provocative escalatory behavior. I think we've only seen the tip of the iceberg in the last couple of days in Syria. And I think the potential for escalation there is enormous. Iran is really doing absolutely reckless behavior in what it does there, in addition to what it's doing in Lebanon, in Iraq, in Yemen, we can go on and on with the list. So from the perspective of the Israeli government, the hope is that the US government on the one hand would try to use instruments built into a deal into more vigorous enforcement, again as Ambassador Tiber had made. But at the same time, try both to check Iran's regional behavior and prevent Iran from scaling up its nuclear activity as the provisions of the deal begin to phase out, unless Iran fundamentally changes its political, strategic, and nuclear orientation. So there's clearly a divide here on the panel between those who look at the deal squarely from a nuclear perspective and those who look at it from a more regional perspective. Can I come back to you, Director General and Baroness? You just heard comments from the Ambassador and from Dr. Levite about their concerns in the region about what this deal does and doesn't do. Can I get your reactions about some of the points that Eli raised when it comes to the nitty-gritty of the implementation of the deal and the phasing out of some of those conditions over time? And for you, Baroness Ashton, you heard there, Ambassador Orteba, talk about the fact that, yes, it's a great thing that this issue of Iran's nuclear program is taken off the table, but is the region now hostage to this nuclear deal? Has Iran gained immunity from everything for the sake of upholding that deal? Let me start with you, Dr. Director General. In my introductory statement, I kept on emphasizing that from verification perspective, this is a clear and significant gain. My job is verification and I can say with confidence that it is a significant gain. I'm not discussing Iranian behavior on other areas but it is not my mandate to discuss them. From the verification point of view, I repeat, it is a gain. The implementation and additional protocol means submission of a very detailed declaration from Iran. We review it and if we have the need, we request access to information or a site. Under this agreement, we can have access to milling and mining of uranium, heavy water production plant, centrifuge manufacturing facilities. Normally, we don't have that access. It is temporary and it was said it is temporary but no advanced centrifuges are allowed in 8 to 10 years. Limit of firm or LEU at 300 kilograms is for 15 years and surveillance of centrifuge manufacturing is for 20 years. Access to uranium mines and mills is some 25 years. It's a quite long time. We measure time very differently in the region and I'll get to you. Additional protocols, CSA are on permanent basis. So I would say this is not just temporary, it is quite a long time. But if the Trump administration wanted to strengthen some aspects of that deal, are there any options? What additional restraints do you think would be most useful? What would be acceptable even to Iran? Would they be even open to that? For example, heavy water threshold is some 130 ton, LEU 300 kilograms and this will say that is an important part but in order to strengthen we need to find a more sustainable solution. The best way to strengthen it is to keep on implementing. We have just started to implement it for one year and some but keep on insisting on implementing it for a long time is a very good way to strengthen and make the agreement sustainable. Baroness Ashton going back to the question about whether the region is now hostage to the upholding of the nuclear deal. Obviously the deal was not meant to address all of these regional issues Yemen, Iran's behavior and a deep involvement in the war in Syria and yet again it does happen in that context and the criticism at the time administration was that they were not taking into consideration the sequencing of events and how they were implementing this deal or approaching it, how they were bringing in allies into the fold, into understanding what the deal meant or did not mean. Is the region now hostage to the upholding of this deal? At what point do parties walk away because Iran is, I don't know, violating the spirit of the deal? I don't think it does give Iran immunity nor should it in any way take the region hostage. I just have to repeat what I said before. It is what it is. It's meant to do one thing and to do it properly which is why what Dr Amano and his organization does is so crucial in making sure that in a very straightforward monitoring and verification way what is said to be done is done and it was, if you wind back it was a very important diplomatic effort on behalf of the Security Council especially to try and find ways in which we could resolve this issue in a world where it becomes increasingly difficult to see resolution of issues. I'm a private person longer now out of office but I look around and see so many issues that people are grappling with that the solutions seem very difficult to imagine at this point in time. This was one element of a much bigger set of questions about the role of Iran in a region and a region that was going through some dramatic and challenging changes of itself. It doesn't do more than that. It's not meant to do more than that. The ambition for it was that if you're able to resolve one question that's considered very important that has been on the table for a long time effectively well didn't this just show that maybe just maybe there were ways of resolving problems by sitting around a table even if it takes a long time that are worth going for and perfection in this case was this confidence that people could have in this thing and that maybe alongside it the relationships that had been built up in sitting down and talking about this between experts between political directors as we call them between ministers would be useful in thinking about how on Earth you were going to resolve other issues not necessarily the same people because the issues were different but if you like the propensity to be able to sit down and take these things forward and I wouldn't throw that away by saying well you know by doing one thing we've made everything else hostage absolutely not it does not excuse behavior beyond it it does not take away from the need to deal with other issues but it does of itself say we have been able to solve this which frankly when I started nobody believed we could do and I wasn't part of the final team so I congratulate them 100% for what they were able to do my responsibility ended a few months beforehand but the building up of all of that which was incredibly hard work detailed work was of enormous significance of its time in its way but it doesn't do more than that and it shouldn't be seen to do more than that in the context of what we now feel needs to be done the dialogues conversations or other ways of trying to tackle these issues Ambassador Arteba did the model of how the partisan negotiations approached these these talks did it inform you about how you could approach dealing with Iran on other issues as just suggested might have been possible and how do you view this administration's approach to Iran regionally and in the context of the implementation of the deal because it's very different from the Obama administration so in theory yes in theory we would like one day to be able to replicate the P5 plus 1 model of the Gulf countries to discuss Iran's behavior in the region unfortunately we have seen zero zero indication from Iran's willingness to do that what have we seen since the JCPOA has been signed we've seen Iran increase spending on military programs by 10% we've seen Iran increase support of Hezbollah and Hamas two groups on the US list of terrorist organizations we've seen 12 missile tests we've seen on the US list of terrorist organizations and increased rhetoric and so while we would welcome as we have publicly said repeatedly we at some point need to think about how we sit down and live peacefully with Iran and by the way no country no country stands to benefit from a productive cooperative relationship with Iran more than the UAE the amount of trade the amount of investment the amount of cooperation on educational cultural programs is imminent but we see in Iran that is sending the signals that don't send that message we see more belligerence and so in theory it can be done I don't see the climate as conducive to that conversation right now do you want to see more sanctions imposed on Iran and how does that then affect the nuclear deal? I don't want to prejudge and say I want to see this I don't want to see that I want to see a more responsible based on Iran's behavior I think we have been pulling our punches with Iran we see weapons shipments going into the Houthi rebels in Yemen and we pretend it's not happening we see more support going in for Hezbollah, IRGC in Syria and we pretend it's not happening there's a lot of things that are taking place that are actually not being honest with how to deal with the Iranian threat in the region so I would like to see a more pragmatic policy a policy that pushes back on Iran's behavior and once I see that then we can address a larger set of questions but I don't want to cherry pick one or two things and say that's what we should or shouldn't do Dr. Levitch you just heard the director general say that the best way to strengthen the deal is to continue implementing it and verifying it good enough for you? Well let's distinguish between a nuclear component and non-nuclear components I think on the nuclear component as far as the IEA meant that it goes we all have to salute the work that the agency has been doing under the leadership of director general Amano I mean really exemplary professional behavior so that goes without sake that being said I think we all need to be very very clear in how we interpret the nuances in what director general Amano had said namely that there's some things which fall within the safeguards domain where he is the ultimate authority as the arbitrator of safeguards and also make passes judgment on them and there are some provisions of the deal that do not that the IEA has to carry out based on guidance from the joint commission and those issues leave a lot to be desired in terms of implementation but that's not the fault of director general Amano or the agency for that matter it's the question of what kind of guidance the joint commission actually gives the director general of what happens on procurement and section T and so on that's one two we would have been ideal if the IEA would have been in position to be more transparent about implementation of for example the additional protocol and yet again he has his hands tied because the Iranians are not cooperating in a way that would actually reassure us about some implementations so I trust that the director general Amano about those issues and so on but what I'm trying to say is there are parts which are outside his hands and therefore we shouldn't hold him accountable for their performance and yet there is some things to be done but I think there is one area which is in the gray area if we confine ourselves to the nuclear stuff because I think Ambassador Tai talked about the non-nuclear stuff the nuclear stuff there is one component in the European and in agency the agency has been promoting the norms of good behavior in the nuclear energy domain convention of nuclear safety convention of physical protection of nuclear materials joint conventions on handling spent fuel liability conventions and so on and so forth early notifications where is Iran on those only Iran and North Korea stand out on those ones so I would have hoped that the director general in the context of anywhere from his personal capacity good offices capacity and so on would have been more supported in his efforts to bring the Iran into compliance with this and we would have at least been reassured that its nuclear energy program is less of a threat to the region and more covers more of the activities in Iran in the nuclear domain than it currently is Director General why don't I let him respond to that in the question of transparency as well yes transparency issue is quite misunderstood it is some obvious that we provided more information before the implementation day and less after the implementation day why the base is completely different before implementation day our activities were based on the former UN Security Council resolutions which stated that Iran is requested not to engage in enrichment activities for example but they were doing it if that is the case as the verification organization we have to inform the member states to which extent Iran is not implementing the Security Council resolutions so the basis was the former Security Council resolutions now after the 16th of January 2016 the basis of our activities are completely changed UN Security Council resolution 20 to 31 and it doesn't prohibit the enrichment activities by Iran what we were requested to monitor if that is 300 kilograms why not and we reported another thing you may have noticed that in the March report I provided more details compared to the previous report after the implementation day it has a reason because in December last year in January this year we were informed about the implications of the memorization documents from the Joint Commission and it gave more clarity and in light of that we could tell the details of the inventory of LEU that's the reason why the level of transparency changed before the implementation day and after the implementation day before and after the March report on top of that I have to tell you that the safeguard agreement stipulates very clearly we have to protect the confidential information we have to protect the information that we obtain through the activities of inspectors this rule applies to all the countries including Iran and comprehensive safeguard agreement and additional protocol are the agreement between state and IAEA we apply this agreement without discrimination without special favor either to Iran Ambassador Arteba you want to say something briefly I was going to make a comment based on Ali's comments which was I just want to offer this at the risk of it being provocative the view from the region Iran, a country on the U.S. is a list of state sponsors of terrorism negotiated a deal that lifts tens of billions of dollars of sanctions and continues to keep an enrichment program where a country like the UAE has negotiated a 1-2-3 agreement that voluntarily forgoes our right to enrich our right to reprocess and so if you're sitting where we're sitting a country that is largely unfriendly to the United States and the West has gotten a better deal than the country that puts its money in this country so I offer this as just a perspective of how the deal looks not on the technical merits but as friends and adversaries go and that's probably a message that the Trump administration is quite open to Baroness Ashton are you concerned about the possibility that the United States rather than just withdrawing from the deal having said, several candidates having said that they'd like to shred it apart that the U.S. government would rather ramp up sanctions on Iran for its non-nuclear behavior thereby potentially undermining the deal if Iran feels that that somehow violates the deal and would the EU, would Europe be on board with sanctions like that? I realize you don't speak for the EU but in your personal capacity that the Arab and keen analyst continued I think you know when the sanctions regime that's connected to the nuclear question is a very distinct set of sanctions and there have been great concerns about for example human rights issues in Iran that have led to action that certainly in the European Union has been taken so it is always possible to look at different areas and say we're going to do this based on this activity and we're going to take measures or sanctions or whatever on this activity as opposed to something else I think the question though underneath all of this is that this was a crafted agreement that involved a number of nations it's often I often think of it when you listen to reports of it as if it was a bilateral agreement and although I never ever ever underplay the role and importance of the United States of America in anything particularly not when I'm sitting in Washington it's also the case that without the other nations it wouldn't have happened because I can assure you coordinating what happened the role of each one at various times was absolutely vital to moving it forward and I take nothing away so the issue for me is that because this worked so appropriately with this group of countries and it belongs to each of them then whenever you think about what action to take on other issues I think it's a good idea if nothing else to at least be in conversation about what's happening and to think about the consequences but that mustn't be taken for as has been pointed out suddenly becoming a hostage to it because that's not and cannot be what it's about it doesn't mean because this particular issue was to an extent dealt with in an appropriate manner that somehow that takes away all the other problems and issues the US administration has already the new US administration has already imposed a number of sanctions additional sanctions for following Iran's ballistic missile test earlier this year Director General Amano are you worried that potential unilateral further US sanctions against Iran could undermine your work could undermine the deal normally I do not discuss other sanctions I don't say I support I don't support other sanctions because there's no word of sanction in the IAJ statute that's it we have inspected you I'm a bit legalistic but we send inspectors to the site for many years and we have been observing the situation but during the time when there was some very massive sanctions we have not observed any decrease of centrifuges number of centrifuges increased constantly and the activities and nuclear related activities some strengthening it was after President Rohani was elected that we started to hear the different rhetoric some different people appointed and we saw the substance so it would be helpful to consider if you introduce some sanctions what does it what impact will it have as far as nuclear issues are concerned we haven't seen our changes and we will not see changes Eli last question for you before we go to the audience what would Israel want to see from a Trump administration when it comes to curbing Iran's regional activities and how worried would you be that it could undermine the nuclear deal or does Israel not really does it not really matter to Israel if this deal collapses or not and what would come after let me I don't speak for the government but let me let me try and present the concerns as best as I understand them and the expectations based on those I think number one is to devise a framework that would reassure us about the long term that unless there is a fundamental change in Iran's attitude strategically and specifically in the nuclear domain that Iran won't be able to get within weeks of a bomb completely legitimately in whatever 8 to 10 years that's one huge concern I should add in brackets it doesn't necessarily require Iran's specific measures and Bazar Atayba had already implied that there are ways of going about it in terms of broader norms that he complies with that could also be relevant for checking the Iran problem and others and so on so I think that the others are complaining that it's the gold standard approximate the gold standard let's do a silver standard all right if you can't afford the gold standard so that's one looking at this component in terms of the long and reassuring us and given the diplomacy takes its time we have to start yesterday not wait until the deal actually expires and Iran will be able to do that's issue one issue two I think at the moment Israel is left in an unenviable situation where it has to do the interdiction itself and the Terence isn't really working in terms of preventing Iran from doing some of these experts and so on in providing the most destabilizing weapons systems to Syria and deploying them against Israel from Syria and handing them over to Hezbollah so the number two is do much more aggressive interdiction with the hope of actually dissuading Iran through the revolutionary guards and others from actually carrying those and I think in the regional interest it's not just to Syria and Lebanon but it's also what you do in Yemen and other places and so on so that's two third on sanctions let me venture a little bit out of my zone of comfort in terms of not speaking of for the government or not for the government and say the following is to see sanctions, not military attack but sanctions being applied more aggressive additional sanctions on non-nuclear behavior on non-nuclear behavior that shouldn't be on the face of it something that is ruled out just because of the deal just as the Baroness had implied I think I would love to see a serious debate in this country at the same time of relaxing sanctions on US companies I would like to see the Boeing deal go through I would like to see GM discriminated against, against Peugeot and so on or Caterpillar or McDonald's so in terms of impressing on the Iranian people that the US isn't after the Iran as such and freeze those things that are not going after the core of the issues of concern at the same time that you step up dramatically the sanctions you impose on the revolutionary guards and their highly provocative behavior as a way of also helping convince those in Iran that the US is actually going to be a partner if they change in a positive direction and that the dividends can be palpable for the people alright we're ready for questions from the audience there are microphones in the aisles on both sides of the if you could line up introduce yourselves and keep your questions short and if they're addressed to someone specific on the panel please say so as well I'll start on this side please Andrea Howard I'm in Ensign in the United States Navy studying at the University of Oxford the missing part of this conversation for me from the two level game perspective was the domestic effects on the Iranian population has the JCPOA with its sanctions released increased the threat potential of the IRGC which domestically shields the supreme leader and other nations and more specifically has it legitimized the current government which has been condemned for human rights abuses in total I guess has the JCPOA essentially crippled the potential for a more democratic Iranian future who would like to take that I mean Bernice Ashton I think that you made very clear that the deal was just meant to be a deal Eli you said that there were some hopes even though they were never expressed publicly by the Obama administration that the nuclear deal would help the moderates inside Iran the reformers gain more power we'll have to see whether they'll get any results when the elections take place in may but perhaps between the two of you you'd like to address this question Bernice Ashton yeah I mean so the deal is a deal but the point about when you could so four and a half years most of the beginning part of my work was with the Ahmadinejad regime and then we moved to Rahani and it was a very different a different set of behaviors and also the potential for getting an agreement became very real much quicker than you might have expected so there's no question that the the way that we hoped the deal would would work would be that it was a demonstration from the Iranian side that they were interested in moving their country forward in its relationships not just with the p5 plus 1 e3 plus 3 but actually and especially with the people of their immediate region in other words it was about them because they were willing to do this deal and they'd certainly not been in the previous regime that this perhaps was an indication that things were moving in a different way so exactly as I said that inherent in it is that if you if you have a negotiation with someone and they're willing to negotiate with you you like to think that part of that is because they're trying to move in the right direction so I don't think it was of itself an attempt to say oh it's become a more enlightened country will move forward but the nature of the fact that you could do an agreement was I think for all of us an indication that perhaps and it is a perhaps there was the potential to do more than that and of course this is about the regional implications and not so much the domestic implications this discussion is about the regional implications I mean not so much the domestic implications of the deal and that's why we haven't focused on that so much but Eli would you like to say something? Just very briefly to say the following Director General Mano has already said we've only been about a year and a half into this be patient beyond the nuclear domain so the jury is still out on the domestic domestic in terms of the domestic what we know for sure is that the hope for changing and restructuring of domestic Iran has not occurred not yet. Iran has not yet has not occurred to date Iran is facing catastrophic threats in terms of climate change desertification the fertile land is diminishing the water is getting polluted and so on their president President Rouhani says this is the existential threat of Iran the hope was that the freeing some of the international pressure and creating a more cooperative climate would actually allow Iran to restructure and reorient its priorities that has not happened we have elections coming up in May and we will find out whether the elections actually give more of a hope that this transformation will begin to happen thus far it hasn't and if you ask me it's much more important than Intel to say if they remain under the siege mentality the Supreme Leader wants to cultivate we know where they're going to be on the nuclear front in 80 years I would just in addition to that definitely keep your eye out on the next elections in May more importantly, keep your eye out on who becomes the next Supreme Leader that will be the key indicator of which direction Iran will go in the future towards a more moderate or more hardline level but that happens at an indeterminate time in the future question on this side please if you could keep it brief and let us know if you're addressing the question to someone specific on the panel Daryl Kimball Arms Control Association yes or no question for each of you is this JCPOA renegotiable or not in what context or under what conditions is can it be renegotiated and if not can it yes or no can it be renegotiated or not each one of you I'd like you to answer the question too theoretical but let's give it a try no it's not theoretical it's it depends on the circumstances but I'll let the panelists speak to the question answer the question I was not a negotiator and some I was not taken in the photo and some celebrated some country you would like to renegotiate that I was not in but I'm using common sense at least it took more than 10 years to reach agreement and it was a very difficult negotiation one of the most difficult negotiations so renegotiating a drastic renegotiation would be very difficult but this is a very technical agreement and just an example you have seen the memorization document specifying the details I think there are room for clarifying or improve on some part like how to deal with the heavy burden or area that is in excess so it is yes and no drastic renegotiation I don't think it is likely improvement further clarity yes I think it is possible I did the interim agreement so let me say something about from that point of view that the framework of the negotiation was set but as Dr Amano said within it there may be bits where you can go through the technical bit of what does that mean and that was certainly true in the interim agreement but if your question is could you just say we don't want that anymore as one party can we start again or can we reopen it I think that is quite difficult to imagine how you could do that I don't know you were in part of the negotiations although we were kept in the sort of in the loop you complained that you were kept in the door initially I would give a typical Israeli answer the answer is yes and no I think it is the theme of the answers to this question so I will try to build on some of those elements and so on on the one hand there are many working parts that could be that are already subject to negotiations within the joint commission and other places and so on as well as other instruments give you an example we haven't talked about the broader conclusion let's remind ourselves how important the broader conclusion is but how actually it is a time bound issue if the broader conclusion is enriched within eight years Iran is off the hook without the broader conclusion what would it take does that require negotiations of course it requires negotiations who would do it, is the IEA alone would it be the joint commission and its partners that actually encourage Iran and so on I'm not saying this again let's look at other cases of how many years it has taken the agency to produce it and I'm not saying this is a criticism I'm actually saying the agency is very methodical how it actually does it so there are many moving parts that are subject to negotiations and could ultimately produce a better deal that's on the one hand I'm not suggesting now wrecking it but at the same time I think we need to complement it by many elements you want to make a point I have a different view of yes broader conclusion is drawn in light of other comprehensive safeguard agreement and additional protocol these are the agreement between state and IEA and tomorrow there's no negotiation it is us to decide and we do not negotiating with other countries with counterpart when to when to draw on the conclusion it is my responsibility it is the agency's responsibility this is not a time bound issue 8 years as mentioned not as a timeline for drawing broader conclusion I cannot tell how many years it will take it will take a long time but it depends very much on the level of cooperation from Iran we will continue verification activities and we hope to come to the conclusion can I just ask you Ambassador Arteba because you were not part of the negotiations you didn't want to ask the yes or no but I do want to ask you about timelines and as I mentioned earlier we measure time very differently in the region for the director general 10, 15, 8 years, 25 years is a long time we do measure time differently in the region so are you in the UAE with your partners in the region already thinking beyond those 10, 15 years and how do you prepare for that that's one of our main concerns because it feels much closer to you if we were asked the question how do you strengthen the deal or how do you renegotiate the deal our answer would be let's focus on the aftermath let's focus on 8 years or 15 years that's for us where we see the risk is at the expiry of the deal when Iran can then reinvest in its new and improved enrichment technology there's less restrictions there's millions of billions of dollars and so to us the risk is what happens at the end for us that's how you would strengthen it I'm not a nuclear expert I've made that evidently clear to everybody at Carnegie before I was asked to come on the panel but I think that's how you make people feel secure or then we start getting into a conversation about well if Iran gets all the checks removed what happens when country X or country Y chooses to do a similar program with an enrichment cycle all right question on the other side please go ahead sir thank you I'm Andre Silverjoe and I am a U.S. Army Colonel retired and current member associate member of the Vietnam Clean Energy Association and former presidential partner for Obama my question is about whether you agree or do not agree with a statement publicly made by the President and he was asked in a press conference do you trust Iran his answer was no but I trust our ability to catch them if they cheat and I would like your degree of concurrence with President's statement Director General trust is a very scarce commodity in this regard and by nature we are inspected body and we trust but verify it means that trust is limited and everyone is operating under such circumstances thus the United States trust Iran trust the United States Iran trust IAA it is quite limited but I'm sure that the United States trust me anyone else does the region agree I trust in Director Amano's ability to catch or detect any cheating where I have a slightly lower level of confidence in what do we do when we detect that cheating what's the response do we go to more sanctions and risk the deal or do we look the other way because this deal is so important so I trust the ability to detect cheating I'm worried about the political consequences of it that's a very good point question on the other side hello my name is Adlan Margoev I'm a consultant at peer center based in Moscow the history of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program the deal was not possible at all whether they wanted to like Iran to stop enrichment or to curb all the nuclear program then in 10 years the parties managed to come to an agreement but it seems that after Iran fulfilled its obligations under JCPOA every country is eager to add up something to that JCPOA and say you have to change behavior you have to do this, that and that don't you think that this undermines significantly and undermines the sustainability of the JCPOA and in some a couple of years we will see a situation when no deal will be in place so we've talked a little bit about that during the conversation already whether people are hanging too much on to this deal Bernice Ashton do you think that that is still a concern today with the implementation or have people moved on and just accepted the deal as is I don't think we had the Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia in Washington last week and one of his advisors put out a statement saying Prince Mohammed bin Salman stressed how bad and very dangerous the nuclear deal is in the region which was a slightly strong statement to say the least about the countries and people who feel very strongly about what kind of agreement they would like to have seen and I used to talk about this in the negotiations with apologies to at least one member of the teams who heard me say this about a million times which was it's like a jigsaw puzzle in a sense that the picture that you have when you put the puzzle together you have to be clear about you have to be certain that what you've done is that picture that's between the pieces but the size of the pieces and the shape of the pieces can vary and so one puzzle that's created by one person may look different to the puzzle that's created by somebody else so one of the problems in any agreement is there are people who feel that the pieces were the wrong pieces were the wrong shape one piece was too big and one piece was too small a piece they particularly wanted to see happen didn't or wasn't done as completely but it is an agreement and the agreement as I've said in the end is about the picture that you see when it's done we hang all sorts of things onto all kinds of agreements because what we're trying to do as an international community is move everything forward the Iran agreement was not just of itself although I've said very clearly what it is on the can is what it is but it was also part of an effort to try and make our world more safe and secure and that means for the region especially that they've got to be confident in the future and one of the issues will be as people think now is that the time scales are very determined and very clear what happens next what happens if what happens after the elections you know it's not a case of doing this agreement then saying we've done that we can move on now to some other problem not a bit of it now what does that allow us maybe to do what does that give us an incentive to do what does that mean in terms of what we need to guard against for the future or what does that mean in terms of the relationships that have been built that just maybe can help take this forward and make the region a safer and more secure place that was what we intended to do it was nothing other than that can we make the world better and safer can this deal contribute in a very small way to that and is this diplomatic solution better than the alternatives to which I say yes just very briefly I think I take a different approach than Berenice Ashton I think the issue is was this deal transactional on the Iranian side or Iran really was undergoing a profound transformation in reassuring the international community not about its immediate intentions but it's about longer intentions it cannot be that the broader conclusion is subject to the IEA will make the final judgment but with Iran collaborates to facilitate that no well for the moment they are not so the issue we have in front of us is whether Iran is actually going under the current leadership or new leadership that emerges going to be more reassuring in a way that is more than transaction right thus far we haven't seen much evidence of this I hope they do this the deal was supposed to create the opportunity to do so and to ease some of the pressure and give us more time in which this transformational hasn't occurred sure the assumption that a lot of people make which I think is not necessarily accurate also is that a more if moderates or reformers in Iran have more power the countries foreign policy would automatically look different and we simply don't know that right as has been pointed out to me several times by people in the region direct to general I have read JCPOA many times of course and it is crystal clear for me that this agreement is about nuclear commitments made by Iran under this agreement and commitment of lifting nuclear related sanctions that is very very clear whether countries expect more wants to do more in other field liberty of countries and they can get into dialogue they can negotiate other things they can make joint commitment they can do everything now part by monitoring and verifying the nuclear related commitment by Iran we can contribute to create a better environment but this agreement is about nuclear issues over there please hi Marie Kierkegaard from Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the University of Tennessee so as a scientist I followed the technical aspects of the Iran deal very closely and I've heard the JCPOA referred to as the first example of true science based diplomacy with scientists from both sides playing a crucial role in the association so my question is directed primarily to Director General Amano and Various Ash I was wondering if you believe the JCPOA will serve as a model for future diplomatic negotiations in this manner Director General I think this is a quite important achievement in this case the United Nations specialized international organization like ours and major stakeholders then discharged played its role, discharged responsibilities and we come to the conclusion of JCPOA this will be the model for other issues that I don't know everything is different I rather hesitate to make a comparison to other issues but I can say this is a rare case in which diplomacy worked there are many other issues but even placing them under control under process is difficult but in this case we could reach agreement and it is being implemented and it is quite significant for me Various Ash, would you like to say a few words on that? I think most negotiations are sort of if you like standalone that you have particular group of people doing a particular thing in the case of the negotiations with Iran there were a lot of nuclear scientists and technical experts that we absolutely had to have because they were crucial to our understanding and certainty about what exactly it was was being discussed and also the implications of what was being offered and what was being requested so that was absolutely vital I do think it is interesting though that the Security Council role in it and the role of the permanent membership in this case with Germany added to it for me personally having to coordinate that for many years it felt like many years it was a really good example of a very collaborative approach and I think when you are looking at how best to try and resolve particular questions you might look at some of the examples of what negotiation groupings or tactics or strategies have actually worked but my personal view from negotiations I've done is that each one is very different requires very different people and there is a danger that if you think too broadly about what it is you're trying to do that you won't succeed anyway because it becomes too complicated and complex to try and resolve all of the many many issues that you would like to see on the table so it is also about clarity of what you're doing and more than anything it is knowing what your mandate says and what you do and knowing what it doesn't say and therefore what you don't try and do Thank you, we'll take the last two questions in one, one on this side Go ahead Dina Svendieri from King's College London so the nuclear deal doesn't cover Iran's missile program but obviously it's part of Iran's problematic behavior and while some Iranian officials have point blank refused to talk about it others have indicated a willingness to negotiate on some aspects of the program for example constraining Iran's ability to test missiles above a certain range so but for that they would require a more for more deal, they would want something in exchange for it, is this something that the panel thinks is possible and Ambassador Atiba is that something that you think would be acceptable to the region to give Iran more to get more back? And the question on this side and then we'll get the panel to answer all in one from Voice of America Persian TV this morning EU foreign policy chief Federico Mogherini said that he she believes that Iran is not walking away from the deal because they have invested so much especially with regards to political leadership and economy and she believes that they will stay with the deal also it's a common established belief among the experts that Iran cannot be trusted and my question is that in your belief can Iran be pushed further, do they give in to more pressure perhaps on their behavior or also toward renegotiating let's say the sunset close all right thank you so the two questions are connected Director General I might if I can start with you do you think that the Iranians are sticking to the deal will stay with it do you fear they might walk away at some point and then for the rest of the panelists if you want to start thinking about what more you can do to pressure Iran on its ballistic missile program and do they get something in return? I went to Tehran last year and I had a meeting with some President Rohani Vice President Salih and Foreign Minister Zareef I also had a meeting with Mr. Zareef in February in the margin of the Munich Security Conference and all of them kept on saying that they will not be the first to leave them their agreement and re-confirmed their commitment to the JCPOA however the IAEA is not analyzing the remarks but we are focusing on facts and we are focusing the amount verifying and monitoring the amount of LEU, heavy water and we keep on monitoring nuclear activities. So what is important for us, it is nice to have dialogue with them it is helpful but in the end the factual and impartial finding on the ground is most important and we are doing that. It's about verification. We've got about a minute left if I can ask each one of you to very briefly answer the question about further pressure when it comes to Iran's ballistic missile and whether it should get more in exchange for a green... I learned long, long ago to not comment on something that begins with some people in Iran say because that's got me into all kinds of trouble over the years so I'm not doing a theoretical question the answer is I don't Ambassador Arteba in the region would you like to see more pressure on Iran for its ballistic missile program and give them something else in return? If we're going to propose a notion of a negotiation on Iran's regional behavior I would not exclude it or keep it exclusive to just missile testing. There's a lot of aspects of Iran's behavior that is deeply problematic from supportive terrorist groups to arming of militias support for proxies so if we're going to sit down and have this conversation I would like to have the conversation revolve about everything about how Iran operates outside of its borders in our region so if we entertain the principle I would like to discuss everything and I put everything on the table and not just and would you be willing to give something in return? In theory yes but what is it that we have to offer we're not the ones who impose the sanctions we're the ones who enforce sanctions and so I don't think there's much in our toolkit to offer Iran that could be attractive to them but I think this is ultimately a negotiation about how we coexist together and again we're willing to have that conversation provided we see interest from the other side which so far we haven't seen Eli, last word I think there is a huge room for Iran to reassure others about its regional behavior in its nuclear program what would it take it would take pressure and incentives. I think it's pretty straightforward. The mixture of those will depend on what Iran is willing to put on the table. I think that the hold up for the moment is domestic political and strategic issues within Iran in terms of its willingness to do so and we should I think be willing to offer more but certainly demand a great deal more and threaten a great deal more if they don't do it. All right. Thank you very much to our wonderful panelists Director General Amano, Baroness Ashton Ambassador Oteba, Dr. Naveed please give them a round of applause but stay in your seats for a few closing words from Tobi Dalton from Carnegie Endowment for bringing us thank you for this conference he's going to bring us to a close for this first day of the session and don't forget the reception right after Tobi. Indeed the most dangerous position is between indeed the panelists and the food so without further ado thank you so much for being here today and staying throughout it's great to see so many people stick around for a fantastic discussion here we'll start again tomorrow morning breakfast at 7 o'clock side sessions at 7.30 and then the main sessions again at 9 o'clock with Senior Director from the National Security Council Chris Ford in conversation with Bob Einhorn that's at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning so please enjoy the reception and we'll see you again in the morning.