 A review and conclusion of Leviathan. A review and conclusion. From the contrariety of some of the natural faculties of the mind, one to another, as also of one passion to another, and from their reference to conversation, there has been an argument taken to infer an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civil duty. The severity of judgment, they say, makes men sensorious and inept to pardon the errors and infirmities of other men, and on the other side, celerity of fancy takes the thoughts less steady than is necessary to discern exactly between right and wrong. And in all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning is necessary, for without it the resolutions of men are rash and their sentences unjust, and yet if there be not powerful eloquence which precreareth attention and consent the effect of reason will be little. But these are contrary faculties, the former being grounded upon principles of truth, the other upon opinions already received true or false, and upon the passions and interests of men which are different and mutable. And amongst the passions, courage, by which I mean the contempt of wounds and violent death, inclineth men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the public peace, and timorousness many times disposed to the desertion of the public defence. Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the same person. And to consider the contrariety of men's opinions and manners in general, it is, they say, impossible to entertain a constant civil amity with all those with whom the business of the world constrains us to converse, which business consistseth almost in nothing else but a perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority. To which I answer that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities, for by education and discipline they may be, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment and fancy may have place in the same man, but by turns, at the end of which he ameth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks, and other times were raging abroad to gather straw, so also may the judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration, and the fancy at another time wandering about the world. So also reason and eloquence, though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet in the moral, may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the laws and fearing a public enemy, nor between abstaining from injury and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such inconsistence of human nature with civil duties, as some think. I have known clearness of judgment and largeness of fancy, strength of reason and graceful elocution, a courage for the war and a fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man, and that was my most noble and honoured friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin, who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civil war, in the public quarrel by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand. To the laws of nature declared in the fifteenth chapter I would have this added, that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace. For he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own body, cannot pretend of right of nature to destroy him by whose strength he is preserved. It is a manifest contradiction of himself, and though his law may be drawn by consequence from some of those that are already mentioned, yet the times required have it inculcated and remembered. And because I find by diverse English books lately printed that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of time it is that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror, nor what is conquest, nor how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his laws. Therefore for further satisfaction of men therein I say, the point of time wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror is that point wherein, having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by express words or by other sufficient sign, to be his subject. When it is that a man hath a liberty to submit, I have shown before in the end of the twenty-first chapter, namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former sovereign but that of an ordinary subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the enemy, for it is then that he hath no longer protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is everywhere, as a thing inevitable, notwithstanding it be an assistance to the enemy, esteemed lawful, a total submission, which is but an assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful. Besides, if a man consider that they submit, assist the enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their submission or composition an assistance, but rather a detriment to the enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a soldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power, as long as the old one keeps the field and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his armies or garrisons, for in this case he cannot complain of want of protection and means to live as a soldier. But when that also fails, a soldier may also seek his protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it, and may lawfully submit himself to his new master. And so much for the time when he may do it lawfully, if he will. If therefore he do it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true subject, for a contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken. By this also a man may understand when it is that men may be said to conquered, and in what the nature of conquest and the right of a conqueror consisteth, for this submission is it implied them all. Conquest is not the victory itself, but the acquisition, by victory, of a right over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain is overcome, but not conquered. He that is taken and put into prison or change is not conquered, though overcome, for he is still an enemy, and may save himself if he can. But he that upon promise of obedience hath his life and liberty allowed him, is then conquered and a subject, and not before. The Romans used to say that their general had pacified such a province, that is to say in English conquered it, and that the country was pacified by victory when the people of it had promised imperata fessere, that is, to do what the Roman people commanded them. This was to be conquered. But this promise may be either express or tacit, express by promise, tacit by other signs. As for example a man that hath not been called to make such an express promise, because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable. Yet if he live under their protection openly, he is understood to submit himself to the government. But if he live there secretly, he is liable to anything that may be done to a spy and enemy of the state. I say not he does any injustice, for acts of open hostility bear not that name, but that he may be justly put to death. Likewise if a man when his country is conquered be out of it, he is not conquered nor subject. But if at his return he submit to the government he is bound to obey it. So that conquest, to define it, is the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory, when right is acquired in the people's submission by which they contract with the victor, promising obedience for life and liberty. In the twenty-ninth chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the dissolutions of commonwealths, their imperfect generation, consisting in the want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power. For want thereof the civil sovereign is feigned to handle the sword of justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold. One reason, whereof, which I have not there mentioned is this, that they will all of them justify the war by which their power was at first gotten, and whereupon as they think their right dependedeth, and not on the possession. As if, for example, the right of the kings of England did depend on the goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, and upon their lineal and directest dissent from him, by which means there would perhaps be no tie of the subject's obedience to their sovereign at this day in all the world, wherein, whilst they needlessly think to justify themselves, they justify all the successful rebellions that ambition shall at any time raise against them and their successors. Therefore I put down, for one of the most effectual seeds of the death of any state, that the conquerors require not only a submission of the men's actions to them for the future, but also an approbation of all their actions past, when there is a scarce commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can unconsciously be justified. And because the name of tyranny signifyeth nothing more nor less than the name of sovereignty, be it in one or many men, saving that they that use the former word are understood to be angry with them they call tyrants. I think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny is a toleration of hatred to commonwealth in general, and another evil seed not differing much from the former. For to the justification of the cause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause of the conquered is for the most part necessary, but neither of them necessarily for the obligation of the conquered. And thus much have I thought to say fit upon the review of the first and second part of this discourse. In the thirty-fifth chapter I have sufficiently declared out of the scripture that in the commonwealth of the Jews God himself was made the sovereign, by pact with the people who were therefore called his peculiar people, to distinguish them from the rest of the world over whom God reigned not by their consent, but by his own power, and that in this kingdom Moses was God's lieutenant on earth, and that it was he that told them what laws God appointed them to be ruled by. But I have omitted to set down who were the officers appointed to do execution, especially in capital punishments, not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration as I find it since. We know that generally in all commonwealths the execution of corporeal punishments was either put upon the guards or other soldiers of the sovereign power, or given to those in whom want of means, contempt of honor, and hardness of heart concurred to make them sue for such an office. But amongst the Israelites it was a positive law of God their sovereign that he that was convicted of a capital crime should be stoned to death by the people, and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and after the witnesses then the rest of the people. This was a law that designed who were to be the executioners, but not that any one should throw a stone at him before conviction and sentence where the congregation was judge. The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded to execution, unless the fact were committed in the presence of the congregation itself, or inside of the lawful judges, for then there needed no other witnesses but the judges themselves. Nevertheless this manner of proceeding, being not thoroughly understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion that any man may kill another in some cases by a right of zeal, as if the executions done upon offenders in the kingdom of God in old time proceeded not from the sovereign command, but from the authority of private zeal, which if we consider the text that seemed to favor it is quite contrary. First, where the Levites fell upon the people that had made it worship the golden calf, and slew three thousand men of them, it was by the commandment of Moses from the mouth of God, as is manifest Exodus 3227. And when the son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God, they that heard it did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put him under custody, till God should give a sentence against him, as it appears in Leviticus 241112. Again when Phineas killed Zimri and Cosby, Numbers 256 and 7, it was not by right of private zeal. Their crime was committed in the side of the assembly, there needed no witness, the law was known, and he, the heir apparent to the sovereignty, and which is the principal point, the lawfulness of his act depended wholly upon a subsequent ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. And this presumption of a future ratification is sometimes necessary to the safety of a commonwealth, as in a sudden rebellion any man that can suppress it by his own power in the country where it begins, without express law or commission, may lawfully do it, and provide to have it ratified, or pardoned, whilst it is in doing, or after it is done. Also it is expressly said, whosoever shall kill the murderer shall kill him upon the word of witnesses, Ibid 3530, but witnesses suppose a formal judicature, and consequently condemn that pretense of Zeus Zolaterum. The law of Moses concerning him that entices idolatry, that is to say, in the kingdom of God to a renouncing of his intelligence, forbids to conceal him, and commands the accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first stone at him, Deuteronomy 138, but not to kill him before he be condemned. And the process against idolatry is exactly set down, for God there speaketh to the people, as judge, and commanded them, when a man is accused of idolatry to inquire diligently of the fact, and finding it true, then to stone him, but still the hand of the witness throweth the first stone. Ibid 1745 and 6. This is not private zeal, but public condemnation. In like manner, when a father hath a rebellious son, the law is that he shall bring him before the judges of the town, and all the people of the town shall stone him. Ibid 2118 through 21. Lastly by pretense of these laws it was that St. Stephen was stoned, and not by pretense of private zeal. For before he was carried away to execution he had pleaded his cause before the high priest. There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance executions by private zeal, which, being often times but a conjunction of ignorance and passion, is against both the justice and peace of a commonwealth. In the thirty-sixth chapter I have said that it is not declared in what manner God spoke supernaturally to Moses, not that he spoke to him sometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernatural voice as to other prophets, for the manner how he spoke to him from the mercy seat that is expressly set down in these words. From that time forward, when Moses entered into tabernacle of the congregation to speak with God, he heard a voice which spake unto him from over the mercy seat, which is over the ark of the testimony, from between the cherubim's he spake unto him. Numbers 789. But it is not declared in what consisted the preeminence of the manner of God speaking to Moses, above that of his speaking to other prophets, as to Samuel and to Abraham, to whom he also spoke by a voice, that is, by vision, unless the difference consists in the clearness of the vision, for face to face and mouth to mouth cannot be literally understood of the infiniteness and incomprehensibility of the divine nature. And as to the whole doctrine I cannot see yet, but the principles of it are true and proper, and the ratiosination solid. For I ground the civil rights of sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty of subjects, upon the known natural inclinations of mankind, and upon the articles of the law of nature, of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the power ecclesiastical of the same sovereigns, I ground it on such texts as are both evident in themselves and consonant to the scope of the whole scripture, and therefore, and persuaded, that he that shall read it with a purpose only to be informed shall be informed by it. But for those that by writing or public discourse or by their eminent actions have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not be so easily satisfied. For in such cases it is natural for men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading and to lose their attention in the search of objections, to that they had read before, of which, in a time wherein the interests of men are changed, seeing much of the doctrine, which serveth to establishing of a new government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old, there cannot choose but be very many. In that part, which treateth of a Christian commonwealth, there are some new doctrines which, it may be, in a state where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a subject without leave to divulge, as being a usurpation of the place of a teacher. But in this time that men call not only for peace, but also for truth, to offer such doctrines as I think true, and that manifestly tend to peace and loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet into liberation, is no more but to offer new wine, to be put into new castes, that both may be preserved together. And I suppose that then, when novelty can breed no trouble nor disorder in a state, men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of antiquity as to prefer ancient errors before new and well-proved truth. There is nothing I distrust more than my elocution, which nevertheless I am confident, accepting them as chances of the press, is not obscure. That I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators, and philosophers, contrary to the custom of late time, whether I have done well or ill in it, precedeth from my judgment, grounded on many reasons. For first, all truth of doctrine dependedeth either upon reason or upon scripture, both which give credit to many, but never receive it for many writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not a fact, but of right, wherein there is no place for witnesses. There is scarce any of those old writers that contradict this not, sometimes both himself and others, which makes their testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such opinions as are taken only upon credit of antiquity are not intrinsically the judgment of those that cite them, but words that pass like gaping from mouth to mouth. Fifthly, it is many times with a fraudulent design that men stick their corrupt doctrines with the clothes of other men's wit. Sixthly, I find not that the ancients they cite took it for an ornament to do the like with those that wrote before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of indigestion when Greek and Latin sentences unshued come up again as they used to do unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of ancient time that either have written truth perspicuously or set us in a better way to find it out ourselves, yet to the antiquity itself I think nothing do. For if we will reverence the age, the present is the oldest. If the antiquity of the writer, I am not sure that generally they to whom such honor is given, were more ancient when they wrote, than I am that I am writing. But if it be well considered, the praise of ancient authors precedes not from the reverence of the dead, but from the competition and mutual envy of the living. To conclude, there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in any that I wrote before of the same subject in Latin, as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the word of God or to good manners, or to the disturbance of the public tranquility. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed and more profitably taught in the universities, in case they also think so, whom the judgment of the same belongeth. For seeing the universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from whence the preachers in the gentry, drawing such water as they find, used to sprinkle the same, both from the pulpit and in their conversation upon the people, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the venom of heathen politicians, and from the incantation of deceiving spirits. And by that means the most men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a few discontented person in their purposes against the state, and be the less grieved with the contributions necessary for their peace and defense. And the governors themselves have the less cause to maintain at the common charge any greater army than is necessary to make good the public liberty against the invasions and encroachments of foreign enemies. And thus have I brought to an end by discourse of civil and ecclesiastical government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other design than to set before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience, of which the condition of human nature and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an invaluable observation. And though in the revolution of states there can be no very good constellation for truths of this nature to be borne under, as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect anew, yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the public judge of doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of public peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted speculation of bodies natural, wherein, if God give me health to finish it, I hope the novelty will as much please as in the doctrine of this artificial body it used to offend. For such truth as a poseth no man's profit nor pleasure is to all men welcome. The End of Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, Parts 3 and 4 by Thomas Hobbes.