 Today, we are going to discuss John Searle's philosophy of mind. John Searle advocates biological naturalism. According to Searle, mind is a biological phenomenon and it is caused by the neuro physiological processes of the brain. Now, look at John Searle's hypothesis that Searle is talking about. The hypothesis says mental phenomena are caused by brain processes and realized in the brain processes. The Searleian hypothesis I have mentioned with reference to Cartesian dualism when we discussed about Cartesian dualism and Searle's criticism to the Cartesian dualism. Now, does Searle commit some kind of a dualism when he makes this distinction that brain is the cause of consciousness? The brain is the cause of mind. The mental phenomena are being caused by certain brain processes. Does Searle make this assumption that mind is an epiphenomenon? Mind is not a reality as such. Does Searle's thesis suggest this? Now, from the hypothesis, we will also have some kind of an implication and that is Searle's notion of emergentism. Does Searle advocate emergentism when he says that mental is caused by brain processes or consciousness is caused by brain processes? Now, if such a theory can be discussed, I think we would have a separate discussion on Searle's concept of emergentism. But today, I will basically focus on what is this biological naturalism? What are the theoretical backgrounds on which biological naturalism is argued by Searle? And what are the main concepts which Searle finds are important for our discussion on theory of mind? Because as we have seen in the history of naturalism, there are various theories have been advocated, particularly right from the mind brain identity theories to functionalists and more recently the kind of theory which was advocated by Dennett and Fodor. Now, Fodor and Dennett are the champions of the computational theory of mind. Now, if we take their naturalistic hypothesis into consideration, then probably we will find that the Searle's naturalism is little different. So, the question is how does Searle's naturalism, particularly the biological naturalism is different from other forms of naturalism? That is one question. I think we need to analyze in this talk. Now, let us go to this hypothesis and try to understand why Searle is interested in biological naturalism? Why Searle calls is biological? The consciousness is biological. Now, biological naturalism suggests that as we have a stomach digestion relationship, stomach is a particular organism which is significant. So, to explain the digestive system or the process of digestion, similarly brain is a particular system which is very important and that would explain how consciousness works. So, without brain if we talk about consciousness that sounds quite illogical for Searle because so far as the neural science is concerned, neural science has proved that brain is an important organism and it is very vital and it is very significant for all of us to understand how this organism is functioning and causing consciousness. So, therefore, Searle gives this analogy to us that the digestive system is responsible for causing or processing food. Similarly, the brain is responsible for causing mental phenomena. So, that kind of things Searle is talking about. Searle also says that biology is specific to the study of life as physics talks about matter. Physics tries to explain the nature of matter. Similar way biology tries to explain the nature of life. So, Searle makes a very clear distinction between physical sciences, particularly the physics and biology. According to him, biology must deal with life and biology does deal with life. So, that kind of importance Searle gives to biology as the science of life. I mean how he differs? He differs in this way when we talk about other forms of naturalism or other naturalists who talk about the causal explanation of the consciousness. There is certainly a causal closure within which the other naturalism functions. So, Searle tries to differ a bit and look at life in a very specific way. Searle does not say that the human body is not constituted of certain material particles. He does talk about the notion of matter, but whenever he talks about consciousness and the emergence of consciousness or the evolution of consciousness, he talks about life and biology is the science to deal with life. So, there are two important theoretical presuppositions in biological naturalism argued by Searle. One is the atomic theory of matter and another is the evolutionary biology. When we talk about the atomic theory, he emphasizes that every material body is constituted of certain atomic particles and so also the human bodies are constituted of certain micro elements of the matter, made carbon or atom molecules etcetera. So, all these micro elements are causally constituted. So, that is one thing which Searle keeps in his background. The other one is about the evolutionary biology. Searle thinks that everything has evolved historically. So, human consciousness has evolved historically following the Darwinian theory of evolution. So, these are the two important points when one reads Searle's biological naturalism. That his naturalism is something does not exclusively emphasize on pure materialistic understanding of the matter or the life, rather he tries to look at life as an evolving phenomenon and how this evolving phenomenon has got very significant properties and those properties are irreversible to the biological or what you call the brain processes. So, why does Searle say that and what kind of thesis, what kind of explanation, explanatory frameworks Searle advocates to explain us that the consciousness though caused by brain processes are irreducible to brain processes. So, life as Searle's is something very significant. Like as Searle's is an evolutionary phenomenon is something very significant because every evolutionary phenomenon Searle has got some distinct properties and these distinct properties are irreducible properties. So, for as the lower level of properties are concerned. So, now we would look at Searle's thesis very closely what kinds of explanatory frameworks are provided to justify his hypothesis that is consciousness is being caused by brain processes and realized in brain processes. Now, it is evident. So, for the naturalistic standpoint is concerned that every philosopher of mind within the naturalistic framework argues that consciousness is caused by brain processes and we have seen extensively when we dealt with the mind brain identity theory particularly with reference to the place hypothesis. When one look at this hypothesis one may find that it is too simple, but it is not that simple. We need to also relate the first part with the second part that is the realization conditions. It is not that the brain is only causing mental states or causing consciousness, but it also has the condition to hold on to this immersed mental states. So, that kind of hypothesis is very unique when we compare it with other philosophers of mind those who talk about the naturalistic theory of mind. Now, the two aspects of this causal relationship is something very important to understand. One is the causal sufficiency another is the causal interrelationship and shall call it the principle of neurological sufficiency. Now, principle of neurological sufficiency suggest that x if you say let us say x is the brain and x is causing y the brain causes consciousness. This says the brain is neurologically sufficient to cause consciousness, but at the same time we also need to talk about what happens when consciousness is caused, what happens to those intentional states or mental states, what happens to them when they are caused. Because for Searle I mean when somebody reads his intentionality and I say in philosophy of mind published by Cambridge University Press in 1983 towards the end of the book Searle proposes this hypothesis, but it is very clearly explained when one reads the book the rediscovery of mind which is published by Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1992. This work suggests that brain causes intentional states. In intentionality Searle argues that intentional mental states are caused by brain processes. Now, in the later work that is the in the rediscovery of mind at the same time in mind brains and science we will find that Searle is talking about that how brain consciousness is caused by brain processes. So, what he means by this that whenever we talk about consciousness we also see that these intentional states are conscious mental states. So, he uses intentional states as conscious mental states. There will be no intentional mental states which are unconscious mental states, in principle they are conscious. So, now the brain has the mechanism to produce consciousness and it has also the mechanism in the sense that it is causally sufficient to hold on those produced mental state. So, that the mental states are realized this mental states gets realized within the function of the brain. So, when you say brain is causing mind or brain is causing consciousness then there is a kind of a bottom up causal relationship we find and this kind of causal relationship is also argued by the emergentist. As I mentioned when Searle says brain causing mind Searle is Searle committing to emergentism that will be understood if we little explicate the hypothesis. Now, let us look at one of the statements of Searle from the rediscovery of mind. Brain not only produce, but also sustains the conscious life. The regenerating process in the brain reveals the realization of mental states in the brain processes. So, you have a kind of a level where brain is causing consciousness and you have also a kind of a level where brain sustains those mental phenomena and we have also a level when we talk about brain realizes this mental phenomena. So, there are there are at least two levels in which you know one can locate this principle of neural sufficiency working. The one level you have the living brain and the living brain brain with life is causing mental states or consciousness and that would show some kind of a bottom up causal relationship. There is also a top down causal relationship it is called top down. Top down in the sense that whenever a particular mental state let us say M 1 is getting realized then it also now causally related to the brain. So, this kind of a realization say for example, I am feeling trusty. Now, if I quench my trust with glass of water then obviously my desire is getting realized in the sense that my desire is is being satisfied with you know a glass of water. So, so that satisfaction condition or the or the or the satisfaction which emerges from this process is showing a kind of a causal relationship that relationship coming from the mental states to the brain states. Now, when Sal talks about the realization of mental states the realization of mental states Sal also refers to this fact that there is no one to one realization rather mental states constitute some kind of a system or a network what he calls network. So, there is a network of mental states or what he says the network of intentional the network of intentional states. So, there are various kind of intentional states and it is those intentional states which are causally responsible for the satisfaction of a particular mental states. Whereas, my desire is satisfied my desire is satisfied and my desire is linked with other mental states. It is not that only one mental state you know is getting satisfied and it is it works in a one to one way, it is not that there are network of mental states and each one is connected with the other that is what is you know that is significant in the framework of Sal how a mental state is realized. So, that is to be kept in mind I will I will come back to the notion of intentional state or the network of intentional states little later when we will talk about intentionality, but let us assume that Sal is talking about two causal modalities. One is a kind of a bottom up causation and another is a kind of a top down causations. This is for our understanding Sal does not talk about bottom up and top down this is typically a kind of an emergentist concept of concepts used by Keem and many others. I am using for our better understanding to clarify that this hypothesis has got two levels of causality operating together. They may be operating simultaneously we do not know that, but theoretically if you try to explain their causal functions we need to look at it a very systematic way. This implication is very inevitable and look at the implication which I would like to draw to your attention. On these definitions consciousness is causally emergent property of the systems. It is an emergent feature of the certain systems of the neurons in the same way solidity and liquidity are emergent features of the system of molecules. According to Sal you have two levels of explanations and consciousness being an amosed phenomenon. You find that this is a kind of a level say level one and you have another level for level two. Now, this level is what is called a kind of lattice structure. This is a lattice structure where you have micro particles you have micro particles only. Now, these micro constituents certainly cause something that is it could be in the case of an illiquid material liquidity or what we call solidity. Now, this table particular table on which we are writing is as kind of solid material object. The solidity is a product of the micro constituents that are together they are causally bound together and in order to produce this effect called solidity. We find that whenever I keep my hand that the table will not fall. So, the table is so solidity that it will be able to rest my arm hold my arm. So, that kind of idea of a solidity Sal is talking about. So, solidity as a what he calls as a macro level phenomenon is different from the micro level phenomenon or what is there at the micro level or what is there at the lattice structure of the brain. So, every phenomenon has got this idea and according to a cell or according to any emergent test they will also hold on to this kind of analysis. So, there is a physical structure and this physical structure is responsible for causing mental network or the network of mental states and network of mental states will causally influence the physical state. So, that kind of analysis is very much present in the emergent test, but this is I think one of the implications which immediately draws our attention when one reads Sal's biological naturalism because this naturalism is advocated on the background of Darwin's evolutionary theory of biology and I as I said when we talk about evolution we cannot percate the hierarchies, hierarchies that we find in the natural things. You have animals, plants, insects, human beings, many beings with life. If life has evolved then you certainly have to maintain this hierarchy very strongly and Sal does maintain that hierarchy. Sal does say that human consciousness is something very specific to human life is different from animal life. So, that is very clear in Sal, but what is important here is this human being that when we talk about evolutionary theory of mind we need to also look at its implication. One of the implication is that it adheres to an emergentist thesis or it is supportive of this emergentist thesis. So, that kind of thing one has to look at. Does Sal advocate emergentism? The answer here is no. Sal's thesis does not advocate emergentism for an emergentist what precisely is the case that the mind is conceived as an as a whole constituted of various functions of the parts or the subsystems of the brain. Nevertheless the emergence of the whole is qualitatively different from the constituted parts that is very significant because when we say they are qualitatively different that is at the level of the lattice structure you have some kind of particles, micro particles and these micro particles are causally related with one another and their function is qualitatively different from the function of the mental states which are also related with one another. Maybe they are causally related with one another, but what kind of causality Sal is interested in? We need to talk about that in order to explain that Sal's thesis is different from other naturalist thesis, but Sal at least holds on to this thesis that mind is a part of the biological reality, mind is a part of the nature, it is not different from nature which is different from human nature. Sal defines emergence in this way that consciousness could cause things that could not be explained by the causal behavior of the neurons. The naive idea here is the consciousness gets squatted out by the behavior of the neurons in the brain, but once it has been squatted out then has a life of its own. Now this once consciousness is caused let us say once you have consciousness then you find that it has life of its own meaning thereby it is it can do all its function it is something very autonomous, it defines its own functions. So, that kind of life because life is a very important concept when one reads Sal's biological naturalism. Now he says once it is squatted out it has its own life meaning thereby it is independent of the brain processes. So, brain processes has no control as if brain processes has no control, but if one relates to the hypothesis then one of course finds that brain is causing consciousness and there is also kind of a causal influence happening when they are being realized they are being realized. These two relationship processes going on all the time. So, but what is important is that no realization happens without the intervention of mind and mind for Sal is constituted of the network of mental states. So, the whole network of mental states constitutes mind. So, what is mind? Mind is constituted of the entire intentional states that is mind and so if we look at Sal's this definition then we would like to conclude that it does not commit to the kind of emergentism which we would probably think in the case of emergentist like Keem say for example, Keem is a critic of Sal's biological naturalism. Now, Keem argues that if property M that is mind emerges from the properties N 1 to N then M super wins on N 1 that is the brain. So, mind super wins on the brain. So, that is to say a system that are alike in the respect of the basal conditions must be alike in the respect of the emergent properties. So, the emergentist like Keem argues that that the mind is very much caused by the brain by talking about this causal relationship he finds that mind super wins mind is a super winning kind of a property or consciousness is a kind of super winning property. All the super winning properties are not causally sufficient to determine the relationship with the physical they are not causally sufficient. So, the physical of poor squashes mind, but mind only super wins I will think will have a exclusive discussion on Keem and Sal and other emergentists. But let us limit our discussion here with Keem's this definition because this definition is quite analogous to the kind of thesis which Sal is advocating. But so far the Sal's thesis is concerned Sal is not advocating emergentism because Sal does not hold this thesis that mind super wins on the physical or the mind super wins on the brain rather mind has certain unique properties mind has certain specific properties and these properties are erodecible properties. So, the erodecibility thesis which Sal holds is something very significant. Now, what are those properties which Sal considers are significant? One of these properties is intentionality. For Sal consciousness is intentional. So, the intentional state is intrinsically intentional. Intentionality is a property of consciousness. So, Keem also talks about erodecibility. So, what is the difference between Keem and Sal? So, we will locate this notion of a emergence in a in a separate class. What Sal argues when he talks about the two levels of explanations? One as I said the micro level of explanations and another as I said it is a kind of a micro level of explanations. The micro level refers to the lattice structure of a particular thing how a thing is constituted and the micro level we have a different kind of explanations where how things behaves with reality. Say for example, what is a tree? You have tree has its micro elements and tree as a as a as a being in the in the nature interacting with nature. So, that is that interaction the tree is an organism interacts intentionally with nature according to Sal. Trees, animals, insects all when they interact they interact intentionality they all possess intentionality because consciousness is intentional in principle it is intentional and all these when they interact with the universe as a living body it shows that intentionality is explicitly present in their behaviors. So, Sal holds on to the thesis that intentionality is intrinsic to the living beings the consciousness of the living beings and for all living beings are conscious beings. If we have this theory then when a living body interacts with the nature that interaction will talk about a kind of a micro level explanation of the behavior the behavior of the particular body when human interacts with the world or when humans are interacting with other human beings or other physical now living beings and then this interaction is macro level interaction and we need to give a macro level explanation to this interaction, but human beings as a living body is constituted of certain micro particles and those micro particles are significant so far as my living is concerned or the notion of living is concerned the biological capacities of the body power of the body. So, that is that will be that explanation will be about the micro level explanations. So, there are two levels of explanations and so far as science is concerned science only deals with the micro level explanations when the scientific community claims that consciousness is caused by brain processes and human mind can be explained scientifically they only refer to the micro level explanation. So, their emphasis is very clear, but we are not just human beings constituted of certain material particles we are much more than that. So, the we are not just you know a lump of physical material body, but we also behave, but we behave in our social world we have some values we interact with others our actions are rational. So, all this if you take into account the social understanding of the being is something very different something very unique and so emphasizes this aspect that we are more than the material stuff we as a human being are social beings and within a social form of life we interact with the other beings in a much different way that is qualitatively different from the kind of things which we find happening at the micro levels. So, this is you know Sal's emphasis on the notion of leveling. Now, what is consciousness? What does Sal mean by consciousness as I mentioned earlier? So, whenever he talks about the emergence of consciousness or consciousness is caused by brain processes he refers to the conscious mental states. Now, all these mental states are in principle conscious, but some of them as he says some of them are intentional not all are intentional only a few are intentional only a few are intentional. So, intentionality becomes intentionality becomes one of the properties of consciousness. So, also subjectivity and mental cautions. When Sal says there are few mental states which are conscious meaning thereby if I say I am conscious of what I am saying I am conscious that I am talking to you. So, I am conscious of this fact that I am lecturing. Now, if that is the case then I am I am only conscious of the few things what has been discussed in say in the theory of biological naturalism, but I am not conscious of many other things. So, that which I am not conscious of at present are though potentially conscious, but they are not intentional right now they are unconscious mental states. So, Sal does talk about unconscious mental states. So, there are unconscious mental states, there are mental states which are unconscious, but those unconscious mental states are potentially conscious. So, they are they are potentially intentional, they do possess intentionality they are potentially intentional, but the very fact that why I am not conscious of them right now makes this case very clear that there are some unconscious mental states and there are some conscious mental states. So, there is a hierarchy of mental states Sal would talk about hierarchy of mental states. So, for example, dream is one kind of a conscious state where which is distinctly you know different from when I am awake. So, for example, when I am walking or I am talking to you will be. So, consciousness with a lower intensity is if somebody is in a coma, if somebody talks about children who are say or infants of example, infants are not full-fledgedly conscious as we are animals, insects. Now, all these have lesser power. So, for the the conscious capacity is concerned, but the Sal's notion of consciousness is certainly not circular. As we find in the case of Descartes, now Sal tries to give a scientific account of consciousness. Hence, he wants to make a non-circular explanation of consciousness that is very clear in Sal. By non-circular he means that this hypothesis is based on certain scientific assumptions and these assumptions or presuppositions are very logical to explain how consciousness is caused by certain neural function of the brain. So, that is very very clear in Sal. So, otherwise if Sal says that properties like intentionality, subjectivity, etcetera are irreducible properties. They are unique properties and these properties cannot be explained with reference to the lower level cases. Now, if they cannot be explained with reference to the lower structure of the brain processes, then is it the case that Sal is committing some kind of a Cartesian dualism? One has to look at this thesis in this way and how far Sal is not a dualist or is Sal a dualist? If Sal is not a Cartesian dualist, then what kind of dualism he is arguing? So, those things I think we need to look at when we talk about Sal's thesis of irreducibility, but when I say that Sal is giving the kind of a non-circular account of consciousness, we need to understand that Sal is trying to avoid this kind of terminologies concepts which are used in Cartesian theory of mind. The terms like conscience, self-consciousness, etcetera are problematic for Sal. Sal will not use this to talk about consciousness because that gives an enough impression of circularity. If I say I am conscious of myself, my self is in principle conscious and I am conscious of that. So, this analysis is a kind of a circular analysis because I, which is the self, self is in principle conscious and that self is conscious of the self. So, this analysis is something now problematic and Sal tries to avoid this. And Sal says we are again and again committing to ontological dualism because we have used this kind of vocabulary in our theoretical framework and I have mentioned it when I was talking about Sal's criticism against Descartes dualism. So, we need to little carefully look at how does Sal explain this thesis of irreducibility and why intentionality is an irreducible property and what is intentionality plan? Intentionality for Sal is a intrinsic property. It is intrinsic because it is logistically associated with a consciousness and it is a mental state of consciousness. All our conscious states are intentional, they are about something, I have said they represent directedness, aboutness and mental states like desire, belief and intentions are in principle intentional because intentionality is involved in the very structure of the mental states. Now, intentionality as a concept was used by Brentana and later on it was theorized by Husser, Edmund Husser. Husser also argues that intentionality is a logical property of consciousness. All our conscious states or consciousness in principle is intentional that is Husserian phenomenology which suggests that intentionality is something very unique to human mind. Brentana's distinction between intentional and non-intentional makes it very clear that intentionality is something which means intentionality is a mental property or intentionality is a mental feature and it is that feature which makes the mind different from the body. So, that distinction is created by intentionality and Husser later on of course theorized it. Now, Sal's notion of intentionality is not a phenomenological account of intentionality, it is what I would call a naturalistic notion of intentionality, particularly a analytic theorization of intentionality. How does Sal theorize intentionality within its analytic framework? An analytic framework of theory of mind. So, that we need to locate when we will discuss what is intentionality and how intentionality is placed in nature. So, and what is subjectivity? How subjectivity and intentionality are related? What is mental causation? So, all these three important concepts are to be discussed in order to understand what is consciousness all about. We will have lectures on these topics and let me conclude here saying that Sal's biological naturalism gives an alternative theory of mind which is non-Cartesian theory of mind. Though biological naturalism talks about iridescibility theses that there are certain mental properties like intentionality, subjectivity, aspectuality etcetera or the mind say is not reducible to the brain processes. So, that is gives an impression that Sal is committing to dualism. Sal's hypothesis also gives an impression that as if he is committing to emergentism. So, we have tried to locate these two questions today that Sal is not an emergentist. So, with this I would conclude today's lecture and we will have a discussion on what is intentionality in the next class. Thank you.