Rating is available when the video has been rented.
This feature is not available right now. Please try again later.
Published on Nov 20, 2008
Game Theory (ECON 159)
We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others' choices. We use this idea to analyze taking a penalty kick in soccer. Then we use it to analyze a profit-sharing partnership. Toward the end, we introduce a new notion: Nash Equilibrium.
00:00 - Chapter 1. Best Response: Penalty Kicks in Soccer 15:14 - Chapter 2. Best Response: Issues with the Penalty Kick Model 24:06 - Chapter 3. Best Response: Formal Definition 29:59 - Chapter 4. Externalities and Inefficient Outcomes: The Partnership Game 01:07:23 - Chapter 5. Nash Equilibrium: Preview
Complete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.edu