 Mae'r ddweud y gweld cael ei gallu gweld, sy'n ymddych chi'n ddweud, daeth eich gweld yn ymddych chi'n gweld o'r economiaeth, ac yn ymddych chi'n ddim yn ym hyn. Y ddechrau yn ymwneud, byddwn yn yn ymddych chi'n gweithredu os ymddych chi o'r methau o'i ysgol, mae'r ddechrau yn ymddych chi'n ymddych chi o'r gweithredu ..y'r amser o'r ddweud. Felly, rydyn ni'n ddweud ymddangos. Felly, y gallwch yn ddweud o litr. Ymddangos o'r amser, rydyn ni'n gweithio'n gwybod... ..y'r amser o'r amser o'r ddweud o'r amser o'r gweithio... ..y'r amser o'r gweithio'n gweithio. Yn gyfnodd, dyma'r amser o archiologe. Felly, tebyg i diddoriaethar honno'r amser o'r amser o'r amser o ddweud o amser o'r amser o'r amser ope carry brandon... ..eg yma, ym explodingig, y dyma llaw The UK is not smiling at the特cek. Why in the name of God didn't you predict the economic crash of 2008? What are they there for? I won't pretend to be able to take on the economists on anything like that kind of level. What I would like to do if something else is... and also to compare it with what I know, which is not much about... about the origins of the particular English approach to it, or British I suppose. Now, the mistakes, Measai's, Hayek, Schumpeter, Mae'r rhaglen o'r cyfnodol yn ymddangos i'r llwyddoedd. Mae'n rhan o'r ddod o'r ddod o'r ddod o'r cyfnodol, ond yn ymddangos, Paul Krugman, yn y New York Times, oedd rhan o'r ddod o'r ddod o'r ddod o Joseph Stiglitz, oedd yn ymddangos i'r llwyddoedd o'r cyflwynt cyfnodol, oedd y Llywodraeth ymddangos i'r ddod o'r ddod o'r ddod o'r ddod, oedd yma yn y 1970 oedd yn ymddangos i'r ddod. felly mae'r iawn ond gofodd. The Austrians came into their own again in the 1980s when I think it's fair to say that you could sense, I won't call it civil war, but an atmosphere of crisis in this country where there was a military coup and where 20 people were being killed every day. There was a crisis in England. And it was a very bad time Ac mae'n meddwl i'w gweithio'n gwneud hynny yn y 1980. Prydddon ni'n feddwl bod ni'n meddwl i'r ysgrifennu. Yn y... Roeddb yn llwyddo i'r... Roeddwn yn ysgrifennu Llywodraeth Precaen, ond mae'n ffgwrdd yn ynnig gweithio, ysgrifennu. Ac rwy'n meddwl, mae'n meddwl i'r ddweud hynny, mae'n meddwl i'r ddweud hynny yn ysgrifennu i'r ddweud hynny, mae'n meddwl i ddweud hynny o'r Ysgol, Fylltwch Cwiym. Mae'n ysgol yma 1860. Mae'n ddigonio'r ysgol yma yma yma yma yma, mae'n ystod o'r cyfle. Mae'r fformillau efo'r cyflwyno oherwydd y cyflwyno blynydol o'r gweithio yma. Mae'n gweithio. Mae'n parlymu, ymgyrchau, mae'r banyddol, ac yn ymwneud. A dyna'r ffordd y Llyfrgell Llyfrgell yn ymdweud yma, yn y ffordd yma yn y 1870s, ac mae'r rhaglen yn ymdweud yn ymdweud yn ymdweud. Mae'n ddweud o'r ffordd yma, sy'n ddweud yma yn y ffordd yma, yn ymdweud yn ymdweud, yn ymdweud yn ymdweud, ac mae'n ddweud yn ymdweud. Ond, ddych chi'n mynd yn ymdweud, yn ym 1860s, ac yn ymdweud yn ym 1900s, mae'r rhaglen yn ymdweud, yn ymdweud, mae'n ddweud, yn ymdweud. Mae'n ddweud ymdweud yma, sy'n ddweud, mae'n ddweud, mae'n ddweud yma. Mae'r ddweud wedi'u ffrindwfyr. Mae'r ddweud yma, mae'r ddweud. Mae'r ddweud yn ymdweud, mae'n ddweud. Mae'r ddweud yn unig, iawn yn ymdweud, a dywedohol sydd yn 48. Mae'r ddweud yma, mae'r tufeic yn ymdweud yn ymdweud. Mae'r tarn yw'r teulu, yna o'r hir. Mae'r tarn dda'u tarn. The little girl is fed two very large bottles of whiskeys, and the door is slammed. Half the tooth came off, so she was given another couple of whiskeys. And they dug the tooth out with the sort of thing that you take stones out of horses hooves. Now, a dental operation in 1900 is another case altogether because they have ether. And by the time my son was in the audience was going to the dentist, he regarded it just the same as having a haircut. Now that kind of progress multiplied everywhere, everywhere. You start off with horse and carts in 1860. Somebody's coming up with the principles of the jet engine in 1900. A Russian is coming up with the principles which will launch the Sputnik into space in 1903. That kind of thing. I don't need to ram this home. And it's a terrifically interesting time with bursts of progress everywhere. And that is the background to it. No, I don't want to sound unpatriotic. Really I don't. But you don't regard modern England. Scotland, where I'm from, is a little better. You don't regard modern England as a particularly efficient state. It has a ministry of death. It has a ministry of immobility. And it's, as Tony Daniels has said, we have achieved the unique feat of combining prosperity with discomfort. However, in the 1860s, this miracle period, England is at the top of everybody's mind. How do they do it? London, for instance, abolished cholera about 30 years before Hamburg did. It built the first elaborate underground railway, which was a very considerable engineering feat. When the Crystal Palace went up for that exhibition, it was more or less three weeks from idea to draft and then another couple of weeks before it got built. There's a wonderful book on this by Andrew Wilson. And England's the country people look at, and they say, how is it possible, constitution, and the key seems to be the adaptation of old institutions. For instance, the local government in England was run through the parish vestre, as it was called. Justice is not particularly... They didn't make a fuss about it too much. A local government in England, right up to 1914, consisted of a man with a booming voice and the sort of face that you want to measure the ipot in use of the square that I put in use for, and one secretary, and he runs the place, and they create places like Leeds and Glasgow. It's all done with, we call it privatisation, and it seemed to work remarkably well, and I think the same is true for the states, although I'm on territory, I don't really know there. England did seem to be the country which you had to imitate. My favourite Italian prime minister is a man called Agostino de Pretis, who dyed his beard white in order to look like Gladstone. So it was until, well, things changed a bit, and on the whole Germany became the model, but England seemed to operate on a principle of privatisation. Now, and if you look at English economics, I'm sorry, I keep using English as a shorthand, it's British, of course, and if you look at English economics, it's got a moral component to it. The Cambridge economics faculty was actually part of what was called the Faculty of Moral Sciences, and that's where Marshall came from. Now, the English state ran into troubles. It was a product of a unique period when England produced one-half of the world's trade, and of course, with France, most of the investment. It was a world which in nature couldn't last because the Germans, the Americans picked up and worked things better. And England, the state had to take things on, and the making of the English state was really Ireland. You know, the unique trick in English history is the abolition of the peasant. In 1900, 8% of the British population lived on the land. Compare that with France, 50, Italy, 60 and so on. And if you're not dealing with peasants, life is a lot easier if you're one way or another, not least with cheap food. But they ran into the problem of Ireland where the peasant problem was still there and the state had to do things. It had to move into more or less to force the big landowners to give up some of their land, that kind of thing. And by the time you reach 1911, the state is taking over things like pensions, unemployment insurance, all of which had been done quite successfully, privately before then. And the English state got a good reputation in, if you look at the official histories of the First World War, for instance, the way in which the English ran their war effort. It had far less inflation than anywhere else for a start. Then comes the second war. Then comes the big disaster. And this is something where I'm a bit critical of the Austrian school. The big disaster, the slump of the 1930s, when Keynes came up and said, in effect, I'm simplifying absurdly, that the state must come in, wave its wand, don't bother about inflationary finance, just get people working again. And in the Second World War, I can remember this as quite a small boy. We all thought that the British state had performed wonderfully. We were all together, we had won the war. Now that picture has been chipped away at, not least by Corelli Barnett in a very good book, pointing out just what went wrong with the state. And the fact is that a lot of the British war effort really came from America, even before America came into the war. And it worked. It worked quite well. And there's an illusion that the state can do things. So British economics abandoned the pre-Keynesian lines, if you want, Marshall, and took up all the economists in 1960, the Keynesians. And there is one point of this that I just do not understand. Round about 1960, the general idea was that the state would step in and abolish unemployment. There wasn't any unemployment. Everybody suddenly starts taking on debt. The Americans with Kennedy, England with the Macmillan government. Even Germany took on a tiny debt in 1964, probably as a manoeuvre to get rid of Adenauer. And quite why Keynes triumphed in the 1960s, a decade of stunning prosperity, is just something I find inexplicable. Now that ended badly in the 70s, inflation, stagnation, all that. So the Austrians, there's a kind of counter-attack with Margaret Thatcher and monetaries, this kind of thing. But it's curious that the English tradition in economics moved off in a Keynesian direction, whereas with the Austrians it's another matter. And I want to talk a bit now about what the background to this is. Central Europe is, I don't need to tell you, a powerhouse intellectually. I'm not so sure that you can claim it now, but in fact you couldn't. But both Britain and America were hit by great force by this wave of immigrants. Some, but by no means all. Of Jewish origin. And whatever you look into in Britain or America, you will find the presence of these Central Europeans. I mean, I've been around for a long time, so I knew some of them. And I think my prize goes to a man called Ernst Gombrich. I don't know if he's at all remembered. He wrote a stunningly good history of Western art. And he was a great globe-shaped figure with globe eyes. And I met him at something rather. I said, are you the son of the Gombrich who developed the iconographic tradition in art history? And he said, no, it was me. You could find people of this kind in any position of great. We've all profited enormously from them, of course. And that tradition of the education system, I've got my doubts about it. There were 40 economists associated with the Austrian school. There are two-thirds of the students in the Habsburg monarchy studied law. And if you study law in German, it is, oh, that is something. And so they have to go through that. Their range of references is formidable. They can look at things from a philosophical perspective. And they can also handle mathematics. So it wasn't all important to them. And that educational tradition with things that are right and things that are wrong is responsible for an awful lot of what happens. Now, the next thing is in the Habsburg monarchy is that the state did not work even in 1914. There's a famous book about it, what's his name, Musil, who said, this is a state which imitates itself. I'd start, does he sell by mit macht. And you were aware all the time of being in a kind of surrealist condition. In 1914, at a time when public employment was not common, certainly not in England. In Austria, 25% of people were employed by the state, which is an enormous figure for that time. There were more judges in the Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Bohemia in Prague than there were in the Supreme Court of the whole of the British Empire. And with this multiplication of public jobs, the whole business, everything becomes waterlogged. Taxes were three huge volumes, very thinly printed on both sides of paper. And you couldn't really find your way around it. I think in the states in Britain now it's not unlike that, is it? So in a sense, Austria presents the problem of the modern state in a way that we're now conscious of. And the Austrian economists, as they come up, really are looking for some way out of this terrible tangle that they are having to live with. Now, why did it develop like that? And here I might allude to something that Tony Daniels was talking about yesterday, the idea of rights. That's where monarchy was a complicated place. When they mobilized in 1914, the mobilization posters went up in 15 languages. And of these nationality disputes, the worst was the one between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia. The Slovene one in the borders of Italy also became poisonous, but not to that extent, and there were others. Now, I could wish that the European Union would look at the history of the Habsburg monarchy, because it is a terrible mistake in these circumstances to try to run anything by a central parliament. You can't do it. Up to about 1860, if the town council of a place like Budweis Budirovice met, there were Germans and there were Czechs. They knew each other. Some old Czech might speak broken German. He was allowed to address the thing in Czech and they would somehow informally work it out. And in 1860, a decisive moment came when the Habsburg monarchy ran out of money and it approached the bankers in Vienna for the Rothschilds, and they said it must be a precondition of help that you have a proper constitution. So they produced, first of all, the October diploma, which in effect decentralized everything. And the bankers said we're keeping our hands in our pockets. So a couple of months later, they produced a programme for a central parliament which is dominated by the German liberal element who thought they had the answer to everything, and they did. They knew about insurance, they could do tax law, they knew how to run a parliament, they would make terrifically good speeches, littered with literary illusions in Latin, and they thought very highly of themselves, which is one of their vast weaknesses. So Austria in the 1860s gets its central parliament, the Reichsrat. Now what happens? In the next 20 years there's a great boom of progress and the Czechs develop a middle class and they say we want education in Czech. We want a Czech university in Prague, they got one. There's a German university as well. And this is where the collective rights nonsense gets revealed. One third of the students in that German university were Czech because they wanted to get on in a language in which there are plenty of books to read and so on and so forth. And the result of all this centralisation on Vienna is that the nationality problems get transferred from places like Budweis to Vienna and the Czechs define themselves by nationality. Everybody else defines themselves by nationality. Everybody then starts hating everybody. And it's a test case of how you do not deal with problems of that sort. And I wish the European Union would learn it. I live in Hungary now and I just think what is the European Parliament doing voting sanctions against Viktor Orbán who's got the support of the vast majority of the Hungarian people. It's none of the European Parliament's business. And if at the end of it they create a great secessionist bloc in the European Parliament electing Viktor Orbán as president of Europe, they'll deserve it. Now if you're living in this kind of world, you're looking for some kind of formula which will get you away from the state which imitates itself with its absurd taxes and its unreformability and its terrible era of surrealism. And I think that's where the Austrian school comes in if I understand it. Mises biography is wonderful when you look at it. It's heroic. Now I will make one criticism of them that they're still right as if the slump hadn't happened. That is really high-ex weakness when you look into it is that he couldn't find a proper explanation for that. And they were not at home at all in a world in which there were world wars. The depression was caused by the problems of the first world war. That's obvious. And I think the Austrian school were rather at sea when it came to that sort of world. And I'll end up with something which I happen to know about because I lived in Turkey to some extent still do for decades. One of the finest moments in this country's history was when Attaturk changed the alphabet which meant we have a literate country. And the old university which was religious objected so he got it closed down and he opened up for business as it happens the first of the 30th of January 1933 when Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany and immediately a thousand of the best German academics came to, well not to, actually yes to Istanbul and Ankara. There were some wonderful characters among them. One of them was Ludwig von Mises' brother. Another was Wilhelm Lubke who can be called one of the makers of the German economic miracle after the war. It was in those days, I'll stop in a minute, it was in those days a precondition for teaching in a Turkish university that you should learn Turkish in three years and teaching it in five. Now it is a very difficult language and poor Ulrubka had a tenir. He just couldn't do it. So rather disconsolately went off to Geneva in 1939 and he bumped into Ludwig von Mises on the station platform. Now this, I don't want to be too critical but this is what's wrong with the Austrian school. Mises said to Ulrubka, if Copten and Bright had been able to sign the free trade treaty with Louis Napoleon's France in 1868, this war would not have happened. I praise the Austrian economists but there are limits. Thank you.