 It is really a great honor to be addressing the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. I'm particularly pleased to be speaking at this prominent center that hosts the Dr. John G. Memorial Lectures. Dr. G. made an extraordinary contribution to the chemical disarmament serving with distinction as the OPCW's first deputy director. He was a central figure in the organization's early life and his influence highlights the active role of Australia that has been played in the global efforts to eradicate chemical weapons. Australia was instrumental in accelerating and concluding the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992. Thanks to Australia's contribution, the treaty was adopted and opened for signature one year later in 1993. I also ensured that the chemical industry's voice was heard in those negotiations through the activity of Australia. Australia launched in Canberra in 1989 the Government Industry Conference on Chemical Weapons, seeking the industry's continued support for the Convention after it would enter into force. Outside the Convention's negotiation, Australia has made other substantial contributions to chemical weapons non-proliferation efforts. In 1988, it founded the Australia Group, an informal multilateral export control arrangement that aimed to prevent illegal trade and, in doing so, the proliferation of dangerous chemicals and related equipment. Today, Australia continues to be a key partner of the OPCW across a broad range of activities that contribute to the full and effective implementation of the Convention. In the current difficult global peace and security landscape, the support that Australia provides to the organization is essential for addressing the challenges we face. In recent years, we have witnessed significant reversals in arms control, with important multilateral instruments weakened or simply abrogated. The war in Ukraine has exacerbated this trend and impaled global peace and security. In particular, it has given rise to fears and threats of the use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. It should, however, be emphasized that both the Russian Federation and Ukraine are state parties to the Convention and have solemnly and voluntarily committed to never develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, transfer or use chemical weapons. It is a collective responsibility of the international community to make sure that chemical weapons never reemerge again, whatever the circumstances. We are now facing a difficult moment in this world of multilateralism and disarmament. Even though the norm against the use of chemical weapons has been recently put to the test, the taboo remains strong and universally supported. From a historical perspective, the stigma against chemical weapons has developed since more than a century. It wasn't until 1899 and 1907 during the Hague Peace Conferences that the international community was first able to formally limit their use. We must note those dates because it's roughly only 100 years ago. The 1899 and 1907 agreements, however, proved incapable of preventing the use of chemical weapons on an industrial scale during the First World War. The massive casualties, the suffering, the terror caused by this form of warfare highlighted the abhorrent and indiscriminate nature of chemical weapons. After the First World War, this momentum led to action. And in 1925, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was concluded under those pieces of the League of Nations. I should note, though, that the Geneva Protocol, which is still in force today, was not a comprehensive ban. It certainly prohibited the use of chemical weapons, but it was silent on their development, production, and stockpiling. Moreover, several states expressed reservations, allowing them to resort to using chemical weapons as a measure of retaliation if they suffered a chemical weapons attack. Nations, therefore, continued to research and manufacture increasingly, increasingly lethal chemical weapons and, of course, to employ them. In the post-Second World War period, efforts to address chemical weapons were primarily situated in the United Nations. But it was not until the 80s of the past century that negotiations in Geneva began in earnest. These deliberations, which took place in the 1980s at the Conference on Disarmament, were conducted in the shadow of a wide-scale chemical weapons use in the Iraq-Iran War. Public outcry at horrific chemical attacks against civilians in Aleppo, Iraq, in 1988, added urgency to the negotiations, but the emergent positions on the future of the Convention remained. Australia's initiative of introducing a proposed, complete treaty in 1992 proved to be decisive. It enabled the Conference on Disarmament to reach an agreement and adopt a text that was open for signature in Paris a few months later in 1993. Concluding the Convention was a major and unprecedented achievement for international disarmament diplomacy. Collective efforts and common political purpose had resulted in a complete ban against an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Further, the Convention instituted non-discriminatory stockpile destruction obligations and strict and effective international verification by the newly established organization called the OPCW. This meant that all states had committed to rid themselves of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Such a legal instrument was only possible through a strong commitment to multilateralism. Nations working together to overcome different points of view in a peaceful and constructive manner. Unfortunately, the 80s and 90s were a different world compared with what we have now. The immediate post-Cold War period was marked by optimism and a cooperative international environment that enabled multilateralism in the field of arms control to thrive. The situation today, however, is really very different as you all know. Against the background of ongoing serious risks to global peace and security, the remarkable record of achievements under the Chemical Weapon Convention stands out. 25 years of implementation have led to significant, measurable and lasting outcomes. Some of you may be familiar with the milestones we have achieved. The OPCW's membership has expanded rapidly from 65 countries when the treaty entered into force to 193 countries today. As a result, 98% of the world's population lives under its protection. In terms of eradication of stockpiles of warfare agents, we can be proud of the advancement into destruction. More than 99% of some 72,000 metric tons of declared chemical weapons, which means that more than 72,000 metric tons of the most dangerous chemicals have been verifiably destroyed. We expect to reach the goal of complete destruction of all declared chemical weapons next year, perhaps in September, when the United States, the last processor state, concludes its chemical demilitarization process, destroying the less than 1% of its remaining stockpile. In 2023, all declared chemical weapons will have been destroyed. It will be a great common success, but the magnitude of the task before us remains immense. We have to be realistic. Perhaps the worst is still to come. The organization will have an agenda that is not closed in 2023. This agenda will remain open in all likelihood forever. In Asia, substantial progress has also been made in destroying the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China during the Second World War. To date, more than 60,000 of more than 80,000 chemical weapons items declared as abandoned on China's territory have been destroyed under the OPCW's monitoring. Closed trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and the OPCW is ongoing to ensure that this project is conducted efficiently and safely. The Convention has also established one of the most stringent verification regimes. To date, 4,313 inspections to the chemical industry have been conducted, with the objective of providing the international community with assurances that toxic chemicals are not being diverted for malicious purposes. Trust in this verification system is further underpinned by a network of designated laboratories located in different countries. These what we call the designated laboratories are independent national facilities that are highly qualified to perform offsite analysis of chemical samples collected by the OPCW inspectors. The network of these laboratories has undergone an impressive growth from seven laboratories in 1998 to 29 laboratories in 21 member states today, including Australia's Defense Science and Technology Group. Beyond our activities in the examined and nonproliferation, the OPCW continues to support the peaceful uses of chemistry through practical programs that foster international cooperation. These include training in different fields and courses to enhance the skills of first responders in chemical emergencies response and management. They also aim at promoting economic and technological development within the chemical industry. These activities involve thousands of participants every year. Even though much of what we do is outside the public eye, these substantive contributions to global security have been recognized. In 2013, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for the task performed in the last years. We are facing now really difficult challenges because with the end of the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles nearing, the OPCW is deepening its focus on preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons. One of the most pressing issues is, in this regard, is the recent repeated use of these prohibited weapons. In the past years, the global norm against chemical weapons has been violated in several places. In Syria, in the Syrian Arab Republic, in the United Kingdom, in Russia, in Malaysia. Some of the most fragrant violations of the norm have occurred in the Syrian Arab Republic. This is the ninth year of the OPCW's activities related to the Syria's chemical weapons dossier. It began in 2013, when the organizations undertook the mission of overseeing the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program. In less than a year, from 2013 to 2014, the OPCW and the United Nations, along with support from 30 OPCW state parties and the European Union, verified the destruction in Syria of 1,300 tons. 103,000 tons of extremely dangerous weapons. Just a few days, years before, Syria had declared to the 1540 Committee that it had no chemical weapons at all. Regrettably, the destruction of Syria's declared chemical weapons did not conclude our work in that country. And chemical attacks have continued. The OPCW has acted in response to these violations and demanded Syria to redress its failure, to fully declare and destroy its stockpiles of chemical weapons agents that have not been declared. We have also responded to other incidents, such as the poisoning of Mr. Sergei Skripal and his daughter Julia in Salisbury, the United Kingdom, in 2018, and to the poisoning of Mr. Alexei Navalny in Tomsk, Russia, in 2020. In both cases, the OPCW provided technical assistance to the United Kingdom and to Germany to confirm the identity of the chemical warfare agents involved in those attacks. These incidents have drawn renewed attention to another issue that the OPCW has been dealing with, chemical terrorism. It is regrettable to say that the possibility that non-state actors might use chemical weapons has grown from a theoretical risk to a dark reality. It has also already been proven that the terrorist group ISIL used toxic chemicals produced by them in attacks in Iraq and Syria. The OPCW continues to address this use. And we have set up, I have set up, an open-ended working group on terrorism, as well as we have promoted the cooperation with other international organizations in this field, like the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism. This brings me to another matter, the rapid expansion and growth in sophistication of the international chemical industry. Unprecedented developments in the industry demands new measures regarding the management of hazardous chemicals over their life cycle, from production to consumption. Preventing such dangerous substances from being diverted into the wrong hands must therefore be our primary goal. And to achieve this outcome, expertise, knowledge, national isolation have to be developed in the state's parties as our first line of defense. Member states are responsible for enacting and enforcing national isolation and regulations in line with their respective constitutional processes. In this front, significant progress has been reached with 122 state's parties reporting that they have complete national isolation covering all the measures required by the convention. However, and this is very relevant, this leaves 36 state's parties which have legislation covering only some of these initial measures and 35 state's parties that have yet to report on any legislation at all, after 25 years of functioning of the organization. 35 state's parties have no national isolation. On this point, I would like to express my appreciation to Australia once again for its support of the OPCW in Asia Pacific region regarding treaty implementation. In fact, I have just attended a sub-regional forum in Brisbane on enhancing regional implementation in the Pacific. Advances in the chemical sciences have contributed immensely to the welfare and prosperity of humankind, but the possibilities of misuse as potential for great harm. It is imperative that the OPCW continues to keep up with the latest breakthroughs in science and technology that impact the convention. One of our primary vehicles in this effort has been the scientific advisory board of the organization. This is an international group called the Sub-Scientific Advisory Board, composed by 25 eminent scientists who report to the director general of the organization. Their role is to assess, report, and advise on relevant developments in science and technology. Australia has frequently been represented in this board. Notably, one of its former Australian members, Dr. Robert Matthews, received the OPCW award in 2014 for his outstanding service to chemical disarmament. To adapt the future advances in science is a big challenge, and the OPCW is constantly improving and updating its capacities. To make it certain, it can continue delivering. I like to say, because it is very necessary, that we have a very strong team of inspectors, around 70, people well prepared. But the update in their knowledge, skills, and expertise is crucial. And if we don't work seriously in this field, we will not be able to deliver in a very short period of time. And that's why we have been constructing what we call the OPCW Center for Chemistry and Technology, the ChemTech Center, which has been built outside the Hague in the Netherlands. And this center will be crucial. It will play an important integral role in this respect for training and knowledge in developing and research and investigation. The construction of the center will be completed in a few weeks time before the end of this year, 2022. This modern and unique facility, unique in the world, will bolster the organization's capabilities in chemical research, analysis, and training to support and reinforce the organization's verification regime. It will also facilitate the delivery of hands-on training programs related to the use of the state of the art equipment, modern techniques of laboratory analysis, chemical samples, detection, collection, and identification. This will benefit the experts from the state's parties as custom officials, first responders, law enforcement officials, et cetera. The center, which is very close to the headquarters of the organization in the Hague, has been fully financed with voluntary contributions from the member states, 54 member states, plus the European Union, and also several private donors have financed the center, including a significant donation from Australia. I'm very grateful to you, Australian authorities, for your engagement towards the center. Over the past 25 years, the OPCW has made a tangible contribution to international peace and security. During that time, the international security landscape has considerably evolved. In response, the OPCW has demonstrated that it is able to adapt, evolve, and remain fit for purpose. Success has not been achieved easily. It has been the result of what Australians refer to as a had, let me try to pronounce it, had jaha. As the OPCW looks to the next quarter century, we are fully aware that what has been gained cannot be taken for granted. The norm against chemical weapons has been violated. This is very well documented. Regrettably, it cannot be excluded that further violations will occur in the future. Therefore, all stakeholders, including all the member states, civil society, academia, and scientific community, must remain vigilant. We must all play our part in safeguarding the norm against the use of chemical weapons. We owe it to the victims of chemical weapons and to the humankind. I feel very much honoured to address you today. I don't need to underline because you know it. And I am very sensibly grateful for your kind attention. Thank you very much.