 On behalf of New America, thank you for joining us today. I think it's a very timely topic to have this discussion. So Matt's going to actually introduce us. So I'll just turn it to you, Matt. Thank you, Suzanne. And welcome, everyone. Thanks for being with us and for those watching online. Thanks for joining us today. My name is Matt Duss. I'm the president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace. And we're really, really pleased to be working with the New America Foundation. I'm glad that they could host this panel. I'm looking forward to the discussion very much. As Suzanne said, very timely. Trying to achieve a nuclear deal with Iran has been a key item in President Obama's foreign policy agenda, going back to when he was a candidate. I think it's important for a lot of reasons, but it also, I think, demonstrates and exemplifies some of the ideas and principles that he's brought to American foreign policy, working within a multilateral framework, advancing America's security through diplomacy, using all the tools in America's toolbox to advance America's security and the security of our partners. So with that, let me just give a brief introduction of our panelists. To my left is Alon Goldenberg. Alon is currently a senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. But prior to joining CNIS, Alon was the chief of staff to the special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at the US Department of State. Prior to that, from 2012 to 2013, Alon served as a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, covering Middle East issues for Chairman Kerry and Menendez. And then before that, from 2009 to 2012, Alon served as the special advisor on Middle East and then as the Iran team chief at the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. To Alon's left, Suzanne DiMaggio. She's a senior fellow and director of the Iran Initiative here at the New America Foundation, focusing on New America's growing body of national security work. Based in New York City, she leads a program on the future of US-Iran relations, looking at Iran in the context of the broader region, emphasizing ties to Gulf states, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other major players. Before that, Suzanne served as the vice president of global policy programs at the Asia Society, setting the strategic direction for the society's work in the policy arena. To Suzanne's left is Shlomo Brahm. Visiting fellow with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, where I worked until August. Shlomo's work focuses on US-Israel relations, Middle East security issues in the Iranian nuclear program, a former Brigadier General in the Israel Defense Forces. He's also a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. His most senior post in the IDF was the director of the strategic planning division in the planning branch of the general staff. So first, why don't I just go to Shlomo, because I think the title of this discussion is the US-Israel and the regional implications of an Iran nuclear deal. I think there's clearly been some tension and disagreements among the leadership, Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama and other members of their administrations over the Iran nuclear negotiations, the strategy, the approach, some of the concessions that I think Netanyahu has seen the P5 plus 1 have made, and he's criticized those. What did you make of the Israeli response to the extension of the JPOA? Thank you for letting me participate in this event. Basically, the United States and Israel are on the same page when it concerns the nuclear program of Iran. Neither of them want Iran to have military nuclear capabilities. And also on other aspects of Iranian policy and Iranian attitude, there is complete agreement between the two sides on opposition to the way Iran is giving support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, opposition to the dismal record of Iran in human rights, et cetera. And what the two states also share is hope that sometime it will be different, because I don't know if Americans are aware of that. But the basic Israel attitude to Iran is different from the attitude that Israel has to the Arab states. Because with the Arab states, we have a conflict since the establishment of the state of Israel. With Iran, we knew good times. And there is always the wish to return to these good times. And I can say that, for example, when Israel is considering different violent operations against Iran and its interests, there is always also the consideration, do we want to create a blood account with Iran? Well, we want to come back to a positive relationship. And because the two states are on the same page, through the years, there was a level of cooperation on this subject that was unprecedented. I can, for example, mention the cyber war that was waged against the Iranian nuclear program, the famous case of the Stuxnet war or virus or whatever. You can call it. Well, we, of course, do not know where the details. But generally, it is believed that that was the product of very close cooperation between the two states. Nevertheless, we often hear about friction between the Israeli government and between the United States administration around the Iranian nuclear program. And I will try to explain what are the sources of this friction. I will use the name of a book that once was very popular. I think it was very popular also here in the United States. It was called Manor from Merch and Wee Manor from Venus. And what I will say is Netanyahu, the current prime minister of Israel, is from Merch, and Obama is from Venus. There is a problem of building trust between these persons because they are so different. One of them in Israel is right-wing. His world view is composed mostly of threats that he is concerned of and less of hope that something would really happen sometime. And Obama is exactly the opposite. He is liberal, he is progressive, he is full of hope. He always talks of hopes. He always talks, yes, we can do it, et cetera, et cetera. While Netanyahu usually thinks about the things that we cannot do. So there is a problem to build trust and understand between these two people. But not only Netanyahu and Barack Obama are from Merch and from Venus. Israelis are, to some extent, from Merch, and Americans are from Venus. Also, I think most Israelis are more optimistic than Netanyahu is. There is also this tendency, A, to focus on threats, and B, to make the calculations that bring about development of policies based on worst-case analysis. And the case of Iran is typical. Iran with the nuclear weapons is an existential threat to Israel in the sense that nuclear weapons can destroy the state of Israel. Of course, they can destroy also Iran. And that can be a basis to some possibility of leaving with the nuclear bomb. But it's very difficult for Israelis to consider that. And because of that, Israelis want to be completely certain that once an agreement is reached, Iran will not be capable of making further progress with the military aspects of its nuclear program. And here, there is a strong disagreement between Israel and the United States. Because the current negotiations of the United States are based on the premise that what the United States want to achieve is to lengthen the breakout time, namely, the time that it takes for Iran from the decision to go now quickly to nuclear weapons until they get the first nuclear weapon, to lengthen this period from few months, which is the situation now, to at least two years, possibly more. And the declared policy of Israel, because they want to move the West toward this place, is that Iran should not have enrichment capability at all, which means even more than two years of breakout time. While the premise of the present negotiations is that what the P5 plus 1 want to achieve is a breakout time of one year. So what it means is that even, of course, it will be coupled with very thorough monitoring and verification arrangements that will enable uncovering that that's what Iran is starting to do, and then doing something to prevent it. Now, that means that even if there will be an agreement, Israel will say that it's a bad agreement. But then the real question, now I am getting to the Israeli reaction to the extension of the interim agreement, is what Israel will do when it will happen? Because saying that it is a bad agreement and saying something that will not be so nice about the US administration and President Obama, well, they are already used to it. But the question is whether Israel will do some sick substitution. So I think what we can learn from the Israeli extension example that the initial Israeli response to the agreement was extremely negative. I don't know if you remember that. But Prime Minister Netanyahu presented it as something like the worst agreement since the Munich agreement and the disaster and so on. And that was based on this kind of worst case analysis, on the assumption that because of that, the sanctioned regime will collapse. Iran will cheat, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Neither of these things happened. Sanctioned regime did not collapse. In my opinion, eventually Iran got of the sanctions that were lifted basically less than it hoped for because of different reasons. I don't want to elaborate too much. And Iran didn't cheat. It complied very well with the intering agreement. So what happened, actually, is that the Iranian nuclear program for the first time for, I think, more than eight years, nine years, something like that, was frozen. And even rolled back a little bit. And because of that, the attitude of Israel changed completely at the end of these nine months. And now not only that Israel didn't think that it is a bad agreement, the intering agreement, but actually the Israelis were asking the US administration to extend it as the preferred option. And my feeling is that something very similar will happen with an agreement. The initial approach will be very negative. But that does mean that Israel will do something because it's difficult for me to imagine that an Israeli government, an Israeli government will, for example, initiate a military operation against the Iranian nuclear program when all its allies, actually the international communities, concluded an agreement with Iran. It is unthinkable. And I am not so sad then also that Netanyahu will use what is think is leveraged through the US Congress, the Jewish lobby, et cetera. Because I think that after the conclusion of an agreement, first of all, when you check it, technically, it's very difficult for the Congress to prevent the administration from complying with the agreement because of the authorities that the president is. And I don't think that from the point of view of Mr. Netanyahu, assuming that he will be the prime minister and that will be my last point, it will be worth the cost of another conflict with the US administration. Now we are going to election. My last point is what can be the implications of elections. I would say that through the time of the campaign until March next year, we can expect more rhetorics. Because at least for Prime Minister Netanyahu and the right wing, from their point of view, their force lies in the belief of the Israeli public that they are good in security. So they have all the time to project this image of being tough, being resolute, et cetera. So they will say very tough things, including threatening again attack of the Iranian nuclear program. But I don't think it would be more than that. Then the elections will come. And this time the elections are very, very interesting because everything is open. The status of Israeli public opinion currently and the political map that we are having that is extremely fragmented, leaves place for all possibilities. So this time it's not a done deal. There was an inclination in all the recent election to say, well, there is a drift to the right in Israel public opinion. So we know who will be the Prime Minister at the end, Mr. Netanyahu. Not this time. The opposition to Mr. Netanyahu is very strong. It's popularity. And the way that the public sees the question, is he fit to be the Prime Minister? Or are there better candidates? Now he's doing much worse than he did in the past. So we can expect surprises. And also very strange bad fellows because of the personal, I would say, hostility of a large number of the different politicians that can be political, can be candidates to be in a Netanyahu government towards Netanyahu. Suzanne, I think go to you. You recently returned from Oslo, where you took part in a series of Track 2 discussions that included Iranian partners. Just I'm curious if you could share with us what you got from them with regard to their perspective on the deal, some of the key sticking points. How they see, in particular, Congress and the way Congress has talked about and operated, pushing for more sanctions, how that registers with the Iranians you spoke to. Well, I think first and foremost, I think the Iranians are feeling quite confident. They feel that they have demonstrated over the past year that they could abide by the interim agreement. And they've done that. The IAEA has confirmed it. As Shlomo said, not only have they made some significant changes to their program, but clearly they have done a lot to open their program to inspections. And now with this extension, they are doing even more. So with this new extension, they now are allowing IAEA to come in twice as often. And beyond that, also to make SNAP inspections. So now the IAEA can come in basically at will. And this really addresses concerns on sneak out more than breakout, but any covert activities, getting heads up on that. So they feel that they have proven that they can be a reliable partner in any deal. And I think to borrow Shlomo's words, Israel is on the same page, ultimately as the US on this issue, because at the end of the day, they don't want Iran to have a nuclear capacity, nuclear weapons capacity. The same can be said for our allies in the Gulf region, our Arab allies as well. They are very concerned more about whether or not the administration can deliver on what they want in exchange for all they are willing to do. What we heard was a great concern, especially after the election, of whether or not the Obama administration can deliver on sanctions relief. They were also quite concerned that if they entered in a comprehensive agreement now with this president, would the next president abide by that agreement? I think that's something that they're thinking about. They're very concerned that some of the things that they may agree to in a comprehensive agreement, they call it things that are irreversible. I think that's stretching it a bit. But let's take, for example, the Arak facility, the plutonium facility in Arak. One of the things they have put forward is the notion of removing its core, which falls short of what the US wants. The US actually wants it converted to a light water reactor. But the Iranians say if they do that, in order to reverse that, it would take a good three years. So they consider that sort of an irreversible thing. Meanwhile, they know that the Congress here will not agree to lifting sanctions. The best they can get with this comprehensive deal at the beginning is a presidential waivers on the sanctions. So they're sophisticated enough to know how this town operates and how Congress works. But they're also quite concerned that they're entering into an agreement where they're going to be on shaky ground. And to a certain extent, I can understand that. But on the flip side is they have, you know, wasn't until 2003 or so. They didn't come clean about their program. They've cheated in the interim. So the onus is on them, I think, to carry the burden. I think that's how this town certainly feels about it. Beyond that, I mean, you can't have a conversation with Iranians purely about the nuclear issue anymore, given what's happening in the Middle East and the turmoil there. So the discussion quickly also turns to Daesh, ISIL, also the civil war in Syria, and even Afghanistan, a lot of concern about what's happening there. We can talk about those issues more in Q&A. But I think it's becoming more difficult to think about the nuclear issue as separate from all of these other dimensions, especially now when we look at Iraq. Essentially, the US and Iran are conducting military activities in the same theater now against the same enemy. That holds a lot of implications. That's one more. I think one of the significant things we saw after the election of Rouhani was the very strong signal from the supreme leader of support for the negotiations and signals to more hardline elements that just to give them political space and support. Is that ongoing? Do they feel that that is still, or is that shaky, or what's the situation? No, I think they feel even more so that the leader, even just most recently, I mean, he had some harsh words to say after the extension, but essentially through his support behind it. The other thing is, if you look at the many facets of the Iranian decision-making system, he has really cast a overall kind of mind-meld of discipline on the system where they're all coming forward in support of these talks, whether it's the Larjani brothers or Mr. Jalili or other parts of the more conservative elements. Now, looking ahead, if things start going wrong, and if, for example, new sanctions come forward out of Congress, then the Iranians turn to different scenarios where, depending on the level of those sanctions, they would feel compelled to ramp up their nuclear enrichment capacity. They may not let the IAEA have as much access as they're having now. They probably wouldn't kick them out, but they'll really limit that. And if things got really bad, then, of course, they would have contingencies in place to undermine our interests in the broader region. But I think the basic thing is that it's clear that the interim agreement, the expansion of direct bilateral relations with the US and the process of this negotiation have empowered the more moderate elements of the political system, Rouhani and Zarif and others, Shankhani and others. And they make it very clear that without a deal and a good deal for them that the radicals, the conservatives, would gain more of an upper hand. And I don't think that's just talk. We saw that happen when this same team, in 10 years ago, tried to do this, and when they failed, what happened to them being very marginalized. So I think there's some truth in that. You bring a particular perspective, having seen this issue from a number of different points, first from the Pentagon, then over the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and then most recently at state. When you look at the sweep of President Obama's Iran policy, what are some of the things that jump out at you and some of the themes that you've seen? Well, I think, if you like it, I'd like to talk a little bit about how the president is, how, really, from a US policymaker perspective, how we've been handling the relationship with Israel and also the relationship with the region in the context of these nuclear negotiations. And in Israel, I agree very much with Shlomo. I think part of this really is it's about the Netanyahu-Obama relationship. But it's also, there is something bigger here. That's something bigger comes down to the fact that we are strategic partners. We do work together. We do see the same threats. But the reality is the United States is a country of 300 million people surrounded by two oceans. And Israel is a country of 8 million people in the middle of what everybody calls cliche, a very tough neighborhood. And so they see the threat differently than we do. Now, how does the United States address that? Traditionally, how we've addressed that is through a combination really of reassurance and also some quiet discouragement of things that we wouldn't like to see. And I think that worked really well from 2009 to 2012. This reassurance, it comes in a number of different forms. It comes in arms sales and things like Iron Dome. And it comes in very intensive strategic dialogue, both at the military and intel professional level and also at the very highest levels of our government. Where we really just, we talk about our assumptions, we sort of unpack a lot of these things. We do it in a way that is incredibly transparent. So that both sides, so that the Israelis, they're never gonna be exactly on the same page as us because they're from ours and we're from Venus. But we can get really close. And that's what we've done. And actually when it works well, as it did, I think, from 2009 to 2012, there's actually a useful role for the Israelis to play in being a little bit further out there. I think it played very much to our advantage to have the Israelis out there in 2011 and 2010, essentially threatening military action, incredibly, I think, threatening military action in terms of what it drove the international community to think about, in terms of the sanctions that it did drive in terms of the pressure that it then ended up putting on Iran, which has gotten us to this point. But I think we've had a bit of a divergence here since 2013, since the agreement on the JPOA. And I think it really comes down to two things. The first is, I think the way the agreement was announced and signed was very important. We had this moment of transparency or we had this very long history of transparency, but we did have this moment where the United States pursued this very secret channel with the Omanis. The Israelis weren't exactly aware of. They weren't really fully aware of the deal. And when that deal came out, Netanyahu had this very extreme initial reaction. And quite frankly, I think he has walked back from that to a great degree, at least internally, and in terms of the Israeli analysis, as Shlomo lined out. But you can't politically walk away from something like that. As a politician, you can't come out and say, bad deal, bad deal, worst deal ever. And then in the public domain, start to walk away from that. So he's continued to be out there. It's still the moment that defines the JPOA in the Israeli public mind and agree to a great extent. The other thing is, I do think there's a bit of a disagreement on tactics right now, where the Israelis I think would have preferred to see the sanctions stay in place longer, to not see the JPOA, and to essentially not see this breakthrough in negotiations, because they thought that if we had waited longer, the pressure would have built more and we would get a better deal. I don't necessarily agree with that analysis. The United States doesn't agree with that analysis. We've had a historic breakthrough for the first time in 10 years. We've frozen the nuclear program and we have an opportunity for a negotiation. But this is a difference that we now have with the Israelis that we didn't have for the previous few years before that. And so how you manage it, I think the best way for the United States to manage it is, again, primarily through these very quiet, intimate conversations where we try to explain to the Israelis where we're coming from, through a combination of armed sales and not offensive weapons, but defensive weapons and things that can really help reassure the Israelis. And also just sometimes listening and understanding matters. If someone went back to, Israelis are from Mars, Americans are from Venus, men are from Mars, women are from Venus. Part of how you communicate is you just listen to the other side and you understand it. And I think sometimes, as American policymakers, we need to be a little more patient and do more of that. The Israelis, I also have a recommendation on this, which is you gotta keep working it through the administration, you gotta keep working it through the White House, you gotta keep working it through these quiet discussions. Because trying to go to the Hill and trying to sort of undercut this policy by trying to get more sanctions from Congress just really undermines trust. I think it's very bad for the relationship. And it's very bad for the fundamental workings between the White House and the Prime Minister's office. So I think that that is, I know why the Israelis have sort of moved in that direction because we do have this rift. But it doesn't really work for them. And you can tell with the election coming up that there's a lot of parties in Israel that don't necessarily agree with this approach. I mean, Buzzi Herzog was here last week, leader of the opposition, and he outlined a very different policy on Iran. One that talked about the United States and Israel sitting down together and talking about what the breakout time should be, as opposed to one where there is no breakout time and there is no nuclear program, which I think the United States considers unrealistic. And so I think there is a possibility where we'll be able to work together with a new Israeli government. If there is a new Israeli government on that, if not, then I think there's ways to continue to work with Netanyahu to manage this. On the regional, I'll just touch very briefly on the regional question too, in terms of the Saudis and especially the Saudis, but the Gulf States overall, I think they see things very differently than Israel does. I mean, so we have a different management issue there. It's less about the nuclear program. It's more about regional competition. And this is where I get a little anxious when thinking a lot lately about, okay, how does the U.S.-Iran relationship change in the event of an agreement? And how does this new ISIS threat change how we work with the Iranians? I would actually argue that we need to be very careful as we think through that. There's some real opportunities. I think first of all, actually the nuclear program should be our first, second, and third priority. I think ultimately, I know that ISIS is an issue for us but it's actually a bigger problem for the Iranians and we cannot give them the impression that they can get on the nuclear program by giving on ISIS because I don't think that that's not in our interest. I think we care more about the nuclear program. Two is I think there's some remarkable opportunities for cooperation with Iranians, especially just in terms of basic communication. I'll tell you, working this issue in the government for a number of years, if we wanted to communicate a message to the Iranians, 90% of the discussion wasn't what, it was how, and the answers were all really bad. Through this intermediary, through that telephone, by the time the message gets there, it's done. The fact that we actually have senior American officials and the Secretary of State, speaking regularly with his Iranian counterpart, is potentially the single biggest breakthrough in terms of their relationship as opposed to any particular issue or any piece of cooperation. In the aftermath of a deal, what you really need to do is think about ways, and even now, think about ways to expand the communication across all levels. That's actually the single most important thing. You know, on ISIS, I would actually argue, we have to be very careful and not start there, because I think that in the aftermath of a deal, the Saudis are gonna be very concerned that we're about to sell out their interests in the region and those are the Emiratis and others, and the last thing, and we need them, we need them for ISIS, and the last thing that they're gonna wanna see is suddenly this perception that we're going really tight with the Iranians. But there are other areas for cooperation. Afghanistan, where we have a lot of common interests with the Iranians and where they supported the Northern Alliance, we're helpful in 2001, and I think we'll continue to be helpful in things like counter-narcotics. And maritime security, where I think we have a lot of interest in counter-piracy that are joint, we have interest in making sure we have communication, so we don't have an inadvertent escalation in the Gulf, so there's a lot of areas that are ripe for cooperation and communication with the Iranians that don't involve also just fundamentally freaking out our regional allies, which is what we would do if we started working very closely with them on ISIS and would also send a signal to the Iranians that we needed them more than they needed us on that. So. Sure. I completely agree. I think the big news here is that senior Iranian and senior U.S. officials are talking on a regular basis. Secretary Kerry has Javad Zarif's cell phone number and he occasionally uses it. That's a good thing for all the reasons Ilan just mentioned. And I do think that, you know, when you look at the nuclear negotiations themselves, one of the things the Iranians tell you privately is, look, if we were just dealing with the Americans on this deal, we would have had it by now. It's the multilateral aspect of it that's very complicated. And of course, that's what makes it so strong. I'm not saying that that shouldn't be the way it is. The fact that there is a coalition of partners is what makes this so strong. But I think in a short amount of time, we have seen American and U.S. officials get a groove in terms of discussing directly. And even I think these last meetings in Oman and then in Vienna, just Kathy Ashton did not attend the bilaterals in Vienna. It was just Americans and Iranians. So that is a positive development that I think both sides have found very useful and hoping that that's the new normal. I would like a little bit to cool down the enthusiasm from a possible general improvement in the relationship between Iran and the United States assuming that there will be a deal. And why I'm saying that? I'm saying that because Iran has different interests and Iran also has different perceptions than we have. So you know that the assumption of the average guy, it is that Iran wants a good relationship with the West. Why not? The West is rich, it's good economically and so on. It's not necessarily true. There are strong elements in Iran that basically do not want a good relationship with the West because from their point of view, the West with its culture is the biggest threat to the Islamic Republic. And un-luckily, one of these persons is the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, he's not so enthusiastic about that. So that is one thing. The other thing, there are interests. For example, the interest in Iran in having this kind of relationship with groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and Yemen and so, it's so strong that it will not give it up for the purpose of now let's dance together with the United States. So I think there will be improvement in the relationship with the United States. There will be some cooperation, but it will be slow. It will take time with ups and downs. Let's say it's a good point because it goes to another question I wanted to ask. I mean, what you said about, it's pretty amazing how unremarkable at this point the fact that top U.S. and Iranian officials are talking regularly is. And in my own conversations, I heard them say exactly what you said, just the ability to sit down and talk with Iranians and just to understand how they view their own interests, even if they're not the same. And I think Shlomo's point about kind of the different views about the benefits of a better U.S.-Iran relations that are very good. But I mean, I think this goes to one of the criticisms of the diplomatic effort that we saw from some conservatives, which is that by sitting down with Iran, you somehow affirm their views. And we saw some of these criticisms against Secretary Clinton, I think last week in a speech at Georgetown, where she talked about her vision of smart power, where she used the word empathy. Empathy with your adversaries. And she was attacked, but to me, if you want to create better policy, you want to try and understand how your adversaries and friends and allies alike understand the world, how they understand their interests. So looking at that, but not only Iran, but also we talked about Israel a bit. Elon talked about our Arab allies. I just want to go back to Shlomo for a moment and talk, I think Israel obviously has concerns with the nuclear program, has concerns with Iran's support for terrorism and some other things that Iran is doing in the region, but I think Israel in general would not be overly concerned about a better U.S.-Iran relationship. It understands that its relationship with the United States is fairly strong and grounded in a whole range of things, whereas a number of our Arab allies do not see that in the same way. If you could just describe that, and I'll go to Susanne on that as well. Well, you are right, of course. Israel, by the way, and that is in contradiction to the perception of many years, never mind using diplomacy with Iran. Exactly, on the contrary, it was also supportive of diplomacy. It always preferred reaching a diplomatic solution, but it was thinking that for a good diplomatic solution, you need to combine it with pressure, namely sanctions, as well as positive incentives. They are also legitimate. So that is the first point. Second point is Israel don't mind improving relationship between the United States and Iran, because I think that Israel can trust the United States to try to use this relationship to have influence on the Iranian policies, so they will behave at the beginning a little bit better as it will envelope, maybe will change their approach also to the other issues that are between the two states. Because I think that the Iran supporters group is a problem also for the United States. I don't think that the United States is in the list of the admirers of Hezbollah, for example, and et cetera. And because, and I am coming back to the point that I made earlier, Israel is hoping that one day there will be a change in the relationship between Israel and Iran, and better US-Iranian relationship can facilitate this change. But we have to understand that I am always returned to that. It will be a slow and torturous process. It will not be easy and not simple. I agree with that. Post-deal, I would not expect a complete reproach month between our two countries. I think what we would see is some very discrete areas where there are some clear common interests that it makes sense to pursue some dialogue and even some cooperation. And I think the point that post-deal, there will be parts of the Iranian system that are going to be very upset about what had just happened. Their interests are going to be undermined because of the sanctions regime. We've seen certain elements of the Iranian system benefit from that economically. They're not gonna want to give that up too easily. And that's, and we don't know, we know the Iranian system has a dark side and sometimes the left hand and right hand don't work together. So moving ahead, if there was a deal, we should expect to see some bumps. They may be significant along the way. And it might be hard to manage that. Now, if a deal was reached, it seems the administration has increasingly come to the conclusion that let's take Syria, for instance. There is really no military solution at this point. It has to be a political solution. And of course, Iran would have a role to play there. So that would be one area where post-deal, there could be some discussion. And again, not, as I said in a recent event on this subject, Iranians and Americans joining hands to sing Khumbaya, but really, we have common interests there and Iranians have leveraged there. Another area, of course, would be Iraq, where as I said, we're now operating together, not together, but at the same time, militarily, at the very least, communication about what each is doing in the area. And whether that's direct or through the Iraqi government, as a matter of to be concluded. And then finally, I would say in Afghanistan, we have a situation where we have a new unity government there that is very, very fragile. There are some significant common interests between the US and Iran there and making that government work, bringing stability to that society, especially as we're drawing down our military presence. So that seems like a likely area where there could be some fruitful discussions. And just to reiterate the point, I don't think we should or could be doing all of these things without a nuclear deal. We really need to get that done first. Throw in a couple of things. One is I think important to just on the Israel versus Saudi Arabia piece, important to distinguish when we were talking about this earlier. For Israel, the priority fundamentally is the nuclear program, doesn't care about the region, as Shlomo said. For Saudi Arabia, nuclear program is actually not that important. What matters is all these regional places. So I actually commented a little bit differently than Suzanne. I actually think that Syria and Iraq are a lot less promising for cooperation early on. And the problem is precisely this issue with who controls the policy. The sort of, is it Rouhani and Zarif? Or is it IRGC and guys like Qasem Soleimani? And I think one of the things US policymakers are gonna have to do in the aftermath of a deal is look at, are Rouhani and Zarif able to sort of claw back other areas of sort of foreign policymaking inside of Iran? And those are the areas we really should be focused on. And I see Afghanistan as being a potential for that because it's a lot less sort of politically loaded in Iran. But Soleimani has been pretty much controlling Iraq and Syria policy for the last few years. And he still does. And I don't think that that changes in the aftermath of the deal. So you can sort of find some balance of cooperation in terms of deconfliction and the Iranians if they're willing to take a new view in Iraq and actually say that the Iranian objective in Iraq right now is still fundamentally supporting the Shia. This has not worked for them with Maliki and it's actually caused Iraq to become unstable if the Iranians are willing to have a shift in a position and say no, actually a federalized Iraq where the Shia are first among equals because they're the largest population and that's the reality of it. And that sort of US policy right now is the only stable Iraq. If the Iranians are willing to look at it from that political perspective then I think there's a lot of space for potential cooperation. But if they sort of keep it this zero sum approach in Iraq then I think there's less. And in Syria I do see that it's very difficult at first. I mean they're gonna continue to support Hezbollah. They're gonna continue to support Assad. I don't see it's gonna be very hard for us to cooperate with them. It doesn't mean there's not opportunities elsewhere and that we shouldn't try to at least find some common ground but I really think the potential lies more to Iran's east and sort of and over in its waters than it does necessarily to its west and to that unstable area. So we've got about 35 minutes left. I'd like to go to the audience for questions. Do we have a microphone going around? Ah, here we go. If anyone does have a question please just identify yourself and if you could keep your question short and if possible put it in the form of a question. This is a gentleman here. Andrew Steinfeld, Foreign Service Officer. Currently a foreign policy advisor to Chairman Martin Dempsey of the Joint Chiefs. It's a question for Shlomo. There's been a lot of talk now. I mean what you mentioned was interesting. Israel's the good old days with relationships with embassy in Iran for example years ago. But there's been a lot of talk now about a potential for warmer relations with the anti-Iranian Arab states. Jordan and Egypt are pretty well but it's in the security realm. They play the game of withdrawing ambassadors over the Temple Mount but we all know that what's deeper is the very deep relationship between Jordan and Israel. Less progress obviously with the Saudis and the Gulf countries. So basically two questions. How do you juxtapose that with some notion of re-establishing a Persian-Israeli relationship against the Arab middle and two which you didn't mention at all the role of the Palestinian issue both vis-a-vis reconciliation with the Arab states and potential step towards reconciliation with Iran. Shall we come to it? Yeah, we'll do it. It's true that we now have much more common interest with the so-called Sunni pragmatic Arab states. Of course not with all the Sunnis. We don't have common interest with ISIS. And the common interest is the opposition to Iran and its nuclear program and the opposition to ISIS and the Salafi Jihadists and also the opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood which is a third category. So we have common interest and on the basis of that there is thinking that maybe more cooperation is possible between Israel and the Sunni states. And the main question is, can we have a relation that was over the surface that will be over the surface, not only under the surface? Because under the surface, I think we have a relationship with for example some of the Gulf states for many years including economic relations, security relations and things like that. But it was always limited to this kind of covert relationship. I think because of another part of your question and the Palestinian issue, that the real potential for a real change in the relationship with these states is very much limited. As long as we don't solve our problem with the Palestinians or at least as long as we don't make serious progress in our relationship with the Palestinians. Because all of these regimes, there is one thing that is common to them. It was true before the Arab Spring, it's now even two years after the Arab Spring, they are afraid of their own people. So they will not do things that their people wouldn't like unless it is very necessary. And this kind of improvement in the relationship with Israel is not very necessary. So they would not like to provoke their public opinion that cares about the Palestinians. Now concerning the tension between relationship with the Sunnis and the relationship with Iran. Well, that is what nations are doing always. It's also a question for the United States. Let's assume that there will be some impact, there will be an agreement, there will be some improvement in the relationship with Iran now. It will deal with its relationship with the Sunni Arabs, with the Gulf fish. Well, it will have to invest resources and efforts to at least make them abandon these conspiracy theories. That now the US is going to Iran and it is throwing them under the wheels of the bus. Which is not true, the United States is not going to do it. The same is true for Israel. It will have to maneuver between them. How did we maneuver for years, for example, between our good relations with Turkey when we had good relations with Turkey? And I wish to at least keep, if not improve our relations with the Kurds that are a traditional allies office, right? We did it, we maneuvered. Ilan, do you want to pick up on that point? We're just on the Palestinians for a minute since I just spent a couple of years working on this issue. Huh? With great success, yes. Or with some interesting frustrations. Apparing good relations. But I do think part of it is, it depends on the election in Israel, is another big piece to remember here. Because I think the Arab states, they see the common interests, like Shlomo said. There is a formula where, there's very little that the Palestinians can actually give to the Israelis that the Israelis actually want. This is part of the fundamental problem in the negotiation. But the Arab states have something that the Israelis want, international recognition, integration into the region, much more, and you see it in the public, you see it in Netanyahu's rhetoric, you see it in Lieberman's rhetoric, you see it across the Israeli public, you saw it throughout the negotiations. There is a formula where the Arabs come to the table and sit with Israel in a public way. And in exchange for that, it gives more flexibility for an Israeli leader to give more to the Palestinians. That's the basic formula. Arab states give to the Israelis, Israelis give to the Palestinians. That is not gonna happen with Netanyahu. It's not gonna happen with Netanyahu because I don't think any of the Arab leaders actually trust him enough that he will give to the Palestinians. And it's a personal thing. And a risk aversion thing, it's just the fact that he is somebody who I think they feel like they've been burned by him in the past. And so if you did have a new Israeli leadership and a new sort of center-left government in Israel, which I do think is a real possibility actually, I agree with Shlomo's assessment on that, then I think that formula actually becomes very interesting in this regional situation right now. Sir, why don't we go to the gentleman here in the second row? Yeah, Ken Meierquart, World Docs. Don't you think even if there wasn't a nuclear issue, we'd still have sanctions on Iran? Well, there are sanctions on Iran for related to terrorism that are separate from the nuclear sanctions. So yes. But those sanctions don't involve cutting off half of Iran's oil exports, which actually dramatically hurt their economy. So you'd have sanctions. It just wouldn't be nearly the same level of sanctions. Not over sanctions. Right. Gentleman right behind you. Thank you, Ali.Mafinezam, West Asia Council. My question has to do with the general idea of thinking of an American presence in Iran. And by that, I don't just mean an official US embassy there, although that's a good goal to think about, but the presence of US institutions, whether it's universities, think tanks, foundations, NGOs, and whether you think any thinking about such things should wait until the nuclear deal is done or not done, or whether you think thinking along those lines can only enhance the likelihood of a successful nuclear deal. Thank you. Well, on the official level, I believe it was in, was it 2009 or some years ago, there were actually plans. The State Department had plans to place American citizens to work in the US Intrasection in Tehran, which is located in the Swiss, yeah, right, and that intersection is located in the Swiss embassy in Tehran, but that was being worked for us through Russia, and then the war in Georgia happened, and it kind of scuttled all that. So there is a plan, at least written up to move in that direction. I think at this stage, it's probably too early to think which direction that would go, to maybe to think about that, but on the, what you're talking about, the more civil society side, make no mistake about it, there is a very strong Persian diaspora in this country, and they are actively thinking, they're going there, they're trying to build these sorts of relationships so that they can, they're thinking post-deal of the potential of doing that, and I think that's a really good thing. When we think of the last 35 years of hostility between our countries, I mean, one of the things that makes me certainly the saddest is the fact that our societies have been so forced to be detached from each other. So I think people-to-people exchanges, we're seeing more of that happen in a limited way already, but exchanges of scientists, more student exchanges, exchanges in the fields of arts and culture, these are natural things that I think would happen once a deal is made, and people are trying to push those boundaries in that envelope now too, but I think it's still very difficult to get traction. Certainly a cooperation between universities is another area where I think there's great potential. So I think people are thinking about it, more creative people are actually trying to get these up and running. I know several people who are working very quietly to start having discussions with business leaders from both countries. That's very sensitive at this stage, but so I think the direction you're talking about, if there was a deal, it would be inevitable and it would probably bloom pretty quickly. One quick point just on something the United States government could potentially do. I agree with Suzanne completely that even interest section is probably too soon right now, but the United States does and has a longstanding no contact policy with Iranian diplomats, which is still essentially in place, except for the nuclear program. I think you can start finding ways to make that more flexible very quickly. I mean, if an Iranian and American diplomat show up at a counter-narcotics event in the Czech Republic, then there's no reason they shouldn't be able to have a couple drinks or non-alcoholic drinks, there's other reasons for that, but have a conversation and begin doing things like that. There's, I think, a low-risk, easy step that can be helpful to just start building normal relations. If I could just go off on that for a minute, going back to something Shlomo said, I think, yes, people-to-people institutional academic exchanges would be great, but I think there is a tendency in the Iranian government, I think, Hameneh himself is part of this, that sees those exchanges as a threat, as a cultural threat. So, and I'm gonna reference something that my friend, Mityer Jamid Anfar, I said, and I know he's watching because he was tweeting about this, where he said that some of the things that have gone on, such as the upsurge and arrests and executions, could be seen as an attempt at containment of a kind of a signal from Hameneh and some of the other hard-line elements to say to Rouhani and Zarif, okay, you can succeed on this file, but don't get any ideas about expanding your reach. Absolutely. You've seen a rise in capital punishment, significant rise in Iran. That is certainly a signal, I think, to Rouhani and moderates, and the public at large who voted overwhelmingly for him, that they're still in control. I think the arrests of journalists like Jason is another way they're sending a signal. So, I don't wanna give the impression that the deal's gonna be signed and all of a sudden, things are gonna be great. This is going to be hard on the diplomatic level. It's going to be difficult on the people-to-people level. I should have mentioned there's also been a very active and productive inter-religious exchange between religious leaders from the US and Iran now that's been going on for a while. That's been very constructive, so we'd probably see more of that happening. But all the things that you've just mentioned, Matt, that's what I think I was alluding to before. They're gonna be elements of the society. They're gonna push back hard. And one big question we have is, if this nuclear deal happens and Iran is reintegrated with the global economy, that's going to be a significant force. And big question I have is the internal changes that will take place. The expectation of the Iranian people. What kind of impact will that have on the society? I think when you talk about these questions, I would assume how many thinks about these things. And those sorts of forces, once they're unleashed, are very difficult to manage. And I think those things are probably being, weighing heavy on his mind and certainly his colleagues. The gentleman right in the room. My name is Faizan Ididj. I wanted to address my question to Shaloma. I think you start with a very good premise. Can you explore that a little farther? Because I think much of the problems we're dealing with in this region is psychological. We have a lot of paranoia. We have sadomasochism in some aspects. And the interest in that conversation really clouds and distracts us from the psychosis analysis. And how can we deal with these problems? How can we find a therapeutic track, really, for both individual actors and collective psychosis? Because until we deal with that, the rest isn't just gonna happen. Well. A therapeutic track? Can we do that? Well, quite another of years ago, I think it was more than 20 years ago, a wise politician in Israel said that what the Knesset, the Israeli parliament needs is a good psychiatrist. That everything would have been better. But well, I think that what you should do and that is connected to what Ilan has said, well, we should try, at least in democracy, elect the right people. You know, not all people are the same. Some, with some it is the easier to build trust. And I think it has to be a consideration for any voter. Because you know, all these things of people to people and so on are very nice. And I have much experience with these things in the area of our relationship with the Palestinians. But you can invest, you know, work and time, et cetera, for years on people to people and it works very nicely. And then one decision of a politician and everything collapses immediately. And I don't have a solution for that. This lady here, and then the gentleman. Why don't we take a few questions? This lady and then we'll move over down that aisle. Hi, I'm Sarah from the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. Do you think the currently tenuous relationship is between Russia and the US is affecting negotiations in any way? Take one more right here. Milton Honig from the International Center for Terrorism Studies. You seem optimistic about the possibility of an agreement by March 31st. Tell me, were you surprised by what happened on November 24th? Not having an agreement, but a fairly long extension of the Joint Plan of Action. Shulmo wrote something I think on November 17th about that. What do you think about the possibility of another extension in lieu of the status of the Iranian economy? Alon, do you want to take that one, and then maybe we can go to Suzanne for the Russia question. Sure, I mean, I'm of the view, I'm actually not overly optimistic about the idea that we're gonna necessarily get to a deal. I'm in the middle, but I was really quite stunned when actually we got to the first deal, so I've since become more optimistic about the second one. But I do think that in terms of an extension, there is a real scenario where you sort of go towards what I call japoah forever, which is essentially, you know, I mean, right now the Iranians are frozen, their nuclear program, they're two months away, that's better than the last 10 years when they've been building up their program. They're getting limited sanctions relief for that, but they're still under a lot of pressure. They're relatively comfortable in this situation. We're relatively comfortable in this situation, so if you can't get to an agreement, the just perpetual extension approach is not a bad one. The danger is with the perpetual extension is, how long can you keep the spoilers at bay from undercutting the entire thing? And here the most likely spoiler, especially as time goes on is Congress, and if it were to pass legislation, at some point, even if for now they're okay, if at some point Congress gets fed up and passes something that includes new sanctions, Iranians walk away from the deal, international sanctions start to fall apart because the international community views it as the United States tanked this deal because it violated the JPOA by passing sanctions. There's also Rouhani who's fending off the hardliners in Tehran, and how long can he do that? And at some point as a supreme leader, stop listening to Rouhani and say no, actually we're gonna go back in a different direction. So I think continued extensions are a preference to a far better than a breakdown where Iran starts moving on its nuclear program again, and we head towards potential confrontation or just the moment of decision that I think the best left avoided, but there's a lot of external pressures that could cause that to collapse eventually. So I still think the best approach is to actually try to get that breakthrough to a final deal. I think the extension on November 24th wasn't a huge surprise. I think a lot of people saw it coming even though by all accounts they got pretty close to a deal. Like Alon said, maybe there would be another extension in July, 2015. I think particularly the pressure on Rouhani would start to become, would start to wear because let's remember he ran on a platform of improving the economy. And although we see unemployment and inflation improving with the current state of oil prices, I mean the Iranians just, Rouhani just presented his budget for 2015 this week and in it accounted for oil at $70 a barrel. The last budget it was at $130 a barrel. That is a significant change. The other thing is in this budget he hasn't included anything, any upswing from sanctions relief. So it's a very realistic budget but you have to think how long can he continue to have the leaders support if the improvements to the economy are not significant. And what, you know, this last extension in terms of the West side, we actually got some significant improvements some extra requirements that I think were quite good. We didn't mention, you know, this Iranians agreed to suspend research on advanced centrifuges to some extent, also laser technology, which many people saw as a loophole in the joint program of action, joint plan of action. So I think maybe the next extension could work but it would be stretching it. It's not a solution. Now in Russia, what senior US officials have consistently said in private about Russia is that they really are playing a positive role in the discussions. I talked to a senior official just last week who made this point. It seems that the problems that we're having elsewhere in the relationship have not trickled in to the negotiations. Could that change? It's possible. It's the other point that we haven't raised is with another extension on the US side, you know, we might start to see cracks in the International Sanctions Coalition. Could we continue to bring Russia, China and others along? I question that. Take a couple more questions. Is there a gentleman in the back here? Charles Abrams, retired physician observer on the scene, just trying to figure this out. Iran is a terror state. Their long-term plans I'm trying to figure out would involve supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. Is there any linkage in any of our discussions on the nuclear program in trying to stop that support as part of reducing the sanctions that are already in place? Is that part of our plan? And if it isn't, why isn't it? Not specifically. The nuclear negotiations are focused on Iran's nuclear program, not on its activities supporting Hezbollah and Hamas. But I do think that, you know, some believe that if we can get to a deal with Iran, those issues could perhaps be discussed and tackled. Some years ago, I believe it was in 2003, there was a grand bargain proposal floating around town here that the Iranians theoretically put forward where it did include discussion on Hezbollah, their support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Could we get back to that? I'm not sure. But I think the administration and the P5 plus one was very wise when they set the framework for these negotiations to only focus on nuclear and get that done with, that's the immediate foreign policy priority. And I think if they had included a lot of other things in the mix, we probably wouldn't be, made the progress that we have today. Just the opposite. If the Supreme Leader could assure Israel that he wouldn't annihilate them, would that be a helpful step in moving the nuclear disarmament type of conditions here? Because I'm sure that's one of the sticking points as far as Israel's concerned. It will improve the atmosphere for, but I don't think it will have much influence on the negotiations because I don't think the reaction will be okay, Hamena-Yinidah now say something else. So now we can trust him completely. He can have his nuclear weapons. It's okay, he will not use them. It doesn't work like that. I think that basically in diplomacy, when you are having negotiations, some of the things that you should do to build mutual trust is also use assertions of this kind that can create more trust. But it will only improve the atmosphere. It will not have influence on the substance actually the subjects of the negotiations. Alan, you had started too. Well, just one thing. I mean, you know, I think as Suzanne said, it's not just an issue of complexity, which I think is right, but it's just I think we care a lot less about Hezbollah and Hamas than we do about the nuclear program. Like the nuclear program for us is a major strategic issue. Hezbollah and Hamas much slower on the list. And the idea, I think Hamas, the relationship between Iran and Hamas is not really that important to the Iranians. The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is long, historic, it's not going anywhere. It's gonna be a problem with them with or without a deal. But, you know, that's okay if as long as they're not building nuclear weapons as far as I'm concerned. We're still gonna disagree on that and we're still gonna have some conflict over that. But, you know, that's acceptable. Okay. Why don't we just take these last three questions if we can make them quick last round of questions here and then we'll. Thank you. My name is Autumn Weidman. I'm a student. And so my question is, with the recent Senate release of the CIA reports, will this negatively influence the U.S.'s ability to negotiate with the nuclear deal? Edison Dick Foundation, Middle East Peace. What are the sanctions that the Iranians most wanna get rid of or most damaging to them from the U.S. and the EU? And conversely, what sanctions would the U.S. be most flexible and who, you know, sort of, be willing to give in now? And the gentleman right in the back there. Thanks. I'm Nathaniel Sobel from the Astiano-Abraham Center from Middle East Peace. And just to follow up on a question over here, I was in a discussion with former Israeli diplomat just the other day who made the calculation that if Iran really wanted a bomb, they'd be wise to tone down their rhetoric about Israel because it inflames the international community. And the conclusion he reaches is that maybe the top leadership in Iran isn't exactly rational. How would you evaluate that assessment? So let's see, we had three, the Iranian rhetoric and rationality question, the impact of the torture report, and then these questions about what are some of the sanctions Iran would prefer to have removed immediately. I can take, I can take sanctions. I'll try that one. Yes, all right, why not? I think the biggest sort of division right now in terms of sanctions is on, the Iranians would like to see, what the Iranians really want is the oil sanctions first and foremost done. And I think you would see that not lifted altogether immediately because those are U.S. legislation. What you would originally see is the president probably signed some waivers that essentially lift those sanctions so they can be quickly snapped back into place if there's violations in the agreement. This is gonna be a sort of step-by-step approach where over time as Iran takes steps on the nuclear program, the sanctions come off. So, but the first big thing you wanna do is see the oil. Now where the biggest disagreement right now is in the negotiations is on the UN Security Council sanctions. Those are not as hardened, those are not as, the way you think about UN Security Council sanctions is a little bit like just the general broad framework sort of like a Supreme Court ruling and then based on that Supreme Court ruling you have all kinds of implications down the line in terms of how different countries implement sanctions. It basically provides this big political cover that allows a lot of countries, especially the Europeans, to then implement the sanctions that have come afterwards. And the reason the Iranians have sort of pushed on those is because they see them as reversible. In other words, they think that maybe we can, that's some place where they can move pretty quickly. It's also an opportunity for them to divide, try to divide the Russians and the Chinese away from the E3. But the P5 plus one is very hesitant to go there early on on the UN Security Council sanctions because once you lift them, it's very hard to see how you put them back in because the Russians and the Chinese aren't necessarily gonna vote for them. I mean, one interesting idea that I've heard from friends in the administration is maybe there's a new resolution that actually puts in place, yeah it supersedes all the sanctions, it puts in place, it basically ratifies the agreement and as part of ratifying the agreement, it describes a step-by-step process of how the sanctions come off. That's one interesting idea that's out there but I think that is still one of the, that's apart from sort of the overall uranium enrichment piece, that's probably the stickiest point remaining in the negotiations. Just to follow up quickly on this sanctions point, when you ask the Iranians why suddenly they are very intent on getting the UN Security Council sanctions lifted immediately, they say that it has to do with principle. They say the UN Security Council sanctions are what started this whole mess for them. From that, the EU sanctions and the US sanctions emanated. So they see it as the foundation for this unjust regime, sanctions regime against them and I think that's part of the thinking. Now getting on to the other question about the torture report, would it have any impact? I don't think so, although I haven't checked how many's Twitter feeds today but Chance is always probably tweeting about this just as he was tweeting madly about Ferguson and all these things. So I think of course not only with the Iranians but I think other countries in the world this does present the United States with a dilemma in some of its negotiations, not just on nuclear but others but I don't think it'll factor in in any significant way. And then finally, whether or not the top leadership in Iran is rational. There's the Mad Mula theory that I've never found very convincing. I think there's been a lot of good work on this by the way, research and analysis. If you look at the Iranian regime since the revolution I see a very rational regime that's focused on self-preservation and has done quite well in managing to preserve that power over time. So I would say that I think it's a very rational regime and even with these negotiations, when you look at the end of the Iran-Iraq war there's some very fascinating analysis of the leader Khomeini then drinking from the poison chalice the way he put it to put an end to that war. That was some rational thinking going on there. And maybe we're seeing that now with the nuclear program. Maybe they've come to the decision that it's costing them too much. I don't know but I would think at least those sorts of discussions are happening. So I want to thank you all. I'm sorry. I want to say something about the Madmoola about all the discussion of rationalism. You know, one have to define very carefully what does he mean by rationalism. In my opinion, rationalism means the capability to make a calculus of costs and benefits and to operate accordingly. Now what people usually are mistaken is when they think that the values of the other party are identical with your values and because of that, benefits and costs are the same to us as they are to them. Because the real question is what is the source of the Iranian hostility to Israel? You may say it's irrational because it is based on religious beliefs or something like that. But I think it is completely rational. It is completely rational because of two reasons. First of all, religious beliefs are important and only are important in a regime that is based on being the Islamic regime. So their claim that they should be the rulers of Iran is based on the notion that they are operating according to the Islamic principle. So religion for the regime is something very rational. That's one point. The other point is that I think for many years the hostility to Israel basically was very useful for the Iranians because that was their way to find inroads into the Middle East which is mostly Arab and not Iranian. So they are in a disadvantage if they won't influence the Arab world because Arabs are not so enthusiastic about Persians or Iranians. But the hostilities to Israel was good that they could market very successfully in the Arab and Middle East. I just want to take a moment. Suzanne mentioned Jason. That's Jason Rezaian, a Washington Post reporter, American-Iranian who's been held now for 141 days in Iran's Evan prison. I don't know if any Iranians happen to be watching this now but I just want to encourage our government to continue to press for his release and to make it clear that we have not forgotten Jason and we hope that he will release soon. So thank you all for joining us today. This has been a great discussion and thanks to the panel.