 It's good morning and a warm welcome into the 13th meeting of the Constitution, Europe external affairs and culture committee. This morning we have received apologies from Donald Cameron. Our first agenda item is a continuation of our inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work and today we'll have our second panel on this topic and we're joined at committee this morning from Anthony Salomon, managing director of European Merchants, Dr Fabian Zullig, chief executive, chief economist of the European Policy Centre, and I welcome you both to the meeting. I also thank Mr Salomon for his submission before today's meeting, and we're going to move straight to questions, if possible, and I've got a couple of opening questions. Dr Zullig, in your briefing for the previous sessions Europe Committee legacy paper, you stated that the representation of Scottish interests in the EU will be crucial for business but also at policy level, but paradoxically leaving the European Union will require a higher degree of investment into these relationships as Scotland has lost the automatic right to be at the table, which it previously enjoyed via the UK as a member state. I'd be interested in hearing your views about how open the EU will be to engaging directly with the Scottish Government and what are the main challenges that you see representing the Scottish interests in the EU. I'll go to Dr Zullig, thanks. Thank you very much for inviting me today. Yes, I think that there is a challenge. It is more difficult for a third country, a country outside the European Union, to engage with European policy processes. That's probably even more difficult as a part of a third country, so there has to be a consideration also what is in it for the member states, for the institutions with which Scotland wants to engage. I do think that, in general terms, the doors are open. I do think that institutions, member states, regions are very happy to also engage with others. We have seen that over the years with other third countries, with other actors in the system, but it does require that additional engagement and additional investment. In my view, it also requires a focus on what Scotland might want to be engaged in, because to cover the whole breadth of topics to be engaged in everything is very difficult. In your submission, you state that Scotland lacks a sufficient policy culture on Europe and international relations. I wonder if you could expand on that just a little and suggest how we might develop that policy and deliver it. Yes, of course. Good morning, convener. There are two main aspects that I would mention of the Scottish Government developing a strategy that Fabian has just said. If you want to engage in the European Union to have a degree of taking account of the challenges that Scotland faces in engaging as a part of a third country and not being a state, and also having a difficult relationship with the UK Government, that is a factor. You need to have a well-developed strategy that outlines a post-Brexit vision for what the Scottish Government aims to achieve from engagement with the European Union and how it intends to go about doing that, considering the new challenges that need to be faced. Secondly, in terms of policy culture, I think that it would be useful to have a greater degree of Europeanisation of Scottish governance. It is not a question of engagement, which already exists, but Scottish politics collectively—the Scottish Government, but Scottish institutions generally—are deepened their degree of interconnection into what is happening in Brussels and what is happening in member state capitals and elsewhere. I do not think that we see that as much, and that makes it a little bit more difficult for the Scottish Government to have that kind of strategic approach. If we look at existing Scottish Government documentation, there is a degree of optimism, which is normal for a Government, but I think that sometimes there is over-optimism of how much influence and how much success the Scottish Government is going to be able to have in the years ahead. I am going to move to questions from the committee, and I will go to Mr Ruskell, please. Thank you, convener, and good morning to you both. Can I ask you about where we are at the moment within the EU institutional cycle and how third countries, but also countries that are substates that are part of third countries, are engaging with that institutional cycle process at the moment? What are the strategic areas? How are they engaging with that? Can we start, Mr Salomon, please? Yes, of course. Thank you, Mr Ruskell. I think that it is always useful to ensure that you are engaging with the European matches with what the EU is talking about. Of course, the EU is not a monolithic entity, but speaking of Brussels and the EU institutions, of course, it is essential to interconnect, if you like, with the priorities of the EU institutions. The Scottish Government did that in a fashion with the strategic agenda document that was published on the day of Brexit. Yes, I think that that is crucial, but at the same time, I still think that the more important point is that you, or the Scottish Government in this case, have its own priorities. The question is trying to connect them. You do not want to be chasing the EU agenda constantly as it changes or chasing each presidency as it changes and say, what are the priorities of this presidency and how do we connect with them? You need to have your own strategic priorities, of whatever they are, the three, four or five main things that we wanted with them, and we are going to try to link those because that links with what we want to see in terms of our EU engagement, the kind of successes that we want and where possible, though it is limited, where we can shape EU policy in a particular way. Yes, it is useful to shadow what is happening in the EU and engage with it, but on the basis of your own clearly articulated priorities. So, are there other examples of third countries or sub-states that have been particularly successful in aligning their strategic priorities with that institutional cycle? Do you have an example of that? Well, as you may know, I wrote a report for the previous committee looking at how certain regions and countries engage with the EU. There are a number of good examples, I suppose. The vast country comes to mind as a region that is clearly part of an EU member state and is involved in that sense, but it is well known in Brussels for its successes in industry 4.0, in vocational training, in advanced manufacturing, through its smart specialisation strategy. It is known for that. People in the EU institutions may often listen to what they have to say on those issues. It is an area where they have developed, I would say, niche expertise, but certainly a profile for themselves in Brussels and that they focus on that, and I would say that they are successful. I am very happy to go into that. The first thing that I would emphasise is that the European Union is changing rather rapidly. That is something that is hard to keep up with even within the Union. Even for member states and for subnational entities within those member states, sometimes the pace of change sometimes takes them at a surprise. I think that this is to do with the big challenges that not only Europe faces, but certainly the discussions that we are having around climate change, the technology transition around Covid, pandemics, health and the impact that it has on economies, on societies, inequalities, geopolitics and the future of Europe. All of that is on the agenda at the moment. I would go back to the comment that I made earlier. It is very much a question of focus. As an example of a country that has been rather successful in the area of engagement that it has chosen, I would mention, for example, Norway, where we have seen that when it comes to single market issues, Norway has engaged very effectively with the European system. That is not just the Norwegian Government. That is also at the regional level and at the city level. Before Covid, I was always half-droking that I see more regions from Norway than I see from any other country that shows a bit the engagement that was there. There are examples of that, but I think that the Norwegian example also shows that that is selective. Even with having a selective approach, it requires an enormous effort. The Norwegian representation in Brussels is very sizable. It is much more sizable than some of the smaller member states, because there is a real investment from Norway into the European Union. Norway engages very much, for example, on energy, because clearly there is a clear interest from the Norwegians. I think that it is looking at these specific examples, and there are other ones that we could mention. However, I think that what they all have in common is that they have that focus. They decide what area they need to be engaged in most, and then they do that significant investment, which is needed to do that. That is all very useful. Can I follow on from that? Is that focus carried through to the concordats that are established between those countries and sub-state regions and countries and the EU? What are the most successful features of those concordats? Perhaps if I could go back to Mr Salamone. It is useful to remember that, as you will know, each state has its own constitutional arrangements for how sub-state entities engage. Most of them are more codified, I would say, than the approach that is taken in the UK. What works best is when central government and the sub-state government can work well together. Fabian mentioned Norway and the extent to which the Norwegian mission to the EU and the Norwegian regions in the EU collaborate together and work together in a way that multiplies the effect that they have. That kind of not just cooperation, but genuine collaboration and, indeed, perhaps partnership is useful, and often times that could be more useful than the formal structures. Of course, dealing with some of the challenges of the formalities, for instance, the different autonomous regions of Spain, they sort of rotate in which one relates more and attends council meetings on behalf of all the regions, which, on the one hand, is useful and gives them some role. On the other hand, it is a challenge because they cycle through that, I believe, every six months or so, so each region has to get back into the business of doing that and sharing it. Of course, trying to represent every region while trying to articulate their own interests. There are different mechanisms that countries inside and outside the EU have developed, but I think that the core point is, regardless of whatever legal structures exist, that there is a positive spirit of collaboration between the central state and the sub-state. Does that ethos of collaboration extend to parliaments and civic society? Is that codified in these concordats as well? Is there an expectation that citizens will be involved in discussions around trade agreements or any other policies that are being pursued by regions or states? It does not immediately come to my mind of an example where it is legally codified that you would have that degree of civil society engagement when the legal document, if you like, is between the central state and the sub-state as to how they will engage in the EU. Of course, there is certainly a growing desire to involve citizens in policymaking. I think that is very appropriate if you want to sustain public support, be it for EU membership or, in our case, for a closer or a positive relationship with the European Union that involves engaging with citizens. I think that there is a recognition of that. Perhaps there may be a feature to come in terms of the intergovernmental relations, but the moment I say that if the central state wants to engage citizens or if a region wants to engage citizens, they mostly just do that on their own. Dr Zulik? I think that Anthony has already mentioned a number of the features. I think that there is a difference between the formal arrangement and the informal arrangement. I think that there very often is a discussion that involves not so much citizens directly, but certainly representative groups who are engaged in particular areas. When it comes to, for example, certain areas of co-operation, if you look at, for example, environment, then very often you will have NGOs involved in those arrangements. But in the end, the European Union is also a political body. The component parts of the European Union are political. The challenge for third countries or for state actors in third countries is to put it very bluntly. What is it that they bring to the party? Why should the other side be interested in that co-operation and in investing in that relationship? If you are talking about a member state or even a sub-state actor in a member state, the logic is much clearer of why you are engaging because these are the actors that you will have to co-operate with on an ongoing basis. So, the demand is always from the third country. What is it that you can bring to this? How do you contribute to the objectives of the European Union? On that basis, you can then have a fruitful exchange. Thank you for joining us this morning. Following on from what Dr Zuleig has just been talking about, what countries can bring to the table. I am interested to know your thoughts on how Scotland is perceived within Europe and within the EU. Mr Salmone, maybe you could start. I think that the Scottish Government and indeed wider actors in Scotland have been very successful in articulating that many people in Scotland did not wish to see Brexit happen or the manner in which it happened. That is very clear. That message is across. Anyone who wants to know that Scotland did not go for Brexit and that most people or a majority of people in Scotland were perhaps unhappy with the relationship that has been arrived at between the EU and the UK know that. That is clear. What is the Scottish Government and indeed wider actors in Scotland? What are they going to pursue in terms of engagement? We talked about strategic priorities, but in terms of what form that takes, I have a two-pillar approach of practical co-operation with actors on areas of mutual interest. Fabio was just talking about the importance of mutuality. It is not just about talking about things that are important to us, to Scotland, but what is important to EU actors and where can you find that common ground that opens the possibilities for substantive engagement? The second is strategic contributions on debates on the future of Europe. As far as I am aware, the Scottish Government has not sought to participate or contribute even externally to the conference on the future of Europe. I think that that is something that it could have tried to do. I appreciate their challenges not being part of the EU, but we are still part of Europe. I imagine that there can be a positive perception of Scotland's shore. Of course, that sort of pro-EU element can enhance that, but that sentimentality only goes so far if it is not activated and connected to what Fabio mentioned of what matters to EU actors and why is it useful for them. That sentimentality only goes so far. With regard to the conference on the future of Europe, I think that there is Scottish participation in that. It would be interesting to know your thoughts on global Scots and the Friends of Scotland group. Also, if there are specific things that Scotland, as part of a third country, can bring specifically to the European table. On the conference of the future of Europe, I know that people in Scotland are going to engage and I think that that is wonderful. It is important to say that, regardless of constitutional matters or relationship formally with the EU, that there are important issues at stake in Europe and everyone in different parts of Europe has a view. In terms of the groups that you mentioned, on the Friends of Scotland group in the European Parliament, that is a very important established bringing together parliamentarians from different political parties who have affinity for Scotland. I would say that that is a private forum. I suppose that is obvious, but I do find it a little bit unusual the way in which the Scottish Government publicly promotes it, if you like. I know that it is on the Scottish Government website, an example of engagement. That is a private thing that needs to be private. Obviously, you could mention that it exists, but the more you shine a light on it, the less likely you are to have the kind of substantive engagement that you might want from it. In terms of global Scots, engaging with people who are part of our global diaspora, and that includes anyone who has an affinity for Scotland, I think that there is probably more that the Scottish Government could do on that, including through its representative offices in engaging with the local communities of Scots who are there, or people who have an affinity with Scotland, and integrating that more in a coherent way of engagement. I think that that is something that could be done to a greater extent than it is at the moment. Okay. Thank you, Mr Salmoni, and similar questions to Dr Zuleik. I fully agree that Scotland is generally perceived positively. On a European level, there is the perception that Scotland shares some of the values. I think that COP26 Glasgow has also reinforced that. In that sense, particularly on the issues of mutual interest, where I would put climate change as one of the key areas, there is a positive perception. I would also put a bit of a reality check on that in the sense that Scotland is no longer part of the European Union. The relationship between Scotland and the EU will not exclusively go through the trade and cooperation agreement, but the overall relationship of the UK with the European Union will have a significant if not decisive impact on the relationship Scotland can have with the European Union. When it comes to formal and official engagement, much of that will be done within the framework of the TCA and the bodies that have been set up within that. That is a limitation, especially since the overall relationship is at this moment in time not going well, and that has an impact on co-operation across a wide range of different areas where there could be more potential to work together. However, at the moment, there does not seem to be the wish of the British Government to do that, and that is limiting the amount of opportunity that is there. In terms of the kind of mechanisms that you mentioned, my general response to that would be the more, the better. I think that the kinds of ways of engaging with the outside world have a very positive long-run return in terms of value for money. I think that they tend to be very high value for money, even though it is very difficult to measure, but having good will being connected and being also able to draw on people's expertise on information is very valuable. Referring a bit back to the previous question, if you want to know who is successful, it is those countries, those regions, those actors, who have recognised that and who are willing to invest in it because they can see the long-term benefit for them. In earlier sessions, we have taken evidence from third sector organisations that have talked about the benefit to them being integrated and feeding off information from counterparts in Europe, and they would hope to be able to continue that. Thank you, convener. I would really like to follow up from Jenny Minto's points there and ask engagement and the Scottish Government approach and perhaps start with Mr Salomon. Mr Salomon, in your submission, you state that the strategy should minimise Scottish constitutional affairs and promote purposeful separation of European and international relations from the independence debate. What strategy in your opinion is the Scottish Government pursuing? A strategy. I think that it would be useful for the Scottish Government to articulate one, a post-Brexit one. Of course, we have documentation. We have an international framework, which is about two pages long. There is a promise of a global affairs framework, which I very much hope will articulate that kind of vision. It is very clear if you look at Scottish Government documentation and particularly at the political level that there are internal Scottish constitutional debate features in engagement. I am not talking about the technical level, but I am talking mostly about the political level. It is very clear that the Scottish Government has a position on independence. It talks about that in its European international engagement. It is not the core aim of that engagement, but it features from time to time. I do not think that that is useful. Who wants to know knows that there is a constitutional debate in Scotland and knows that there is a question of independence or remaining in the UK. In my view, that is best left to civil society when it comes to engaging with European international actors. The risk is that, if you talk about constitutional issues, you reduce the scope for substantive co-operation with EU international partners because they do not want to be involved in Scotland's or the UK's internal affairs. In my view, it is something to be minimised as much as possible and to focus on the areas of practical co-operation that the Scottish Government does, but perhaps it could do that more. Thanks for that. Just as a follow-up, what do you think Scottish Parliament's role should be in scrutinising Scottish Government engagement priorities? I think that the Parliament has a crucial role. It is important to recognise that the Scottish Government, as stated in the programme for government, intends to increase its engagement in the European and international plane. To me, it would make perfect sense for the Scottish Government to increase its scrutiny of what the Scottish Parliament is doing in that area, so that the scrutiny could focus on the global affairs framework and what the substantive content of that will be, what kind of priorities and areas of focus and strategic objectives that the Scottish Government will articulate, and how it is going about doing so. More generally speaking, of course, there has been a lot of emphasis on Brexit and the formal arrangements under the trade and co-operation agreement between the EU and the UK in terms of the attention of the Scottish Parliament, and that is very natural, given that that is so consequential to our engagement or our relationship with the EU now. It is also worthwhile to continue to, and perhaps develop more, scrutiny of the substance of what the Scottish Government is actually doing in terms of its engagement with the EU. Dr Zuleig, if you could comment on the general engagement approach from the Scottish Government and the role of the Scottish Parliament in that? I will try to answer that a bit more generally rather than looking specifically at the Scottish situation. I think that the first thing I would emphasise is that where this kind of engagement is successful, it is very much, and Anthony already alluded to that, about a team approach of actually acting together. In this particular case, I would say that, yes, there is an important role for the Scottish Government, but it should also bring on board the team Scotland approach, bringing together all of the different actors that have a role in that relationship. I would certainly see the Parliament also to have a role, not only in the sense of scrutiny, which is important, but also in the sense of direct engagement, of being involved in this process. One of the very common features of my work in Brussels is that I often receive delegations from Parliament, both at the member-state level, but also third countries. I was recently talking, for example, to the House of Commons committee, so I think that these kind of exchanges are very important, and they should go beyond just simply the Government itself. On a broader level, where that is possible, that should also be extended to co-operation with London, with the UK level, but also with other actors within the UK. It makes sense that, for example, the devolved administrations work together on some of these issues. It is a multifaceted approach, and Parliament should also play a role in that. It has been very interesting to listen to your answers from my colleagues so far. Can I ask a question about the priorities for how we make the connections, both in terms of Scottish Government and our scrutiny of the Government, but also in terms of parliamentary work, to follow up the questions? I particularly want to ask a question about Mr Salomon. You have mentioned in your report a couple of recommendations that I want to follow up in detail. First, you make a suggestion about better delineating the operation of Scottish officers within diplomatic missions, within the UK diplomatic missions. I was wondering if you could tell us a bit more what that would look like in practice and, associated with that, you have also talked about the range of officers that the Scottish Government has, again how they could be better used and what you think the priority should be for expansion in the EU. You said that the existing officers were logical, but there was something about needing more of a rationale for the best options for expansion in the EU area. Can you focus on those two issues? Of course. On the question of the Scottish Government's representative officers and how most of them are situated within UK diplomatic missions or within UK embassies, my suggestion was that there could be a new concorda on international relations because there were two. There was an EU concorda that is now obsolete in the UK's withdrawal from the European Union. We have an international relations concorda that dates to 2030 as the proposals to leave that as it is. However, there could be merit in seeing if there was a possibility of renewing that. As part of that renewal, I want to reflect a bit more of how things work at the moment and see that in the concorda, which is to say that the Scottish Government officers pursue their own agenda, even though they are based on UK missions. That is perfectly logical. Of course, they communicate with each other and talk to each other. That is good. However, I have seen examples where the Scottish Government was aiming to hold an event and it was going to be in the UK embassy, but it discovered that the topic might be one that the UK Government did like. They moved the event to another location. That sort of thing to me is something that perhaps could be avoided if there was a renewal to the concorda. In terms of the officers themselves, they do plenty of good work. It is not necessarily a question of the performances of the officers that they like. For me, it would be seeing that they work as a coherent network. Of course, that is a process of development, because some of the officers are new. They will take time to develop in their own right, but there is a degree of connectivity. Of course, that links back to Edinburgh. Everything is about what happens in Edinburgh and the home headquarters, if you like, to ensure that, while the officers have the necessary flexibility to adjust to their local circumstances, they do different things. In Brussels, it is more an EU policymaking. In Berlin, we know more about German politics and trade and investment and so on, but there is sufficient interconnection between the officers. They are all working collectively in the service of a clearly articulated Scottish Government strategy for engagement. In respect of the expansion of officers, it is reasonable for the officers to grow in relation to Scotland's current constitutional position. Given that all those representative officers are worth having a suitable rationale and justification for them, why the Scottish Government feels that it needs new officers, why it has chosen particular locations that it has chosen, why those locations will be in the service of a strategic objective that is already outlined and clearly needs an articulated strategy. On that basis, if that information is available to the public and Parliament to scrutinise and perhaps even take a decision on, to me that is a logical approach. I have heard it mentioned, for instance, that the Scottish Government could have officers in almost every EU member's day. I do not believe that it is feasible, given the resources of the Scottish Government and given Scotland's constitutional position. It is purposeful expansion, but in a way that is clearly evidenced to demonstrate the value of why the Scottish Government needs its own representation, as opposed to, for instance, Scottish Development International or, of course, UK Government admissions. I think that your points are very well made about the need for an evidence-based approach. Previous colleagues' questions you have answered about the Scottish diaspora networks and the crucial issues of trade and culture and the climate crisis. There is clearly both a parliamentary and a Government priority on those issues, on how they are actually played out across the EU. On other parts of the UK, the Northern Ireland protocol has taken up a lot of energy, but our committee has been looking at the trade issue and the alignment project. To what extent would those officers and that Government connection help in terms of transparency on those issues? It links back to the purpose of the individual offices. In terms of the trade relations view and the Scottish Parliament scrutiny of that, the Brussels office is a logical point of reference in the sense that they are monitoring what happens in the EU institutions and in Brussels more widely. That is a core part of the Scottish Government's monitoring engagement on what is happening in Brussels from the outside. That monitoring might be useful to the Parliament in some way, if that might be possible. I think that that is the main focal point. It is fairly clear at the moment that, while bilateral political relations are a focus of the other offices, they are mainly focused on their domestic context in the regions. The Paris office, the Berlin office and the Dublin office are mainly focused on the bilateral relationships between Scotland in those countries and where appropriate nearby countries are. For instance, Austria and the UK are less focused on substantive engagement on European Union issues or the specific relationship between the EU and the UK. That is an area that could be developed, but that is not the main focus. I mentioned from the Parliament's perspective understanding what is happening in the Brussels office and perhaps the information that is gathering could be useful. That is really useful in thinking about our scrutiny of the Government. Finally, I just wanted to ask you a question about the issues of the parliamentary connections. There is obviously the Parliament Partnership Assembly, and, as I understand that the conference on the future of Europe is not finished yet, have we missed the vote on that or is there the chance to come in towards the end of that officially? I am sure that there could well be some option for the Scottish Parliament or wider actors in Scotland to make a kind of contribution to the conference on the future of Europe. I would not say that the vote has been missed, but I imagine that there would be something to perhaps a religious fashion, if you like. Again, that is about saying, as you mentioned, as Boyack, that there are clear areas of interest in Scotland and in the EU, be it on climate change or be it on other areas that you have mentioned. There are views here in Scotland on what happens in all of Europe, and it is not just about the EU. Of course, the conference on the future of Europe is an EU conference, but to me it is worth articulating that there are shared issues here and shared priorities. Despite the reduction in formal access that the Scottish Government and the UK Government now have as a consequence of Brexit, there are other forums to articulate views. It is not to say that they will become integral parts of the EU policy, but it is part of sustaining an important conversation and the linkages between Scotland and the EU. If I could ask a question to Dr Zuleik, I was thinking to focus in on two of the topics that are clearly of major importance to Scotland. It was whether post-COP, in Glasgow, there are opportunities for us to have practical links that would link activity on climate crisis and economic development between the Scottish Government and the EU. Is that something that would be fruitful in terms of putting priorities in for the Scottish Government over the next few months? Certainly, from an EU perspective, this is still top of the agenda. It continues to be a major area of discussion on how we move forward. There are already policy frameworks that have been put into place to realise some of the goals. The Green Deal clearly is influencing a lot of the discussion. The recovery and resilience fund is the main mechanism by which the funding is now happening at the European level. We are starting to see the disbursement of the first funding for that. There continues to be the possibility of engagement. I would always see this when it comes to policy. There are other functions of having relations, but when it comes to policy, I think that it is always important to see it as a two-way street. It is about putting the Scottish position into the Brussels debate, engaging with the debate wherever possible, with the limitations that we have already mentioned. It is also an important part for Scotland to be aware where the debate is going in Brussels and what kind of future policy priorities might be emerging. One of the challenges is that these debates are no longer separate. You cannot easily say that this is the debate on climate change. We will, for example, have a major debate on what role does climate change play in international trade? What kind of carbon border adjustment mechanism might be necessary? How will that influence the openness of the European Union to international trade? We will have debates around industrial policy, strategic autonomy and how far does the European Union have to ensure that some activities protect supply lines. Those will all join into the discussion around climate change. I think that this is a major challenge because engaging with this debate means being engaged in a rather broad way of looking at how policy is made. In addition, we have had a change in recent years that the national dimension is also more and more important within European debates. It matters what happens in Brussels, but it also matters what happens in Berlin and what happens with the new government. What are the priorities that are emerging in the presidential election in France? There is a complexity to that, but I think that it is definitely an area where the European Union is very willing to engage and where there is still a wish by the European Union and the member states to build an international alliance. In that sense, having others on board who share the same values and the same direction is also something that is of political value to the European Union. That is a very helpful answer. I will follow on to the previous questions that I asked Mr Salomon. In terms of our energies as a Parliament, there is holding our government to account and then there is the cross parliamentary liaison. What are your thoughts on the priorities for that in the context of the climate and economic opportunities? Just to follow on from that last answer, what would your advice be for us as a Parliament working within the UK with the other devolved parliaments but also building those links with the European Union? Should it be through the representative networks of offices? Should it be direct parliamentary liaison? What would be your recommendations for us as a committee? From my perspective, the multiplicity of different linkages is always helpful, also being able to use different mechanisms. I would say that, certainly wherever possible, and this is part of the question internally for the UK. This has nothing to do with the European Union, but part of the question is in how far are the different actors within the UK involved in the formal mechanisms, including, for example, the parliamentary assembly? It is helpful to use the offices that are there, which in the end are there to serve the Scottish breadth of organisations, including the Parliament. It is also useful to make direct connections with parliaments. The challenge, of course, is capacity. Doing everything is very challenging, so I would say that, when it comes to direct parliamentary links, you cannot have direct parliamentary links with every member state, with every subnational actor. It is, again, coming back to the question of what are the areas of priority and where might there be an opportunity to work together? For example, when we look at the energy question, I think that there is certainly a natural corporation in the North Sea area with some other countries that also have an interest in energy and climate change in that area. It is very much about looking at the issue and then deciding what is the best way of engaging with that, bearing in mind the limitations and the resources. That is very helpful. I am conscious that we are at the start of a parliamentary term, so those are issues for us to reflect on, thanks to both the contributors. Mr Salamone, you have both referred to Norway and the success that Norway as a non-EU actor has in engaging. It is a great and flexible word for engaging with European institutions. Can I ask you what you feel is that Norway is going to be so successful? The obvious answer to that is that it is a long time since Norway sent its diplomatic budget for your stock home to have someone else represent it, but what is it that Norway is doing that is successful and is the implication for Scotland that we need to scale up our activities in the future? Thank you, Dr Allan. I think that there are a number of elements to Norway's approach and, in some cases, success. One is that you mentioned is that the budget, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is well funded. Of course, Norway is a state. It has an embassy of Norway in almost every EU member state. Of course, most of the EU policy engagement is in Brussels, but as Fabio was mentioning, engaging in the politics of the individual member states is crucial, too, and Norway is able to do that and to do what I call bilateral triangulation. That means that if you want to engage with, for instance, German actors, that you do that in Oslo, that you do that in Berlin, that you do that in Brussels, and you triangulate between them. Norway has the resources, has the missions, has that. The other is that Norway articulates a clear strategy. There is a Norwegian multi-annual strategy for engagement with the European Union, and, if I remember correctly, annual action plans as well, which help to focus priorities against it. Yes, you want to connect with what is going on in Brussels and the EU, in Norway's case, you want to shape that, but you also have your own objectives, your own priorities of what you want to do, and, in Norway's case, engaging on shaping the single market or, as Fabio mentioned, on energy or on the Arctic and so on, having that clear choice of objectives. The other is working quite closely in a very unique way with the Nordic EU member states. I mean some Brussels in particular. The extent to which Norwegian colleagues are able to engage with Swedish, Danish and Finnish colleagues, including the sharing of information, of EU information, which is useful to them, is very helpful. At the same time, that is also added, because Norway spends a lot of time observing what happens in the EU institutions. It can, when a Norwegian nation and Norwegian officials can pick up on things that the Nordic EU member states do not. It is not a question of Sweden telling Norway things that are happening in the EU, and that is it. The Norwegians are also telling the Swedish things that are happening in the EU that are useful to them. That degree of Nordic interlinkage, which I would say is quite unique, I think that helps a lot. The other is that the Norwegians are proactive, they are willing to engage. If an opportunity comes up for some sort of meeting in Brussels that is useful and they can attend, they will. They will fly in people from Oslo to augment the personnel that they have, and they see it as an integral part of their foreign policy, not being an EU. In short, just to resource the co-ordination engagement and all of it, that does not mean that you are necessarily going to influence EU policy the way you want to, but if you want to have a hope of doing so, you have to do it. In that case, Dr Azulig, the predicament of Scotland both covers being non-independent and non-EU. Given what has been discussed today about the complicated relationship between the Scottish and UK Governments and the UK Governments and Europe, what do you feel the opportunities are for multilateral engagement between the Scottish Government directly and other EU states or substates? We should not wait for the UK to come up with a helpful position before we do that engagement. I certainly would see that there is a lot of scope for engagement. I would still make the distinction between the formal and the informal. I think that when it comes to formal engagement, then the mechanisms which are there, the TCA and all the governance which is attached to that will be the formal way that the European Union interacts with the UK and that includes also substate actors. That is not going to be a discussion on, for example, trade between the EU and the UK separate from these mechanisms, but there are many other areas where there can be engagement. I think that what is important there, and that is maybe adding a little bit to what Anthony was saying on Norway, I think that Norway is also very much aware of its limitations. It knows how far it can go in terms of influencing. It knows that it has compromised on many areas and it knows that to be really effective, it needs these alliances. It needs to build something inside the union to be effective. On top of that, at least in the past, there are some issues now also domestically, but in the past there was a very strong domestic recognition of the need for Norway to do this. I think that this is also something that I would say in terms of the Scottish debate. I think that there needs to be a recognition of why this is important, what kind of influence that has. I would say that certainly the goal of the Scottish Government to align as much as possible with the European Union provides that directly. Yes, there is a lot of scope for engagement. In my view, there is also a need for that engagement, but much will depend on how Scotland and not just the Scottish Government, but the wider Scotland, will approach this issue. As you are very aware, Scotland's position is one in a state of flux to some extent, but it is interesting that you mentioned alignment there. I think that Mr Salomon used the word Europeanisation of our political culture. I suppose that there is a question for both of you, but do you feel that those are two sides of the same coin? Are we talking about roughly the same thing here or are we talking about different things? From my perspective, they are certainly connected. The alignment is a practical expression of Europeanisation. I think that this is also a question that I would have for the Scottish political system. What does alignment actually mean? In how far does alignment also mean making difficult choices? The choices where there might then also be divergence with the rest of the UK on certain issues. Of course, this will always depend on the constitutional settlement. It depends on what kind of choices the Scottish Government can make. Alignment is a very ambitious commitment. I am not saying that that is not something that you should do, but to be truly aligned with what is happening in the European Union is an enormous task. It is an enormous task for member states. It is an enormous task for subnational actors within member states, especially when they have legislative powers that are touched by European policy. If that is the direction in which Scotland wants to go, it will require quite a lot of focus and investment to ensure that that is a meaningful alignment. That also means having that two-way discussion with the European Union. Very often, when it comes to alignment, it is not simply about having the text of a law that is then transmitted into the national system. It is about how that is interpreted and how that is then actually realised and implemented. Alignment is a very far-reaching goal. If you do it well, it is a certain Europeanisation of the debate. Europeanisation, in my view, goes further than that. However, it is a major task to aim for. Finally, if I can ask at the same point of Mr Salomon, Europeanisation and alignment, how do they connect? Sure. Thank you, Dr Allan. Yes, I agree with what Fabian has said. Of course, it would be rather unusual or perhaps unique in the case of choosing to align more closely with the EU as part of a third country than the UK would wish to do as a whole. That is something that could be new. The alignment aspect is one part of the Europeanisation, so just on the alignment specifically, it is worth noting the democratic challenges associated with alignment. In the case of any entity that is not part of the European Union, if you choose to be part or align with EU laws of policies or standards, obviously you have no say in those. That can still be a democratic choice, but it means that there may be some challenges there in the sense that you are not shaping those policies that you are choosing to be part of or those laws that you are choosing to follow in a sense. Europeanisation, for me, is much wider. It links with some of the things that Fabian has already said about paying attention. Scottish politics, Scottish society, collectively, or indeed by any one institution, that there is a great awareness collectively for all of us of what is happening in Brussels, what is happening in core EU member states, how that impacts on what happens in the European Union, how that impacts on what happens for us, the general major debates in the EU, the extent to which Scottish actors understand and are a part of acquiring European languages and use them, the extent to which practical co-operations are formed between Scottish Government, Scottish Parliament, civil society, all of Scotland as a collective team with various actors in the EU. They generally speak, including Scottish media, which gives almost no substantive coverage of European affairs beyond Brexit and independence. That all of that comes together in a way that means that Scotland was much more a part of what is actually happening in the rest of Europe, and I think that to a large extent we are just connected from the substance that goes on in the EU. The theme of today is, with some power, the gift to gears to see ourselves as other seers, and I quote Burns specifically, because obviously there is a cultural diplomacy around all of this. No matter how we feel about the shortbread look of Scotland, this is about much more than that. Some of the challenges that I see ahead in our role as a scrutiny in those areas is the fact that we have the PPA coming from the agreement with Europe between Westminster, but we will have no formal role in that as a Parliament. In terms of our role, we are empowered under the Scotland Act to scrutinise our own Government's involvement in that, but they will say that they have no formal involvement in the TCA at this stage. That presents a challenge to us in terms of scrutiny, because we have no power to scrutinise the UK Government going forward. Although the common frameworks are under development, they are still there. The uncertainty around the common frameworks and that executive power is, to my mind, one of the challenges that we have at the moment. How do we do that engagement when, at any turn, if that executive power is used in an area of powers coming back to the UK from Europe? Even though they are part of the devolved settlement, we still might see the UK taking a different turn. That is one of the challenges that I see. I would be interested in your comments in those areas. Surprisingly, I would consider us very staunchly European in our outlook and our attitude. Having served in this Parliament for 10 years, we would say that we have done that, but, obviously, from what we are hearing today, much, much more could be done. I know that we have agreed that the Scottish Government is committed to Erasmus, but are institutions seen as key partners in Europe, still in our universities, in terms of horizon research? If I look at the economic priorities of the Scottish Government, in terms of space technology and life sciences, I would recognise that we are able to contribute in those areas, particularly investment in fintech in Edinburgh. Where do you see those key strategic areas for Scotland? Is there any recognition of those developments in Europe at the moment? That is probably enough to ask at the moment, so I will go to Mr Salomon first and then back to Fabian. I very much appreciate the scrutiny dilemma that you have outlined for your committee and the Scottish Parliament. It is a challenge. As I outlined in my written evidence, I think that it is important, even though it may be unfortunate to be realistic, that the scope that exists for Scottish institutions to influence the EU outwith the UK or the UK itself, and the bilateral institutions of the TCA, could well be limited. The best options—the most promising avenues for scrutiny—is through the Scottish Parliament, but I appreciate it. If the Scottish Government is not as involved in what you scrutinise, I suppose that, as part of the evolution of us adjusting to this new kind of relationship with the EU and, as Fabian mentioned earlier, the animosity that exists at present between the UK Government and the EU, which I suppose we all hope will have a positive resolution. I am afraid that I do not have any particular answers other than to say that whenever engagement with the Scottish Government—that is something that I hope the Parliament can influence—in terms of EU relations broadly, I think that it is important, at least in terms of my own remarks, to be clear that there is a lot of good work that goes on in terms of the Scottish Government's engagement with EU actors on the question that nothing is happening or that nothing good is happening. That is not that. We are in a post-Brexit reality. In that context, it is very important to see a strategic vision for the years ahead. As I have said in my written evidence beef for five years or more, here are our priorities. Here is what we are going to focus on. Here is how our offices are going to work together as a network and how we are going to make the kinds of goals that we set for ourselves to happen in full recognition of the challenges that we face, and they are substantial challenges. In terms of issues like Erasmus or Horizon Plus, even if the UK had agreed to be part of those, there would still be a degree of uncertainty, because in Norway, as part of these initiatives, the UK still opts in with every multiannual financial framework, in some sense, but it is not a perpetual thing necessarily. In terms of the Scottish Government trying to secure unique access to Erasmus Plus, instead of the UK, I do not see that as something that is likely to be successful, to be frank. I appreciate that that could be a disappointment for people, but I imagine that that is the reality of the situation as if the European Union is looking for a UK response on Erasmus and the UK Government does not wish to participate, then there is little scope in between there, unfortunately. More broadly speaking, I would say that yes, the core element of that I want to get across is the Scottish Government having a clear long-term strategy that is what is needed at this point. Dr Silly? I agree with that. I think that the difficulty that I would see from an EU perspective is that, even within the EU, but even more so when you are talking about relations with third countries, it is the Government of that country that is the conduit of that relationship. You do not have formal relations with individual parts of that. It is entirely up to that country to then decide how to involve, for example, sub-state actors within that. What we see, for example, in many federal countries, is that the federal regions are very much involved, but it is up to the Government to decide in which way that is done and, very often, it is based on internal constitutional arrangement. In that formal sense, I think that this will, unfortunately, mean that there are limitations to what Scotland can achieve because of the relationship that the UK is having with the EU at the moment. At times, there have been attempts by the UK Government to actively shut down some of the other voices because they have not been seen as being helpful to the negotiation tactic that the UK Government has pursued. I think that we have to be realistic about what they are. Sorry, we lost you for a moment there, Fabian. Have you concluded your comments? My final point was to say that I would go back to the distinction between the formal and the informal. On the formal side, it is very much dominated by what the Government wants to do, but on the informal side, there is a lot of scope for co-operation and co-ordination. I thank you both for your attendance at committee this morning. It has been really helpful. We will now suspend briefly to swap over to our new panel. Welcome back. We now move to our second agenda item. We are welcome to committee this morning, David McAlister, MEP, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the European Parliament. That is a continuation of our inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work. I invite Mr McAlister to make a brief opening statement. Honourable convener, hon. Members, I thank you for inviting me. I am once again honoured to be a guest of the Scottish Parliament European Affairs Committee. The last time I spoke to hon. Members of your predecessor committee on culture, tourism, Europe and External Affairs was on 25 February this year, just weeks before the final ratification of the EU-UK trade and co-operation agreement. Now, we are seven months into the implementation of this treaty. We certainly face our challenges, but this treaty remains a solid base for EU-UK relations. The withdrawal agreement and the TCA cover a wide array of sectors. The governance framework of these agreements provides tools that ensure a comprehensive and consistent approach vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. All actions here in the European Union need to be seen together and should be coherent and focused. In the future, we need to seek ways to broaden and to deepen our EU-UK partnership. I believe that this would be in the interests of both sides to maintain a close and lasting co-operation, given our shared values and interests, especially in an increasingly unstable world. From my point of view, there is potential for foreign and security policy co-operation with the United Kingdom in several areas, such as co-ordination in multilateral organisations, sanctions, crisis management, capacity capability development, intelligence and development. I do hope that we can exploit the potential in the near future and take benefit of the TCA's broad governance structure and the living character of this agreement, which allows us to build upon a solid base if there is political will on both sides. Let me finish by saying that we as parliamentarians have two key roles when it comes to the implementation of the TCA. We need to ensure close scrutiny of the proper implementation of both the withdrawal agreement and the trade and co-operation agreement, and we need to play a full-running role in driving forward the debate on future areas of co-operation between the European Union and the United Kingdom. I will keep it there. Thank you once again for inviting me. It is a great honour and thank you for your attention. Thank you very much. If I could maybe open with— Are you okay? I'm asking my assistant to close the shutter because the sun's— Yeah, so as long as you're hearing us, that's the main thing. So thank you for your introductory statement. We are in a position of having had a very good relationship with Europe as a devolved Parliament. As you mentioned in the past, there was a lot of co-operation between our predecessor committees and Europe. While we were aligned with the European Union and part of the European Union, that was a more simple situation. However, as a committee that scrutinises the Government, we are concerned about the level of scrutiny and how we might be able to work with the European Union to ensure transparency around the decisions around the TCN. I wonder if there is any light to shine on how we might be able to work with the European Committee in order to do that scrutiny. The general question is how can the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament engage with the European Union and what should it seek to achieve from this engagement? First of all, being of Scottish descent myself, I'm always among the first to welcome close engagement with Scotland and the Scottish institutions. The way Scotland engages with the EU after Brexit will inevitably change also with the change of the relationship between the European Union and the UK. We all know that the fundamental difference simply is that now the UK is no longer a member of the EU and it simply doesn't enjoy the same degree of privileges but also representation in European institutions. That of course also affects the representation of Scottish interests here in Brussels and the way Scotland engages with the EU. I believe that, on the one hand, Scotland should pursue its engagement with the EU by pursuing its interests with the UK Government, bearing in mind the current constitutional situation of Scotland. That channel remains important and it is the formal one. On the other hand, Scotland can pursue a different and more informal engagement with the EU within the limits, of course, of its constitutional position. That includes exchanges that we are having just this morning, as well as informal exchanges on topics of mutual interests, which would be particularly important. Scotland House and Brussels are doing an excellent job. Scotland House is, of course, a useful channel for any kind of engagement with the EU, as well as its representations in some of the member states that you have now established. We are the European Parliament and I can say this on behalf of colleagues from all the different political groups who are keen to hear representatives of civil society and various stakeholders and, of course, politically and democratically elective representatives. We are happy to have informal contacts, but we can also reach out at formal events like the one this morning. I think that the most important thing is that the Scottish voice is heard in the EU and, therefore, my advice would be to use the formal channels that you have within the framework of the UK and, on the other hand, use the other channels that you have, including the informal ones in Brussels, to get your message across. Colleagues are very well aware of the fact that the people in your part of the United Kingdom and Scotland voted in large numbers to remain in the European Union. That is not forgotten. We will always try to find flexible, pragmatic solutions to try to get Scotland as close as possible to the European Union. I want to move to questions from the committee members. I will go to Mr Ruskell first. Thanks, convener, and good morning, nice that you are in front of the committee this morning, Mr McAllister. I wanted to ask you about transparency, in particular in relation to the parliamentary partnership assembly. I am wondering what expectations MEPs might have going into that assembly about how open and transparent the workings of that assembly will be. I am thinking in particular about the long-established rights that we have as European citizens to be part of open policymaking and for the business of policymaking and scrutiny to be open and democratic. What sort of demands will MEPs be making as to how accessible the workings of that assembly will be and what will be the implications for European citizens? Thank you, Mr Ruskell, for your question. I already said that we parliamentarians play a crucial role in scrutinising the implementation of the two agreements and fostering a debate on how we can move forward. I think that sessions like today, as well as the good track record of similar sessions with your predecessor committee show the importance and benefit of our exchanges. I have also attended similar events with the Welsh Assembly committee, and there is a huge interest in the European Parliament, especially to reach out to the Northern Irish Assembly, because for many many reasons in the moment the political debate here in Brussels is very much focused on the protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland. When it comes to the parliamentary partnership assembly, I can inform you that just this morning at 10 o'clock we had the constitutive meeting of our European Parliament's delegation for relations with the United Kingdom. We just voted our president, Natalie Wazaw, from the renew group from France and the two vice-chairs, one Irish colleague from the EPP, Sean Kelly and an SND colleague, a social democrat from Bulgaria, second vice-chair. The 35 members in the EPP delegation will be the European part of the joint EU-UK parliamentary partnership assembly, which hopefully will soon start its work. The parliamentary partnership assembly is mentioned in the EU-UK trade and cooperation agreement, and we are now keen in organising the first meeting. The new delegation that we have here in the European Parliament will closely co-operate with the UK Contact Group, which also gathers representatives from all political groups to scrutinise EU-UK relations and coordinate our position as European Parliament on the matter. Perhaps you can say that the differences between the UK Contact Group and the UK delegation in the European Parliament is that the UK Contact Group is the first point of contact for vice-president Sheffturevich before important meetings with Lord Frost, debriefing and briefing members, whereas the parliamentary delegation is more responsible for the contacts with the UK Parliament. Now, we receive a lot of recommendations as regards the composition of the partnership parliamentary assembly. Of course, we cannot influence in any way how the British, the UK side, is composed. In the end, the decision was taken by representatives from the House of Commons and the House of Lords. There will be no members from the devolved nations parliaments. We respect the British decision, but I would always welcome you to, as I said, use the different channels of informal co-operation, including the European Friends of Scotland, which is an informal network of NDPs representing different political groups. I know that Angus Robertson is keeping a close contact also to those members. On the scrutiny, I would say that we in the European Parliament in the moment are very happy with the work of Marisheffturevich. He is doing, from that point of view, a very good job. He is very transparent in his work. We in the UK Contact Group are informed on a regular basis. We will have our next meeting on 20 December. We have managed to find such a good co-operation that Vice-President Sheffturevich can share a confidential, relevant document about being in the newspapers the next day. We have tested this. At the moment, I have a group of colleagues around me who are very much interested in getting things done and not so much in informing the media in an informal way. That is what I can tell you about the implementation and the scrutiny of the European Parliament. Thanks very much for sharing that news with us. Obviously, it is very early days, but what I am thinking about is practically how, as institutions that are scrutinising this process, or civil society organisations, or even just as European citizens, we are able to engage with this. Will there be full access to papers that are being brought up to the PPA for scrutiny? Will there be full disclosure, full transparency, and what might that look like? What sort of mechanisms are you used to implementing within your own committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee? What kind of culture of openness and transparency might we expect for the PPA? What might that practically look like in terms of sharing of information that is presented to you as elected representatives from both sides, but perhaps might not be available to citizens or those scrutinising the process from afar as we are here in Holyrood? We are just at the beginning of setting up this parliamentary partnership assembly. How visible work in practice in the moment nobody can really tell. It took a long time to actually establish the PPA. Now, obviously, it took us a long time to agree on the size and who is going to be represented. It is all now being formally set up, but we still do not have a date for our first meeting. It always takes two to tango, but I am very sure that we will now see progress also in London to actually move forward. That is the one point. The second point is that we might be able to set the standard in Europe, on the Brussels side, in how we inform parliamentarians. At the moment, we are, as European Parliament, currently receiving all the documents from all committees of the trade and corporation agreement. The European Commission is very transparent, and we cannot complain about not being informed. Quite the contrary, I think that the way that Team Sheffield is doing this is very impressive. However, of course, we do not know what the UK side will be doing, but perhaps if our UK counterparts and colleagues find out and get to know what information we are receiving, they might want to remind the UK Government that they would also like to receive the relevant documents. Thank you, Mr McAllister, for joining us. The previous session of evidence that we talked about is on the formal and informal relationships and contacts that we can have. Clearly, there is a formal relationship for Northern Ireland. As you have pointed out, the PPA has currently no representation from the devolved parliaments. I wonder what we can learn from the relationships that the EU has and the Commission has with other nations. We have heard a bit about Norway, and it will have a different relationship than Scotland would, but also the Basque countries and Quebec. Any thoughts that you have as to how the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government can engage and build on, as you have said, the perception that Scotland did vote to remain in the EU? As I mentioned, the European Union has close relations with so many third countries in the world. We also have good parliamentary co-operation. I was the lackator for Serbia on the last term from 2014 to 2019. I was a member of the EU in Serbia parliamentary delegation. We met on a regular basis. We had exchanges of views. When Serbian ministers would come to Brussels, interested ATEs would be invited for events. We would have lunch events or dinner events. There are many ways, but the difference between a third country and Scotland is that we, as a European Parliament, cannot establish formal relations with the regional Parliament because we have to respect the constitutional order of the third country that we are dealing with. Formal co-operation is not possible, but there are many possibilities of informal co-operation. Here, I have already mentioned that a Scotland House is doing a very good job. It is very active and very present. We have the European Friends of Scotland, an informal grouping in the European Parliament. We have colleagues including myself who are very close contacts with Scotland. My door is always open for representatives from the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament. I am looking forward to meeting Angus Roberts as soon as Covid conditions allow his travel to Brussels. I would encourage US members of the Scottish Parliament to get on a train and please come to Brussels. I am sure that, throughout the political landscape of this Parliament, you will find colleagues who are interested in talking to you and listening to your concerns. I also encourage your Government to come on a regular basis. I was a minister president of the German Bundesland from 2010 to 2013 in Niedersachsen, Hanover. A German minister president is something like the First Minister. I travelled to Brussels at least twice a year because we knew in Hanover that there are so many things going on in Brussels that have a direct impact on Niedersachsen. Just like you have Scotland House, I had a representation. We have representation here and they would usually organise a good programme. Please come to Brussels. You are very welcome and also try and invite European officials to Scotland. I was just together with the Chairman of the International Trade Committee and the two of us co-ordinate the UK contact group. We were just in Northern Ireland for two days and we spoke to representatives of civic society, the business community, the political parties, the Speaker of the Assembly, the members of the Government. It was so important for us to be in Belfast on the ground and to listen to people who are dealing with these issues on a daily basis. We went back and both said that we want to find the most pragmatic and flexible solutions to facilitate everyday life in Northern Ireland but within the framework of the protocol. I am not in any kind of position to give any advice to the UK Government but I am in Northern Ireland and I would always ask Lord Frost and his team to listen carefully to what people in Northern Ireland are saying. Please listen carefully to what businesses are saying in Northern Ireland because they have to live with the consequences of the protocol, not politicians in London. We also use our contacts with the councils that are based in Edinburgh and elsewhere in Scotland. It is a two-way conversation. Thank you very much. Can we move to questions from Mr Golden, please? Thank you, Mr McAllister, for that welcome. I will speak to the convener in due course about perhaps a committee visit to Brussels when restrictions allow. I am sure that we would all love to meet you in person. In the earlier panel around the Scottish Government's EU engagement and thoughts around two main areas of focus, one on practical co-operation on areas of mutual interest and, secondly, participation in debates on the future of Europe. I wondered your thoughts on the Scottish Government's approach around those areas and anything else that you would like to add. Thank you, Mr Golden, for your question. I cannot really add much to what I have just said. I think that the Scottish Government is very present at Scotland House's doing a great job. Unfortunately, we were not able to find a solution to Scottish participation in the Erasmus Plus programme, because the situation was simply that we cannot allow parts of third countries to join the Erasmus Plus programme. I have been informed that the Scottish Government has now established a known programme to encourage young EU citizens to study in Scotland. Those are the ways and means that we have. In the end, it will be a political decision in Edinburgh if you want to present the Scottish position through the formal communication channels that you have within the constitutional framework of the UK, or if you want to use the informal communication channels that exist. That is a political decision that needs to be taken in Scotland. I guess that, in the end, a good mixture of both would probably make sense. That is what I can tell you. Furthermore, there are areas in which we would like to see closer co-operation with the United Kingdom, as I already mentioned, foreign policy, security and defence. That is something that is totally lacking in the trade and co-operation agreement. We here in the European Parliament regret that no agreement has been concluded here. Of course, there are other things that have not been finalised yet in our relations district of the wider area of financial services, where we have a memorandum of understanding, but that is not legally binding. We need to move forward here. From 2026 onwards, we need a sustainable solution for fisheries. At the moment, we have now the 25 per cent decrease of the TACs from 2026. The TCI is considered to be a living agreement. It will need to be adopted to cert realities in the next couple of years. At the final point, I am receiving a lot of letters in the moment, why things are not moving forward on certain topics, including horizon. I think that there is a simple point to consider. As long as we have not found a sustainable solution for all the issues around the protocol in Ireland and Northern Ireland, there is not much appetite in Brussels to move forward on other things. Everything is interlinked. I welcome that in the past two or three weeks, my understanding is that team chef Cheverge and team Lord Frost are sitting down and trying to work on practical solutions. We have not set a deadline. We do not want to have drama just before Christmas, but we all know that we cannot go on and on and on with the Northern Ireland-related issues. Let us try to find a solution for Northern Ireland before the election campaign in Northern Ireland starts. We do not want that to be politicised. We, as a European Union, do not want to get dragged into domestic politics in Northern Ireland. We will have a meeting with Marochef Cheverge and the UK Contact Group on 20 December, where we will get the next update of where we are. Once the Northern Ireland-related issues are solved, we can also move forward, I believe, on other political questions, including all the questions around horizon, which is also a huge importance for Scottish universities. Given your experience of devolved assemblies, on two fronts, I wondered what role the Scottish Parliament could have in scrutinising the Scottish Government's engagement with Europe and the role of parliamentarians and local councillors on direct engagement with the European Union and other representatives from across Europe. For example, even though Scotland and the UK are no longer part of Europe, we are still invited to observe the Committee of the Regions, for example. I wonder perhaps how further integration might be able to be aided in that respect. How you scrutinise the work of the Scottish Government is, of course, up to yourself. I can't judge this and I can't give you any advice, but the few times I've been to the Scottish Parliament, I think it's always extremely interesting following the preliminary debates and the committee work. That is your job. The parliamentary democracy in Scotland is functioning. I have experienced both sides. In my political career, I was an opposition member of Parliament in Edezax, and then we won the elections. First, I was a majority leader and then a minister president, and I finished my career in Edezax and been back in the opposition. I can tell you that it's wonderful to be in the opposition, but it's even nicer to be in government. I wish you all a good success, but that is the nice thing about democracy, that governments actually change. I'm saying this as a German citizen. You probably followed all on Scottish TV yesterday that we have a new chancellor now, and my political family, after 16 years of power in Berlin, will have to learn what it means to be in the opposition and to scrutinise, thoroughly scrutinise, the work of the German Government. Back to what the Scottish Parliament can do. On the one hand, I think that events like today make sense. On a regular basis, I invite representatives from the different EU institutions to speak in front of your committee to reach out and inform the ways to your European counterparts. When it comes to the engagement of UK representatives in European institutions, one consequence of Brexit is that we no longer have British representation in the European Parliament, in the council and all those other institutions. It is very unfortunate that the British voices are no longer heard in so many institutions here in Brussels and in Strasbourg. We are now going to build a bridge between the European Parliament and the UK Parliament, the parliamentary partnership assembly. If our EU institutions, such as the Council of Regions or the Committee of Regions or others, will establish similar formal or informal contacts, I cannot tell you. We in the European Parliament have now done our job. We have established the EU-UK parliamentary partnership assembly. If I could ask a brief question to the parliamentary work that is happening. We have been working with our devolved counterparts and the devolved legislatures. We have asked for observer status within the arrangements for the PPA in Westminster, something supported by the House of Lords Committee. Is that something that you would have a view on? Would you support that approach? As I mentioned, we have to respect the constitutional order of the United Kingdom and it is up to the UK side to decide whether representatives of the devolved parliaments can be sitting around the table or not. I have raised the issue with some of my UK counterparts, and I always received the answer that this will be decided in the UK. It is really good to have you in this meeting with us this morning. Your comments on democracy are well made. We have spent quite a few weeks getting evidence about how we scrutinise the keeping pace legislation. I think that having the parliamentary connection for us is really important. Your observations about sub-national state governments are actually quite important for us because you are still our nearest neighbours. What we want is effective links and accountability. The priorities are about how we maintain those on-going relationships. That inter-parliamentary liaison work is important for us in the UK, but across Europe as well. What are the opportunities for us if we think about top priorities post-Colk 26 and shared climate agenda challenges? You have the climate challenge that people in Germany and Belgium experienced this summer, the climate crisis, and what relationships do we need to foster and how that links into our trade relations. What is our best approach for keeping pace with colleagues in Europe, both at the European level in terms of the European Parliament, but also thinking about devolved states and that regional government agenda, which is very important for us? Well, if you are interested in finding out what we are doing at the EU level, I would suggest that you reach out to representatives of the commission. The European Green Deal is probably the biggest project for the commission led by President Ursula von der Leine in this term. The commission has now represented the so-called fit for 55 package, which is a huge legislative proposal that the European Parliament and the council will now have to agree on. I believe that these debates will at least take one and a half, perhaps even two years. What you might be interested in is, as soon as travel conditions are there, come to Brussels, speak to people in the European Commission and get a presentation. What is the European Green Deal and what is especially this fit for 55 legislative package? Climate change is a huge task for all of us, all over the world and all over Europe. What you might also be interested in is—I can only say this from a German point of view—that the German Bundeslender in many ways has similar competences as you did in the Scottish Parliament. You might be interested in, for instance, reaching out—I think that you have a good partnership with Baden-Württemberg in Germany to reach out to Baden-Württemberg. What does active climate change policy mean for a regional government, for a regional parliament in Germany? I think that you could perhaps learn a lot here, but we in Germany can, of course, learn what this means for us, what you are doing in Scotland, and I know that it is one of the top priorities of the Scottish Government in this term. That is what I would do. Then I wanted to say, as a European citizen, congratulations to Glasgow for being such a good host of the COP26. I spoke to various representatives who were amazed at how friendly the glass regions were, despite the city being invaded by thousands of international guests. I hope that all the participants behaved well. When it comes to our EU-UK relations, we are talking about—I just wanted to underline that in the trade and cooperation agreement and in the political declaration in particular, there are level playing field provisions, and they refer to six fields—competition, subsidy control, state-owned enterprises, designated monopolies, taxation, labour and social standards, environment and climate. Climate also plays an important role in the implementation of the trade and cooperation agreement and also parliamentary scrutiny. That is useful feedback both for our net zero committee and for our economy committee. Our challenge is keeping the overall relations and the scrutiny of overall relations between Scotland and the EU post-Brexit. Your comments earlier about inter-parliamentary liaison have been very useful, particularly in response to your diplomatic answer to the convener. I think that is something that we want to keep pursuing. However, the other point is the trade keeping pace agenda, the challenge of us. To what extent do our Scottish offices in Brussels and other parts of the EU? To what extent can we make better use of them in terms of keeping in touch with the developments that you see taking place in the EU, the conference in the future of Europe was mentioned earlier? Are there lessons from that project that would be useful for us to be kept aligned with so that we can anticipate what is happening next in the EU and at least have the bilateral relationships so that we can see what is coming next and potentially think about where it suits us to align in Scotland and the rest of the UK? First of all, I guess that Scotland House is closely following what we are doing, what we are discussing in the commission, in the council and the European Parliament, and that Scotland House will be providing the Scottish Government with all the relevant information. Scotland House knows that I am always very impressed how they work here. They are a small team, but they are a very effective team, and they are very visible and very present, and they reach out. I also understand that Scotland House is working on a network of people, including myself, to have relations with Scotland, who are dedicated to bringing Scotland to the whole United Kingdom as close as possible to the European Union. On the conference of the future of Europe, I am not a member of the conference of the future of Europe. I understand that the meetings are public, so you can follow them on the web-street. What the conference in the end will bring is too early to tell yet. The conference is gathering input in the moment. It would be premature to already say what conclusions it will make, but we certainly need to steer the European Union in a more geopolitical context. You might have followed that. The president, Ursula von der Leyen, has announced that she is leading a geopolitical commission. I think that one of the main questions that has already been debated in the conference on the future of Europe is how we can strengthen the EU's position at a global level. What we are seeing is that when it comes to trade, we are a superpower. When it comes to trade, we are at eye level with any other power in the world, including the United States and China, but when it comes to foreign affairs and especially defence and security, the European Union is not a global player. Or, as I sometimes say, we are the global payer, but we are not a global player. We definitely need to better co-ordinate our common foreign security policy in Brussels, and we definitely need to become more effective, not only strategically but also the way we have our decision-making processes. We have probably made more progress on security and defence in the past five years than in 55 years before, and that unfortunately also has to do with Brexit. As long as our British friends were sitting around the table, we could not make any progress at all on security and defence cooperation. After 2016, from the last years that the UK was still in the EU, they were happy with those debates, but they said that they would no longer veto things when we tried to move forward. However, I also want to tell our British friends that, if we are now discussing a close European corporation on security and defence, this will be a priority of the French presidency of the council in the first half of 2022, I would always underline that this is not about doing anything in competition with NATO or against NATO or duplication of NATO capabilities. It is about strengthening the European pillar within the established framework of NATO. We know that the UK remains for us a very important and loyal NATO ally. If you follow the debates here in Brussels and in Paris in the next few months about closer cooperation on security and defence, it is not against NATO. It is trying to strengthen the European pillar within the NATO framework. I am not sure whether there is already an English translation of the new coalition agreement of the German Government. For the first time, we have a free party coalition in Germany. Germans love very detailed coalition agreements. I know that a lot of British counterparts observe great interest. It might be worth reading the coalition treaty from pages 131, where the new SPD Liberal-Green Government in Germany also describes the German approach towards Europe. When it comes to the conference on the future of Europe, for instance, the new Government in Berlin expects that the conference on the future of Europe will lead to a, as we Germans call it, Fafasul's convent. It might be a new convention how to reform the existing treaties of the European Union. I am not sure about all 27 member states are discussing this from the same angle in the moment, but at least here you can see an approach in Berlin, which will be echoed in Paris, in Luxembourg, in Belgium and in a few other countries. That is what I can tell you. I am following the recent agreement in Germany with great interest. It is always nice to have such a friendly and very diplomatic face to deal with in terms of our relationship with the European Parliament. You are diplomatic and you have said a number of times that you quite rightly have said that you have to respect the constitutional order in the UK. Of course, I do not have to do that, so I will ask a question as diplomatically as I can. You have talked about the fact that we can use channels through the UK to communicate with the EU. Of course, you have alluded gently to the fact that the relationship has not been simple over the past year between the UK and the EU. Has it been conveyed or is it something that is widely appreciated that the sense of frustration that the Scottish Government and many actors in Scotland have that, for reasons that are not your fault, we cannot exercise any formal channels of parliamentary communication and have to rely on the informal ones? Life is too short to be dragged into domestic British politics. I have so much dealing with European politics here at the EU-level and national politics in Germany that I simply am a very interested observer of British politics. I know so many politicians from all the different political parties in the UK, but I just tried to remain as diplomatic and neutral as possible. How do you organise things in the UK? That is up to you. I can only give you the advice to use the formal channels, but also you are welcome to use all the informal channels. I want to tell all members of this great committee whenever you are in Brussels and regardless of your political affiliation, you are always welcome to come to my office. I have a fantastic view here on the 15th floor of the Spinelli building and my team serves one of the best coffees that you can get in Brussels. I am always happy to listen to your points and all the issues. I am probably one of the few German politicians who actually follow Scottish politics closely and sometimes even listen to Good Morning Scotland on the internet in the morning. That is all that I can really tell you. I think that I have been clear about that there are so many informal channels that you can use. Here, there are people across the political parties in Brussels who very well know exactly that the public opinion in Scotland in 2016 was slightly different than in other parts of the UK. By the way, we also miss the six Scottish MEPs. As we miss most of our British colleagues, it is just so sad that the British boys are no longer heard in these institutions, and that is why if we cannot hear them in the institutions, we need to invite people from a third country UK to our institutions so that you can get your messages across. That is a very diplomatic and very kind answer, so we will take you up on your invitation individually and hopefully at some stage when it is possible, collectively. I wonder if I could ask perhaps more diplomatically, in that case, if I could ask a little bit about, from a German point of view, the lender and obviously your experience in lower Saxony. What kind of role does the lender create for themselves in representing themselves to Brussels and whether that varies from land to land? All 16 German bonus lander have representations here in Brussels. Of course, the larger, the bigger lender have more staff here than the smaller ones. The German lender are very different in size. North Rhine was failure with nearly 20 million people, the economic powerhouse of Germany, and on the other hand, the tiny little Bundesland of the city of Bremen and the city of Bremen have them together. They have about 600,000 people, but all 16 lender have representations. Very active ones are North Rhine was failure, Barton-Württemberg, Hessen and Niedersachsen. You might, at some stage, might want to have a look at, let's say, Barton-Württemberg, which is probably the Bundesland you have the closest contacts to. Go to see the Barton-Württemberg representation or the Niedersachsen or the Hessen representation. What do they do? How are they staffed? What kind of events do they organise? And how do they report back to their regional capitals? The most active and the most visible German representation on the lender side is, of course, Bavaria, which has this fantastic location directly next to the European Parliament of the Castle, where a lot of people often ask me, is that the house where the commission president lives, as I know it's the representation? I say, oh, it's the German representation. Oh, no, it's the Bavarian representation. So, as in many things in Germany, Bavaria is usually the gold standard. But, of course, Bavaria is an extremely wealthy German Bundesland, and they can afford more things than other Bundesländer. That's the one thing. The second thing is, I was a minister president from 2010 to 2013. I went to Brussels usually twice a year. It differs. If you look at the 16th Bundesländer, but usually it makes absolute sense that a German minister president comes at least once or twice a year to Brussels. We have some Bundesländer who have even organised cabinet meetings in Brussels. I remember two or three years ago with Bavarians. We're here with the whole government. Then, on a regular basis, we also have committees coming from the lender parliaments to Brussels. Of course, I'm only aware of when the need is action comes, but I would say in a five-year term of the need is action parliament, every committee of the need is action parliament will come to Brussels at least once during the five-year term. There are so many things that are of huge importance on Brussels for us in the need is action, for Volkswagen, climate change, agriculture, education, researcher. I always encourage my colleagues in Hanover from our regional parliament to come to Brussels. I have never met anyone who said that I was less informed going back to Hanover. I know that sometimes Brussels appears to be very complicated and the procedures are sometimes different than in our own countries, but I can only encourage you to come to Brussels and be received well by the people in the council, the Parliament and the commission. Thank you for that invitation and thank you, convener. Thank you very much. Mr Macaldo, thank you very much for your attendance at committee this morning. Your points about visits and that personal contact are well made. It may interest you to know in the previous session of the parliament, as convener of the Education and Skills Committee, I was able to visit Hanover and see the stem expo there that has been put on for the pupils from everywhere in Lorsac's day to come to Hanover for that conference that they have every two years. It was an incredible experience and I was very welcomed by your colleagues in Hanover. We will take from that some possibilities going forward. I am sure that you will see more of us over the coming months and years, but thank you very much for your attendance this morning. Thank you, convener. Thank you, colleagues, and good luck for your political work of the fantastic country of Scotland.