 Yeah, sure. OK, so I'm going to try and present in 20 minutes a project that Doug mentioned. It's essentially a project that we started doing in 2005. It was a DFID-funded consortium. And it was not just on Africa, but also in India. So we're going to try to present comparative work. And actually, this particular work that we started, I'm still trying to carry on this with this work in a new consortium, also funded by DFID, called Effective States Inclusive Developments in the University of Manchester. So this presentation is based on this book, which came out earlier this year. State Business Relations, Economic Dev from Africa in India. It's a Routledge book. Just probably came out a couple of months back. So it's going to be based a lot on the book. But we have also now got lots of journal papers in different journals, well-developed in JDS, JIG. So if you're interested in some of the journal papers, most of it could write to me and I'll send you those papers. So what do we try and do in the book? We try and address three core questions. The first question is, what characterizes state business relations, or effective state business relations, and how they evolved over time in the United States and also, as we'll see, across African, Sub-Saharan African countries over over 20, 25 years. And secondly, what are the implications of this for economic performance, particularly as an economist, I would like to know is there any causal role that effective state business relations play and can be asked to do that particular role or effect from other factors that affect economic performance? And the final question we had to answer was, how do these relations emerge? I mean, what are the political factors that explain the provenance? And why is it that we actually often see collusive state business relations that are not grown through the enhancing, persisting for quite a long time in many different countries? So this book, what we try to do in this project, actually, we brought in economists and political scientists. We used qualitative methods. We used qualitative methods. And we tried to do both case studies and also econometric work. And this, as I said, is based on this consortium. The website is still alive. It's the consortium finished in 2010. And you can go and check the papers if you want to. Right, so I think some of the stuff Ali Dirk has talked about. I mean, we have to keep in mind, we think about this work. There's been a lot of work already done, mostly by political scientists, who have argued for quite some time that collaborative relations between state and the business sector can be growth enhancing. We know that. And this is something we use to think about the current project. And of course, the case studies have mostly come East Asia. There was a lack of quantitative evidence of what decisions can do for growth. And so as economists, we were interested in this sort of questions. And there was relatively less evidence for African-South Asia. That's changed a little bit, as Dirk mentioned, in the last few years. But really, when we started out in 2005, there wasn't much work on African-South Asia. Just to be clear, what we mean by effective SBRs, and I'm going to use SBRs in short, is a set of highly institutionalized, which we mean repeated interactions, repeated games, can happen through formal mechanisms, but it also can happen through informal mechanisms or formal and informal institutions. So that's very important. Number one, it has to be institutionalized. It cannot be one-off. It cannot be really a situation where it's a one-off game. It has to be repeated interactions. Secondly, it has to be responsive from both sides, both parties, the state and the private sector. And thirdly, it has to be to some extent, to a large extent, public. Not all of it can happen behind closed doors. There has to be some kind of accountability and some transparency in this relationship and state and the business elite. So that's what we mean by effective SBRs. And effective SBRs are more likely to be characterized by collaborative and synodistic relations with the state and the business elite, by definition. And ineffective SBRs will be more likely to be characterized by collusive and trans-seeking relations in the state and the business elite. And that's sort of a way to think about this in an innocent way. And again, Dirks mentioned this, transparency and information. This, of course, the principles of good SBRs come from the work by Donor and Snyder and John Johnson and so on. So this is not our contribution. It's already there. Transparency and information. There has to be some transparency and information provided by the state to this private sector in terms of policies and so on. Reciprocity and actions. We know that in the East Asian case, if the state is giving some credit subsidies to the private sector, they expect something in return, exports for example. Credit working statements. It has to be essentially fixing the creditable commitment problem. The private sector has to believe the state and believe what the state is saying and doing will persist for some time. And trust, of course, has to be there between the two different parties. And so you have to see an absence of collusive behavior to the state and the private sector. How do state SBRs affect economic growth? And again, Dirks talked about it, so I'm going to try and go to this very quickly. Effective SBRs can help prevent both government failures and market failures. How do they prevent market failures? Will the health solve information-related market and coordination failures? For example, business associations monitoring their members and ensuring compliance. That's a very standard way you can think through how good SBRs can help in growth. Also, peak and sectoral business associations that are active, independent of the state, and represent the private sector, the region, can resolve into the curative action problems that are inherent in developing countries. Now, if I step back a little bit and just think about institutions, the literature institutions development, we think about the kind of two kind of dominance trends on that. One has been the argument that property rights are very important for development. This is the argument that Asimoglou Robinson and others have used. A second argument has been what transaction cost minimization functions institutions. This is the Oliver Williamson argument, which is informed to a logic so they're doing business reports to the World Bank. The way we see SBRs is as we see through a third function of institutions, which is coordination and solidarity, solving collecting action failures. We're not saying that you can't bring in transaction cost minimization or property rights within SBRs, but I think seeing institutions in coordination failures as SBRs are helping to resolve that is a very nice way of thinking about why SBRs matter purely from an institutional form. How do they, and so sorry, so the next point would be government failure. So essentially, as I said, the big issue here is that SBRs can lead to credible commitment as a part of the government to certain policies that can minimize uncertainties on future policy actions in months investors. And the next feature of this would be a creating institutional environment where the private sector can demand high quality public goods when the state has infrastructure effective public transportation and secure property rights. And finally, FHPSSBRs can provide check and balances about balance function of government tax expenditure policies because you'd expect within good SBRs the government essentially trying out different views on taxation and expenditure policies on the private sector who are saying to them, well, this makes sense, but this probably doesn't. So you'd expect some kind of a way, the calibration that happens within good SBRs that can provide a check and balance function government tax and expenditure policies. But to try then, so the question of causal effect of SBR, that was a big thing we struggled with at the beginning of this program. So how can we actually actually be convinced convincing other economies perhaps more so than other social scientists that SBRs matter of economic growth? And for that we had to obviously, as we are all in as in economics, we had to find a measure of effective SBRs. I mean, and here is where, because we were essentially trying to develop a measure of SBRs where we are not going to try and start doing a lot of primary, try and get a collection. We had to go back in time because we wanted to get a sense of how SBRs evolved in Africa and in South Asia. So we essentially find to try to find a measure that was time varying over time and across countries or regions, right? So we could, in that case also, purely methodologically, we could use panel data. It was very useful because as we know, there's a lot of criticism of cross-country regressions in institutions and developing literature. We don't want to avoid that. We had to find a measure which was based on observable features of effective SBRs because we were going back in time. So we were going back in time in African context about 30 years, 40 years. We had to find what is something we can observe. So the properties of a measure in most parts, it is objective and not subjective, not perceptions-based, like the governance measures, the Coffin-Gray measures to some extent. We captured more of the formal dimensions, less informal dimensions. That is a weakness of a measure. And we call it as a combination of both de-heure institutions and de-facto institutions. Because again, as you know, there's been a big debate about measurement, that do you go for de-heure or do you go for de-facto? Our measure combines both de-heure and de-facto. So the four dimensions we tried to do, this is Dirk Williams' pioneering work on this particular, on the measurement of work. The first is how is the private sector organized vis-a-vis the public sector? Is there an umbrella of association, for example, when was it formed? How active is it? And so on. Secondly, how is the government organized vis-a-vis the private sector? Is there an innocent promotion agency? When was it formed? How active is it? And so on. Third was the relations, interaction with the private and the public sector. How are state-based relations practiced and socialized? Is there a joint economic council, for example, when was it instituted? How often does it meet? And so on. And finally, what mechanisms are there? What is the harmful, collusive behavior? Are the competition laws? When are they enacted? And are they actually enforced? So in Africa, we had Dirk did this early work for us where we measure SVRs for 19 African countries for about 30 odd years. So I'm going all the way to 1970, use mostly de-heure measures. Mostly, as I said, you have to consider data collection. There's nothing stopping us if you want to do something, work in the future, to use de-facto measures and use perceptions-based approaches. There's nothing stopping us in this way. In India, we also went back for about 20 to 35 years, 1985, for 15 major states. In the Indian case, we had more time and we could do live more. In primary data collection, we visited every state and allowed us to bring in some de-facto dimensions. So the African case, just to briefly put up this plot, the group one of the countries that have been the fastest growing countries, this happens to be Motsbotswana, Mauritius, Uganda, Mozambique, and so on, so. And interestingly, if you can see in the African case, SVRs improved pretty much across these 19 countries, but the country that had the highest growth in the simple descriptive graph also had highest improvement in SVRs. This is just purely looking at a correlation, right? And the country which had the lowest growth, group four country, which, if I can just read off from here, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Zambia also had the lowest improvements in SVRs. And then we did some econometric work. Dirk and I did this, this came out in JDS a couple of years back, a general development studies. There's also a chapter in this book. This was a dynamical palliative regression we did on looking at economic growth and found whatever we did with cross-any controls, across any type of robustness checks, we found the effect of SVRs and a strong positive current growth, the significant 1% level in most regressions. An interesting thing was that when we also brought in other measures of institutions, the standard measures that are used in the literature, exploration risk, corruption, those other measures seem to lose significance versus the SVR measure, which was quite interesting. And also we found, and this was slightly less robust in the earlier finding, we found that good SVRs, very SVRs, seem to lead to proper growth because we also had data on poverty and growth over this period. Again, Dirk's got a chapter in this book with Mahavash Kureshi looking at, so suppose you are in a country which has good SVRs and you're a member of a Debit's Association. What does it mean for productivity? And so we also looked at micro effects of SVRs and here we find, interestingly, the work that Dirk's got here, we find the countries with the best SVRs for membership associations get the biggest productivity gains, and that's also interesting. So in a sense, as a firm, if you happen to be in a country where SVRs are improving or getting better, you tend to see much more productivity gain of being a member of the association. And actually, this particular work, we did it also for Indian states, with Indian data, we find very similar results. So in the Indian case, again, the advantage in India was that, obviously, with India, we have meta-institutions that are fixed, rule of law, legal institutions all are fixed. So the problem, again, comparing countries, often is not the case in India. And India also, we know that different states are done differently over time. And the fact that India, we also have a federal structure where we have significant political economy, a political autonomy of Indian states, allows us to explore sub-national variation in SVRs. And that's also important. So not only talking about cross-national variations, SVRs in the African case, but also talking about sub-national variation in SVRs. And again, in India states, very quickly, you can see that SVRs evolve very differently. There are states like West Bengal that's been very little improvement, states like Bihar that's pretty much flattening out and probably falling off. And the states are Andhra Pradesh, which have shown significant improvement over the speed of Andhra Pradesh is there. So is Tamil Nadu and so is Punjab. So we can see very different variations in the same country within different parts of India. Same thing we did for India as we did for the, as we had done for Africa. This is a paper I did with Max Calius, come out in World Development a couple of years back, and also chapter in this book, a version of the work we did. And here again, we estimated downloadable data regressions. Here we could do a lot more in terms of checking for endogenous concerns, because that's a big issue in institutions literature. That is the fact that growth is actually leading to better stability relations or vice versa. We did, we had a lot of range of controls and we found strong evidence of impact of SBRs in growth. The one person increase in our measure, our measure was from zero to one. A one person increase in our measure is a three person increase in long run state level growth. This is a very significant effect actually. Now, finally the last couple of slides, really. The third question was, why is it that we do get to see improvement SBRs? And we've seen that already in Africa, where we've seen improvement in some countries and not in others and in the Indian case. And this is where we essentially the case studies and political scientists did a lot of work for us in this project. And of course, there are different things. I'm gonna just sort of put this up in one slide. Develop an ideologies and go to dominant and political economic elites. What do they think about the, about growth? What do they think of the private sector? How much is that linked synchronized with effect of SBRs? That's very important. And the second thing that's important is just, the first one is probably pretty well understood. Nobody will have a problem with that. The second one, I think it's more interesting in the sense that we do think, and this is where Adrian's, the late Adrian's work is very important, that you can't really have effect of SBRs. We think of SBRs being a game, a game between two players, the state and the business sector. You can't have effect of SBRs if the population is heavily one sided. You have a very strong state and a weak private sector. You have a very strong private sector and a weak state, somebody could get captured. And you know which one could get captured. So symmetry of power is very important here. And we found that in our case studies, that you essentially, you need to have some symmetrical power relations within the state and the private sector. It also mattered. Again, I think this has not been discussed so much in the literature, how the bureaucrats is organized is very important and bureaucratization. So not just the IPAs, investment professional agency, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry, the different public sector organizations that deal with the private sector, like if a structure corporations, how are they organized, how do they function is very important. Along with that, on the other side, how is the business sector, the private sector organization is also very important. So if you see more than one business association in a country, then we know there's a bit of a problem. Particularly if those two associations are trying to speak for the same set of people, same set of firms. So multiplicity, form, structure, how is business sector organization organized, how effective is the organization, how often does it meet its members, all that we form are very important, explaining effective SPRs. And of course, along with that, formal and informal institutional links within a state and business, it didn't always have to be to formal institutions in the African case. It happened often to informal mechanisms, but we needed to see repeated, as I said, repeat interaction in the state and the business sector for effective SPRs. And finally, of course, leadership and human agency, you did see sometimes certain elites taking a particular role and interested in this effective SPRs. And we saw that and, in fact, it also used the Malawi Mauritius example, but I may not have time. That was very important. But the thing that was important in this work that we found was that getting good SPRs, effective SPRs not a technocratic fix. You just kind of said this ago and say, I'm gonna try and get good SPRs in this country. It essentially came from political processes, establishing, sustaining and renewing effective SPRs was essentially politically determined and could not be had to order. That was very important. So there's not a part dependency that came in having good SPRs. I'm gonna skip this next two slides because I don't think I have much time. I wanna just focus on this one slide, last couple of slides. The first thing is, what does it mean for Southern governments, our research? Our research sort of shows, and I think particularly the work that Dirk did with co-authors, including me and others also, that formal organizations and institutions that exist in the IPAs, formalized BPDs, private-settlement associations and enactment of competition laws into a matter for growth. And I think the way to think about this is that, when you set up an IPA, which is functional, when you set up effective competition law, it's the signaling that you're sending from the state of the private sector that we take you seriously. We take you seriously, we also want to avoid collusive behavior. So the way I think, I would see this as a signaling device, more than what the IPA really does, but the competition law actually does, it's a signaling that you're sending the credible commitment problem that you're going to fix, that gives you the growth effect. That's the way I would like to see it. And also if you have effective private-settlement associations, then and formalized BPDs, the private-settlement will just convey its legitimate concerns and demands of the state and transparent and credible manner. Very important to fix collective action problems in the private sector, and especially in the context, as in Africa and India, where we have very, very dispersed private sector, lots of small players, lots of small firms and some big firms. If you let the big firms do the talking for you, then you have a problem. You've got to find a way to bring in small firms in this intense interaction. For donors, what does it imply? It implies a different institutional approach to growth that stresses government, private-settlement relations, interactions, less focus on property rights, less focus on transaction cost minimization that's been there in the literature institutions. And the clear that evidence that we hope we present using this kinematic work, this relations interaction matter for growth. We hope we can convince those who take, who want to see causal stories that we have a causal effect of SBRs of growth. The other thing I think it's important to keep in mind that we're not talking about setting up an IPA or setting up trying to get an associate business association up and running. We're talking about brokering the processes that facilitate good SBRs. That's very important. And also, given that there was so much suspicion with these associations, certainly in India and perhaps also in Africa, you got to recognize the fact that business associations can be developmental in the sense that they can actually help in bringing in the private sector and actually play a very important role in the development process. In the Indian case, it's very particularly striking because those who have followed the Indian economic policy, there was this very strong command and control regime where the public, the state, did not really take the private sector association which was there very seriously because a lot of them in fact were engaged in significant rent seeking behavior. And then in the mid 1980s, the state at that time, the government of the time, decided to start promoting a new association called the Confederation Indian Industry which was very different, most composed engineering firms, not at all like the earlier associations which were essentially composed of traditional industries and that association played a very important role in brokering good SBRs in India. And there's some very good work by Ashima Sinha, not to our project, Ashima Sinha and Stanley Kochanic on that. But the other thing is that, we've got to be careful that as I was saying, that it's not really about trying to create formal organization, that's not so important. And again, we've seen many times, you have seen business associations out there who are not really doing their job. We've seen state agencies out there who are not really doing their job. The more important thing is trying to make sure that the interactions that are there have been set in business association, that the business elite actually gets strengthened and is effective. Okay, thanks, John.