 Welcome to the Stockton Seminar Series. My name is Professor James Kraska, and it's a real honor for us here at the Stockton Center for International Law to have three outstanding presentations from experts in Indian Ocean Maritime Security and Law. First, I'd like to introduce Captain Sravjeet Parmar. He's the Executive Director of the National Maritime Foundation, and he has decades of experience in strategy and concept development with the Indian Navy and the Ministry of Defense. Also, we have Commander Kumar, who joins us. He's the Deputy Director of the National Maritime Foundation, and he has decades of experience with fleet operations, and he's a specialist in anti-submarine warfare. And finally, we have Dr. Bimel Patel, who comes to us as the Director General or the Dean of Rakshakti University in India. He's the former Dean of Gujarat National Law University. He's a member of the National Security Council Advisory Board. Welcome, gentlemen, and we very much appreciate your thoughts and comments on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. And with that brief introduction, I'd like to turn it over to Parmar. Sir. Thank you, James. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I've been five minutes to a broad brush on what I will call the Indo-Pacific. And first of all, we have to understand what is the Indo-Pacific? What is the Indo-Pacific from India's point of view, from the American point of view, from the Japanese point of view? If at all, that concept has to emerge as a construct, whether it's security, or it's economic, or a holistic maritime security, we need to have a consensus. I take a leaf from Barry Buzin's theory on regional security concepts, in which he says he's divided the whole world into various regions and the regions changed after the Cold War was over. And among all the points which defined a region, one of them was durable periods of amity and enmity. Now, this is applicable to all subregions. So even if you look at various subregions in the Indo-Pacific, you need to amalgamate them together, come to a consensus to an understanding of what is the Indo-Pacific. Then only can the Indo-Pacific as a concept and lines thereon gain importance. For the simple reason that it is still developing, and today we have the COVID situation, which has thrown the whole world into turmoil. And therefore, the impact of COVID-19 on the maritime capabilities of nations is still being assessed. I don't have to give you an example of Thierry Roosevelt or the French carry a fork or a Russian nucleus. Somebody that was tied up alongside, all nations have been impacted in some way. These are trying times, or as Henry Kissinger said, we are living in dangerous times. We need to work together, we need to pull together. COVID-19 situation, who's taking advantage? I really don't know. Are the Chinese as strong as they claim to be? I don't have an idea right now. Maybe it'll take a better part of a year for us to analyze as to who is going to come out top. But in the meantime, if you're going to look at Indo-Pacific maritime security, we need to come to a consensus and see it from the same lens, if not similar. I'll pause here, thank you. Commander Kumar, would you like to go? Yeah, I'll do that. Can you enable my screen share? Yeah, considering that, I thought that we are discussing now the naval or military aspect of what we discussed. Am I audible? You're good to go. Yeah, so if we see this entire map here, the Indian Ocean region, including the South China Sea, it's a vast thing and it has got the centrality and what we talked about that it has got the ocean churn which is already happening and there is a requirement to consider it as a holistic problem and then sort out the issue by not having, getting a divided, different, different regional bouquet but having one consolidated in any one can be picked up. Maybe Ion's is a good idea. This holistic maritime security which I discussed, I very much believe that if until and unless we look at the entire situation as a whole, we will miss out on something and our efforts may not be as effective as it is and that's what we are seeing. The non-traditional threats also we have seen that they are all closely combined with each other. If you see human trafficking, there is some requirement reason for it because of the economy, there is on trafficking, everything is interrelated and that's why we have, we cannot look at one particular thing and go. However, after this, the important thing comes back or as a naval person, how do I impose laws in our maritime zones because these things we too confront. So one is that we can invoke right to visit that article 110 and in that most important thing is that the flag state content is not required. So most of the non-traditional security threat which are there if a naval vessel or if a naval practitioner faces, it can invoke the right to visit article 110 and go ahead and do the law prevention at least and wait in the time the coast guard comes to carry out the law enforcement or right to hot pursuit for the ship which has violated the law. Second option can be maritime law enforcement as a simple routine peacetime operation. And this will be only thing that we'll have to be careful to remain within the existing international law that is we should not cross the level of use of force where it becomes a human rights law. Until the time we are there, I think as a law enforcement we'll not have a problem. The most difficult thing comes is the military maritime militia in the South China Sea which is affecting and they are milling around wherever the naval vessels are there. So how do we tackle them? Because if we go and directly attack them then there will be a human rights issue that they are a fishing board. However, if we can prove that they are acting as an auxiliary during the armed conflict or while they are doing, that means if they can prove that their nature is not purely fishing, then we will be able to enforce the law enforcement. However, for that I feel video and audio recordings will play a large, large important role because it will show how they think graduated, what all checks and balances have been done for the force which you use the force to ensure and ascertain that the vessel indeed is not involved in a legal fishing activity. So, or if the country has got some fishing regulations apprehend the vessel, treat the vessel as military instrument in times of armed conflict. Now, this navigation through NINDAS law, I think I have talked about this with Professor Casca earlier also and there was a mail I sent about the freedom of navigation. I think there is no requirement to term it as a freedom of navigation. UNCLOS gives us every right to go within the 12 miles. And ICJ also has given the same remarks. It says inherent right of innocent passage. So, there should not be any hesitation in going there. Denial of rights, it says that a state can for a time being regulate the innocent passage, but only for the time being. It does not mean that it can be forever. And for that even Professor Patel gave example of Corpo Channel case. And at the end, I would sum up with this if you see this picture, John, what can you see? I see both an older couple. I see a chalice and I see musician, another musician. There are more. There is a lady here. There's something here with bottle high here. What I'm trying to say that the more I read UNCLOS, it depends on the figure and ground. The more you read the perspective from you want to see it, it gives you that understanding. So, if you want, I think UNCLOS can give many, many answers for which we are struggling right now. That's all, thank you. Thank you very much, Commander Kumar and Professor Patel. And I turn it over to you, please. Thank you, James. Very much. My major questions again arise with how the Indo-Pacific construct, which apparently looks to establish cooperation to make the Indian Ocean more stable and perhaps one of the intentions could be to prevent any power which would like not to respect the international law of the sea and generally the question comes and the whole world targets China. As I also mentioned, there are significant differences on almost all aspects of May 10 zones. So, if you're talking baselines, TES, CZ, in fact, the US practice vis-à-vis its own ratification of 1958 conventions and its reluctance to join UNCLOS itself is going to be a big challenge because let's keep in mind that US might be very well-dread before any international tribunal, successfully or unsuccessfully, we do not know. If US would like to go for more liberal navigational rights, which are directly in conflict with 1958 conventions to which it is a party. As I also mentioned, the question of historical title, well, the South China Sea arbitration award has given some ideas on historical titles and special circumstances, but let's not forget that US and Japan itself would have very hard time not to accept the arbitral award for its own purposes because if they would like to deny China, then they have to deny it to themselves. So, I do not see so far the treacher coming out how the US and Japan in the respective regions are interpreting the practices. I also raised the question of international states and archipelagic sea waters. Number of basic states with which India and US would like to cooperate, they're very hard times. Indonesia, for example, North-South axis is not to define Philippines is under tremendous pressure. In view of this, what will happen? Because as I said, the US has drawn straight baselines on a number of its areas and US is denying or consistently protesting against also including India on the straight baseline, why? So, for example, would US continue to protest and how this protest will turn around? So does it mean that, for example, if India or other countries would like to come up with straight baseline method and would they succumb to US pressure under this so-called Indo-Pacific cooperation? I think this is very, very fundamental question, which I don't think would be in the interest of number of the Indian Ocean states which would like to have Indo-Pacific. So therefore I believe that Indo-Pacific cooperation will have a roller coaster journey. One very specific point which I consider is I personally believe that US is far less interested in all other soft law, soft law of the sea problems such as maritime environmental pollution, human smuggling, US doesn't care in my view. US is more interested in military activities and therefore it is very important to keep in mind how Indo-Pacific regime will deal with military activities in the EZ because the large number of Indian Ocean states have different interpretations than the US practice. US is insisting upon absolute freedom of navigation, as it is important for our economic security, strategic relations, and global dominance. How the higher countries would react to this regime of permissible activities advocated and practiced by the US in the EZ there is very, very question. For example, will Indo-Pacific countries allow military activities including surveillance and training because I believe that Indo-Pacific regime would be very interested in doing surveillance and monitoring, sorry training not only for Indian Ocean but we are looking at China, we are looking at Russia as well. And therefore I fully appreciate the concerns with China and Russia has vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific construct because I don't think the Indo-Pacific construct actually is coming in direct conflict with the Russian and Chinese interests. So we cannot be oblivious to the interests of these two major powers as well. As I also say that our own practice, we would like to return authority to regulate military activities in the EZ. Does this mean that India and US will gradually reconcile our views and in what direction? And let's not forget about Article 301 and Article 224 and if you read Article 88, which says about high seas for coastal properties and this provision applies to EZ, for us, coastal properties means the military activities as well. So are we talking some sort of gradual erosion of the Indian concept of non-permissibility of military activities in EZ? I very much doubt. And therefore US will certainly not like to have any limits. And if that is the case, it will directly at crossroads with countries. So these are very, very hard questions which we all have to address. And therefore maybe a soft understanding, not maybe arrangements are very important at least among the four countries. Let's not forget that if Indo-Pacific regime is being, will be perceived or not only by Russia and China, but also other Pacific countries including other, you know, I'm talking in Japan, I'm looking here on the other side of the world, also Canada, I think these countries would not appreciate if we will move in the direction which would actually come into conflict with their interest as well. So I think we have a lot of hard work to do and we also to do a bit of strategic communication to these countries as well that the Indo-Pacific cooperation is not intended to contain any particular country. It still allows the national interest to prevail as my colleagues also say, you know, national interest when Henry Kissinger was here when he addressed us in December last year only. He was very clear, he said to us to the national security advisory board, what matters is the national interest. And I don't think neither India nor any of the Pacific countries would like to give up their national interest for the so-called emerging Indo-Pacific cooperation, especially when the, you know, the intentions are not known to large number of countries. So at this stage, as I said, I sound very, you know, sounding well, allowing bills then music to the ears, particularly my colleagues in the US, you know, defense or USNWC, but I think we have to move it very, very cautiously and we have to address the concerns of not only the foes or adversaries, but also the friends in the Pacific, broader Pacific region. Thank you. Thank you very much for those comments, Dr. Patel. And with that, Commander Kumar, you have an additional thoughts that you'd like to share. Please go ahead. I just wanted to raise a discussion with Professor Patel. Sir, your point with regards to not having military activity in EZ by India, let's say India, have you looked into this possibility of reciprocity? If we hold on to very strongly that in our EZ, we will not allow military activities, then if we are going out as a blue water navy and we also have our aspirations to become a, you know, provider of net security or go to other countries to look into and expand ourselves, then will it not be, you know, straining us? So from that point of view, as a responsible power, which remains within the bounds of law and honors the law and expects others also to do it, is it not that we should, our stand on EZ should start changing? Because if we are holding on to it, then tomorrow nothing stops, let's say, Obama or UAE or any other country, which allows free military activities to say, hello, in our area also you can't do because it is reciprocity. So probably from that point of view, also we need to have a thought about it. That's all. Thank you very much for those thoughts as well. And so I think, are we out of time, Colonel Cherry? Unfortunately we are, sir. You have to close out the session. Okay. That's wonderful though. It really provides a really nice presentation. I think all of you are very complimentary, beginning with a strategic focus from the captain and then more of the operational level from Commander Kumar and then Bimmel with some sort of broad international law issues and policy issues. Really wonderful collection. I think this is gonna be helpful for the students at the Naval War College and we deeply appreciate all three of you sincerely.