 So in this second lecture, I will try and give you an introduction to the international legal framework for nuclear security. Nuclear security, as you can see from this definition, which is a bit old, and I think the IEA now uses a broader definition as a working definition for nuclear safety. But I still have on this slide an old definition that was adopted in 2002 by an advisory group on nuclear security, which is a group of experts which advises the IEA secretariat, the DG, and the IEA secretariat on issues of nuclear security. And from this definition, although it's not the more recent one that the IEA uses for working purposes, you can see what I already told you in the previous lecture that basically the difference between nuclear safety and nuclear security is that, whereas nuclear safety is about protecting the outside world from the negative consequences that can potentially derive from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear security is really about trying to avoid outside interference by unauthorized people or maybe terrorists or other non-state actors with nuclear material and facilities, which could then result, of course, in a nuclear safety event. Because if there is outside interference with a nuclear facility or with nuclear material, this could then result in a nuclear safety issue if there is a release of radiation. But nuclear security is really about trying to avoid these outside interferences in order to protect nuclear material and associated facilities from the unauthorized activities of non-state actors, individuals. So the focus is really on non-state actors. And that is why nuclear security is also different from safeguards, which is, you will hear about it this afternoon, is about the verification of non-proliferation obligations which are placed upon states. So safeguards is really dealing with whether or not states abide by their legal obligations in the area of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or as nuclear security is about trying to avoid interference with nuclear material and associated facilities from non-state actors. This is an area, by the way, which for a long time was not exactly dealt with within the IEA. Because as I mentioned in my previous lecture, for many years there weren't any treaties in the era of nuclear law, except for nuclear liability, which we will deal with in the next lecture. But there were the IEA safety standards. There were the IEA safety standards that the IEA could adopt under its statute. And then at some point states decided that it was time to adopt binding obligations in the era of nuclear safety. And they started to adopt these various treaties which deal with different aspects of nuclear safety. In the era of nuclear security there were no standards because the statute of the IEA does not specifically empower the IEA to adopt security standards. It only refers to safety standards. So it is an area where gradually the member states of the IEA became aware that there was a need for the IEA to deal with nuclear security as well. And the Board of Governors started to adopt decisions whereby the IEA secretariat was decided, was authorized to do a number of things in the era of nuclear safety. These were the so-called nuclear security plans which were adopted by the Board of Governors, which is one of the governing bodies of the IEA. But even before these nuclear security plans started, at least one treaty was adopted under the O-species of the IEA. This was the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which was the first binding instrument which was adopted not by the IEA, but under the O-species of the IEA, by the IEA member states. This is an important difference because the IEA can't do anything unless the member states tell us that we can do something. So the states decided to adopt binding obligations in the area of the physical protection of nuclear material. This convention was then amended in 2005 by the amendment to the physical protection convention, which ended into force in May 2016. Then there are, of course, also non-binding instruments. I don't want to go back to issues that I have already mentioned in my previous lecture concerning nuclear safety. But in nuclear security, we have the same pattern that we see in nuclear safety. On the one hand, we have the treaties which are binding upon states that have freely consented to become parties to these treaties. And these are the Convention on Nuclear Safety and its 2005 amendment. But we also have non-binding instruments that have been adopted under the O-species of the IEA. One of them we have already mentioned is the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiative Sources, which is important precisely because it deals with both safety and security. And that's why it's relevant also when we describe the legal framework for nuclear security. But in the area of nuclear security, another, an important factor which distinguishes it, if we want, from the area of nuclear safety, from the legal point of view, is the fact that apart from those instruments binding or non-binding that have been adopted under the O-species of the IAEA, there are a number of other instruments, treaties in particular, but also resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations that have been adopted outside the framework of the IEA. So the IAEA is not the only entity under the O-species of which instruments have been adopted which deal with nuclear security. And for example, we have here, and I will come back to this later, the most important of these treaties that have been adopted outside the framework of the IAEA, which is the number of United Nations conventions that were adopted under the O-species of the United Nations organization, the most important of which is the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This convention was adopted, I think it should have been adopted under the O-species of the IAEA, but for some reason, for political reasons, I think it was the Russian Federation at the time who took the initiative to start drafting this convention. And they decided that it was better to negotiate this convention within the United Nations and then have it adopted within the framework of the United Nations organization. So there are a number of UN conventions, the most important of which is the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism. But there are also other specialized treaties which deal with specific areas where nuclear security is relevant, which have been adopted under specialized agencies of the United Nations. You're probably familiar with the fact that the United Nations family is made not only by the United Nations organization, but by a number of other intergovernmental organizations which are legally separate from the UN are part of the United Nations family because the UN exercises a supervisory function over these organizations through the Economic and Social Council, mainly, which is an organ of the UN. These organizations are called specialized agencies, and one of them is the International Maritime Organization under the O-species of which two important instruments have been adopted, which are relevant for nuclear security. And yet another one is ICAO, which I already mentioned before, which is the International Civil Aviation Organization. In this case, it makes more sense that these instruments, these treaties, were adopted outside the framework of the IEA, although one may question even that. But at least these relate to specific aspects of nuclear security, which deal with maritime issues, and that's why they were adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization, which has its headquarters in London, or they deal with civil aviation aspects of nuclear security, and that is why they were adopted under the auspices of the ICAO, which has its headquarters in Montreal in Canada. And then finally, we have at least two important security council resolutions. These are not treaties, but they are also legally binding, like treaties, because, as some of you I'm sure know, the United Nations Organization treaty provides that the charter of the United Nations, which is the constitutive treaty of the UN, provides that the Security Council, which is an organ of the United Nations, under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, when there is a threat to the peace, which is a very generic concept, which can encompass everything and its opposite. So it's up to the Security Council mainly to decide when there is an issue which constitutes a threat to international peace, or whether there is a natural breach of the peace, which is a more grave a situation, or whether there is an act of aggression, which is the most important of these situations. But normally, when there is a threat to the peace, the Security Council is empowered under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter to adopt binding decisions, which are binding on all UN member states. They are binding because the UN Charter, which is a treaty which has been ratified by the members of the United Nations Organization, the Security Council has this power. And under Chapter 7, the Security Council has adopted at least two important major resolutions, which are binding, which are relevant for nuclear security. So the picture from the legal point of view of nuclear security is a little bit more complicated than the picture we've seen in the area of nuclear safety. There we have legally binding and non-legally binding instruments, but they have been all adopted under the auspices of the IAEA. Here we have also the same pattern. We have legally binding and non-legally binding instruments. But at least when it comes to the legally binding instruments, some of them have been adopted outside the framework of the IAEA under the auspices of either the United Nations Organization or some of its specialized agencies, such as IMO or RECAL. And then we even have decisions by the UN Security Council which are not treaties but are binding on all UN member states. So as you probably know, maybe I didn't say this strongly enough in my first lecture, there is a major difference between a UN Security Council resolution based on Chapter 7 and a treaty. Because treaties are legally binding, of course, but they're legally binding only on those states that have freely decided to become parties to these treaties. It's not that once a treaty enters into force, it binds everyone. It only binds those states that have freely consented, normally through an act of ratification, to become parties to the treaty. So it's a voluntary process. Each state is free to decide whether or not it wants to become a party to a treaty. Once it has made that decision, it ratifies the treaty, the treaty becomes binding upon that state. When it counts the UN Security Council resolutions, it's more like being within a federal state, in a way, in the sense that the UN Security Council resolution has the power, unlike the IEA, to adopt binding decisions on all UN member states. That means that it's no longer a question of free will, in particular because, as you probably know, the UN Security Council is not made of all UN member states. It's made of 15 UN member states. So 15 UN member states can decide to adopt measures that become binding on all UN member states on the basis of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, when there is a threat to international peace or a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. So this is a major development in international law that was made after the Second World War, when the United Nations Charter was adopted. So this is the major difference from the legal point of view between safety and security. Here we have a number of legally binding instruments that have been adopted outside the framework of the IEA. And we even have at least two decisions of the UN Security Council, which are binding on all UN member states, and not only on those states that are freely consented to be bound, as is the case for multilateral treaties. There is also another aspect that I would like to point out from the general point of view, that leaving aside the UN Security Council resolutions, which have a more comprehensive scope of application, in particular one of them, if you look at these treaties that have been adopted outside the framework of the IEA, like, for example, the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, all the specific treaties dealing with maritime nuclear terrorism that have been adopted under the auspices of the IMO or of civil aviation, nuclear terrorism that have been adopted under the auspices of IKAO, all of these treaties only deal with one aspect of nuclear security, which is the criminal law aspect. Those of you who are lawyers probably know what criminal law means at the national level, at least. It means that there are a number of offenses which each state decides are criminal offenses in the sense that an individual who is suspected of having committed one of these offenses can be arrested and he can also be prosecuted. And if found guilty, he can then be sanctioned, sanctioned and put in prison, for example. That is typical of criminal law at the national level. Most states have a criminal code, others do not have a criminal code, but they have common law offenses, they have statutory offenses, and so on. At the international level, there have been a number of treaties that have been adopted in the area of criminal law that put upon the state's parties an obligation, an international obligation, to consider certain acts committed by individuals as criminal offenses in their national criminal law. And these treaties then usually also deal with international cooperation in criminal matters in order to facilitate the arrest and prosecution of individuals who have committed these criminal acts in the sense that they provide that if an individual is found in the territory of one state and that state does not have a direct interest to arrest and prosecute that individual, that state still has to arrest that individual and if it doesn't want to prosecute that individual, they will extradite that individual, I mean is they will transfer that individual to another state that has a more direct interest in prosecuting that individual. For example, because the criminal act was committed on the territory of that state or because that criminal act was committed against a person which is a national of that state. If these are cases where there is a more direct interest for a state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction vis-a-vis an individual and thereby prosecute that individual than for example within another state where the individual may be present at some point but the offense was not committed there, it wasn't committed against any national of that state and therefore that state does not have such a direct interest in prosecuting that individual. But because the treaties have, these international criminal law treaties have the aim of facilitating the prosecution of this individual so that there can be no safe haven for people who have committed these offenses that are of an international character, then there is an obligation for the state to extradite that individual so that it can be tried in another state that has a more direct interest in prosecuting. So this is the international criminal law aspect and these treaties that have been adopted under the auspices of organizations other than the IEA mostly or exclusively deal with this aspect of nuclear security. There are certain acts which are relevant for nuclear security which have to be considered as criminal offenses and in respect of which states have an obligation to either prosecute or extradite the individual who is suspected of having committed one of these offenses. When we look at other aspects of nuclear security like the actual measures that the state has to take in order to protect nuclear facilities or nuclear material from the interference of these individuals. So the preventive aspects if you want of nuclear security we don't want these offenses to be committed and therefore we take a number of measures in order to protect, physically protect nuclear facilities or nuclear material from outside interference. Then if we don't succeed then we will prosecute the individual who has committed that act. But even before that we need to take measures to avoid that and physically protect and do other things that may be important in order to prevent these criminal offenses to be committed. So this aspect of nuclear security is not dealt with by these treaties that have been adopted outside the framework of the IEA. It's only the IEA that has adopted either binding, oh actually, it's only within the framework of the IEA that states have adopted binding treaties in this area and the IEA has also adopted a number of non-binding instruments which we will see are called nuclear security recommendations that deal with this which is probably the most important aspect of nuclear security because nuclear security is much more than simply the criminalization of certain acts committed by certain individuals. We'll see this for example in the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material which is the first convention that was adopted in this area and it was adopted under the auspices of the IEA. This convention has at the moment 155 states parties. The scope of the convention is threefold in the sense that it deals with the physical protection of nuclear material and then it deals with the criminal law aspect, so the criminalization of offenses and then it deals with the third aspect with international cooperation and information exchange. So there is one aspect of the CPPNM which is the criminalization of offenses but there's only one aspect of the convention. Perhaps not even the most important aspect of the convention. The most important aspect is the first one, the physical protection aspect. Here again we see the usual pattern that we've seen in nuclear safety. When states decide to sit down and adopt a treaty they discuss its scope of application and there will be some who want the scope of application to be very broad, there will be others who want the scope of application to be very narrow and then there will be inevitably a compromise and this is what happened when this convention was adopted. Although it has a very general title like the CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety has a very general title but then if we look at the contents of the convention we see that it only applies to the safety of nuclear power plants that has a very narrow scope of application compared with the concept of nuclear safety as a general concept. Here the convention is called Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material but actually the articles are in the convention that obliged states to adopt measures to physically protect nuclear material only apply to nuclear material which is being transported from one state to another to nuclear material which is in international transport. That was a compromise at the time. States didn't want to adopt binding rules relating to the physical protection of nuclear material in general. They said oh we only want to deal with the transboundary issues. When it's a purely national issue because there is nuclear material which is in domestic use storage or transport we don't want to be bound by any international treaties. This is a matter for national sovereignty. Each state has to decide freely by itself how, if and how it wants to protect nuclear material at the national level. So that was the compromise when the convention was adopted. So actually the scope of application of the convention when it comes to physical protection is rather narrow. Fortunately when it comes to the criminalization aspect the scope is not so narrow because there are a number of acts which are criminalized by the convention which means that the state's parties has to consider these acts as criminal offenses in their national criminal law which relate to out let's say in general unauthorized interference with nuclear material by private individuals and these are quite general application. It doesn't matter anymore whether this unauthorized interference is with nuclear material which is being transported from one state to another. They just apply to any outside interference with nuclear material whether it's in domestic or international transport. So they have a broader scope of application. The article relating to criminalization of offenses and then of course there are a number of other articles that deal with jurisdiction, extradition, cooperation in criminal matters and so on. And there are also in the convention a number of provisions relating to international cooperation and information exchange among the state's parties but I don't want to go into details because we don't have too much time. However, this was a compromise when the convention was adopted. At some point it was realized that the scope of the convention was too narrow. In particular as regards physical protection it was realized that it's not true that any state should be free to decide by itself whether or not and how to protect nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport and that there was a need for international binding obligations even for nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport and for nuclear facilities that are by definition within a state's territory. And that is why at some point negotiations started that the outcome of which was the adoption of the amendment to the CPPNM which was adopted in 2005. This amendment took many years to enter into force. It only entered into force as I mentioned last year because the convention on the physical protection on nuclear material has a provision relating to its amendment which puts a very high threshold on the entry into force of any amendment to the convention that may be adopted. So this amendment was adopted in 2005 but the convention provides that any amendment to the convention only enters into force once it has been ratified by two-thirds of the contracting parties to the convention. This is a very high threshold. If we look at some of the other treaties that have been adopted in the area of nuclear security outside the framework of the IEA which ended into force much sooner than the amendment to the CPPNM we'll see that the reason was that the threshold for entering into force was much lower. Of course, if you put a low threshold and you say the amendable ended into force once it's been ratified by five states you will have an amendment that will enter into force very soon, it's not very difficult to find states who will ratify an amendment. But then of course it will end up with an amendment that is only in force for five states and the others may join at a later stage and God knows when. So the decision was taken when the Convention on the Physical Protection was adopted that because this is a sensitive area any amendment to the convention should enter into force when there was broad consensus and broad consensus meant for those states at the time at least two-thirds of the state's parties must have consented to be banned. And this threshold was reached only last year and that's why the amendment ended into force so long after its original adoption in 2005. So, but now it's in force. It's in force for those states that have ratified it and the IAEA of course is working on getting all the other states parties to the CPPNM which have not yet ratified the amendment to also ratified so that everyone will be party to the amended convention. The amended convention has an extended scope of application in all three areas but I think the most important one is the first one physical protection because as I mentioned the CPPNM despite its very general title had a very, very narrow scope. It only applied to the physical protection of nuclear material while in international nuclear transport. Here at last states realized that this was not acceptable there was a need for obligations in the broader area of the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and therefore the amendment now covers the physical protection of nuclear material in not only in international transport but also in domestic storage use and transport and it also applies to the protection of nuclear facilities. And the important thing about this aspect is that the convention and like the original the amendment sorry unlike the original convention has a number of obligations that a state has to abide to regarding the national legal framework relating to the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. There are a number of general principles that have to be abided by the states parties that relate to the independence of the regulatory authority and other aspects which are familiar to those who deal with nuclear safety but in the air nuclear security have been for the first time put into binding rules by the amendment to the physical protection of nuclear material. There is also an extended scope of the criminalization provisions because new offenses have been added which relate to the nuclear smuggling, illicit trafficking and sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. The original convention mainly related to the unauthorized possession, use, transfer, disposal of nuclear material that could cause that caused or could cause injury to third parties. It applied to robbery or theft of nuclear material. And now we have these additional offenses which relate to nuclear smuggling and illicit trafficking and sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. And then we have an expanded scope of the provisions on international cooperation among states. Now within the IEA, apart from the physical protection convention on its amendment, we then have a number of non binding instruments that have been adopted under the auspices of the IEA or by the IEA directly. Like in the era of nuclear safety, I think the most important one as we've already mentioned is the Code of Conduct which is important because the CPPLM and its amendment do not cover radioactive sources. They only cover nuclear material which is defined in such a way to exclude radioactive sources. So again, this is a pattern that we've seen in nuclear safety as well. States are not prepared to adopt binding obligations for activities which they consider rightly or wrongly to be less risky. So for sources which are risky but are not as risky as nuclear material, there is only a Code of Conduct. Also for the security aspect, there is no international convention. There are those who would like to transform the Code of Conduct into a binding treaty. But so far, this tendency has not reached the stage where states are prepared to consider whether or not to turn this Code of Conduct into a binding treaty. We have then what might be called the equivalent of the IEA safety standards. So I've said that the statute of the IEA only provides for the IEA to adopt safety standards but the practice has developed whereby the IEA also adopts nuclear security recommendations. And the number of such recommendations have been adopted which are published in the IEA nuclear security series. The most important of these is also known as INSIRC 225-RF5 because it's also published as an information circular. INSIRC's are information circulars that the IEA produces for the information of its member states. And one of these relates to recommendations providing guidance for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. This is very important because it goes into details like the safety standards go into technical details. The nuclear security recommendations go into technical details which are not in the conventions. The conventions have more general provisions but so the recommendations will actually facilitate states in abiding by their obligations under the CPPNM and its amendment because they will provide more technical rules and guidance that states will incorporate if not at the level of legislation at the level of secondary legislation or regulations that will be adopted by a government or by a regulatory authority within a state to provide the details. But there are nuclear security recommendations. This is the most important ones but we also have nuclear security recommendations relating to radioactive material which are not covered by the CPPNM. So the IEA recommendations go beyond the scope of what is obligatory for states under the CPPNM and its amendment. And we also have recommendations for nuclear material and radioactive material out of regulatory control which is nuclear materials as experts on nuclear security will be able to explain better to you these are nuclear or radioactive materials which are no longer under the control of a regulatory authority but may also be interfered with by non-state actors and therefore pose a nuclear security threat. And there are nuclear security recommendations for those as well. Now if you go outside the IEA we will find as we've seen before a number of treaties that have been adopted in order to cover specific aspects of nuclear security. Under the auspices of the IEA we have at least three important treaties that are relevant for nuclear security. But I would like to emphasize once more that unlike the CPPNM and its amendment these treaties are really exclusively or almost exclusively about the criminalization aspect of nuclear security. They don't deal with physical protection. They only deal with those acts that a state has to consider as criminal acts under its criminal law and they deal with the contained provisions on how to facilitate at the international level the arrest, prosecution, extradition of individuals who are suspected of having committed one of these acts. You see the conventions listed there. The most important of these conventions is the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism. This is important because it covers criminal acts and authorized criminal acts which are related not only to nuclear material like or facilities like the CPPNM and its amendment but also radiological. So it has a broader scope of application than the CPPNM and its amendment because it deals with radiological material other than nuclear material as well. But on the other hand it doesn't deal with physical protection. It has some provisions but these provisions basically mostly refer to the IEA measures relating to physical protection. So these conventions like the other UN conventions is basically a criminal law convention. Doesn't deal with other aspects of nuclear security except through referring to the IEA. Then we have the other conventions that have been adopted by specialized agencies of the United Nations. I am Mohony Kaur which deal with specific acts relating to maritime terrorism or aviation terrorism and specifically relate to offenses which have to do with nuclear or radioactive material. So they are also relevant for the purposes of nuclear security but again they only deal with the criminal law aspect of nuclear security. The fact that there are so many conventions about the deal with the criminal law aspect of nuclear security may give the impression that it's actually very difficult for a state to abide at the national level with all of these conventions. There are so many of them. We have the CPP and Amnesty Amendment. We have the three United Nations conventions. We have the IMO conventions. We have the IKAO conventions. But actually a good criminal lawyer, I'm not rating myself as a good criminal lawyer because I'm not a criminal lawyer at all but I think a good criminal lawyer can adopt or can advise a state to adopt criminal law provisions that can comply with all of these conventions without having to have too many separate articles. One on the CPP and Amnesty Amendment. One on the UN conventions. One on the IKAO conventions. One on the IMO. You can have relatively simple criminal law provisions that cover all of these offenses which at the international level are covered by different treaties. It's not so difficult for a good criminal lawyer to devise a way whereby through the adoption of a relatively low number of criminal law and procedure provisions a state can abide by all of these treaties together. And finally we have the United Nations Security Council resolutions. There are two of them that I think need to be recalled. One of them was adopted almost immediately after the events of 9-11 in the United States of America and the aftermath of these deadly terrorist acts. There was a United Nations Security Council 1373 adopted under chapter seven of the United Nations Charter and therefore legally binding at least on UN member states which is about the prevention and suppression of terrorist financing but not only of terrorist financing so the financing of terrorism. This is a relatively new aspect which was then also translated into a convention on the suppression of terrorist financing by the UN which you've seen in that list of United Nations Convention which are relevant for nuclear security. It's also about the prevention and criminalization of terrorist acts. So most of what this convention of what this resolution provides you can already find in international treaties but of course there is a big difference from the legal point of view because as I mentioned before international treaties are only binding of those that have ratified these treaties freely decided to ratify them whereas this resolution is binding on all UN member states. So they're mainly important in a transitory period before everyone has ratified the treaties. There also are provisions that go beyond the treaties but I think mostly they are important because they make it binding for everyone to abide by rules that under treaty law are only binding on those states that are freely decided to ratify each of the treaties that we have mentioned before. We also have another UN Security Council resolution 1540 that was adopted in 2004. Again under chapter seven of the United Nations Charter which deals with it's about the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction but not so much from the point of view of the IA safeguards because it deals with non-state actors. So it's a nonproliferation. What the convention, what this resolution wants to prevent is non-state actors becoming involved with activities that may lead to the building of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. So it does contain a number of provisions which are very directly relevant for nuclear security. Some of them again you will also find that are similar or corresponding to legal obligations under existing treaties and in this case the main importance of this resolution is the fact that it makes it binding for all UN member states whereas the treaties only oblige those that have freely ratified them. But the resolution also goes beyond and regulates a number of other aspects which are not necessarily covered by international treaties. Both these resolutions, so 1373 and 1540 established Security Council committees which are composed of members of the Security Council which have the competence to monitor the observance of the resolutions by the UN member states. Again, there is a reporting system, states have to report to these committees on how they abide by their obligations and the Security Council committee is there to verify or monitor how states comply with these resolutions. What happens if they don't comply? In theory, because this has not happened yet, United Nations Security Council is in a better position than the IEA to adopt sanctions because under chapter seven of the United Nations Charter if a state does not comply with any of these resolutions, the Security Council could decide that that state's behavior is a threat to the peace and adopt sanctions against that state. Economic sanctions or other kinds of sanctions which again will have to be adopted by UN member states but they're much more effective than what the IEA can do. But of course this can only happen if there is a consensus within the Security Council because as you know, the Security Council is composed of 15 states, five of which are permanent members and these five permanent members have a veto power. So no Security Council resolution can be adopted under chapter seven unless the five permanent members are in agreement. If one of them is not in agreement, there will be no sanctions against a state that the Security Council Committee may have found to be not in compliance with the Security Council resolution. So finally, these are conclusions. One of the mantras that you will hear if you participate in activities within the IEA is the concept that responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each state. Legally speaking, this is a mantra because this is true for every activity. It's an aspect of national sovereignty that states are free to decide on what to do within their borders and it could be relevant for nuclear safety just as well as for nuclear security. But in the era of nuclear security because of the sensitivity of nuclear security, states like to repeat this whenever they have an occasion to. Nuclear security is the exclusive responsibility of each state. At the same time, the recognition that there is a need for international cooperation has increasingly been recognized within the international community and that has been translated in the adoption of these treaties, the treaties that we have seen were adopted under the auspices of the IEA and those that were adopted outside the framework of the IEA or non-binding instruments. So the need for international cooperation is recognized as extremely important. There is a publication which the IEA has issued which goes into more details about what I've been introducing to you today. So if you're interested, this is also available online. It can be freely downloaded through the website of the IEA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Andrea. You, for this comprehensive presentation, you've managed to keep it as it was not simple within the allocated time and therefore I would suggest to you that before we move to the last item this morning, liability, we could accommodate a couple of questions, if any. And are we going now to one? Madam.