 I have a couple of questions in the pipeline one from Ruth Martenson asking, well, saying you say that households and firms have different inflation expectations. Is there also a difference in inflation expectations between between northern and southern countries or eastern and western regions? For example, the reason for this question is that there seems to be a difference in attitude depending on the geographical and socio-economic background. Yes, there is a difference and again, this is why it's important to have a survey which is run by the ECB to have a consistent measurement of inflation expectations. For example, in Germany, people tend to be more informed about inflation and they have inflation expectations schooled to the ECB inflation target in other countries. Now, why is this happening? It's a good question. We can do more research there. And again, this is one reason why we need more investment into infrastructure here. Build surveys run under mice control trials and see what people respond to. We can have different messages for Italy and have different messages for Germany to manage expectations and have them under control. Okay, so let me take another one, Roberto Motto asking, can it be that households and firms do not respond to policy announcements, but they respond to practical implication of the policy decisions? For example, the mortgage rate that they face is lower after an expansionary monetary policy. So the response found in micro-models may be right after all. Yes, that's a great question. And Dimitris Gergarakos, Oliko Bjorn, Michael Weber and I have a paper where we inform people about recent inflation numbers also about mortgage rates. And we see that the mortgage rates generate the biggest responses on the part of households. But what is surprising is that most people are still relatively uninformed about mortgage rates. And mortgage rates are not directly controlled by the central bank. So one implication of our research was that when we deal with policy communication telling people about the policy rate, for example, the Fed Fund rate in the US is not particularly helpful for households because that's not the rate that they face. If the Fed can say something specifically about their objectives for the mortgage rates, that's going to be more effective. And so it's true, our models may be right in the end, but the transmission mechanism is different. So a related question from Matthias Farkas. What does this mean? So what Roberto asked for? Would this mean that asset prices are more relevant for households because they are more volatile than consumer prices? What is the relationship between SPF and households? Can we think of SPF's expectations as an anchor to household expectations? How about the term structure of household inflation expectations? Well, many questions. Let me start backwards. The term structure for households is typically suggesting that they think inflation is extremely persistent. So if you ask me what inflation is going to be next year and I tell you 5% and then you ask me how much inflation I expect over the next 10 years per year, I will also tell you 5%. So it's kind of very peculiar inflation structure. There is very little mean reversion. And in contrast, professional forecasters don't take inflation as highly persistent. It's number one. Can professional forecasters work as anchors? Yes, they can. There is this very influential paper by Chris Carroll where he has an epidemiological model of information transmission that people gradually learn about forecasters and micro-economic conditions in the economy from professional forecasters. And this channel is operational, but again, it's relatively slow. It takes time for people to absorb this information. And so I guess the evidence I see in the data suggests that there are this information, this information frictions, they create these departures between professional forecasters and households, and it should be incorporated in our models. And finally, the stock market, households who have stocks and hold bonds, they tend to be much more informed in on profits because they have higher education, they have higher wealth, they have higher stakes in tracking this information. But in the U.S., the fraction, for example, of households who hold stocks is very small. And as a result, you know, this is a force, but it's not a very strong force. Okay, let me ask you one question on my own. I remember reading your paper, the paper you wrote with co-authors on adjustments in inflation expectations for a control group around, you know, the J. Powell speech, Jackson's speech last year, where he announced, you know, the results of the Fed strategy review. And I remember that I thought the conclusion one could distill from that paper, disheartening as it was, was more or less the following. When Central Bank speak, the broad public doesn't listen. When it does listen, it doesn't understand. When it does understand, it doesn't agree. So would you agree with this? And if you do agree, do you think the last thing so that they don't agree with what we say? So Central Bank say it's due to the fact that they have a supply side story in mind for inflation? I think it was a very good summary of what we found. I tend to be an optimist and, you know, being a university professor, I believe in education. So we can certainly, over time, educate people and explain to them the benefits of average inflation targeting. And people will learn eventually. Yeah, that's a good sin. How much time it will take? I don't know. But again, with some luck and effort, we should be able to overturn this mindset. Okay. I don't see more questions coming. So, unfortunately, thank you very much, Yuri. Again, a very, very good presentation. And I must say this brings us to the end of the conference. Let me express our heartfelt gratitude, particularly for all the panelists and presenters for giving us so much insight into issues that are very relevant for Central Banks and with which we all grapple every day. But also all participants know us best and made the debate so lively. So we hope to see you next year at our next Monetary Policy Conference, hopefully in person. So great day to everybody, or great evening, and see you soon. Bye-bye.