 This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. For thousands of years, Pacific Islanders have been masters of the sea, navigating oceans by canoe, guided only by the stars. With climate change and globalization hitting their shores, they've become innovators on how to save their heritage. There are over a million and a half Americans of Pacific Island ancestry and over 1,000 citizens from freely associated states serving in the United States Armed Forces. This puts people-to-people ties at the heart of our relationship to a part of the world that has been vital to the strategic interests of the United States. During World War II, the U.S. Navy built an airstrip on what is now the nation of Kiribati. But today it is the People's Republic of China that has planned to rebuild the former American airstrip. Beijing is signing policing deals to provide cybersecurity and community policing assistance in the region. Since the Solomon Islands changed their recognition from Taiwan to China, PRC nationals have moved to the islands, flooding the market with low-cost goods, extracting timber and fish and other resources, bringing in tourism practices that threaten the natural environment, and some cases setting up transnational criminal operations that evade the limited capacity of local law enforcement. All this compounds the forces that drive young people to search for economic opportunities elsewhere. Developments that are deeply concerning to the United States and our allies in the region, like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, at the same time Pacific Island nations are on the front lines of the climate crisis. Many are only a few feet above sea level. This makes them particularly vulnerable to extreme weather events brought on by climate change. Not only does this mean many of these nations could be uninhabitable in coming decades, it presents a serious threats to important sensitive American military installations. Earlier this year a series of extreme waves damaged the U.S. military base at the Marshall Islands, a base used as space and missile test range for the United States, Department of Defense, with some of the Army's most sophisticated tracking equipment. So I'm pleased that the bottom administration has prioritized our engagement in the region. Building new embassies is not easy. We all know that, especially where land and domestic capacity is limited and ocean levels are rising. But I want to encourage the Department to be creative and to move as quickly as possible. Beijing will not slow down its efforts to gain influence in this important region. Neither should we. Congress recently passed and funded for all three compact of free associations, nations, and we're glad that the COFA was finally enacted. For more than 40 years, COFA agreements have governed these critical relationships. The bottom administration has called these COFA the bedrock of U.S. role in the Pacific. I want to thank Senator Manchin, Barrasso, and ranking member Rich for their bipartisan leadership in getting COFA agreements across the finish line and signed by the President. I also want to acknowledge the leadership of Senator Schatz and Senator Arona in regards to that agreement. I wish the same spirit of cooperation applied to our China bill and the administration's out and compete China's proposal, which has been proposed again in this year's budget. The U.S. competition with China concerns almost every single member of our committee, as well as most members of the United States Senate. I appreciate the staff on both sides getting us about 80 percent there. We now need to reach the finish line. But if we're serious about countering China, I ask that the ranking member to work with me and every member of this committee to finish the job in the next work period. I also want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. We have a distinguished panel of witnesses, and I look forward to your presentations. I hope you will speak about how we can speed up the expansion of our diplomatic presence. How do we work with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and others to support and foster economic opportunities in the Pacific Islands? What we can do to climb and prove our military installations to defend our national security interests in the years to come, recognizing the great risk there? And finally, I ask that you lay out what is at stake for the United States military in the region if we fail to engage. I look forward to your testimony. With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member, Senator Bish. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me, before I start on my preparatory remarks, let me say that on the China issue, like the issues we're talking about today, this is a bipartisan issue, and we should do that. On February 6th, as you know, I wrote you a letter about this, and we haven't had a response to that yet, but we should air these things privately and will continue on, I'm sure. But these are bipartisan issues, nonpartisan issues, not partisan issues. We've had a long history of friendship with the Pacific Islands, and this hearing comes as we usher in the next chapter of U.S. commitment to the region. Just last week, Congress acted to renew the Compacts of Free Association, as you noted, Mr. Chairman. These agreements are foremost a promise to the three compact countries, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Papau. Through these compacts, we partner with them to advance economic prosperity, provide for U.S. military veterans from nations, from these nations, provide cooperation in areas of law enforcement and judicial training, and much more. Further, our security partnership with these states are critical. In World War II, we fought our way across the Pacific, costing significant American blood and treasure. We have been in that region for decades, and with these agreements, we stay for years to come. They are strategic investment in our national defense and in our partners in the Indo-Pacific region. However, in order to maximize these partnerships, the administration must adjust its policies to demonstrate U.S. focus and commitment are not going anywhere. First, our diplomatic presence in this region still needs serious work. We have been too slow to get our diplomats permanently on the ground to push back against Chinese influence. I am also concerned about the lack of support for the diplomats we do have in the Pacific. Nowhere is this more evident than the Solomon Islands. By the time the State Department started paying attention, China was already signing a major security agreement. When the Department asked personnel for the post, it did not ask for a single public affairs officer to push back against the Chinese propaganda. This is a large globe. There are a lot of countries, but my staff has been monitoring this particular region for the numerous important reasons I just mentioned. This isn't just about getting our people on the ground. Once there, they must be able to do their job and advance U.S. interests. It is clear we are moving at the speed of bureaucracy and not the speed of relevance. I have sent five letters to Secretary Blinken urging a nuanced expeditionary approach to our diplomatic expansion. I have encouraged using these flexibilities that my Secure Embassies Construction and Counterterrorism Act provides to stand up our diplomatic presence and creating a South Pacific management platform to improve support to these remote missions. The Solomon Islands example brings me to a second issue, security cooperation. In addition to greater Chinese military and law enforcement presence in the Solomon Islands, other nations continue to explore security arrangements with China. Luckily, in May 2022, Pacific Island countries came together and rejected China's push for a region-wide security agreement. That was proof of what dedication to sovereignty and regional unity can achieve. Papua New Guinea, which just signed a new security pact with us last year, has been approached by China about a new security and policing arrangements. Chinese police are present in Kirimas, and we know Chinese has set its sights on other nations. I would like the Departments of State and Defense here today to discuss the implementation of our security pact with Papua New Guinea and help the Committee understand how this agreement serves our interests region-wide. I would also like an update on where Chinese security cooperation initiatives are causing the greatest concern and how we are working with our partners to address it. I would especially like the Defense Department to discuss Australia's role in security for the Pacific Islands. We all know about AUKUS, but there's certainly more to it than that. Finally, I'd like to an update on economic development in this region. I am aware of our work on undersea cables and illegal fishing, but want to know what other concrete projects we are pursuing. I want real details on this, not just descriptions about creating an enabling environment or building stakeholder networks, etc., etc. We know that some Chinese projects, like a hospital in Fiji, did backfire. But this means the U.S. and our partners need to get our act together more quickly. With that, I'll turn it back to the Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rich, for his opening comments. We will always attempt to work together on all issues, including this region. I want to welcome all three of our witnesses to today's hearing. I'll introduce you, and then you'll have approximately five minutes to give your opening statements. Your entire statements without objections will be made part of the record. Welcome, Assistant Secretary Crittin-Brank. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and has been an American diplomat since 1994. He has served in numerous posts in the Indo-Pacific region, including most recently, as the former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam. Assistant Secretary Ratner, welcome. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs and also, along with this committee, under then-Chairman Biden. So you get special privileges. You can speak for five minutes and 10 seconds. He has also served as a Senior Advisor on China to the Secretary of Defense. And then we have Assistant Administrator Schiffer, who is no stranger to this committee, and we welcome his return to SD 419 in his capacity as USAID to talk about his work in the Pacific Island region. Again, as alum, you get the extra, we'll give you an extra 15 seconds because you and I worked together when I was chair of that subcommittee. Mr. Schiffer is a former Senior Advisor and Counselor on the Foreign Relations Committee, covering issues related to the Indo-Pacific. So he, in theory, should be able to anticipate and answer every one of our questions. Mr. Schiffer also brings an abundance of experience prior to his service on the Center Foreign Relations Committee. He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and as Program Officer at the Stanley Foundation, responsible for the Foundation's Asia programs. With that, we will start. Mr. Chairman, can I interrupt for just a moment? Certainly. I'd like to note that Assistant Secretary Clinton Brink is actually from Nebraska, so maybe he should get 10 seconds for that. Absolutely. This committee is getting a little out of hand. I can understand that. Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, good morning. Chairman Cardin, ranking member Rich, members of this committee, thank you very much for convening this hearing and for the opportunity to testify on U.S. strategy in the strategically important Pacific Islands region. I'm honored to be joined by my colleagues from the Department of Defense and USAID today, and I understand my good friend, the Pacific Island Forum, Secretary General Henry Puna, is here as well and honored by his presence as well. The United States is a Pacific nation, and we share long-standing, historic, and cultural ties with our Pacific Island neighbors. As Vice President Harris said in 2022, the history and future of the Pacific Islands and the United States are inextricably linked. U.S. prosperity and security depend on the Pacific region, remaining free and open, prosperous, secure, and resilient. The Pacific Islands are important partners on many global issues, from standing together at the U.N. on human rights and opposing Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, to contributing to global security through peacekeeping operations and to tackling the climate crisis, as well as combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. The Pacific Islands face significant challenges to their security and their prosperity, including from climate change and economic shocks, making the region more vulnerable to influence from the PRC. As Secretary Blinken has said, the PRC is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. That certainly holds true in the Pacific. Through foreign assistance, elite capture, and robust public messaging campaigns, the PRC has moved aggressively to assert itself in the Pacific Islands. In addition, in recent years, three Pacific Island countries have switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the PRC. And in 2022, as the Chairman and Ranking Member noted, the Solomon Islands signed an unprecedented security agreement with the PRC, the details of which have not been publicly released. Of course, as we have often said, we are not in the business of forcing countries to choose, neither in the Pacific nor anywhere else. But we do want to ensure that countries in the Pacific have a choice and the ability to make their own sovereign decisions free from coercion. Under the Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Pacific Partnership Strategy, the United States has expanded its diplomatic and development engagement with the Pacific Islands. President Biden has convened two summits to engage with Pacific Island leaders on shared priorities, including climate change, trade and investment, and a free and open Pacific region. Since the first Pacific Island summit in 2022, we have announced plans to work with Congress to provide over $8 billion in new funding and programs. We opened embassies in the Solomon Islands in Tonga in 2023, and we will open an embassy in Vanuatu later this year. We also continue to work with the government of Kiribati on our plan to open an embassy there. We have recognized the Cook Islands in Yoy as sovereign and independent states. Peace Corps volunteers have returned to Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga, and they are planning to return to Vanuatu later this year and Palau in 2025. We appointed the first-ever U.S. envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum to enhance cooperation with the region's leading foreign policy body. We have also increased our presence and assistance through the U.S. Coast Guard and maritime domain awareness programs. In 2023, we signed a defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea, which will increase our engagement with the region's most populous country. We're also working with partners to increase internet access in the Pacific, and together with Australia have pledged $65 million to finance future submarine cable connectivity for Pacific Island countries. We've announced our intention to request from Congress $600 million over 10 years beginning with the FY24 request in support of a new economic assistance agreement related to the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, which is crucial to the region's economy and has been a cornerstone of our relationship in the region for over three decades. Our strategy is also multilateral. In 2022, the United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom launched the Partners in the Blue Pacific, an informal strategic coordination initiative guided by Pacific priorities. Since its inception, the grouping has expanded to include additional partners and has announced tangible initiatives on disaster relief, disaster resilience, cybersecurity, and ocean and fisheries research. The U.S. shares especially close relationships with the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Our compacts are free association with these three countries, and the economic assistance we provide in support of those compacts are key to maintaining the stability and prosperity of our closest Pacific Island partners and to safeguarding our shared long-term defense and strategic interests in the region. I want to sincerely thank the Congress and the members of this committee for approving the compact agreements and authorizing the necessary funding and authorities on a bipartisan basis that will allow us to move steadily ahead in our partnership with these vitally important countries. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate the Pacific region's critical importance to the United States in our long-term strategic interests. I look forward to working with Congress and this committee to continue our renewed engagement across the Pacific in an era of increased geostrategic competition. Thank you very much. Thank you. Secretary Ratner. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Rich, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today about how the Department of Defense is contributing to peace and security with U.S. partners across the Pacific Islands. I'm here with my good friends, Assistant Secretary Crittenbrink and Assistant Administrator Schiffer, to underscore the administration's whole-of-government approach. From a national security perspective, the Pacific Islands form an essential part of a strategically vital region. The U.S. military's access and posture in the Pacific Islands are crucial for our logistics, sustainment, and power projection throughout the region. Moreover, hundreds of billions of dollars in maritime trade flow through the Pacific Islands, and our partners there provide critical linkages between the continental United States and our allies across the Indo-Pacific. That's why the United States is strengthening our diplomatic, economic, and security ties throughout the Pacific Islands, and it's why DOD plays a significant role in deepening these partnerships and sustaining our defense posture and presence. Importantly, this also includes our posture in Hawaii and the territories of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. To highlight a few areas, the Department is doubling down on our relationships with the freely associated states, and we're capitalizing on our momentum with Papua New Guinea after concluding a landmark defense cooperation agreement last year. We're building capacity through security cooperation and we're conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities with our partners. We're also working together with allies and partners like Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. More than ever, we're devoting attention and resources that reflect the strategic significance of this region. Mr. Chairman, I'd also like to take a moment to underscore the importance of our compacts of free association with the federated states of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. For decades, our relationships with these partners have been anchored in the economic assistance that the United States has delivered under the compacts. Thanks to strong bipartisan support from Congress, including critical leadership by members of this committee, that economic assistance will now extend to the 2040s through the Appropriations Bill that President Biden signed last week. Last year, our friends at the State Department negotiated strong deals with each of the freely associated states to renew our compacts. Providing the necessary funding was one of the most important things Congress could do this year to advance our priorities in the Indo-Pacific. Defense experts, diplomats, senior military officials, and friends in the region all agreed that we had to get this done, and because of you, we did. The compacts ensure that the United States can maintain a military presence in the freely associated states, and they enable FAS citizens to serve in the U.S. military. These agreements provide assured access for our operations, and they prevent would-be adversaries from accessing sovereign FAS land, airspace, and territorial waters. The bottom line is that the compacts help secure a part of the Indo-Pacific that is larger than the continental United States. Mr. Chairman, we also know that the PRC is drawing from a range of coercive tools in an attempt to erode longstanding U.S. partnerships and advance China's own influence. In recent years, these activities have included covert efforts to bribe local officials, economic pressure against sovereign nations that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing that harms both the environment and local economies. But, Mr. Chairman, our commitment to the Pacific Islands and to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region will endure. The Department of Defense looks forward to continued work with Congress in this endeavor. What we have achieved with our Pacific Islands partners in recent years would not have been possible without your support, and delivering meaningful results in the years ahead will continue to require urgency, attention, resources, and strong partnership with Capitol Hill. Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your questions. And I yield back my alumni 10 seconds. Oh, right. You are very mindful of this committee's protocol. You know how to get on the good side of the committee. Administrator Schiffer, there's no pressure on you on time. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Rich, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands and how USAID is working to deepen U.S. engagement in the region. The only way for us to tackle the complex problems of the Indo-Pacific is to align the 3Ds of diplomacy, defense, and development, drawing on our successful whole-of-government approach as Assistant Secretary Ratner offered. We have learned the hard way that one D without the others, or even two Ds without the third, is not a sustainable pathway to success. As a steadfast partner to the Pacific Islands, USAID plays a key role in advancing a free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific region. Our relationships are based on mutual respect, shared history, and our shared values of diversity, fairness, and freedom. And consistent with the Pacific Way, it starts with listening. Last August, I had the privilege of joining USAID Administrator Power at the opening of our Pacific Islands mission in Fiji and our country representative office in Papua New Guinea. It was a critical milestone delivering on a promise made by the President, illustrating that USAID is on the ground to listen, partner, and deliver together with the people of the Pacific Islands. And we have demonstrated that the United States has heard our Pacific partners loud and clear, enduring presence matters. Our vision for the Pacific, embodied in our first-ever strategic framework for the Pacific Islands, approved in March 2022, reflects our shared aspirations. It is about listening to the voices of the region and rolling up our sleeves to partner and deliver on our commitments. And we are ensuring that our engagement with the region as guided by the Pacific Islands respects the existing regional architecture and delivers sustainable, tangible benefits to Pacific Islanders, a contrast to the approach of the People's Republic of China. While we are clear-eyed about PRC capabilities and intent, as Secretary Blinken has offered, we have no objection to the engagement in the Pacific by any country, including the PRC. On the contrary, if it helps generate a race to the top, that's a good thing. However, in recent years, we have seen a range of increasingly problematic PRC behavior in the region, predatory economic activities including illegal unreported and unregulated fishing, and investments that undermine good governance and promote corruption. USAID offers Pacific Island countries a different way, a tailored development model responsive to their needs and their aspirations, rooted in economic trade and integration, in inclusivity, in locally-led solutions, and in the democratic values that can positively transform our shared planet. USAID's work is designed to address what the region itself has defined as its own most pressing challenges. In climate, health, democratic governance, infrastructure, and economic growth, meeting these goals depends on enhancing our cooperation with local communities, individual countries, as well as Pacific-led organizations, including the Pacific Island Forum and the Pacific community. In Papua New Guinea, USAID is expanding access to renewable energy, protecting the country's environment, combating the HIV AIDS epidemic, addressing gender-based violence, and promoting peace and stability. In Palau, we have partnered with Australia and Japan to support the development of an undersea cable spur that will connect the country to the world's longest undersea cable and increase reliable, safe, and secure internet bandwidth to spark economic growth. In the Solomon Islands, we work with partners at all levels to advance the country's economic competitiveness and inclusiveness, with specific emphasis on developing the agribusiness sector and improving natural resource governance. Through the USAID climate-ready activity, we have mobilized more than $550 million for Pacific Island countries to improve access to climate finance from various institutions such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and the Global Environmental Facility. We are also responding directly to requests from Pacific Island governments to expand opportunities for economic growth. At last year's U.S. Pacific Island Forum Summit, President Biden announced the U.S. would launch a flexible microfinance facility valued at up to $50 million to expand access to fair and competitive finance for micro-small and medium enterprises in the Pacific Islands. USAID and the Development Finance Corporation are now bringing together our comparative advantages to fulfill this commitment. Lastly, the United States remains one of the largest bilateral humanitarian and disaster donors in the Pacific, providing year-round disaster preparedness, responsiveness, and resilience to enable the Pacific Island nations to more effectively lead their own disaster responses. Across all these efforts, USAID works directly with like-minded allies and partners through mechanisms such as the Quad and partners in the Blue Pacific, and we do so to ensure that our work is complementary and led and guided by the Pacific Islands. Mr. Chairman, Senator Rish, members of the committee, USAID's investment in the Pacific Island's regions are a critical part of the U.S. vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, a vision that animates our activities not just in this region but around the globe. Thank you for your support in providing us the necessary resources to implement our strategy and our policy with our partners in the Pacific and the opportunity to share with you today what USAID is doing in this important region of the world. I look forward to your guidance and to your questions. Again, I want to thank all three of our witnesses, not just for their appearance here but for what you do. It is true that the United States is a Pacific Pacific nation, but we have one Pacific Island state, and I'm going to yield the place in order for questioning to Senator Schatz, who's been our leader on Pacific Island issues. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and thank you all for being here. I also want to recognize Secretary General Puna for our continued and productive engagement. He's in the audience and also the Finance Minister of Tonga, Mr. Tiewetti, for being here. I want to start with Mr. Crittenbrink. Can you just, the United States has provided $4.5 million to the Pacific Resilience Facility. Can you talk about the importance of PRF and how you see it as a mechanism for the kind of engagement that Secretary Blinken and President Biden have talked about, and I think we are all on a bipartisan basis in the middle of executing, but as I talk to the PIF, they are prioritizing the Pacific Resilience Facility. I'd like you to just talk about why we made that first investment and maybe why we should consider continued investments. Senator, thank you very much for the question, for the opportunity to be here today. I would just underscore what you've said. Our whole approach to the Pacific Islands is to listen to the Pacific Island leaders, what their top needs are, to study the Pacific Island Forum's own 2050 strategy for the Blue Pacific continent, and then to make sure that we meet the needs that are outlined in that strategy. And the number one need that they've outlined is the existential challenge of climate change. So the Pacific Resilience Facility is one of several steps we've taken to show our support for meeting the Pacific Islanders where they live, so to speak. That initial investment is designed to build local resilience and capacity to help combat climate change, but I do think it's just the beginning of what we are doing and what we need to do, and we will need to do more going forward. My colleague Michael Schiffer may have more details on the actual implementation on the ground, but I couldn't agree more, Senator, with the importance of the climate issue. Mr. Schiffer, I actually want to pivot a little bit to something that you said in your testimony about predatory economic arrangements with Pacific Island nations, and I think our theory of the case, at least in the last three or four years, has been to really listen, to try to respond, to understand these are sovereigns. They are not colonies, they are not insular areas, and to be more sensitive to that, and to understand that they, as sovereigns, they get to have whatever economic partnerships make the most sense to them. I'd like you to make the case a little more explicitly about how these predatory economic arrangements are, in the end, bad for some of our friends across the Pacific. Thank you for that question, and let me underscore from the outset, and as Assistant Secretary Clinton Brink offered, we fully recognize that our partners in the Pacific are sovereign, and that they can make their, and should make their own choices, and that our role is to support them in that process, and that is what we seek to do. But as we look around at PRC behavior in the Pacific, we see that the PRC is violating many of the rules and norms that have been established by the international community for its own benefit, and that negatively, in fact, impacts the work that we do, including in the Pacific Island, in the economic growth and the development sphere. So, for example, we've seen a surge in investment by the PRC in the telecommunications sector in recent years, which can lead nations vulnerable to cyber security risks and other national security concerns. And so we see our role as partnering with like-minded and partnering with our Pacific Island friends to ensure that they have the options that they need for fast, secure, and reliable connectivity. I want you to, Mr. Scherfer, sorry to interrupt. I just want you to get to, what's the catch here? When you go into a partnership with PRC on a harbor or whatever it may be, what's the catch on the back end? The catch on the back end for the partners is that oftentimes the PRC is not motivated by developing an economically viable and sustainable program, but is motivated by other geostrategic considerations. And we'll work to create a project that is not economic, not sustainable, and leaves a partner saddled with debt on the backside. Thank you very much. Final question for Mr. Krithinbrink. This is either yes or no, or as quick as you can do. How important is it to, I guess it's not yes or no, how important is it to ratify the law of the sea? Well, Senator, I think Secretary Blinken has spoken to this before. It would be very effective to our diplomacy in the region. Maybe just on the previous question underscore my colleagues point, where of course countries make their own decisions and their own choices. We want to make sure that they can do that freely. Oftentimes, we find that deals with the Chinese can undermine country sovereignty and can lead to giving China leverage over a country that undermines their position. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Senator Rish. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Krithinbrink, what's, can you describe for us challenges if there are any or difficulties there are of attracting diplomats to serve in the EAP area that you oversee? Is it difficult? Is it challenging? What's unique about it? The challenges of recruiting diplomats to serve in the Pacific. Yes, correct. I would say two things. I think there are certain challenges because we need to make sure we have diplomats who are ready to serve, who are truly creative and expeditionary and can serve in some of our most important, but some of our smallest environments. But I've been really gratified, Mr. Ranking Member, that thus far there's been a lot of enthusiasm for service in the Pacific. As I noted, we, in addition to our previously operating six embassies, we've opened two new ones and we have two more on the way. And I've been gratified that we've had people step up in every instance, including both at the senior level and at the working level. Well, we appreciate that. And we've tried to help. Yes, sir. You know, I passed the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act. I assume you're familiar with that. And it was in 2022 and it provides a state with much needed flexibility to stand up our overseas military. Yes, sir. Which is especially useful in the Pacific Island. Well, since you're here and your boss isn't, you get the opportunity to explain to me why he's only answered two out of the five letters I've written about that subject to him. And one of those two that he answered, we just got this week. So I see it's been over a long period of time. Mr. Ranking Member, when you see him, tell him I want to chat with him about it. I will look into that immediately. We're grateful to you and other members of this committee for your support. Because of your support, we've been able to open our two new embassies in the Solomon's and Tonga in record speed. And I'm confident we will do the same in the very near future in Vanuatu and we're still working on QT bus, but grateful for the support. Appreciate that. Second, that law that we just discussed requires that the secretary issue official guidance on implementing it. That hasn't been done. And I don't suppose you can't enlighten me as to when that might be done. That's something that I can't, Mr. Ranking Member, but I will look into it. Would you take that for the record, please? Yes, sir. I'd like to hear about that. Okay. Mr. Ratner, I've been intrigued by the fact that the Chinese have been modestly successful in these policing agreements that they've entered into with some of the countries. You know, when we go out to try to work with another country, we offer things in food or medical area or education or human rights or things like that. But the Chinese focus on policing agreements. I think I know why, but can you enlighten us a little bit maybe why the Chinese focus on that? Senator, I believe the PRC is focused on policing agreements because it's a mechanism through which they can support and gain leverage over host regimes. And the population itself, would you agree with that? Yes. Have we thought about at all offering the same kind of services? Because look at that, certainly for the people who run the country, obviously security becomes number one, particularly their own security and hopefully being able to stay in office. So it seems like that's a pretty attractive bait to put out there, forget to get countries to bite. So if you guys thought at all about making some kind of offers like that in the same lane? The Defense Department has a number of security cooperation activities and military to military cooperation activities with countries in the Pacific Islands. We do not do internal policing support in that regard. So we defer to Assistant Secretary Crittenbrink to talk about some of our programs there. And I understand that by the way. There are two different lanes, the military and the placing, very, very different lanes obviously, one being domestic, one not. But maybe you could- Could speak to that very briefly, Mr. Rancher. Remember that we've increased our own law enforcement assistance in the region, but I think perhaps even more importantly, we've worked together with partners in the Pacific family, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand who have a long-standing tradition of helping countries in the region with security and with policing. And I think that's been quite effective to show that there are obviously alternatives to PRC policing agreements which are opaque and we think deeply concerning. Yeah. I think we're all concerned about that when they first started popping up. I would strongly suggest that you guys revisit your efforts in that regard and see how you might be able to make them more attractive. So when they do bite on the hook, that it's our hook and not the Chinese. So thank you very much. Time's up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Crittenbrink, is it fair to say that China remains an important market for Pacific Island countries, natural resource exports and tourism? Yes, Mr. Senator. I think that's an accurate statement for probably the majority of the country. And is it also right that 10 Pacific Island countries have joined China's Belt and Road Initiative which promotes PRC-backed infrastructure development? I don't know that figure, but I would not dispute it. I'm happy to look into that. And I'll send it to you. I'm pretty sure it's 10. Yes, sir. So is it also fair to say that since China is the economic force within that region, that we are challenged in terms of our own national interests in meeting that economic force with one that can compete with it? Senator, I would agree with that. But I would say, having engaged intensively with our Pacific Island leader friends over the last couple of years, the demand signal for U.S. engagement is probably as strong as I've ever seen in any region. Certainly, there are economic engagements with China that are important to these countries. And we're not asking countries to choose, but it's clear to us that our Pacific Island friends want to have options. They have a desire to partner with the United States, and we're doing everything we can. I agree with you. They'd like to have options. The problem is that we provide them no option in terms of an economic or trade agenda. There is no trade agenda of consequence with the Pacific Island countries. And for so long as they therefore do not have an option for their economic vitality and well-being of their citizens, they're somewhat hostage to China. We've certainly tried to meet their needs. Well, as I indicated, our strategy is based on meeting their needs in terms of security, combating climate change, infrastructure investment, and the like. So our focus has been primarily in those sectors. We also promote good governance in people that people ties as well, but those would be the priority sectors. Those are all worthwhile things, Mr. Secretary. Some of the things that I have advocated for for the better part of nearly two decades of being here in the Senate and three decades in Congress. But we have to be realistic that if we do not have a robust trade agenda in the Pacific Island countries, that they will not by desire, maybe, but by default ultimately deal with the Chinese. And the urgency of climate change, there's a lot more that we should be doing as it relates to climate change, which is in our collective interests as well as a global interest that we have, but which is really an existential challenge to our Pacific Island neighbors. And so I just hope the administration gets to a better place because, you know, IPEF is a nice framework, but it doesn't deal with any market access at the end of the day. And without market access, I think that we are going to be at a competitive disadvantage with China. Mr. Schiffer, it's good to see you back before the committee. I see you have adopted the State Department's ways of expanding beyond the five minutes, so I hope that's the only thing that you adopt from that experience. Let me just say, I think our colleague was trying to get to this. At the end of the day, isn't what China often does through its Belt and Road Initiative, is to trap many of these countries in debt diplomacy? That is exactly the behavior pattern that we've seen, where China offers what appears to be an attractive proposition, but the backside of debt and entrapment and then the leverage and the additional openings for corrupt practices create serious problems down the line. And they entrap them not only in debt, but then entrap them in their political diplomatic questions. Yes, Beijing is very, very skilled at using the leverage that it finds itself to have available. Finally, Secretary Ratner, in March of 22, the Solomon Islands and China signed a security agreement ostensibly aiming in part to address, quote, internal threats, including protecting Chinese-owned businesses in the country. In 23, the two countries signed a deal on police cooperation as part of their comprehensive strategic partnership. And while I certainly applaud last year's opening of an embassy in the Solomon Islands, what tools is the United States using and utilizing to encourage the Solomon Islands commitment to continue working with the United States and Australia as security partners? Senator, again, I would defer to this, as I already couldn't bring, particularly on the question of policing, but as it relates to the Department of Defense's role throughout the Pacific Islands, much of our cooperation depends on the nature of the island, the size, and their resident forces. There are, of course, three Pacific Islands that have militaries, so PNG, Tonga, and Fiji, and we maintain military-to-military relations with them and maintain status as partner of choice there. We have a number of Section 333 capacity building programs. We have DOD, state partnership programs through our National Guard programs. We do a number of regular exercises with Pacific Island partners, and we are deeply engaged with Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan, and other partners. My time has expired, but that's not the question I was seeking an answer to. For the record, Mr. Secretary, since my time has expired, would you respond to that question for me? What are we doing to get the Solomon Islands to be aligned with us, particularly in our security partnership with Australia? Yes, Senator. I appreciate hearing it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, Senator Menendez, I'm actually going to follow up with Assistant Secretary Clinton. I couldn't bring on that as well with regard to the, if you could go into more details, we've covered a number of the countries already like the Solomon Islands, Banuatu, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, that have established these security arrangements with the People's Republic of China. Can you talk more in detail what we are doing to say, for example, supply the training or international standards, working with our allies, like Australia and New Zealand, to be able to counter some of the things that the PRC is doing? You can certainly, again, understand countries wanting to have security, but obviously the malign influence that the PRC can do once they have a whole that security apparatus. So maybe you could hit upon what we're trying to do to counter it and also talk a little bit about what the PRC does. For example, we've seen them be able to extradite people from Fiji, Chinese descendants and so forth, about how that once the PRC gets a hold of that security forces, what kind of malign influence they can exercise in those countries. Thank you, Senator, for the question. As we indicated, it is deeply concerning when we see these agreements inked because they are opaque. They have caused concern, both within the individual countries and across the region as well. And I think our most effective approach in every instance is we continue to engage with every partner in the Pacific, including those who have signed these agreements. But I think we're most effective when we work together with others in the region who share those concerns, who can also quietly convey the depth of our concern and to offer alternatives. I think, really, that's the crux of our entire approach. We have to give these countries options. Can you get into some of the alternatives that you're offering some of these countries? Well, for example, how can we do to counter China saying, hey, we're going to provide you people that can be on the ground? What can we do to counter that? We have our own law enforcement training programs active throughout the Pacific, but as providing us an explicit alternative and boots on the ground, so to speak, of security forces that can help these countries, that's really where partners like Fiji, Papua, Nagini, Australia, New Zealand, they actually have police forces on the ground in many of these countries. I think that's the most effective way forward. And again, finding that solution that's comfortable with friends in the Pacific, I think is the most effective way forward. And including in the Solomon Islands itself, where those countries that I mentioned have helped to provide security even after this PRC. So are we offering you training in places like the Solomon Islands and Baruatu? I would have to look at the details of each country, but yes, we do provide training in the region. And again, our partners in the Pacific in particular are very active because they actually have police forces on the ground in many of these places. Can you also talk a little bit about PRC-linked organized crime in these places and again, how it undermines the security? But can you talk about what we know about that and how that may relate to the security issues? Senator, I don't have a great deal of depth on that. I'd probably have to bring that back. But certainly when you think about some areas where countries ought to be cautious about their engagement with China, part of it is the leverage and the coercive avenues that are opened up for the government. But part of it is related to organized crime as well. But for any details, I'd have to take that back, but I'd be happy to do so. Can you talk a little detail about, again, when security forces are on the ground in some of these countries and how the PRC then uses that to suppress their distance who may be there or anything like that? Well, that's the concern, Senator, the very clear concern voiced by partners, citizens of countries where these forces have been and others in the region. I'm not sure if we've seen much of that yet, but that's certainly the concern. And I think as Assistant Secretary Ratner indicated, when we've seen China do this elsewhere, oftentimes they're looking for an avenue to get in the door, so to speak, and to expand security arrangements from there. And so that would be a deep concern, I think, to many in the region, including ourselves. I'm going to switch gears on you just a little bit here. Can you talk about, obviously, after the Taiwan elections, Nauru switched their diplomatic ties again from Taiwan to the PRC. How much awareness do we have of that in the State Department? And obviously, this is not the first time it's happened. What are we doing to maybe try and flip them back to Taiwan recognition? Well, there is a history for some of these countries of flipping back and forth, so there is that precedent. I think what disappointed us in that move was the way it was done, the excuses that were used by the PRC, including certain economic inducements and UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which was misused and misinterpreted. But our message to Nauru and then to the three remaining partners of Taiwan in the region is, again, countries ought to be careful and clear-eyed about entering in these arrangements with China, China will often make many promises that remain unfulfilled and that can have negative consequences. And then with those three remaining partners, three formal diplomatic partners of Taiwan, we've worked very carefully and closely with them to make sure their needs are met and that we try to close off any opportunities that China could exploit. But do we know that that was going to happen? Do we know that Nauru was going to do that right after the Taiwan election? Because what are you just talking about? Some of their flights and so forth right before that? We had known for some time that there were concerns in Nauru and we were working with partners to meet those. But in this instance, they decided to flip. There is a history in some of these places of going back and forth and we'll have to see. But I would just say, again, we issued a public statement right after this was done. Every country has the sovereign decision to make their own decision, including on these recognition questions. But we do encourage countries to be cautious and careful given the track record of the PRC. Great. Thank you, Assistant Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Gritton Brink and Administrator Schiffer, I want to ask you a question related to the local media and information space. We talk a lot about the need for Western engagement on infrastructure. We recognize that many cases that China might be the only player in town to deal with some of the infrastructure projects. And therefore, they give a deal that's too good to believe and it turns out not to be what they thought it was going to be and then you have the debt diplomacy issues. But it also seems like the PRC is actively engaged in influencing local media and information in the region. And what is the United States doing to try to counter that activity? Let me start with the Secretary. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Very important question. I'll mention two critical efforts at the outset. First is in every place where we have a presence and we are on the ground, we are active in the local media space and through our own public diplomacy to make sure that there is alternative messaging to the PRC there. So again, our countries, our partners in the region have choice and have accurate information. And secondly, we're working on programs to provide many of our partners in the region with access to credible news wires and the like, the AP and others. So again, a newspaper, for example, on the ground in the island country is not completely dependent on Xinhua for its news but has other options. Those are the two that I would mention at the outset, Mr. Chairman. Sure. And if I can build on that, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the CableSPR project that I had talked about earlier and the work that we've done with other partners on the East Micronesia Cable, we've also been extraordinarily active working with our department of state colleagues supporting free and independent press in the region, including through a number of journalism fellowships, particularly targeting journalists who are interested in working on natural resource management, as that addresses a number of the corruption and governance concerns that we have. And then we had recently, we also recently launched with the University of the South Pacific, a digital cyber connectivity partnership that allows us to step into the digital space in a more forward-leaning way, responsive to the requests that we're getting from our partners to provide them the digital services that they need to be able to control their own information destinies. I think this is an area that we really need to work on. I am going to turn the gavel to Senator Cain. I have to be on the floor in regards to our nominee for Haiti. We will be voting on a confirming an ambassador for Haiti, which obviously is extremely important in our foreign policy decision-making. So let me thank you all and I'll recognize Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I don't watch as closely as I'm sure you do to see just what China is doing, but I must admit it strikes me that they have a very comprehensive plan to establish global leadership and to replace us with that's an international institutions where they insinuate themselves into people in leadership, whether it's the movement away from democracy generally and the growth in autocracy. Freedom House indicates that trend continued again this year. They dominate certain raw materials that are the raw materials of the future, whether it's nickel or magnesium or rare earths and so forth. They either dominate the mining of those things or the processing of them. They put in place the rail lines to get the raw materials to their ports. They own the ports to get the products to their market. Of course, then they have TikTok, which allows them to gather data on the American people and to provide propaganda as they did in the Taiwan election with the TikTok algorithm there. They, of course, likewise have Huawei. I mean, you look through the things they've done. They lead in a number of the new technologies and businesses, whether it's electric vehicles or solar panels. They've invested in hypersonics, which allow them potentially to threaten our fleet. I mean, you look at the things they do and it's a comprehensive plan and it appears to be a very effective strategy. If we have a strategy to counter China, it's not working. So two years ago or longer, the chairman of this committee and I drafted a legislation requiring the State Department to gather internally and with external input experts with different points of view to create options and to develop a China strategy. We included that in legislation that was passed. It was due to be provided to this committee and to the Congress in June of 2022. So it's obviously late. Now, call me old-fashioned. I thought that when we passed a law and required the State Department to do something that they would do it and the State Department has not or someone has not and I don't understand why. Now, I can understand people say, hey, we're late. We'll get it to you. But apparently the work has been done, but this has not been provided. By the way, if it's classified, let it be classified. But China, from what I can tell, has a game plan and it's succeeding. We don't have a game plan I recognize and whether we do or not, we're not succeeding. So, Mr. Curtin-Brink, why do we not have this in hand and when will we? Senator, thank you very much. You know that was coming, by the way. Good to see you. Thank you, Senator. I'll say two things. We do have a strategy. We've talked about publicly that the pillars of that strategy invest a line and compete. I would. Three words does not make a strategy. I mean, it's a wonderful headline. Invest a line, compete. And the Secretary gave a speech of that nature over two years ago, three years ago, and I said, that's terrific. That's exactly right. But we need to comprehend the strategy. I've just described a few things China has in their strategy. We don't have that. At least it's not been provided to this committee or to the United States Congress or the American people. And we're losing, if you will, on the strategic battlefield. Senator, I will take this back immediately. I've committed to you before to provide this report, and I apologize that that hasn't been done, and I commit to doing so. Number one, number two, the point I would take issue with our strategy, it is a lot more than those three elements. And I think if you look at the actions that this administration is taking out, taking investing in our sources of strength at home, and you're aware of that agenda, the aligned piece, which I think has been unprecedentedly successful, all the alignment with our allies and partners and friends around the world in the Pacific and especially in the Pacific Islands. And then the actions we've taken to compete against China, including protecting the sources of our economic strength at home, but in many other domains as well. So I'm confident that we have a strategy. I'm confident that our China strategy is succeeding, has been successful and is succeeding, but this is an unprecedented challenge. But I commit to being responsive to your request, Senator. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. To start, I'd like to say congratulations to Special Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations Joseph Yun and the team that worked for more than two years to successfully renegotiate the Compact of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau. This is critically important to our national security, and I'm glad we can highlight it today. Over a thousand citizens of the freely associated states serve proudly in the United States military. They are more than just good neighbors in the Pacific. They serve alongside us, study, innovate, and trade together with us. And they should not be put in a position of doubt to doubt our commitment to continuing our decades-long partnership, nor our willingness and ability to make right the wrongs of the past, including providing compensation for damages caused by past nuclear testing. Secretary Ratner, I want to dive in a bit more on DOD's vision for Joint Task Force Micronesia. As you know, the FY 2024 NDAA mandated an assessment on the implementation of JTF Micronesia. While we await the results of that report and the related assessments pertaining to Guam, I want to make my interest in this issue clear. While our plans and reports recognize the vastness of the Pacific, we have to make sure our structure and resourcing also reckons with that vastness sufficiently. For example, our Coast Guard has realigned assets to Honolulu to better meet the heightened demand signal, a signal that's not only coming from our planning process, but from our allies and partners who are asking us for more opportunities to work together. Secretary Ratner, what are your thoughts on the question of how our resourcing in the region currently aligns with the actual vastness of the scale of the region? Well, thank you, Senator. And I will tell you that the Department is currently looking at the evolution of our command and control structures throughout the Indo-Pacific, not just as it relates to current structures, but potential reforms of that. So what that looks like down the road is something we're taking a look at, including as it relates to how we operate in the Pacific Islands. The national defense strategy is laser focused on the PRC as the pacing challenge, and that has informed a lot of our resourcing as it relates to the Pacific Islands, including in major posture initiatives throughout the Pacific Islands. And we have ongoing exercises. And as Assistant Secretary Crittenbrink has said, we're doing everything we can to leverage our allies and partners who have great contributions to make down there. So we have stepped up our game. We are doubling down in places like Papua New Guinea, and we're looking for additional opportunities. Thank you. You know, I sit on both SFRC and SASC. I feel especially responsibility to ensure that there's strong interagency coordination to address pressing national security challenges. And last week, I spoke to the commanders of CENTCOM and AFRICOM about how important it is to do this in their areas of responsibility. What, Secretary Ratner, what can you say about how Joint Task Force Micronesia may include liaisons, not only from across the different service branches, but also the interagency to ensure robust coordination across diplomatic, developmental, and defense functions directly from the region, as it is already being done at INDO-PACOM, complimenting the work that's done at JITF West. Well, thank you, Senator. I will refer to INDO-PACOM and the specific staffing, but I 100 percent agree with your point. And it's a broader point to make here today, is that even as it relates to our security issues, the work that USAID is doing, the work the State Department is doing, and other department and agencies are fundamental contributions to our security in the region. So when we talk about concerns about China's influence, concerns about China's military, resourcing, and funding, some of our economic and assistance programs are critically important. And we work very closely with the State Department and USAID. I know Admiral Aquilino hosted the Regional Ambassadors Conference recently, where Assistant Secretary Clinton Brink attended, and we are taking every chance we get opportunities to integrate our posture in our military strategy with our assistance and diplomacy. Thank you. I think that speaks very strongly to the importance of our presence in the region. Secretary Clinton Brink and Administrator Schiffer, I'd like to stay on the topic of this interagency cooperation when it comes to implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy throughout engagement with the Pacific Island countries in particular, and in the context of COFA specifically. We know that our failure to pass a budget on time did nothing to help make the case for U.S. leadership and reliability in the world, including in the Pacific. But now that COFA funding has passed, I want to understand your assessments of whether the U.S. government is presenting a unified, consistent presence to our allies and partners, particularly the Marshall Islands, Micronesian Palau. In your opinion, is the United States building strategies that project not only our strength, but our values, that makes the case that the United States is a responsible Pacific power and that democracy actually does deliver? Because you know that the PRC is making the opposite argument. Our investments and commitments need to be visibly American, and what more can we do to reinforce our reputation as a reliable partner of choice? Senator, thank you very much for the question for your leadership and support on these issues. On the issue of our interagency cooperation in implementing the COFA agreements, I'm very confident in the work that the three of us have done at this table together with our colleagues at the White House, especially Senior Director Mira Rapphooper, our colleagues at the Department of the Interior as well. So I'm very confident about that going forward. I fully agree with your point about that our values have to be on display as well. But Senator, I think my experience over the last couple of years dealing with friends in the Pacific, I feel very well aligned for the most part with many of the leaders and most of the peoples on the ground where we do have concerns. We worked in particular to build the capacity of our partners, but I couldn't agree more. I want to thank you and the Congress for the leadership passing the COFA was one of the most important things that we could have done, I think, in the last decade to demonstrate our commitment to this finally important region. Very grateful to you. And I will add very briefly to Secretary Grittinbrink's comments. I think we have had exceptional interagency cooperation over the past several years under the Biden-Harris administration, really linking together all of the elements of our national security community to be able to deliver to our partners. And as you offered, Senator Duckworth, to be able to present that unified face that demonstrates America's added value as a partner and a friend in the region. As I offered earlier, our approach has been to listen, partner and deliver. And to your point, delivery is just as critical as any of the other pieces. And I think we have stepped up our game in the past couple of years. And if I could ask you to summarize where over time, and I want to have Senator Hagerty. My apologies, Mr. Chairman. I was just going to offer that when the President has made commitments on our recent Pacific Island summits, both the State Department, USAID, the Department of Defense, and other elements of the US government have moved out quickly to implement and to make sure that we're showing up in tangible ways. Thank you. And I apologize to Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good discussion, Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Administrator Schiffer, Secretary Ratner, Secretary Critt and Brick. It's good to see all three of you. I'd like to talk with you about the investment strategy that we do undertake. And I know that each of you have different tools. Secretary Ratner, you've got the Office of Strategic Capital. I'd like to hear about Administrator Schiffer. You've got the microfinance program that you're dealing with and Ambassador Critt and Brick. We talked about the strategy document that you're putting together. I'm deeply concerned about our ability to show up, particularly when it comes to hard infrastructure in the region. And I may have shared this with some of you, but when I was in my previous role as ambassador to Japan, I was literally reading in Nike, Asia, about a bankruptcy that was underway in the Philippines, the old Subic Bay port, the Hanjean shipyard there, South Korean shipyard was in bankruptcy. The two bidders' names were of concern to me. And I reached out to the appropriate people and found out that those two bidders were both affiliated with the PRC. They were trying to take control of a very strategic shipyard, one that had been a US Navy, post back in the 80s when I lived in Japan the first time. And I was deeply concerned about that and what we might be able to do. I won't go into the details of it here, but we put a tremendous amount of effort into trying to address that situation. And that asset now is called Agila Shipyard. It's now a US asset. It's a very strategic asset for us in the region. And the way we got that done was by me making a lot of phone calls. The State Department, the Department of Defense, coming together on an ad hoc basis, server's capital management in New York taking a very important leading role in doing all of this and the Japanese government stepping up and helping us as well. We worked with the Philippine government, with the Japanese government, certainly with the US government to make all of this happen. It probably took the better part of two years to get it to work. And the Development Finance Corporation, which I thought would be the tool that we could use to really step up the US government's participation, was unable to participate in this. In fact, we were not able to get any US government direct participation. A lot of effort, a lot of elbow grease, but not direct participation. So I'd like to come to you, and I'll start with you, Secretary Ratner, to talk about the new Office of Strategic Capital. Is this a means, a tool by which you might be able to do hard infrastructure? I know you talk about technology here, but is that a tool, or are there other tools where you could step up and play a more direct role? Yep, Senator. I can, we'll get back to you specifically on the Office of Strategic Capital as it relates to the Pacific Islands. What I will say related to infrastructure, we have a number of major posture initiatives underway throughout the Pacific Islands, obviously in US territories such as Guam and CNMI. In the COFA States, in Marshall Islands, in Palau, we have some major projects underway. And of course, last year concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Papua New Guinea, and have already had one Indo-Paycom site survey team down and another one on the way to start looking at some of the infrastructure projects that we can do there. So we do see this as a huge priority. It connects to the development and economic issues that we've been talking about this morning, and we are looking to do more throughout the region. And some of those projects are included in the President's FY25 budget request. I would encourage you to take a very hard look at the Philippines too. There are more assets there, I'm sure you're aware of. The Chinese Communist Party has great interest in that region. We should have a great strategic interest in projecting our own relationship. I've been very happy, frankly, with the relationship that we've built with the Philippine government and the direction that's going. But I think we have a lot of opportunity there. Secretary Kittenbrink, could you speak to this in terms of your thoughts? And as you prepare the strategic document that you promised to Senator Romney, I'd love to hear how this infrastructure piece may fit in. Well, Senator, first of all, thank you for your leadership on the Philippines example you mentioned. It's still one of the best textbook examples we have of a success story. I would say what we're doing right now is we are focused, especially with other partners, on trying to catalyze investment in key infrastructure in the region. Certainly the subsea cables is probably the place where we've been most active, the East Micronesia cable, work on the Google cable, and elsewhere. We've also partnered with Australia. We announced in October that we were going to co-finance maritime infrastructure including at Canton Wharf and Charlie Wharf. So certainly we're focused on the infrastructure issues and again giving countries options in the region. Secondly, to underscore what Assistant Secretary Ratner said in the President's FY25 budget request. There's a four billion discretionary request and a four billion mandatory funding request. And the mandatory funding in particular is designed to allow the United States to be able to fund hard infrastructure projects and to invest in what we call these strategic connectivity projects in the region. If you all could get back to me a little more detail on that, I'd be very interested to see how your plan is unfolding. Thank you all. Thank you. Thank you to the witnesses. I'll do my questioning now and then call on Senator Young. I'm a big fan of the AUKUS framework in the Indo-Pacific. I think this announced framework by President Biden of a couple years ago can be extremely powerful going forward. I have some home state equities involved as well because the pillar one submarine portion of the deal will involve a lot of work at the shipyard in Newport News, Virginia. I want to tell a funny story about AUKUS that's sort of a thank you to this committee. Secretary Ratner about 10 days before the Defense Committee marked up our NDAA in June. The Pentagon sent a group over to meet with me in the SCIF and said, you're the chairman of the C-Power subcommittee. We need to get all of this legislative language in the NDAA. Will you help us? And I said, no, I'm not going to help you. And they said, wait a minute, you're on AUKUS support. I said, I am. Why won't you help us? Because none of this is jurisdictional in the Armed Services Committee. I can't get it in the NDAA. It's all in the Foreign Relations Committee. We then worked together great members on this committee. Senators Cardin, Senator Menendez, and others really helped get the AUKUS framework through the Foreign Relations Committee so that by the time the NDAA hit the floor, we were able to attach the AUKUS legislative framework to the defense bill on the floor. And so I want to thank this committee for working very expeditiously to make that happen. Obviously, we're still in process in this way. While the NDAA has been signed, we have a supplemental bill that's pending in the House that passed the Senate by 70 to 29 vote. And the one piece of that supplemental that hasn't proven controversial is the portion dealing with the AUKUS framework, the investment that needs to be made in the submarine industrial base to make sure that we can match with our investment what the Aussies are putting in to grow an industrial base to enable us to complete this important part of the project. Secretary Ratner, just from the Pentagon standpoint, I would like you to talk about the importance of the AUKUS framework in terms of stability and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific because I do think we need to do more education of the American public and others about this. So talk about why this is such an important priority for the administration. Well, thank you, Senator. This is an absolute top priority insofar as our undersea capabilities are critical to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and they're an area of U.S. overmatch, and it's essential that we keep it that way. And when we apply our allies and partners to that overmatch, it's even more powerful deterrence. So maintaining our undersea advantage is going to be key to maintaining peace and stability in the region. The AUKUS legislation helps to do that. You mentioned submarine building. The President's budget request for FY 25 would provide $4 billion toward the submarine industrial base and the national security supplemental on top of that, and that'll be critical to keep pace with the challenge. Just one quick story about submarine building. The Navy has stood up a manufacturing center of excellence in Danville, Virginia to train the submarine industrial base, and on my last visit to this center, it was pretty heartwarming to walk into these classrooms and see not only U.S. shipbuilders from around the country, but also Aussies. Aussies who have been dispatched here from Australian companies to learn side by side with their American counterparts. And the other thing that I noticed is each of the classrooms I went into also included a number of Afghans. Afghans who served bravely with the United States and Afghanistan, they moved to the United States. They're looking for a new career, and they've decided, I'm going to be a shipbuilder. And watching the Aussies and the Afghans and the young people from Danville with all their conflicting accents, learning side by side to become part of the U.S. submarine industrial base and the Australian submarine industrial base was really positive. Secretary Grittenbrink, the other piece of AUKUS is the pillar two, which means sort of anything else, pillar one's about subs. But pillar two is focused on cyber security, AI, advanced technologies, innovation. And one of the opportunities there is for partnerships between research universities in the U.S., Australia, and the U.K., and innovative companies. My sense is, in the same way that the U.S. has alliances that are strong and that that is seen by China is kind of threatening, we also have deep ties between universities in our country and Australia and the U.K. and other nations. And I think that is a kind of an alliance that's pretty powerful. From the State Department standpoint, looking at pillar two, what do you see as ways we can cooperate with U.S., with Australia and the U.K., to find new innovative technologies on which we can cooperate to promote stability in the region? Senator, I completely agree with the way that you framed it, the tremendous opportunities I think under pillar two as well for broader-based technological cooperation, certainly among our three countries as you've outlined between our universities and our companies. And as you know, we've also indicated we're open to potentially cooperating with other countries in pillar two as well. So I think this is quite an exciting and strategically important area. Thank you. Well, if the Big 12 can have 16 teams, then the Quad can have eight members, or AUKUS can have nations whose names aren't in the title. So I'm going to now go to Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. And I was really encouraged that you asked about pillar two of AUKUS. I have it right here, pillar two. That's what I also was going to follow up on, just emphasizing the importance of that piece of the AUKUS relationship. There's been a lot less attention focused, at least in the media, on pillar two. But I think the tech-sharing opportunities between our research institutions and high-tech companies are just, it's really exciting to me. So thank you to the State Department for your emphasis on implementing that. I'd like to turn to the topic of illegal fishing activities. China has by far been the leading aggressor in illegal fishing throughout the region. It's affected the economies of each country that relies on this important industry. China, through their illegal activities, have diverted all manner of economic resources. And therefore, our armed forces have been doing their part to help. They've conducted missions to counter what we've come to call illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, fishing. Mr. Crittenbrick, what diplomatic efforts has the State Department been leading to challenge Chinese IUU fishing in the region? And has any notable progress been made, especially on what we call ship-rider agreements with our Coast Guard? Senator, thank you. Really important question. And that was where I was going to go first, that I think our Coast Guard has been most effective here in the ship-rider agreements, in particular. I don't have in front of me the list of all the countries that we have ship-rider agreements with, but I think our Coast Guard's presence in the region cracking down on illegal fishing, especially through ship-rider arrangements, helping countries in the region understand what's happening in their maritime domains, and to defend their rights is probably the most important thing that we can do. But I could get back to you on those details. I would say, secondly, what we've done just across the board, more broadly speaking, is we've tried to increase partners' maritime domain awareness through the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative. Again, the theory of the case is that when countries understand what's happening in their domains, they can better protect them. And then, thirdly, I think the more we can do to publicize and shine a bright light on this activity, you are correct that we believe that the PRC is by far the country that carries out the vast majority of illegal fishing in ways that's really detrimental to the economies of the region. Thank you. If you'd kindly get whatever information you have, the list of ship-rider agreements with a great start to the committee will take a look, please. And then, by way of follow-up, when the Chinese government does nothing to control its fishing fleets, engaged in illegal fishing, maybe you can tell us, how does the U.S. government differentiate our adherence to international conventions on fishing and maritime boundaries? I'm sorry, Senator, I didn't catch the last part of my apologies. When they respond, when they do absolutely nothing to control the fishing fleets that are engaged in this sort of illegal fishing, does that make it difficult to follow international conventions on fishing and maritime boundaries? I understand. Yes, sir. So, really appreciate the question. I think there are two challenges. Yes, there's ship-rider agreements and our other actions to try to help countries to control their maritime domains. And then there are also waters on the open sea that are overfished and overutilized in ways, again, that's detrimental to the region. So, our effort there is, one, through shining a bright light on these issues, and again, secondly, trying to build the capacity of partners in the region to understand that in addition to our own operations. Thank you. So, staying on this topic, the Coast Guard is currently analyzing what resources they require to increase their presence and increase their operational tempo in the Western Pacific. This follows a directive that I secured in the recent Coast Guard authorization. And these findings should become available and reported to Congress and the State Department as we hit the end of this year. So, can I have your commitment to review those findings as soon as they become available? Absolutely, Senator. And can I say, Coast Guard leadership in the Pacific has been absolutely tremendous. And when we did the Second Pacific Island Summit, one of the most effective events we had was at Coast Guard headquarters. And I think our Pacific Island partners are really encouraged and impressed by the resources and capabilities we can bring to bear. Well, thank you. We'll look forward to those findings and also any council you might have about how this committee can be helpful and informed by those findings, doing whatever is needed to empower state and our Coast Guard to help address illegal fishing activities moving forward. Thank you so much, Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Redholan, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for your testimony and your service. And I just want to say amen to Senator Young's questions regarding maritime security and protecting fisheries. And I know a lot has been covered in this hearing already. And I just want to stress, and I know you all know this, that when it deal, when we're dealing with, you know, China's influence in the Pacific Island region, it can't just all be, no, don't work with China. In fact, quite the opposite. We need to provide a better alternative, both in terms of the vision of the future, but also material support. You can't beat something with nothing. And again, I want to just encourage all of you to continue to use all the tools at our disposal economic tools, whether the DFC or other agencies to put forward, you know, proposals that support people in this region. Assistant Secretary Krittenberg, I do have a specific question about Kiribati. And I know it's been referenced, the China's police presence there. I also know there's an IT component. I understand to their involvement. So, you know, one question is, you know, what are we doing to counter PRC influence in Kiribati? But the larger question is, how can we anticipate these kind of challenges and not play whack-a-mole after they come up? In other words, how can we be proactive rather than just reactive? Senator, thank you. Fantastic question, really. And thank you for your leadership and support. I think the number one thing that we need to do is to be present, to be active in all of these countries, and to, as you said, offer alternatives. It's specifically in the case of Kiribati, our accredited ambassador, whose resident, Fiji Marie DeMore, my understanding is visiting right now, again, to hear the needs of our friends in Kiribati and to determine the best way forward. I know our friends at the Millennium Challenge Corporation have a threshold compact of about $30 million, if I remember correctly, again focused on education and building local capacity. I mentioned a little while earlier some of the work we're doing together with friends in Australia to refurbish the Canton Wharf and another wharf there. And also, we're following up on the agreement we have from a Kiribati leadership to establish a U.S. embassy in Kiribati as well. So getting that permanent presence on the ground, working on all those alternatives from infrastructure to other areas across the board, I think that's the best way, both with our friends in Kiribati, but across the board in the Pacific, we have to be present, that we have to be active and we have to bring alternatives to the table. We think our strategy is designed to do just that. I appreciate that. In terms of the diplomatic presence, as you say, if we're not there on the ground, we are not going to be in the game, can't offer proposals or engage. Can you just give a brief update on how we've expanded our diplomatic presence in the region and what more we need to do? Thank you, Senator. We've identified four countries in which we want to establish new embassies. We've successfully done so in the Solomon Islands and in Tonga. We will be open imminently in Banuatu. And then, as I said, we are working diligently to follow up on Kiribati and we'll need parliamentary approval for that, but we're working actively on that. In each instance of the two new embassies, we've opened thus far. We opened an immediate presence very quickly and now we're moving to build out that staff, build out the permanent facilities, the long-term facilities in which our staff will be there. And then we're also working on the personnel side to get open quickly. We basically had to find temporary duty personnel to boots on the ground and plan our flag. And now we're following up with the full-time staff and also together with this committee. We hope to be nominating ambassadors to these new countries as well. But as you said, there's no substitute for presence. And I'm confident we will be present in these four countries and then we'll build out that presence. I think it'll make a huge difference. And already is in the Solomon's and Tonka. Very good. Thank you. And I do have one last question on the implementation of COFA for you, Dr. Ratner. I know that Senator Duckworth raised this issue and I think her focus was some of the work that AID is doing in the aftermath of passing funding for the Compacts of Free Association. On the defense side, what kind of measures are you taking now that that's passed? Senator, we obviously have a range of activities associated in terms of exercises and operations rotating through the compact states. In terms of major investments underway, we have a couple specific major posture initiatives there and posture sites in RMI. Republic of Marshall Islands hosts the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Testing Site at U.S. Army Garrison on Kwajalein, which is a really important location as it relates to space operations and space situational awareness. And then, of course, we have the Tacmore radar, the tactical multi-mission over the horizon radar in Palau, which is going to give the department and the U.S. military unprecedented situational awareness over a huge swath of the Pacific, so really important posture initiatives underway there. Appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have been informed that Senator Cruz is on his way, and I'm going to give him two minutes, so play quietly at your desks. And if he's here within two minutes, then he'll be up next, and then we'll conclude the hearing. And if he isn't, I'll gavel us to a close. But I will say, while we're waiting and those two minutes are running, we had an Armed Services Committee hearing right before this, and two of the Armed Services members, Senators Ernst and Senator Hirono, had been quite involved in the Convene Act, which was very much focused on security agreements with the co-finations. I was a co-sponsor of that. Senator Hirono, I think you are as well. And that Convene Act was largely included in the NDAA. And when I told Senator Hirono that I was coming up to this hearing that was focusing upon the Pacific Islands and strategy, and that it was to my recollection the first time that we've had a hearing on this topic and this committee during the time I've been on it, Senator Hirono was very glad and said it's about time. So there were some happy Armed Services Committee members knowing that this hearing was happening today, too. And the ranking member and I will now patiently wait for now, if I think it's 62 seconds now, to see if Senator Cruz arrives. As we're counting down, I'll do the homework, which is there may be members of the committee that want to submit questions in writing, including Senator Cruz. We'll keep the record of the hearing open until the close of business on Friday, March 15th. If members do submit questions, we would encourage you to respond promptly and thoroughly. There is a vote ongoing on the Senate floor right now and an important one with respect to our nominee to be Ambassador to Haiti, very timely one. And with that, and with the concurrence of the ranking member, with the concurrence of the ranking member, we will be slightly graceful to a colleague who is said to be in the building. And we'll wait just a bit longer. Senator Cain, do you have any more acus jokes while we're waiting? I thought that story would be appreciated. It is a great initiative and good work moving out on it so quickly. Thank you so much for your support on that. That legislation was really critical. Australian sailors training in the nuclear power program in South Carolina with U.S. sailors to take a nation that only has the only nuclear in Australia's medical isotopes. And to go from that to the ability to operate, maintain and eventually build nuclear subs, the most complex items manufactured on the planet Earth, that is a lot of work, but it's going to be great work to be able to do together. Well, with that, I'm going to decide that the hearing is now to be adjourned with the thanks of the committee for your appearance. We adjourn, and please do follow up on questions if they are submitted.