 such as the account of the Army's role and experience in Korea. Then there is the job of tracing the family history or lineage of individual units within the Army. The Military History Office has also custody of thousands of examples of war art, work done by our own soldiers and by men of enemy forces. This particular painting was done by Adolf Hitler. He didn't paint too badly, but the world might well wish that he had never done anything else. However, the prime mission, the one we want to examine today on the big picture, is that of preparing and publishing such historical works as the internationally known series, the United States Army in World War II. Here with me today is Mr. Mark Watson, military correspondent of the Baltimore Sun, who can speak with far greater authority than I about the work of your Army's historians. Thank you, Sergeant Queen. The story of your Army's military history mission is an impressive one, and I don't use that term impressive lightly. I'll show you what I mean. Here is World War II, virtually every aspect of it. Tactics, strategy, supply, action accounts from the highest planning level down to the level of the infantry platoon. Europe, the Pacific, Africa, the Mediterranean, China, Burma, India, the Aleutians. The true big picture of the Army's actions in World War II is being distilled into the volumes of this series. It's a tremendous project. I'd like to emphasize that. There has never been a record of any war which even approaches the scope and detail of this Army series. The French writer Voltaire said, history can be well written only in a free country. This is well written history. Here is one of the latest volumes to come from the pressings. It deals with an operation in the Pacific, which most people have never heard mentioned by its official name. Cartwheel, the reduction of rabble. The story of Operation Cartwheel has been chosen for examination on the big picture because it is a story which is fully understood only now with the publication of this book by Army historian Dr. John Miller, Jr. Even General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey, the two top level commanders of Operation Cartwheel, didn't have the detailed picture we have today because in writing his book, Dr. Miller was able to draw on a wealth of valuable information found in many captured enemy documents. Cartwheel took place in the South and Southwest Pacific areas. As Cartwheel got underway, the situation was this. We had taken Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands and defeated the Japanese in the Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea. We had thus blocked an enemy plan to cut us off from New Zealand and Australia. The next step was attack in four places at once. Nassau Bay in New Guinea, the islands of Woodlark and Kirowina in the Solomon Sea, and at New Georgia in the Solomon themselves. Of the four attacks, New Georgia was the main event. June 30, 1943. The men of the reinforced 43rd Division made their landing on Rendova, a small island off the coast of New Georgia. The enemy had not expected a landing here. The men went ashore virtually unopposed. The entire landing was complete within eight hours. There were only about 120 Japanese soldiers on the outlying island, but when they got over their initial surprise, they fought. In the first day, they lost some 50 or 60 men, about half their number. We lost four. With enemy resistance under control, the main problem was to get supplies ashore and stockpiled for the main assault on New Georgia itself. In preparation for the move to New Georgia, heavy artillery was set up to pound the beaches across Blanche Channel. Early in July, the assault on New Georgia itself began, a beach-to-beach landing from Rendova. This is why we wanted New Georgia. Munda Point held a highly valuable airstrip, from which we could soften up Bougainville, the next step in the march across the Pacific. Munda was a valuable plight, and it was going to cost us dearly. On New Georgia, our forces faced some of the most determined and well-commanded troops in the Japanese Army. The quality of the outnumbered enemy soon became clear as the push toward Munda airfield began. Our beachhead was only a couple of miles from Munda, but in the weeks which followed the landings, it was often a good day's work to advance a hundred yards. More than once, our advance was pinned down for days at a time. Still, we kept pushing as reinforcements from the 37th and 25th divisions came into the fight, but only when he could not hold another minute would the enemy pull back. It took us nearly a month to punch our way through the two miles of jungle to Munda airfield, but on August 5th, the 14th Corps sent word to Admiral Halsey that the airstrip was secure. The hardest part of the New Georgia fight was over, and immediately we began readying the cratered runways for use by the Army Air Corps. At the time, the objective of Operation Cartwheel wasn't known to the general public. We planned to move up along the coast of New Guinea, north-western through the Salamans, and reduce the key Japanese stronghold at Rabaul on New Britain. Vela la Vela was the next step. In the first bypass maneuver of the Pacific War, we skipped over heavily fortified Columbangara and took its sister island Vela la Vela. The enemy on Columbangara saw immediately that he was cut off and evacuated. The bypass tactic had proven its practicality. Main time at Port Morrisby on New Guinea, the men of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment were getting ready to try another first in the Pacific, a vertical envelopment. The first airborne attack of the Pacific War was about to be mounted under the personal direction of General MacArthur. The objective was an ideal site for a large air base in the Markham Valley near the port town of Lay. Australian troops were already pushing down the New Guinea coast toward the port town as we prepared for the airdrop. The Aussie soldiers made steady progress toward Lay, confident that the airborne conquest of the Markham Valley would soon give them the other arm of a pincers which could force a large-scale enemy withdrawal. The Aussie's confidence was well placed. The 503rd airborne on schedule lifted off the runways at Port Morrisby to swing toward the rugged peaks of the Owen Stanley Range. It was September 5th, 1943. The enemy had no idea that an airborne attack was coming. It took only four and a half minutes for the C-47s to spill a regiment of men into the sky above the Markham Valley. As an airborne operation, it was almost textbook perfect. The drop took place on schedule and regrouping on the ground was unopposed. Three men were lost and these threw accidents in the jump itself. Swiftly engineered teams ready the valley floor for its new function as an Allied airfield. Just two days later, C-47s were flying in troops of the Australian 7th Division. They would have taken the next step in securing this vital airfield site and a good-sized harbor at Lay to boot. The Australians moved out rapidly, pushing hard toward the sea on their rendezvous with the other Australian force. The pincers was beginning its squeeze. For a week, the two Australian forces pressed the enemy, each trying to be the first in reaching the port town. Sometimes an enemy's strong point would hold up their advance, but the Aussies knew how to do some pounding of their own. They were never halted for long. On September 16th, both arms of the pincers met at Lay. The enemy saw the trap closing and pulled out. He would not return. We were a step closer to Rabao and Lay Harbor, plus the new airfield, would be stepping stones for the move forward. The first airborne operation of the Pacific War had been a highly profitable success. The next move was Admiral Halsey's and the next stepping stone, Bougainville. Halsey's forces had already secured the treasury islands and our troopships and cargo vessels were on their way to Cape Torakina, Bougainville. The Japanese were expecting them. The task of softening up Bougainville's beaches went to the Army Air Corps. Bougainville was to provide an air base within 200 miles of the enemy's stronghold at Rabao. We planned to secure a beachhead and get fighter strips working to pound Rabao before the Japanese could organize a counterattack. The landings went well. The relatively few enemy soldiers who opposed the landing fought savagely. Halsey's forces secured a strong foothold and launched immediately into the grim business of enlarging their holdings. By mid-December, Marine and Army forces would occupy enough ground on Bougainville to start air strikes against Rabao. We would simply hold the enemy back for the time being while the aerial bombardment of Rabao was getting underway. Now a new and startling bypass maneuver was undertaken. The Joint Chiefs had decided to bypass Rabao itself, the main objective of a whole cartwheel operation. And this made sense. Rabao held 100,000 of Japan's best soldiers. A thousand artillery pieces and plenty of ammunition were dug into 350 miles of tunnels and caves. It would have been a nightmare to take by direct assault. So we pounded it from the air, constantly and heavily, but with no intention of ever following up with a landing. Eventually, Rabao would find itself isolated by sea and air blockade. Still strong, but with no one to fight. Rabao would be simply cut off and left to wither in isolation. There was an interesting sidelight to this operation. The pounding of Rabao called forth an all-out effort by the Japanese air arm. Every carrier plane of the Japanese combined fleet was sent to reinforce Rabao's airpower. They didn't know what they were getting into. Within 10 days, the whole force was to be destroyed. Day by day, the Japanese air losses mounted. Of hundreds of enemy planes, less than a dozen survived. So that later, when Admiral Nimitz moved on the Gilbert's, the Japanese fleet lay helplessly at anchor, unable to oppose him. With empty hangar decks, the Japanese carriers were useless. While the ground fighting went on, troops were briefed frequently on the constantly changing combat situation, on the premise that a well-informed soldier was a more effective soldier, a premise which proved itself in practice as the war progressed. After the briefings and explanations, there was always the final preparation, each man on his own. Operation Cartwheel was gaining momentum. Now we plan to move right into the enemy's backyard. A landing at Cape Gloucester would give us an airfield on New Britain, the same island which held Rabao. As the assault force moved in prior to landing, Army bombers laid smoke where the wind would build up a white screen between hilltop observation posts and the approaching ships. By now, the men of the Pacific Commands were well experienced in the techniques of amphibious assault. Knowing how didn't necessarily make it any easier, but at least it reduced the risks. The assault troops found the beaches of Cape Gloucester good, but shallow. They moved immediately across them into the dense jungle. They found opposition, but not in the strength they'd met on other landings. By day's end, the beachhead was secure. It was the day after Christmas. Tough fighting lay ahead, but by late February, the enemy would pull back to the tunnels of Rabao, and there he would stay until the wars end. Now the Admiralty's came into the spotlight, and one of the strangest operations of the Pacific War began to unfold. Repeated air reconnaissance of the Admiralty's had revealed no sign of life at all. The area looked deserted, but intelligence had reported about 4,000 enemy soldiers on the two islands. A hand-picked patrol was sent ashore for a look around. Contrary to aerial reports, they observed hundreds of Japanese on the Admiralty's. Captured records later explained it. The Japanese troops had been ordered to stay concealed from air observation, and had obeyed. General MacArthur decided to investigate for himself. He directed a thousand men of the 1st Cavalry Division to perform a reconnaissance in force. This was a far cry from the more than 25,000 ground troops originally scheduled to take the Admiralty's. It was also a month and a half ahead of the timetable. Aboard the command ship, General MacArthur conferred with his subordinates as the small force approached the Admiralty's. Sure artillery batteries which could oppose the landing on Los Negros, the smaller of the two islands, were to be neutralized in advance by fire from the ships. It was going to be a noisy night on Los Negros. The main battery target range will be... When I give you a mark, the main battery target range will be... 12,800. 12,800. Bearing 255.4. 255.4. Max to port. Max to port. Load. Are you ready, Plot? Aye aye, sir. I invite everybody to open bridge. We're on the line. Main battery loaded and ready. Commence firing. The men of the first cavalry division went ashore on Los Negros on February 29th, leap year day 1944. With all the conflicting reports about enemy strength, no one knew for sure just what to expect. The troops met only light resistance on landing. The Japanese lost only five men that first day of fighting, the Americans too. This despite the fact that as we discovered later, there actually were 4,000 Japanese soldiers on the Admiralty. About four in the afternoon, General MacArthur came ashore to evaluate the situation. There was still some sniper fire, and the mud was ankle deep. But the commander-in-chief saw what he needed to see, and decided that the situation was in hand. Before leaving, he told the reconnaissance force to stay, hold their ground on the airstrip they had taken, and wait for reinforcements, which would soon be on their way. The rest of the first cavalry division arrived, and cleared the remainder of Los Negros. Enemy casualties from this action were staggeringly high. With Los Negros secured, the attack was carried across the channel onto the main island of Manus. The Japanese commander had orders to make a massed attack with his full force, and throw the Americans back into the sea. Instead, he attacked piecemeal, in a series of fanatical rushes. By the time the Admiralty's were secured, in the middle of May, about 75 enemy soldiers had surrendered. The rest of the 4,000 were dead. Power losses numbered less than 400. The two islands would provide us with four airfields and a fine harbor to serve the Allied fleet. The action taken in the Admiralty's had shortened the Pacific War by six weeks. The finale of Carquio came on a tiny island called Emeral, east of the Admiralty's. The landings went off without incident, almost unopposed. Japanese strength in the South and Southwest Pacific was ebbing swiftly. Directing the Emeral operation, Admiral Halsey summed it up six days from standby to shove-off to well done. The vast reaches of the South and Southwest Pacific were opening up to us again, and the objectives of Operation Cartwheel had been completely attained. Lines of supply and communications between the United States and Australia had been kept open. A string of air and naval bases had been secured, paving the way toward the Philippines. The enemy bastion at Rabaul had been isolated. Its 100,000 troops virtually imprisoned. Operation Cartwheel was over, and the way west to the Philippines and to the mainland of Japan was clearly defined. The campaign described in this volume was important to the Army as an experience in amphibious warfare and in combined operations against a skilled and resourceful enemy. It played a major role in the evolution of our strategy in the Pacific with its success in bypassing and isolating enemy strong points instead of spending huge numbers of men to gain them physically. It tested and proved the principle of unified command as General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey, the top-level Army and Navy commanders, worked smoothly together to achieve a common goal with efficiency and a minimum of casualties. Like each of the other volumes of this monumental project of the Army's historians, Cartwheel is a book which can be of tangible value to professional military men and to anyone else who desires to understand the full story of what happened on the wide-flung battlefield of World War II and thus to increase his knowledge of the problems faced by soldiers and statesmen in the defense of our country. On behalf of the big picture, I'd like to extend our thanks to you, Mr. Mark Watson of the Baltimore Sun. The volumes he has just described are not restricted to the use of professional military people. Anyone wishing a catalog of the books available can get it simply by writing to the Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, Washington 25 D.C. Now this is Sergeant Stuart Queen, your host for the Big Picture. The Big Picture is an official report for the armed forces and the American people. Produced by the Army Pictorial Center. Presented by the Department of the Army in cooperation with this station.