 Felly mae'n mynd i amdano i gael i ei wneud yn ddublon, ond oedd i'n ddublon yn gweinig er mwyn i'n cymrall corecau daeth y byddwch ar holl yma. A'r meddwl yma, dyma yw yma, felly ddim yn y gael i'ch gael i'r maeith amdano i'r argynnu, ac yn ddwy'r cymryd yma, mae'r gyflawneth eich bod yw eu cefnaleis, ac yn gyflawn hefyd yn ymgyrch, mae'r cyffredig yn meddwl i'ch gweinig ym embrace bwysig. ac am ymlaen i ni i ddweud yn ymddangos yn y cynhyrchu cymdeithasol. Rydyn ni'n credu caeth fy modd i chi. Rydyn ni'n credu bod ymlaen i ni ddweud 3 cymorthol syniadau, wedi'u lluniau i gyd yma yn ei ddweud yn ysgol iawn, a rydyn ni'n maes i ddweud rysgwyr, i'r cymorthol syniadau i ddweud yma i'r cymorthol syniadau yn y lluniau syniadau yma yn y lluniau. Rydyn ni'n credu fyddwch chi'n cymorthol syniadau. there there is and that just it's a question of the rise of nationalism or another way of putting it just sort of from the political center is where those previous three crisis meet, and that's one of the themes of what I'm going to try and say today is that although in many ways Russia on the Middle East, the Euro crisis, they have very different roots, very different patterns, the common denominator it seems to me as that they're helping to fracture politics, as we've known it, with some decades now, you've had a kind of mainstream agreement centrist domination of European politics in the major countries that it's then been without as quite realising it a critical to the functioning of the European Union as when you have these 28 countries meeting, it's very important that you don't have too many a'r Fyliadau Gwladau, y Fyliadau Ffrancau yng Nghaertyn, ond y cyfrifysgau ym mwyn, yng Nghymru ym Mhwy, yn ddod i'r rhan i'r ffodol. Ond, rwy'n rhaid i'n… Dwi'n rhaid i'n siŵr i'n ddwy'n cael ei gydag o'i amser ymlaen yma a'r hyn o'i gynhyrch. Yn ymlaen i'r ffodol, mae'r cyfrifysgau i'r gyrchau a'r hyn o'n gwych i'r ffodol o'i gydag ymlaen. Roedd ddim yn ymddych chi'n gweithio arddangos i'w gwneud amserolol. Yn y gallwn gwneud eich bodi amser o'r rhwstdiadau, y peth yn wedi'i ddweud i chi gweithio yn ei fod yn y rhan o'r ysgrifennu, sy'n ffordd arall, roedd y rysg y gallwn yn ymlaen i'r ddechrau. Mae'r ddweud yn y casg oherwydd maen nhw, mae'n oes yn bilydd i blod i'r cyffin Afterwards, ond mae'n ddechrau elent, llawer o'r rai o'r ei fawr. Dwi'n meddech chi'n ystod a ble oedd hwnnw i gael y cyntaf yma lloi yma, ac mae hynny hi'n meddwl i'r ddweud yn bwynt gyda leodaf a ni wedi'u mwylo'r bod arlasig. Roedd yn yn ymddangos, oedd Yn yn ymddangos ddweud a Roedd Rysg Yn. Ac rydyn ni'n dweud hynny hwnnw i'r ddweud i hynny. How does the West respond as events unfold? Have we got it right? Are we making it worse? I think that one of the thing that makes us anxious about Russia is that so far Putin has shown a consistent ability to surprise on the downside had a crisis in his last 15 months. Felly, mae'r bloddau ychydig yn gallu cyntaf arwagaeth, yn gallu bod hi'n meddwl i thwyg iawn, a notification tyfydd hyn am eich cyfancion yn rhoi, i ffordd unrhyw ymgyrch iawn. Ac maen nhw'n ei ffordd ond gan Gwasanaeth Brytych yr Ffantysiaeth democr area. Mae Bwydhwch ei ddweud ymchydig, wrth gwrs, yr mynd i ddigwethaf ydyn nhw, a yna, ein chyfyddiad, ydy nid yw. P地'r llwyth wedyn yn fydd gweithio'n gwasanaeth bwyddiad ar ei hoffa, but surely he won't now start the incursions in eastern Ukraine and now that's happened. The next question is, will he attempt to build this land bridge to Crimea by annexing down the coast? I think that's looking quite likely. Certainly, the later ceasefire has never took hold and it didn't break down. Why are there questions that the question is coming are whether there will be an effort to try to carve out a significant chunk of Ukraine and turn it into either a quasi-independent state under the control of Moscow or an exit. a'r wych yn i'n amlwg, i fynd i'n cael ei maen nhw'n rhan o'r mynd ar hyn o'r rhan o'r rhan o'r rheshwych. Yn y ddigon gweithio'r gwirlau yma, dylai'r ddim yn bulteniad bultech. Yn hyn o'r gweithio'r gweithio arnau, ac mae o'r rhan o'r wych yn ei gweithio'r gweithio'r rhan o'r rhan o'r rheshwych a'r rhannu ar gyfer y llyfriddau yng Nghymru byddoedd yn ymlaen o'r 5 o'r fforddau. Mae'n gweithio bod yna'n cael ar y siwrll yn ei hwnnw, yn y catagrwynd. Mae yna'n unig i'ch ddweud ymlaen i'n mynd i ddyddai'n ffordd, ond yn ychydig, ychydig yw i'ch gafodd yn gorfod o'r bultwch, mae'r gwneud yn ei ddechrau a'r prysg peth. Mae'n ddweud ymlaen i chi'n ymlaen i gael i chi ddweud ymlaen i chi, mae'n rhaid i ei ddweud yn hynny'n ddweud ymlaen i chi'ch ddweud ymlaen. Felly, mae'n ddweud bod rhan o'r rechydig. Mae y gallwn y rhan o'r trafod yn wrth i, mae gynhyrchu ar hyn o'r amser o'r cyffredinol fyddai'n gynghent, ysgolion Ffarrinwyr, Sikorski, ymlaen i hynny, oherwydd gynhyrchu, yma'r gweithio, oedd yna'r ffordd o gymryd yma, yma'r gweithio gyda'r Gweithreitio, yna'r gweithio'r cyffredinol, a mae'n gweithio, ac mae'n gweithio gyda'n gweithio ar y dyma'r cyffredinol, rydych chi'n gweithio y dyfodol, i'n cael ei hynod drafod i gwn i bwysig yn bwysig ystod y 89-tyeth Gaeligau. Felly, dyfodd o'r Cymru, o'i gwneud ofach o hyn o ffordd y rheswedd a i'n gallu bod rheswedd yn gweithio'r ddechrau yn gweithio ar gyfer sy'n gweithio'r ddechrau ddechrau yn Gaeligau. Ie, y Gaelig i'n golygu i'w gwneud gan y dyfodol i'r ddevai tynnu cyflaeddiadol. When will ydy'w lle i mi leol ar gyfer y pwysig gyda'r cyffredinol? Mae'r cyffredinol wedi arwain y pwysig terfodol. A le oedd yr ur rien yw am rhaid i'r hyn o ran y cyfan. Rydyn ni'n feddwl i ddiogelu. Mae'r cyffredinol wedi'u ddiogel ar gyfer y cyffredinol hefydlau ddigon. Fel gydigodd y rhossion yn edrych yn eu hwnnw yn siŵr y rhan. ac y gallwn wedi'i ardechrau'r ardal iawn oherwydd yr anoddiaeth a oeddent hefyd yn rhaid i'n adysgu. Ac er bod yn Ysbryd yn Ewa F Staat yn ddechrau'r Ysbryd yn y cymhwyl yn ddigwydd. Rhaid i'r wrthwyf ni siaradau wedi'u gwneud narod hynny'n gweithio fel y cymhwyloedd acquire, felly yny'n cyllid yng Nghymru'i gyfrifio'r cyllid yma o'r hyn yn ddifrif o'r pethau sydd hynny. Mae'r ddifrif, oherwydd dyna'r ddweud o'r hynny, mae'n ddifrif, mae'n ddoch chi'n ddifrif, mae'n ddifrif, dyna'r ddifrif o'r cyllid yma o'r cyllid yma. Mae'n ddifrif, yn ymweld, oherwydd dyna'r ddifrif, a'n ddifrif i'r ddifrif, ac mae'r ddifrif i'r ddifrif i'r rymd, ac drwy'r amser, rai'n gweithio'n ddechrau'r dda, ond dwi'n edrych yn dweud o fei'r reoli, ac mae'n gweithio'n ddod, a'n teimlo i ei ddweud o'r Dmitri. Mae'n gweithio'n ddod, rwy'n ddweud o'r ddweud o feithio'n ddod o'r dros yn ddod o'r dros yn ddod. Ychydigon nhw fyddwn ni'n gweithio gweld yn ddod. Yn ddod o'r ddod, a rwy'n ddod, Os ydych chi, fel y tifonwyr yn ymweld, ond yma, mae'n ddefnyddio yr ysgol yn y Pwysig. Ac mae'n hyn yn ei gilydd i'r lltyt ymdill, ond mae'n hynny'n ei gilydd i'r intrestodd rhan o'r prifsgol. A dyna'n cael ei bod yna'r llwyddiadau a'r llwyddiadau a'r llwyddiadau. ond y peth yn i wneud dwi'n meddwl i'ch hyn. Yn ymgyrchwch ddiddordeb oedd Prydyn hefyd wedi ei fod yn gweithio'r penedigol i'r gwneud yn yn dweud gyda'n caelael yr ystyr. Mae'r bwell oedd mwyaf y dyfodol yn i fynd i gyd yn japdadodd yn ddu o gyd-guddus i'r mewngymau mewn cyd-diadau a bobl yma yn ei gwell i'r Mod Ymryd. Tor i fynd i'r rydyn ni'n canisiau, ac i'r ddwy ribwyr, ac i'r eich cyfwyr am ymlaen. Rwy'n dechrau sydd yn clywed y clywed o'r gwneud yr unig gyntaf o gyfnodau'r cyfrifod yn ystod y cyfrifod y Cymru, ac mae'n ddefnyddio chi'n ddiogelio i'r ddiogelio i ddim yn ei gweithio'r ffordd o'r ddechrau. Mae'r argumau ar y ddechrau i'r ddweud. Yn ddweud yw'r gweithio'r ddweud o'r ddegfynu o'r rhannu, a ddydig yn ychydig i'r ddweud o'r ddegfynu o'r ddegfynu o'r boblistig o'r gwell. I will anger him, and the stakes will be upped and at that point I think the chap in Volt said we could well go all the way to Ukraine. Anyway, you go to Kiev and actually occupy it. So the West will have to figure out whether we do this. There's a much livelier debate about it in Washington or rather a bigger push to arm the Ukrainians in Washington than there is in Europe. I think Merkel probably speaks for most of the European governments when she says we're not going to do that. But we're moving into an electoral cycle in the U.S. where the Republicans, certainly I think the kind of McCain wing of the Republican Party will make this an emblem of Obama's slash democratic weakness. Obama, rather to my surprise, has started to talk about it at least as a possibility. And that will then lead to this question first of all, how will the Russians react if the Americans actually do it? And secondly, will we be able to keep Western unity, which so far has been reasonably impressive on Ukraine, amidst all the strains? If the Americans start arming the Ukrainians, will the Europeans at that point say, look, we're not with you on this? And does that then weaken one of the few things we've got in the West which has been this ability to present the United Front? I mean, I think that the first step will be more sanctions and there is more we can do. There's this famous swift ban on the Russian use of electronic money transfers, which sounds pretty technical, but was used against Iran with enormous effect. And the Russians clearly are extremely worried about. We know this because the Russian ambassador showed up at the FT offices and said they would regard it as the equivalent of an act of war if we cut them out of the swift financial system. So that was a fairly clear sign that they were concerned about it. But swift is that the, as one American put it to me who's involved in all this, if you think of sanctions on a list of one to ten, swift would be ten. And he said we're so far only about two or three. So there's a lot more that can be done. And I suspect that while keeping the weaponry issue as a threat, we're probably going to go for more economic sanctions. But even there, there's a question about whether in the European Union we can keep that consensus because there are clearly countries that want even the current sanctions lifted. The Greeks have been most vociferous, but I think that's probably the Italian position as well. And the Italians, you know, a big country, they matter. The French possibly too. So I think that the overall picture is of a worsening of the situation on the ground in Eastern Ukraine and a sense that Western unity on this and a Western sense of that we know how to deal with this and can maintain a United Front is going to come under increasing strain over the next year or so. Meanwhile, you have the Euro crisis going on, which is also obviously threatening to fracture the European Union. And I mean, I thought it was very striking that Merkel had to fly from 48 hours talking to the Russians in Minsk straight to Brussels to then try to deal with Cyprus and Syritsa and so on. And as a journalist, you know, I suppose it's good times in one sense that you can take your pick. You've got Russia greaves the Middle East. There's never something, never a moment when you don't have a crisis to write about. And it's quite interesting trying to work out which one should we be most worried about because as I say with Russia, the sort of catastrophic scenarios are easily the most catastrophic. But possibly, you know, they're still at the 10% chance level whereas the Euro crisis, the chances of the Euro actually breaking up I think have risen substantially. Now, as you say, we'll find out today whether a deal will be done over Greece. I suspect they'll do it and that they will keep the show on the road for now. But I think that you'd have to be naive to believe that that's it. I think the problem is that we've now, those of us who've argued that there are big structural flaws in the Euro and that these are going to keep coming back to haunt us have, I hesitate to use the word vindicated, but it's in that argument certainly looking a lot stronger year by year and a package deal to keep the Greeks in is not going to address those fundamental issues. Now, I'm sure everybody's familiar with the arguments about whether the Euro was an optimal currency area and whether it's actually structurally damaging the countries of southern Europe. It seems to me that certainly for some of them, for a country like Italy which has used devaluation and inflation as kind of key tools for managing their debt, managing their competitiveness to have those taken away has proved very damaging. It's not the only problem Italy's had. They've got the run up of debt because of the financial crisis. They've got competition from China and so on which has hollowed out their manufacturing base. The Italians have lost 25% of industrial capacity since the beginning of the crisis. This is a huge blow and those kinds of issues are not going to go away if we get a package deal in Brussels. They lead to the questions of what are the bigger structural solutions one could arrive at. One of the reasons that I was always sceptical of the EU project for the single currency was a very simple chain of logic which was to argue that currency unions tend not to survive unless you have a political union and that I never really believed we would get to a political union within the EU and therefore I kind of believe in the long run it won't last. It's a fairly simple chain of logic but if you put those arguments to people in Brussels certainly the time I was there which was 2001, 2005 you tended to get one of two responses. The first was well just because most monetary unions almost all are backed by a political union doesn't mean you have to have that and we've set up all these arrangements and just you see it'll work. That was one set of arguments but actually it's not working so I think it's pretty clear you do need structural reforms. The second argument was that well if we create the monetary union the political union will follow that the logic for it will become apparent and you'll get a transfer union because you'll just need it. And I think that's where we're reaching a breakdown status because I think it's become apparent when the Germans were told there won't be a transfer union. People took that at face value and they then really not up for a transfer union and the spectacle of what's going on in Greece makes them less and less willing to sign up to the kind of big fiscal transfers that underpin say the donor in the United States. So we're likely to be stuck with a monetary union that's backed by a EU budget that's just 1% of GDP as opposed to a federal budget of which is 19% of GDP in the United States without the transfer union and with these big competitiveness issues across the monetary union and that seems to me to be a recipe for continued political unrest and continued discontent so that even if we manage to get our way past this current crisis the underlying factors which make the Eurozone crisis prone are still there and unlikely to be rectified. So moving right along to the Middle East that I think also is contributing to this overall sense of crisis within Europe because the whole of the southern border you know the other side of the Mediterranean is obviously in turmoil. And for a while it felt that that could be ignored or at least the European Union is doing its level best to ignore it. But there are two things that are making that a harder position to maintain. One is the growing fear of terrorism and the extent that you get a kind of backwash of people who either directly being radicalised by going to fight in Syria or elsewhere or who've been radicalised by the internet and the kind of propaganda that's coming out of that region. And that is then feeding directly into fear of terrorism and also social tensions within our own societies about immigration and the rise of anti-immigration parties. You know the formula. Then of course there is the flow of migrants which has become very intense and I mentioned the problems of Italy economically. Well Italy is also at the forefront of this. I think there were 100,000 people showed up on the shores of Italy in the first six months of 2014. There are as you know hundreds of people dying in the Mediterranean. It is a humanitarian disaster and one which we are very far from coming up with either coherent European response or really a response of any sort. And it doesn't seem to me likely that that's going to get any better in the short run either because what's happened is the implosion of Libya as a functioning state. Libya has now become the transshipment point for people not just from North Africa but all the way back from Eritrea, Niger, countries whose issues we're barely aware of in Europe but which are becoming increasingly things that we're going to have to engage with. And yet at the same time I think European countries have never been less willing to put boots on the ground to intervene. The faith that we can sort this stuff out by doing that is really down to in a negligible. And we were talking downstairs about Britain's kind of withdrawal from international affairs and you can cite that in various dimensions. There's the fact that we're obviously not players in the Euro crisis. The British are not really involved in the Ukraine negotiations even though they were signatories of the Budapest memorandum. But for me it's almost most striking because it was on this watch that the Libyan and Cameron's watch that Libyan intervention took place. And there's now almost no discussion in the UK perhaps because of a sense of embarrassment of what happened in Libya subsequently. No suggestion that we might have some kind of responsibility for trying to sort it out. You could argue that well maybe we don't but there's not even a debate. And I think that reflects a profound lack of belief after Afghanistan, after Iraq and now after Libya that this is possible. But that then leads to a kind of sense of helplessness that you know would prefer just not to think about it because it's just too difficult. And if Britain which is along with France one of the two major military powers in the EU has lost completely lost its appetite for these kinds of interventions or stability operations at a time when actually arguably they've never been needed more, then the chances of Europe coming up with a coherent solution to this I think are pretty negligible. So the question then becomes well what's going to happen in the Middle East itself? And I was talking to colleagues who follow the whole question of IS much more closely than I do. And I think that in Iraq itself actually the American led bombing campaign has if nothing else at least contained the problem. So the idea that they're not actually making territorial gains they may be forced out of Mosul. Syria were in this awful paradoxical situation where I think we now the West is now having almost bombed Assad in 2012 is now in a tacit alliance with him. And one of the things that's happened is that at the time of the Arab Spring I think the West sort of briefly sorry if the West is a broad term but I think in this case it is kind of applicable. There was a sort of joint European American view that maybe we found the key to solving our moral strategic dilemmas in the Middle East because we know that the false stability of dictatorship is a false stability and also it makes us feel bad because we're sort of conniving with all sorts of horrible dictators and now we can have a democracy and that all kind of sought out the problems in the Middle East and we can even feel better about it. So that's great. Now we've really kind of abandoned that there's essentially the Egyptian counter coup has been endorsed although Sisi is far from being pro-American he's still regarded as certainly better than the alternative. And watching Sisi at Davos recently it did strike me. Is it conceivable in five years time Assad will be speaking at Davos? I don't think it's inconceivable. There's that much sort of cynicism taking hold. I mean I think that the debate hasn't settled actually from what I know of the arguments in Washington. There are people inside the administration who say look we've just now got to accept that we are effectively in tacit alliance with Assad and that it is not in our interest for him to go. Maybe we could leave him out and get a sort of another bathys general in charge but possibly even that's not possible because actually if you take those kinds of regimes if you take the figure head out they tend to collapse anyway. Some of that might be too risky. Let's just accept unpleasant as it is. That's where our interests lie. ISR a threat to us, a direct threat to us. Assad isn't. So let's go with that. But I think that there's still pushback against that view of John Kerry and the last I heard was still arguing that actually no no we have to sincerely get Assad out and that the Syrian moderates are the way to go. But not many people believe they're capable of holding the ring. So American policy even in Syria is confusing and confused as is European policy insofar as there is one. And then if you look at the broader Middle East I mean the US and the West are on every side of the argument so that they're sanctioning Iran but in a tacit alliance with Iran in Iraq they're opposed to Iran in Syria. So what are we trying to do? I don't think anybody really knows. And meanwhile the situation continues to deteriorate on the ground. Not everywhere as I say the military situation in Iraq is better than it was a few months ago but I think Libya is now the big worry because what Al Qaeda and now IS have always wanted is a real nice failed state where they can operate freely. And Afghanistan was quite a long way away but Libya is right on the shores of the Mediterranean and looks very much like it's meeting that bill. So that's crisis three. And as I said I think that the danger for Europe is that those crises are merging in the sense that they're helping to destabilise mainstream politics within the European Union. Now how is that happening? Well you have various revolts. You have the revolts against austerity going on and that's connected to the Euro crisis obviously and that's epistemised by Syriza in Greece but it's also Podemos in Spain and a host of other left and right wing parties which have been making gains and Syriza was the first one to actually take power at a national level. And as we're all aware one of the reasons that governments from Ireland to Spain to Italy are not willing to give them any ground is precisely because they fear encouraging the Syriza-like parties in their own countries. How that plays out we'll see over the next year but it clearly has been perhaps a slightly delayed reaction to the financial crisis of 2008, the economic fallout but it's now happening and you are getting left wing anti-capitalism. In broad terms parties are coming forward. You then have the revolt against immigration which is fueling the far right and just jotting down the parties who would fall into that category where you have the national front in France, you have UKIP in the UK, at the kind of fascistic end of things you have Golden Dawn in Greece, the Sweden Democrats who I'm told are pretty nasty characters who are up to about 10% in Sweden, the Danish People's Party, you have a similar party in Norway which is actually in government. So it's the northern league in Italy if anything that's more ubiquitous than the anti-austerity parties. And one of the things that actually unites the far right and the far left is the surprising extent to which they're pro-Russia, pro-Putin. So that if you looked at the people who sent along so-called observers to the kind of slightly phony referendum in Crimea, they included Delinca from Germany but also the Front National in France. So the far left and the far right seem to share some kind of soft spot for Putin. And it's not just Delinca in Germany, the Melanchon in France is also fairly pro-Putin and there are others. And I think for the left maybe it's just a residual kind of sympathy for Russia. Syrits is obviously the other example. Possibly it's to do with a sense that anything the EU is opposed to, they're in favour of. And I think that certainly is the case for the far right that if you look at the rhetoric of rhetoric's too strong a word, they were kind of throw away comments by Nigel Farage but quite telling comments. I mean his initial reaction to the Ukraine crisis because he sees everything through the prism of the EU and his dislike of the EU was to say well this is all the EU's fault and therefore to slightly revel in the extent to which Putin was pushing back against the EU. And that's certainly very much part of the Marine Le Pen reaction to it. She's become pretty close to Putin indeed. I think he's, I don't know whether it's actually confirmed that the Russians are funding the National Front or just one of those things out there but they're clearly a close relationship. So for the right it's Putin's hostility to the EU, it's a taste for nationalism as opposed to supranationalism. It's also social conservatism, the whole kind of anti-gay bit plays into the social conservatism of the far right. And there are some parties which have managed to combine all three of those kind of themes that are appealing to the extremes. The anti-austerity, the revolt against immigration and the pro-Russian bit at the National Front in France are the main example of a party that's actually managed to assimilate all three of those themes. And the question is well how threatening is this? Are these parties kind of signs of distress, economic and political distress in Europe but they're manageable, they're not going to really do much damage, they'll stay at the 20% or so level and then gradually subside. Or are they a threat to, could some of them take power? Or even if they don't take power could they so affect the way that the political discourse is carried out that they make the EU harder to operate? I mean you can see an element of that in the UK where you were talking downstairs about well what does Cameron want, what does he want with the European Union? I mean I think it's very domestically, politically driven, it's driven by the rise of UKIP and splits within his own party and really he just needs something that's going to make that go away and that then makes him behave in a way that his European partners find very difficult. And so you don't necessarily need these parties to take power for them to start driving the political agenda. Another example would be the hardening of say Sarkozy's rhetoric on immigration which is clearly a response to the kind of attempt to take away some of the ground from the National Front. So they're changing the discourse already but I think it becomes potentially critical when a far right or far left party actually gets hold of power in a European Union government and when I've tried to think through my own mind well if the euro collapses or God forbid the European Union itself collapses what would the mechanism be? What would be the trigger event if that happened? And it's always seemed to me that the real danger is if you get the collapse of the consensus among the 28 governments that's tended to get us through crises because however bad it's been if you've had a European Council where essentially they're 28 countries or the most important ones committed to somehow sorting it out because they believe in the European project you've tended to get to the other side of it. But if you have a European Council where there are parties that really don't accept the idea of the European Union or really have ideas that are so radical that the others can't accept them then you're in trouble. And we've got a first taste of that trouble with Syritza which is why as we were saying it's been such an important test case and why people are so unprepared to give it ground. And I think that with Syritza essentially I mean you know I'm tempting fate we'll find out tonight my guess is that they will essentially be forced to back down and in that sense they'll be a sort of sigh of relief and well you know these radical guys that didn't get anywhere and that's all fine. But the question is what the thing is Syritza are too isolated and operating from too weak a starting position both as a small country and a country on the point of bankruptcy. They have no leverage so they're pretty easy to shove back into their box again tempting fate maybe that won't happen. But what if there were several Syritzas around the table or what if it was a country that was actually a large country you know a national front government God forbid in France. Then I think at that point the EU actually does become inoperable and that's why I think all these three crises and the way they're merging together are a threat to us. I mean I was able to talk to the beginning about the really kind of blood-curdling threats you know war with Russia, massive terrorism that kind of thing. But I think that the most plausible threat certainly from the situation we're at now is just an erosion of our institutions a radicalisation of politics to the extent to which the European Union itself which has for all its flaws been the kind of framework in which politics has operated in Europe for the last 40 years and more and has been terribly important for bringing Europe together after the end of the Cold War. If that begins to erode and break down then I think we're in a new situation domestically and internationally and one which is not particularly favourable. So I'll stop there but I'd be happy to take questions particularly ones that tell me that I'm wrong and it's all going to be fine.