 Well, thank you very much for your very kind words of introduction. Thank you very much to the Institute for International European Affairs for their fantastic opportunity to celebrate the 15th anniversaryulating of the Elisia mee� reflectey here in Dublin. I can think of no better place to do it, and you are all testament to the fact that Ireland is the place to be on days like this. Rwy'n dechrau, mae'n cael ei bod i'r bodi ar y ffaith, y tydd hynny'n ei wneud yn y llennodd, rwy'n creu i'r bobl yn y cyfle yn y llun o'r blaes, ac rwy'n creu'n cyflwydoedd lle o'r llun, lle mae'n cyflwydoedd lle o'r llun o'r llun o'r bobl, ac mae'r parwyr yn y llun o'r bobl, rydyn nhw'n Llyfrgellol Ysbryd, rydyn nhw'n ei ddweud o'r opero a'r adrodd yn gol, wrth gwrs, mae'r ddweud o'r opero a'r seining, ac mae wedi'i cael ei ddynodd, ac mae rhaid â y ddynodd wedi'i gyd-dynodd yw'r ysgol yn 1929, ac mae'r ddynodd yn cael ei ddysgu'r ddechrau, ac mae'r ddynodd yn cael ei ddynodd yn y oprha yn parys yn y tîm Llywodraeth. Mae'r tîm yw'n mynd i gwybod eich ddysgu'r ddynodd yn hyn yn rhan o'r ddynodd, mae'n sgwr i'r llwyg, ac mae'n llwydd, wedi bod yn d ..o'r rhaglen newydd yw llyfr? A gwych eich trafwynt yn y gwbl cumfau a'r rhaglen newydd yw'r rhaglen newydd. Mae'r rhaglen nawr yn gallu'r BP i fy Nesaf yw'r rhaglen. Mae'r rhaglen yn ni gyrraedd o'r rhaglen mae'r rhaglen newydd yn digwydd yn llyfrgeittau. Mae'r rhaglen nesaf, amser, yn bwysig yw'r rhaglen newydd... ..dur i'r rhaglen newydd a ddych chi'n rhan fydd ychydig yng Nghymru... .. gallwch yn ystod, yw'r rhaglen newydd o'r rhaglen... a cofnodd yr engin yn cyfweld a'r cyfnodd ac yn cyfnodd ac yn cyfnodd. Ieithio ymweld ymwyng. Ynddyn nhw yn Ynchart Dygol, yr Ynchart Dygol yma, a'r ymddir yng ngyfrau yng Nghymru, ac wrth gwrth, er fawr y byddwch menny i gweithio yng Nghymru a'r ddegol yma eich amddir yn ddigon i'r ddylch yn ddigon i'r ddegol. Rober Shuman, yng nghymru'r ddegol hefyd, schools, John Wayne and others worked very successfully, without Eila, on whether we're not only on creating European integration and post-war, but also making that happen through the Franco-German relationship by FGV Captures, and, in that sense, I would say that the Indonesia Treaty is the culmination of a first chapter in Franco-German relations. At the same time, of course, the basis of everything that followed. mae'n gwahodd y ddweud o'r llysiau a gwahodd ar y stedd gyrnau, mae'n gwahodd y methu yma. Rwy'n credu'r llysiau. Rwy'n credu'n credu. Mae'n credu'r llysiau, dyna'r perffasurau. Yn ymgyrchu'r llysiau, dyna'r perffasurau ffarrig fel y ddweud. Rwy'n credu'r llysiau, dyna'r llysiau, dyna'r perffasurau, dyna'r llysiau i ddweud, fe allan, yn gallu bod yn gweithio'n fawr yn y gweithio ar y Cynllun yn ychydig yn Yllwynol ar yensynol a oedd yn Llunol perthynasol nai ffwrdd a'a gyntaf hwnnw, bod pob gwrth o'i maes ffrindwch ar gyfer cymaint oherwydd, neu ddeg yn ffrindwch, a'n rhesbwysig yn hyn yn y trool ac yn gweithio'n y trool. Mae cymaint cymaint yn y trool. mor hwnnw, bod yn ffrindwch yn y trool ac yn fffrindwch yn cynradd y trool. Mae'r llwyddiu i chi'n bwysig ar y trool i gweithio o ddaraf y ffaraid o gweithio a ddifes? Mae'n ddifes yng Nghymru ym Mhagor. Mae'r ddod o'r ffaraid o'r ddod o'r ddod o'r ddod o'r ddod o'r ddod, bod ddaw'n ymwneud cyfio ar Mali, a yn ymdwylltio ar Libia, mae'n cael ei chyfnod i ddod. Rwy'n meddwl amser o'r trafod, sydd wedi ddweud y ddod o'r ddod o'r ddod o'r Maes wirfod a'i ddod o'r VADS, Mae'r fforddai'r ysgrifennu ddifrif yn ymdill ar gyfer ystod o'r ddynamiad. Yn hyn mae'n credu, fel ystod o'r ddyn ni'n sefydlu ar y canfodd o'r rhaglen, mae'r rhaglen yn llwythol yng Nghymru, mae'n ddiddorol y Llywodraeth ar gyfer Eidgellol, ac mae'n ddiddorol yn llwythol. Mae'n rhan o'r rhaglen yn llwythol, ac mae'n ddiddorol yn llwythol lle mae'n ddiddorol, ..fraimwyr, ac mae'n cymryd i gweithio'r fawr o'r fawr o'r rai gael... ..yna'r dynamoedd yn y Dynamiad eu Dynamiad... ..ac mae'r ddau yn fawr o'r ddechrau sy'n mynd i'r rai gael y cyd-gweithio... ..o'r ddau yma i'r ddau. mae'n bod yn dweud i'r ddau yma, mae unrhyw fydd yn fawr, i'r ddechrau... ..yna'r ddau, mae'n ddau'r ddau... yn unig y gallwch yn ddawn i'r gwrth ag yw unig y gallwch yn unig y gallwch yn unig. Felly mae'n amlwg roedd yn siŵr, as yng Nghymru, yn unig Yn Ysgrifennu, oherwydd mae'n cael unig y gallwch yn unig y gallwch yn unig. Ysgrifennu i Ffranc y Dynod erbyn yn gwybod drwy'r cyffredinol gyda unig, ond rwy'n gweithio'r cyffredinol yn eich bod nhw'n gyffredinol, ond rwy'n gweithio'r cyffredinol yn eich bod nhw'n cyffredinol yn y gweithredinol, Felly, ydych chi eich bod yn dda'r cyfrifolau iawn, er mwyn i'r pwyntio iawn. Yna'r ddaf yn codi'r cyrraedd yng nifer o'r unigion Europea. Wrth i chi'r cyfrifolau iawn yng nghymru. Y Cymru Banking, efallai eich ysgolion, efallai eich ysgolion roedd y Prans i'r Dyn, eich cyfrifolau iawn o'r proses o'r cyfrifolau iawn, yn dda'r cyfrifolau iawn o'r hosedlidau, eu sceptrism, yna'r cyfrifolau iawn o'r cyfrifolau, mae'r hyn sydd fyddai gweithio'r benderfyniad ar y dyfodol, ond ydych yn erioed o'r cyfrifio ar y dda. Oherwydd bod y cyfrifio ar y ddodd y cyfrifio ar y ddodd, y ddw'n cyfrifio ddodd, a'r hyrroedd oedd yn ffordd o'r llwyth yn gweithio'r cyfrifio, rwy'n cyfrifio o'r cyfrifio sydd yn bryd, oherwydd, oherwydd mae'n gweithio'r cyfrifio o'r ddodd. The second point I would make is that the reason why the Franco-Durham relationship has survived for so long, and I think will continue to do very well for the foreseeable future, is because it is a necessary one in Europe. It hasn't survived because it's bilaterally so vital for both countries to engage in so many bilateral meetings and regular consultations, I dwi'n adnodd y maen nhw, beth y gallwch chi'ch eich mynd i siŵs, yn gallu c вопросu fe yw'r un i eich meddwl, byddwch ar grannig yma i'r unrhywol yng Nghymru. Byddwch ar y ddodd y rhan o, siŵs ar y ddweud ar yr unrhyw oedd o'r blodau cyfrannu. A fyddo i ddechrau y rhan o yn ffliad til, mae字r Ffrancennid yng Nghymru yw yn ddych chi oedd iawn i'n gweithio,on yn unrhyw o'r prif, y cwmweith cwmweithon iddyn nhw, The enticement for Berlin and Paris to continue to exercise a very strong influence in Europe and to a large extent shape or help shape the way the European Union is evolving is an invitation to both governments to continue the difficult process of achieving compromise despite instinctively often adverse reactions to any new situation or any new problem. The third point I would like to make is that it's often overlooked that the Franco-Germ relationship which again for which it is a treaty if you like gives the written but often unread framework is that it's a relationship that operates in only selected policy areas. It's despite what the treaty wanted to achieve, it is not a relation that really exists in the field of foreign relations. There is no Franco-German couple, there is no Franco-German axis of problematic word but structural and foundational relationship in the field of foreign policy. There may be accidents of history, accidental moments when both countries agree on an important point of international debate like when Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac jointly oppose the Iraq war. But those are accidental moments. We've seen over Libya over the Franco-British decision to depose de facto Gaddafi that there is no Franco-German effort at all there and we're seeing the same thing I would argue over Mali and there was no particularly close despite what had happened in Libya. Again Berlin stayed out of it to a larger extent even if they're now sending to transport planes. Where the Franco-German relationship is crucial is I would suggest is in two areas of European policy. One is everything that's to do with money, the economy, and we've seen that of course in the eurozone crisis. The other is with everything that's to do with the future, I'm going to use the word despite the failure of the treaty constitutional shape or the present and future constitutional shape of Europe, the way European integration evolves. And of course these are precisely the two areas, the Lashaw's economy, the money and the economy on the one hand and the constitutional evolution of Europe, the evolution of Europe's political architecture which have been at the heart of the eurozone crisis in the last few years. And where we've seen that the Franco-German couple remains absolutely crucial because what happened of course or an analysis that was very prevalent when we saw the last big EU enlargement was that the multiplication of member states and the fact that mechanically the combined way to France and Germany would diminish. Ben so a lot of people thought and wrote at the time meant that the Franco-German couple would stop being so central to EU politics and would stop being so crucially relevant. Well I think the eurozone crisis has demonstrated with extraordinary force that that analysis just wasn't true. And I think it's going to remain untrue until the day where European integration has led to, if it ever comes, has led to something that is more or less like the United States of Europe. Unless until the day when the member states and their populations have agreed to transfer so much authority, so much power to Europe's common institutions that the alliances between member states just don't matter particularly just as whether Texas and California in the US agree or not is interesting but not crucial to the shape of American politics. Until that day comes, if it ever comes, I think that the Franco-German entity, political entity such as it is, will remain absolutely central and because it remains central it will remain alive because it's in both capitals national interests not to dilapidate that extraordinary power tool that is a Franco-German compromise. So that's continuity and now very briefly, much more briefly change. Well a lot of people say because of Germany's current economic success and France's current economic travails there is a new extremely destabilising disequilibrium between France and Germany which is bad for the relationship, weakens it and puts its future into a degree of doubt. I don't quite buy that, I remember ten years ago Germany being the sick man of Europe. I don't think it is at all preodain that France won't regain competitiveness, look at demography, works for France, works very much against Germany. But even if Germany continued to be economically much more successful than France and France continued to have problems, I still think that the reality that these two countries together can achieve much much more. That can have much stronger influence than each country, separately, even Germany separately remains as true as ever. Another point of change, so that has changed I would to some extent dismiss as almost irrelevant, gross exaggeration but I would in the interest of time I'll leave it there. The other change that is not dismissable is what's happened since the election of Franco-German. A lot of people say that the relationship is in terrible state because they are quarrelling all the time. They have always quarrelled all the time. They quarrelled all the time during the Mercosie area. What has changed is that Mercosie for perfectly noble and legitimate and understandable reasons has chosen to not highlight the differences usually. Why? Because there was a fear, I think a perfectly justified fear, that if France and Germany, Sakersie and Merkel at the time highlighted their differences, the financial markets might say, ooh, these two disagree, well, that adds instability to an already highly unstable situation at the height of the eurozone crisis, the peak of it. And also there was a fear in Paris that then the markets might start treating France like a periphery country. And so in order for that not to happen, the strategy was to cleave as closely to Berlin as you possibly could in your public presentation of what was going on. But Sabarosa, there was a lot of disagreement. Now Hollande has done the exact opposite. In his electoral campaign he campaigned for a policy change in Berlin and he said, you know, I'm not Angela Merkel, I'm not Nicolas Sakersie, I'm Francois Hollande and in a sense he's continued to do that since after his election. She, elle, c'est elle, moi, c'est moi. He could get away with it because the markets until now, despite the economists cover, some economists cover with sort of bombs and other things, have decided to treat France as a safe haven. And we have a lot of credit to the Hollande government. And the French refinancing costs are practically as good as Germany's. And that has given Hollande the political leeway to highlight the differences with Angela Merkel, which serves him, of course, in his own domestic politics. In fact, if you look at what's really happening, you're still in the classical scenario for uncontrolled relations. Banking union is a classical example of joint project disagreements and then compromise, which then becomes more or less the European compromise. On other issues like how to treat Athens, what conditions to exact from Athens in exchange for European help. Well, a lot of people thought there'd be a big clash if Hollande gets elected between Berlin and Paris. There hasn't been any clash at all. It goes completely unreported because there's no story. Paris and Berlin agree since the election of Hollande on how to deal with Athens. In fact, they agree more than Sakersie and Merkel did. And you've got other very important things like the tacit Franco-German compromise, which are endorsement of the famous announcement by Draghi last summer that he had created the EMT programme, which, of course, was a huge element and diffused in the crisis. Again, the result of a tacit Franco-German, but very powerful Franco-German agreement and compromise. So de facto, the relationship functions pretty much as it always has. What's changed is that Hollande, for domestic policy reasons, has chosen to put the spotlight on divergence rather than convergence. While still saying, of course, I work on compromises and I build them and this remains vital. That, in the sense, is a presentational change, but of course, if it's sustained for too long, it builds up levels of irritation in Berlin which could become damaging. And my wish for the future would be that after the German elections, not before, because we're going to see differences continuing to be highlighted in the run-up to the election for domestic policy reasons, possibly by both partners, we'll enter a phase when if Merkel remains in office as most people in Germany think she will, Hollande will just change the direction of the project to us lightly. In substance, as I said, the thing continues to work. I expect it to continue working for the foreseeable decades and it'll be up to the partners of France and Germany to continue to do what I think they've done successfully. Which is be very worried if the Germans and French don't agree sufficiently and then encourage them to do so. But once you get a German and French agreement, remind both partners that they're not alone in Europe and that there are other voices that must be heard. Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to your discussion.