 Good afternoon. Welcome. My name is Lisa Grande. I'm the head of the United States Institute of Peace. We are a public nonpartisan institution that was established in 1984 Dedicated to helping prevent mitigate and resolve violent conflict abroad in today's world this mandate Sometimes means that not only do we address active conflicts But also that we help to establish and maintain mechanisms and tools that increase stability and Prevent future conflicts. We're very pleased to have the opportunity this afternoon to explore one such potential mechanism the growing political and security partnerships between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Its partner countries in the Indo-Pacific Australia Japan the Republic of Korea and New Zealand This topic is the subject of a new report that a US IP expert study group has just issued It's available online and we have hard copies outside for all of you My main role this afternoon is to welcome two of the most respected gentlemen in Washington Deputy Secretary of State, Dr. Kirk Campbell and Former National Security Advisor and former chair of US IP's board my boss Steven Hadley Following their discussion We're delighted to welcome a number of colleagues who are going to be part of a panel Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Douglas Jones State Department Senior Advisor for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Eliasen Laskowski former NATO assistant secretary general for operations John Manza and Chair of the US IP senior study group on NATO and Indo-Pacific partners Murna the Washington Summit in July is going to mark the third year in a row that the leaders of Australia Japan New Zealand and the Republic of Korea join NATO counterparts and an alliance summit There's a lot to talk about at the summit and a lot at stake in these discussions Including the return of strategic competition to the international system threats to the rules-based international order From Russia's war in Ukraine the realities that are posed by a more assertive China and Urgent transnational problems including climate change and emerging disruptive technologies As the NATO alliance enters its 75th year some of the challenges we face together are familiar But others are now far more complex and fast evolving Then could have been imagined at the first NATO meeting in Washington in 1949 Our aim is to talk about these challenges today and how they can be addressed through new partnerships That are focused on deterrence and information exchange and interoperability and can also be addressed through cooperation and goodwill Which are the basis of our shared pursuit of peace and stability Deputy Secretary, maybe we invite you to the floor So Kurt thank you very much for for being with us We're going to have a conversation here for maybe 20 30 minutes, and then Curt is going to depart We're going to invite the panelists to come up part two of the program will be discussion with the panelists of this terrific report Which I recommend all of you pick up as you leave if you haven't gotten it already. It's a great job So Kurt I'm going to start and give you a bit of a softball on this one But it's an opportunity to say what you think we need to hear But 75 years ago. No one could have imagined that an integrated Europeans Union of European states Let alone the president of the Republic of Korea and the Prime Minister's Australia Japan and New Zealand would be joining NATO member states for regular summit meetings Yet that is what's now occurring How did we get there and how should we feel about it? Well first let me just take a moment to say thank you for the invite to help commemorate the report that's just been issued At least I want to thank you and your team And you have a great panel including Doug Jones distinguished member of the your team also other colleagues that will be joining as well I do want to just say just a few things if I can as we get started I Have never been to this part of the US Institute of Peace This is some of the most magnificent architectural integration. I've ever seen I want you all to know We've been scouting around Washington where we might hold the AP for soon to be IP for I think and I think we have found our site So we're thrilled it's just magnificent and then just the last word. I'm sorry. This is not filler These are sincere grateful to do anything with Steve Hadley. I don't think There's a person who has done more in a bipartisan content text to support American purpose When you look at the people that this building is dedicated after President Bush and President Clinton it was people like Steve that helped propel National purpose in many important endeavors. I just want to say as we get started I'm deeply focused on the upcoming summit This is an opportunity for us to both take stock Steven that also kind of look into the future I don't think anyone could have imagined so many five years ago If you look at all the things that have been accomplished over this time first victory in the Cold War Return of conflict terrible conflict on the continent of Europe Inclusion of new members that no one would have ever thought would have met the sort of terms of membership and now a recognition that security and other issues transcend The simple geographic boundaries of Europe and so I think the fact that countries in the Indo-Pacific Have expressed an interest and a focus on NATO as an organization and member states in terms of the core missions of understanding disinformation cyber security and larger Sort of challenges strategically. I think is very important. I will also say see I think you know in the past We've always thought about how countries in Europe may focus on the Indo-Pacific and you know either with the United States or alone It is interesting that the most Decisive expression of the linkages that are now emerging between the Indo-Pacific in Europe run the other direction It is the countries of the Indo-Pacific Japan South Korea Australia New Zealand Singapore and others that decisively got behind support for Ukraine and have made consistent messaging of the importance of prevailing two weeks ago when President Biden hosted Prime Minister Kishida And he spoke to a joint session of Congress people on the Hill were a little surprised That virtually the first thing that Prime Minister Kishida raised was the essential struggle that we are focused on and that Victory or avoiding defeat was essential Pre-wet prerequisite for maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. I think he and other leaders in The Indo-Pacific recognized the connected tippity between these two distinct Regions, but we are now combined by many other things and there is a sense that Common purposes common approaches to global security Overcome simple sort of geographic differences, and I will say that what we've also seen over the course of the last Few years is a Russia that is Bolstered by partnership with both China and North Korea in ways that are Antithetical not only to our security interests in Europe, but also the Indo-Pacific So I'm going to This relationship between NATO and NATO countries and the our Indo-Pacific allies I think is pretty popular in Washington and reflects the consensus we have That we've got to get serious about the challenge presented by China I want to ask you a couple questions of poke a little bit at that Yeah, and one of the questions I would begin with is so how has China reacted to this Increasing cooperation between NATO and our Indo-Pacific friends and allies Steve first So just to set the context as we go forward here I think it is incumbent on us to tell our story carefully and to explain Exactly what our purposes are and what they are not We are not proposing that NATO explore out of area contingencies in the Indo-Pacific that is Far from what we believe the current dialogues are about we also think it is critical that That countries in the Indo-Pacific Understand exactly what the nature of our conversations are about and the limitations of what's being discussed And so for instance, there are important member-state Relationships with NATO there are interactions more generally, but there is no real Proposition of some Combining force that would integrate countries in the Indo-Pacific into some former formal self-defense Article 5 article 9 structures in NATO that that is not what is being discussed or articulated I think it would be fair to say that that China and Russia Have for years not recently, but for years Had a drum beat a very negative information Sorry, okay, we spent like hours putting this microphone on and it doesn't work So it's a wonderful building, but we still need to work on the technology. So I would say that's a joke. See don't It's okay. It's fine. It's a good technology. So so Virtually any move that the United States or other countries Sought to make on the security side in the Indo-Pacific Was labeled like the importation of NATO into the Indo-Pacific in very negative ways And I will say that I think it would be fair to say that this information space has been very effectively Played by Chinese distance information and Russian disinformation So as you travel around the Pacific and Southeast Asia you will often hear questions about, you know NATO ambitions, what are you doing in the Indo-Pacific? Part of one of the reasons that I'm so pleased by this report and the work that it will underscore is that we do have to Tell our story better. We have to explain clearly first of all the Critical role if you had to point to one institution Steve over the last 70 years that you can stand up and sort of focus on the Distance takes them pride in it would be NATO and in truth. It is a it is a A case study of how Countries can work together to solve problems all the challenges that it's faced It has overcome over decades even during periods where people thought that the West was Decline or would collapse so I think these partnerships will be important They help countries understand how to take security interest interests seriously I will say that some of the initial discussions are around disinformation They're around cyber related issues. They're around Narratives that are negative like what we are confronting with respect to how NATO is depicted in In in Indo-Pacific countries, I think the AP for Summit gives us the opportunity to feature how these four responsible members of five eyes independent states Not not all of them, but but South Korea Japan Excuse me Australia and New Zealand plus Japan and South Korea how these four states have played such a responsible Role in not only security in their region, but each of the leaders of these countries Desires to play an increasing global role And when we say a global role in the past that had often meant in the global south but what we're seeing increasingly our Responsible voices indicating that the links between countries in Northeast Asia for instance and Europe are tight Important and should be Furthered. I'll also say Steve one of the things that's important We've talked about this before I worked on the Indo-Pacific for a long period of time when I was in the Obama administration there was something that emerged called the pivot or the rebalance and I've said this before but most Initiatives that you launch in government Disappear almost immediately without anyone like noticing and you point it to people and they're like I don't even know what you're talking about on the very rare occasions when you do something that takes off Then you're you're left with a different set of challenges, which are how do you deal with the unintended consequences of? An initiative that you let out the most important unintended consequence of this was a sense that somehow we were pivoting away from Europe to the Indo-Pacific that was a serious mistake and In fact completely contrary to our interests and our desires Everything that the United States has ever done of purpose on the global stage We have done with Europe and I expect that that will be the case as we go forward And it's also the case Steve as we've looked and thought about the Indo-Pacific strategy I'm proud to say that one of the most important features of that are not just advanced Partnerships and engagement with the Indo-Pacific but with Europe dramatic dialogues some countries almost a dozen interactions in which we Explore joint issues and engagements in the past when you talked about a country in Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy that was largely how they thought about China What we're now seeing in Europe is a broad interest in the region as a whole advancing Relations in technology with Japan and South Korea markets in Southeast Asia how to think about Engaging India and yes, how to have a responsible relationship with China as well So Kurt let me come back to you on what you've just said and ask you this question So when you have your interactions with China What do you say to them when they say? This increased relationship between NATO and the you your allies America's allies in the Indo-Pacific is part of an effort to In circle China constrain can China keep China down and what do you say? Sort of part two of that question to some critics here who say that by emphasizing a renewed relationship between NATO and the countries in the Asia Pacific and our own pressure on Countries to do more for their own defense We're in fact going to get a further Chinese military build up of both their conventional forces and their There's nuclear forces. So we're in some sense creating the security challenge that we'd like to avoid So what do you say to the Chinese and then what do you say to those? Yeah, so look We often hear from Chinese friends and air locketers about how the United States is seeking to strangle or undermine commercially or economically or Surround China and I just I think it's important to take a moment and to provide just a little bit of context before we depart on This question if you look at the last 40 or 50 years You could make an argument that these are the best 40 or 50 years in China's history Remarkable creation of wealth Innovation lifting nearly a billion people out of poverty now You have to credit the ingenuity and the effectiveness of the Chinese people But it is undoubtedly the case that they accomplish this with the help of countries in the international system Probably no country has helped more than the United States open markets investment support for joining international institutions highly debatable now and Also is importantly the maintenance of peace and stability that the United States has provided in the Indo-Pacific for decades These have provided in many respects the conditions that have allowed China to rise to thrive and To develop more generally see that I would I would largely answer Directly to Chinese friends that I do not see the actions that the West the United States and Europe is taking as somehow Initiating Chinese responses on the nuclear or military side I think many of those plans were already well underway and advanced at the time that I think sometimes reluctantly and slowly Groups in the West Recognize that it was in our own best interest to work together to confront and engage on challenges that were posing severe threats and concerns to our mutual security and prosperity and soon I would say And I try to explain these to Chinese friends much of what we've done is not designed to Thwart China directly it is designed to preserve and protect protect the institutions and the capabilities the hard one Operating system that we have developed together I would also say that I even hear from Chinese interlocutors sometimes quietly when we press them on Their relationship with Russia. I will say look at the partners You are choosing the partners that you chose to Propel yourself on the international stage the United States Japan South Korea other Southeast Asian countries. You have now Pivoted to work most closely with Russia with with North Korea increasingly with Iran with Iran I think that sends a signal On the global stage that is concerning not just in Washington and Steve, but across capitals in Europe as well Clearly if if NATO started signing up as members Australia New Zealand Japan and South Korea It would be a red flag to China But what about the argument that some have made that NATO being the most successful military alliance and history? We should not bring NATO into the Indo Pacific, but we should create if you will and NATO Look alike in the Indo-Pacific pulling together our friends and allies in a more structured self-defense arrangement NATO's like what what is what would China's reaction be to that and what it would be the reaction of our friends and allies if So look Steve, I think what we have tried to do over the course of the administration Building on bipartisan efforts for some time Look the the the defense and security architecture in Asia is quite different than the architecture in Europe I don't need to tell you this and in fact Multilateralism in Asia is a relatively new thing you can recall. I remember when I first met Steve back in the 1990s Ladies we were debating whether it was an American interest to support the development of multilateral institutions in the region that have now You know taken wing in many respects what what we are seeing is The United States has a series of important bilateral relationships in the region and then a number of Informal ties with other countries. I think the goal has been to Not only diversify those links bring new partners in but to create cross-cutting partnerships that that Are many lateral in and and sometimes purpose-driven it is our Able ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel calls it the lattice work fence arrangement in the Indo-Pacific. I think for right now the Building blocks that we are seeking is not only to strengthen our bilateral relationships of the kind that we've seen When Prime Minister Kishita was here again a week and a half ago And I would just have all of you just take a moment to just to consider the depth of the bilateral accomplishments it is remarkable it is an update of a of a now 70 year old relationship in ways that are Completely unprecedented, but we've added to that by again trilateral mini lateral groupings The quad that brings all the maritime major democracies of the you know Pacific together, AUKUS that seeks to provide Nuclear power conventionally armed submarines and then other elements of AUKUS that will hopefully over time integrate other like-minded countries in joint technological pursuits the important trilateral at Camp David between the United States Japan and South Korea that sought to bridge decades of real serious divisiveness, and then most recently Steve a week and a half ago the one between Japan The Philippines in the United States. We think these Efforts along with strengthened bilateral relationships with countries like Vietnam increasingly like-minded on Security issues and a major project that we are all engaged in which is trying to develop a stronger Relationship with India given its critical and central role on the global stage these efforts together we believe provide a kind of security ballast In the Indo-Pacific that will be sustaining that gives confidence to member nations and helps provide The maintenance of peace and stability. I will also say we believe and I think what you will see in July that the AP for Steve is now rising to the level of This kind of strategic initiative that will be integrated into the other efforts that we're undertaking. I Think you may have answered my question, but let me put it on the table You've done a fantastic job About strengthening these bilateral Relationships with individual countries. You've also created a number of different architectures for different purposes that involve a not necessarily the same group of Countries though there is a core group All of that seems to be going extremely well to be well received in the region and China is fussing, but You know it's it proceeds nonetheless the US IP report talks about the AP for the IP for as a as a Sort of an issue of some sensitivity in the region. Yeah, there are differences among the four members why Given your success on the bilateral relationship and on these Arcus and all these other institutions trilateral relations that you've got why raise up The IP for and try to institutionalize it isn't that some sense giving a target? For the Chinese and and some the rouser for the reason that you don't need given all the great work You've done bilaterally and these are no other mechanisms Steve It's a great question. It's an important question I will say that that you know launching any one of these initiatives we have faced challenges they're domestic critics of the Engagement between Japan South Korea the United States it has been criticized broadly in South Korea and there Some concerns in in Japan. I did not mention the The work that we're doing in the Pacific which has initially confronted with doubt and concerns Where the United States would follow through and whether we could be counted on for as a stable and steady presence in a region Where we were once very important and largely departed from so I think even though in some of these circumstances That you sometimes confront Early doubts and disagreements. It's important to both Strategically formulate what you're seeking what you think is in the best interests of the United States and other countries Advance that and then recognize that to be effective. It is no longer important to just Design something in an elegant structure. You've got to get out there and explain it and defend it One of the reasons I am here today is to commend the work that USIP is doing which is remarkable and important This is the first report of its kind that really explores what the potential is If I could say one last thing Steve It also suggests that for a lot of these initiatives that it is the United States that is the sole architect Nothing could be further from the truth many of these initiatives are driven by strong willed Countries with their own strategic sense. I would argue 15 years ago. No one would have said look some of the biggest most interesting Strategic concepts that would be introduced on the global stage would come from Japan for instance But the Indo-Pacific concept the free and open concept was a powerful tool That helped synthesize how to think about the region promoted by Prime Minister Abbey It is Prime Minister Kishida that is so interested and focused along with the leaders of Japan of South Korea Australia New Zealand who are themselves promoting the idea of working more closely with European partners and NATO and I think it is incumbent on the United States to to encourage that to shape that And to work in you know the best possible Way with them. I also have to say see this is a hard thing to be so direct about but sometimes when a country is Really unhappy with something it can also mean that you're on the right track, right? And so you know sometimes we do get concerns and questions about the Indo-Pacific strategy I think that might mean that we're doing some things more effectively than others might believe That sets up really. What is my last question? There's a lot going on the region You've described it bilaterally these countries in the United States with NATO with European countries How is it playing in their domestic politics? Both these governments in Japan and South Korea are Under considerable domestic pressure at home is this Pivot in their defense relationships that you've described Contributing to that discontent and do we run the risk in some sense of undermining these governments and breaking their politics? If we move too quickly on this these are hard questions Steve I mean look, I don't think it should be lost on anyone that in many countries in Europe In the Indo-Pacific and the United States we have leaders with challenged opinion polls, right? And I think it is also the case that there is Some disenchantment and anxiety about what democracy more in general can provide I Actually think one of the most important reasons why these venues are so important and I have seen it personally Like I know and Steve you have to you're even much more close the burdens that our senior leaders feel the the weight of history and sometimes the ability to sit down and work in common purpose with other democratic Partners is deeply reassuring and confidence providing and provoking and so I I Actually believe one of the most important things that countries can do when they face domestic challenges is to Recognize that you take you know purpose and courage and strength from gathering with others It is undeniable that in the Indo-Pacific It's hard to sometimes make the argument about why out of area thinking Is complicated, but I would simply say that's not unique to To Japan and South Korea if you look at the debate that occurred here On Capitol Hill over the weekend and on Friday you saw very clear voices Arguing that it's not in American interests to be spending so much time and to be focused on other people's problems We should be focused domestically. I believe that we're best able to you know Confront those nationalist impulses when we work collectively and effectively together. I'll also say Prime Minister Kishida, President Yoon, Prime Minister Modi Prime Minister Albanese when they left Washington after what I would consider and remember we've done the Quad now in terms of state visits each of them saw a Substantial bump in their popularity, which means probably yeah substantial that that that working with the United States is Still important and popular even in highly contested Domestic circumstances We've come to the end of the time for this first portion of the program. I'm sorry. We did not have time for audience Q&A We're trying to pack a lot into this time I apologize for that. We're please stay stay tuned Kurt is going to depart we're going to bring the panel up here and we're going to talk about this terrific to part report But please join me in thanking Kurt Campbell for being with us today Just a last word there is such a distinguished group in this audience I hope you have an opportunity to engage on this report and I want to encourage Everyone to take a look at thank you for putting it out It touches on all the issues honestly that we are confronting I will tell you even though we're going to face some headwinds on this stiff Steve We're going to we're going to press ahead good Thanks so much for being with us So let me invite the panelists to come and come to the stage and we'll continue this discussion so Lees has already introduced the panelists briefly I'm going to tell you a little bit more about them and I think you will conclude at the end that we could not have a Better group here to talk about this issue I'm going to start with Mirna Gallick who's at the end and She was the chair of the USIP expert study group a Native of the Indo-Pacific partners that produced the report that's out on the tables outside She is the USIP a USIP senior policy analyst for China and East Asia She's worked at the Department of State in the Senate and at the United Nations well traveled in her professional career Doug Jones is deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs and Overseas European issues and security including NATO OSCE Conventional arms control and Arctic security a robust portfolio indeed from 2018 to 2021 he served as charge a defer and deputy chief of mission at the US mission in NATO Thanks for being with us Ellison Laskowski Is a senior advisor is in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State Her areas of focus include NATO's into Pacific partners Her previous posts include the Department of State's Office of Policy Planning and the Asia program at the German Marshal Fund and Last but not least John Manza served as NATO assistant secretary general for operations from 2018 to 2022 where his responsibilities included Alliance exercises plans and defense capacity building with partner nations He currently serves as the executive director of the Haiti interagency Working Group in the office of the Secretary of Defense and that's an assignment that will keep you busy for some time I want to thank the panelists for all for coming and joining us this afternoon And I'd like to begin with Mirna and ask her really to Summarize the report. I hope you all take a copy of it I hope you all read it and when the members of the audience do Mirna, what are they going to find and what do you think is going to surprise them that they might not have known Before they picked up the report see for well, thank you so much Steve So in addition to the report I'll give a quick summary also of the study group And I'll start with why we decided to undertake this project So as president Grande mentioned in her opening remarks We were very interested in the potential of NATO and into Pacific partner relations as a potential mechanism of stability in the region And what we really wanted to do was understand the perspectives of the partner countries on Both their deepening relations with NATO and on the growing interest in them from the Euro-Atlantic So we had a fantastic set of experts We had two from each of the partner countries and four from NATO ally countries And each of these folks had focused before on their relations with NATO their countries relations with NATO or NATO's relations with the end of Pacific and the number of people who are experts on this issue is very slim So we were very lucky to get the right folks in the room And they were an absolute joy to work with so we started out with the right people And I think that kind of set the tone for for our ability to go where we went eventually So the report looked at a number of issues in addition to national level interests in NATO We we looked at four main areas First we looked at the history of NATO's engagement on the region and with its regional partners Not only bilaterally, but also as a group of four which as we've mentioned has various names But we're calling in the report the IP for the Indo-Pacific for Second we looked at trends among the partner countries on certain issues So one of them was Expectations of NATO on the region another one was views on NATO in China and the final one was views on NATO in Ukraine The third area that the report looks into is how these partners see themselves as being grouped into the IP for Are they happy with it? How they how they feel about it and what they think its potential is as a mechanism and then lastly we looked at Public diplomacy and strategic messaging on relations between NATO and these partner countries and The group made some observations and outlines and policy options in each of these areas Which I will only briefly go through since we don't have a lot of time But that's why you have the report available to you and we do hope that you will take a look at it So in terms of NATO on the region the alliance has a very long history of engaging on the region and with its partners in the region One that precedes the NATO recognition of China as a potential security challenge, which only happened in 2019 By at least a decade if you go back to when these partners started their partnership agreements with NATO in the late 2010s Or more than two decades if you go back to the beginning of NATO's engagement with Japan And then the country is cooperating with NATO on its mission in Afghanistan in the early 2000s NATO actually even carried out three consecutive counter piracy missions in the Indian Ocean between 2009 and 2016 Which were welcomed by regional countries including China So it's really important to kind of keep this history in mind because NATO or peace China rather is really painting NATO's interest in the region as New and foreign and unfairly all about China and if you look at the history, this is simply not accurate So on the trends among the partner countries, I'll just pull out what I think are the most interesting ones In each category essentially so on NATO in the region None of the partner countries Expect NATO to be a significant direct actor on the end of Pacific instead what they want is The alliance to coordinate with them on issues of mutual concern in Stemming from or affecting the region what the study group basically characterized as NATO with the Indo-Pacific not in the Indo-Pacific On China although all of the partner countries want to be invited to participate in relevant internal discussions on China at NATO None of them appear to want their cooperation with NATO to be characterized as being about China and Finally on the question of Ukraine. This was really the area where the four countries are the closest in terms of their Positions all of them are very concerned about Russia's war against Ukraine and all of them see this as a security problem Not just for Europe, but also for their region They see Russia's abrogation of the rules-based international order as problematic Both in itself in that they see the rules-based order as necessary for their prosperity and security just as Europe does But also because of the signals this abrogation sends to China and North Korea and all four of these countries have placed Sanctions on Russia and coordinated with NATO on a delivery to Ukraine. Let me just take this off and hold it So in terms of views from the partner countries on the I before grouping So for my very first meetings at NATO at the beginning of 2022 both Partner country officials and NATO officials strongly emphasized the importance of the bilateral relationship between NATO and each of these countries So that remains I think a priority for both groups But the fact of the matter is that the IP for grouping is a fact on the ground And it's something that's gained in prominence over the past couple of years So as a result of this what's important is that the countries understand how best to take advantage of this fact for their national and regional goals And we discussed in the report some of the benefits of the grouping and we also suggest that these partner countries first internally And then as a group kind of take a look at how they can take greater strategic advantage of being the IP for essentially On the question of public diplomacy and outreach to partner countries the quick summary is we need more of it Basically, there's still a relatively limited understanding of NATO at public levels in all the countries and even within policy circles across countries And this is really important as Steve and Kurt Campbell also mentioned because China is picking up its negative messaging on NATO in the region and then the last area the strategic rationales for engagement We really wanted to clarify Why these kinds of relations are important in a way that can resonate with policy makers both in these partner countries and at NATO and Given the strategic or the changes stemming from Russia's war in Ukraine and from the return of strategic competition In the international system the study group basically looked at three possible Strategic rationales for engagement that go beyond what we've traditionally had with partners in NATO Which is the narratives of shared values and transnational threats So essentially very generally the three we looked at they focused on one the connections between NATO and the regions Sorry between the two regions that make them more relevant for one another security than was previously perceived Second we looked at the growing interdependence of deterrence dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific With the rise of strategic competition between the US and China and third we looked at the impact of strategic competition competition on transnational threats. So basically for example cyber security but in the in the context of geopolitical tensions between the major powers or Non-proliferation but in the context of Russia's saber rattling over Ukraine So these kinds of things and basically the group felt that more systemic discussion between NATO and the Indo-Pacific partners on these issues Would help improve each side situational awareness and coordinate perceptions. So maybe I'll stop there Thank you very much One of the things that surprised me about the report was where you started which was that there's Long-standing relations between NATO and some of our closest security partners in the Asia Pacific which I was not aware of There's another sense of in the report. There's a tone and it picks up a little bit my question to To to Kurt Campbell and it's a question really I want to put to all members of the panel There's a sense in which there's a certain Fragility about the IP for there's certain sensitivities in the region There's certain differences among the participants of the IP for and some of the issues you mentioned that so the question I would have is from our From a US perspective our NATO IP for relations and this emerging role for the IP for a Fleeting trend or they here to stay as Kurt said is this something that we work on over time and it becomes part of the Fabric of the architecture in the region What so so how do you see it is it fleeting? Are we seeing something that's here to stay a new institution and what makes you think so so why don't we start with you? Thanks for having me here today. It's been great reading through the report great listening To the remarks thus far, and I'm very honored to be joined by colleagues up here on stage. I think My man job here today, too, is to you know support what the deputy secretary has said, but I don't disagree I think that this is not a fleeting moment. I think the fabric is well woven at this point and is here to stay The point that you touched on that he touched on that going back over decades looking at the really the historical cooperation between these four on some really important issues Shows the the depth of the foundation of these relationships He also touched earlier on sort of their by natural bilateral nature. Excuse me The growth that we see around the world on interconnected transnational threats The interconnectedness of one region to another and responding to these shared threats the growing list of areas of practical Cooperation that I think we can touch on in a little bit. That's the hybrid threats emerging threats cyber Responding to disinformation all give us a really long list of reasons to believe that this cooperation will continue to deepen So I agree with your main point. It's not fleeting. This is something that's for the long term and I think It's important to think that not only not only as you said is this not new But I think also the partnerships with the Indo-Pacific are also not unique We often talk about it as if that's the only area where NATO has sort of this deep partnerships But NATO concluded quite a long time ago that your Atlantic Atlantic security is tied to security elsewhere in the world and so NATO has 35 partnerships around the world it has partnerships in Africa it has partnerships in the Middle East in a actual formalized structure in the Istanbul cooperation initiative because NATO knows that what happens elsewhere impacts in in your Atlantic security and that's the same basic conclusion that's driving This deepening relationship with the inter-Pacific partners because we know what is happening in the inter-Pacific impacts your Atlantic security and our inter-Pacific partners are realizing that what's happening in the Europe your Atlantic space is impacting them and so This is this increasing realization that there are these interplays between what happens in the your Atlantic area and elsewhere is only becoming More prominent and I think what's driving a lot behind the increased focus on the Indo-Pacific is a it's China is becoming more of a factor in your Atlantic security But also we're seeing more and more examples of how the security is linked in Ukraine being the most recent example that's driving this as we've seen how the PRC's support for Russia economically and supporting their defense industrial bases impacting the war in Ukraine. We're seeing how ammunition and missiles coming from the DPRK to Russia is helping them prosecute the war in Ukraine and then on the flip side The conclusion that what happens the outcome of what happens in Ukraine will deeply impact Security in the Indo-Pacific and what conclusions the PRC may may raise if Putin's Invasion of Ukraine is not there's not a defeat. They may take long lessons that would have serious Consequences in the Indo-Pacific, so I think all trends are there's a strong Basis for why we have these this dialogue and these connections and it's growing stronger Thanks very much Doug John. How do you see it? so I think the cooperation may be up until fairly recently was more at a political level at a almost a token level But then over time especially with the rise of China and now the world kind of bifurcating into totalitarian states and and democracies and democracies recognizing the threat from China, Russia, North Korea Maybe you'd put a ran in that in that mix I See this as Increasingly important it started really in my mind in 2019 in London and finally Allies were able to get over that hump and talk about China More in terms like you hear here in Washington and just recognize the threat from a rising China But up until that point there was a lot of reticence on both sides. I think in the Pacific Rim and amongst allies many allies simply didn't want to discuss What was happening in the Pacific Rim as a threat to their own security? But but certainly Ukraine has helped foster that That thinking So I think there's a reason that these countries Are playing as prominent a role as they are in the region and it has to do a lot with their Democraticness their the strong military is their strong economic performance and their strong support of the rules based on international order which are values and Sort of characteristics that they share with NATO allies So, you know if anything I think the question is not so much as you know Are the IP for fleeting is are we going to see more countries that NATO wants to engage in this region? but I think these countries certainly are Are talking to NATO and being pursued by NATO because of the nature of of the kinds of countries? They are and I think they're able to provide an insight for our allies in Europe into what's happening in the region That's really not replaceable by anyone else So I don't I don't see these partners becoming less important anytime soon Thank you John, I'm gonna put a question to you that sort of follows on something you said which obviously one of the things that brought this relationship between NATO and our You know Pacific partners closer was the concerns about China So how do you just how do you describe it characterize it frame it in such a way that doesn't play into the narrative that this is about Constraining and circling and keeping China down that this is actually the NATO has a hidden agenda Against the PRC and that this is really all aimed at China How do you how do you avoid playing into that narrative because that's a narrative that is going to make it more difficult for some countries to Work with NATO and it's also going to be an issue within their public So how do you what's the narratives how you describe this work in such a way that doesn't play into the Chinese narrative here, well, I think this is Especially difficult because I'm even in our own country I mean what is the percentage of of Americans who really understand NATO And and the Alliance and what it does and you know our relationships even Bilaterally with with nations abroad so to educate public's on this is very difficult, but you know Chinese leadership I think you could you could certainly target. I think Doug hit a Very strong point, you know, this is not unusual. We have partnerships all over the world And that's a good one to explain. It's good as was discussed before to talk about you know This is not new in the Pacific But I also think you know, maybe we shouldn't hide it so much We should be proud of democracy standing together I mean we do that in Europe all the time and across the North Atlantic we talk about being shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies to To deal with threats to democracy So, you know, I know there's a risk there of making the Chinese feel isolated But I also think in terms of deterrence and that message we shouldn't hide it We're we're proud democracies and supporting other democracies in the Pacific Rim Yeah Thank you Anyone else want to comment on that one before Doug you're next if you're Ready not agree with what John said. I think maybe another way to talk about it is that NATO and and it's into Pacific partners and its other partners are talking about dealing with security challenges regardless of where they come from so this is not aimed at the PRC but we face challenges to our security from a lot of different sources and as Democracies that share a lot of common values. There's you know, we see value in cooperating with them Regardless of where that those challenges come from Mary you want to say a word about how the study group saw this issue. Are you on up? Yeah, I think the study group didn't see I think one of the quotes we have in the report is From one of the study group members when we were talking about this question who said We they don't like to see their cooperation with NATO characterizes being about China because quote It's not all about China. There's many reasons with which NATO is cooperating in the region with these partners and so I think you know talking about it as Being something that's directed at China on on on the first instance isn't correct on the second instance I think kind of plays into this Chinese narrative of you know, the Asia Pacific NATO You guys are moving into the region. This is you know going to so sort of instability. So I think you know There's there's a lot we can do with these partners in the region that is Doug said touch on issues that are transnational that cross regional boundaries and you know at the same time, you know having a NATO eyes on the region is is certainly I think Helping to I think make these partners feel more secure and feel as though, you know People are paying attention. What's going on? Which certainly whether it's intended to or not has a deterrent effect on China in terms of its sort of desire to to to have military adventurism Alison I want to come to you. I want to get your view on this question But I want to frame in a little different way Just ask how does the Indo-Pacific region perceive NATO at this point? and the Indo pack Indo-Pacific partner relations and what is the US government doing to sort of shape the perceptions in the regions? Sure Taking a little bit of a step back for a minute And I think reflecting on what you heard a little bit the deputy secretary said from the United States view looking at this partnership and our engagement with the region with these Allies and partners in the region, you know, it has been part of our strategy it's consistent with the strategy laid out the national security strategy the end of Pacific strategy that You know deepening our engagement between allies and partners across the board to counter transnational challenges is at the core of this vision Doing so Again, the deputy secretary touched on sort of this idea of the lattice work. We are committed to Strengthening bilateral relationships in the region. We are committed to existing multilateralism in the region commit to ASEAN centrality All of these things we continue to do. They are consistent with one another The NATO Indo-Pacific partnership idea It's been described a little bit as mini lateralism fit for purpose these terms are thrown out but really at its core is Looking at ways to bring together allies and partners to address concerns And so this I think very much is consistent with that idea And then the other piece of that that I would just say which has been touched on a little bit here is that We do need to do a better job and more consistent job messaging I think it's incumbent on all of us to do and strengthen our public messaging in the region to talk more about what this is and is not And then at the same time or the flip side of this to counter the rampant disinformation about it that we've talked about here today I really have always thought that very of these very old geometries that you're coming up different groups of countries Appropriate for the purpose for which the group is pulled together and the Subjects to which we're going to deal with is a very resilient structure over time And also makes it a difficult target for China to shoot at it quite frankly I want to Doug ask a question for you that was given to me and I want to sort of put on the table Is the NATO liaison office in Tokyo still under consideration and Would such an office affect the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region or would it change the nature of NATO? So can I ask you that question? Yeah, no, you can ask me that question I'll answer it there We're not talking actively within the alliance about it is not not being actively discussed within the alliance to establish a liaison office in Tokyo in any case It was blown way out of proportion in any case We have NATO has liaison offices in a lot of places has a zone office at the UN and has one that the African Union that's one of the OSCE These are standard way that we can increase partnerships and and dialogue so Certainly no to the other two questions as would not transform NATO or the balance of power would actually I think a lot A lot was made out of something that would just be a way for us to you know Have a mechanism to increase The dialogue it's already existing that wouldn't it wouldn't symbolize any change in NATO's posture or approach You know one of the things that I take from this conversation. It's useful and it's a great answer the China question NATO has relations globally. You're basically saying because it's views Security threats is coming from a variety of different directions particularly transnational threats And that therefore this is of a piece with where NATO has gone given the security situation Challenges that its faces and I think if you can frame it in that context Makes it easier to answer the question is this all about holding down China? I think it's been useful that you add that point I want to pause for a minute. We have a number of folks online And we said that we would give some of the questions from those online to the panelists here. Do we have some? Thank you so much Ruffio Moreto asks can the panelists respond to how NATO might respond to other issues the Asia Pacific faces? like North Korea non-state armed groups terrorist groups and more We'd like to take that one out I'll have to draft somebody Here I Could jump in I guess I'm sure Doug would probably back me up But you know the level of NATO's involvement in the Pacific region You know it's something that would be determined by all allies collectively When you're making decisions by consensus You know, I think that would Limit the scale and scope of involvement as in that that question doesn't mean, you know individual allies won't get along or carry out Various actions in the region and and one of the real strengths of the alliance I think is that these issues even if they are you know from far away places like the DPRK are discussed in the North Atlantic Council any threat to to to NATO territory or just Issues of grave concern around the world are discussed almost every single day in the North Atlantic Council by all the members Has there been a discussion of North Korea per se both in the Atlantic North Atlantic count NATO Atlantic Got the NATO the Linnak as they say and I've now forgotten what the North Thank You North Atlantic Council There have been discussions of North Korea in the NAC and is it a subject that NATO has talked about with the IP for I Can answer that question And this is actually an interesting point because when we looked at the history of NATO's engagement with these partners as a group It's actually North Korea that spurs the first meeting of the IP for with NATO. Yeah, so that's in 2016 So again, this is before NATO even becomes interested in China's a security threat And I can't remember the exact date But it's in the report basically since X year the North Atlantic Council has issued regular statements on North Korea and North Korea has appeared in the declarations of NATO's summit meetings regularly So yes, NATO thinks about North Korea a lot and it has certainly talked with these partners about North Korea I have a second question here from online. I'm gonna give a little context. I think There's been a lot of discussion about over the years whether the perception of Europe and the United States about the China challenge is The same I think there's a lot of people think there's been some convergence It may not be on all fours at this point in time but But there has been some progress there and this question from Laura Bauman is the following What strategies is the US considering to navigate the competition with China? While maintaining the cohesion cohesion and cooperation within NATO Alison do you want to take that one on I? Might in a roundabout way Thinking about the question specifically, but let me start I just wanted to piggyback on the last question to slow to respond and I'll try to come around I do think we've touched on this a little bit here But I think it's important to remember that these Conversations important conversations about security on any topic and I do think we have a growing list of topics that are right for practical cooperation and further Collaboration cooperation going both directions Atlantic Pacific that these are also happening in the bilateral channels as well So yes, the panel up here. We are specifically talking about you know NATO Conversations with capitals in the Pacific but these are these are this is kind of the bread and butter of a lot of conversations that are happening in different channels and I guess I would just touch on partly my my response to the the second question though too is although I'm forgetting out the second piece of it, but just in how we Think about the broader context and conversations that which with which we are addressing these in a variety of fora Right, I have a final question here, and then we're going to go to the audience for questions It sounds technical, but I think it is important John This may be for you and mirror you may have talked about in the study I'm told that NATO sent observers to the 2022 bilateral military exercise keen sword between Japan and the United States That Australia participated That South Korea New Zealand several NATO member states and regional countries were invited to observe Will we likely see more NATO observers at regional exercises in the Indo-Pacific in the future and Will we see NATO flag exercises into Pacific anytime soon NATO sponsored Exercises in the Indo-Pacific is that an evolution? We're moving toward John. You want to start and you want to comment on that? So the the last question about NATO flag exercises But I don't see that anytime soon again because you have to get all 32 members of the Alliance to approve something like that and there are you know some allies who were just hesitant to To show the NATO flag in the in the Pacific in the Pacific Rim But you know really you know I hope that they continue to to visit Exercises and to have exchanges you know on a host of things when it comes to war fighting in in particular because the the carry I come from being a just recently a Professor at a war college, you know the character of war is changing so rapidly and a lot of that is being driven by China and You know so I would think these Western nations all of the democracies again around the world should be learning from each other as much as possible I mean this should be one of our greatest strengths is our ability to Interact and share information tactics techniques and procedures what? What equipment each nation is is developing and and figure out how to best use all that in order to Determine and protect our countries, so maybe not flagged exercises, but but learning from each other and certainly you know those nations in particular Australia They they come and observe Many exercises in Europe, and when I was assistant secretary, I had Australians working on my staff I mean so they they are very integrated into into the alliance Many did the expert study group deal with this issue. We couldn't possibly answer that question better than John All right, I think that concludes our conversation up here I think we should go to the audience if you'd raise your hand. We have microphones that will come your way please introduce yourself and Ask your question and you can address a specific member of the panel all the member of the panels or just put a jump ball And someone will grab it. Hello. My name is Kayla or time senior associate for Korea Research at the Wilson Center I just returned from some travel in Seoul in Tokyo where we had some conversations about NATO So thank you very much for this excellent and timely event looking forward to reading the report further I'd like to go back to one of the comments made earlier by the deputy secretary about Multilateralism and many lateralism. I know this is a point in conversation We talk about it a bunch, but particularly in the trilateral space I'm very in actually clarify the US Korea Japan trilateral space I'm curious how that form of multilateralism might be reinforced or encouraged through the AP or IP for and Maybe a follow-up question to that speaking a little bit down the road Are there ways to institutionalize this partnership and relationship? More tangibly as we move forward in those spaces as well. Thank you I can take a first bite at it I think To your first question my answer is very simple and it follows what the deputy secretary said talking about Ambassador Emmanuel and it literally talks through this concept with using lattice work again the Secretary of State likes variable geometry But the idea you know you can do this thing with your hands is that you are you are connecting? Partners there are overlapping circles Whether they're around substance around issues around the configuration itself But the idea is that you're sort of covering in a you know nimble way A variety of circumstances that come up and in a sense getting to your second question Developing and weaving the fabric to bring in another analogy here that is making that stronger for the future going forward The other piece of your second question that I alluded to earlier I think is that the deepening of the bilateral Relationships that are at the heart of these trilateral Mini-lateral other groupings are really what bind it to and as the deputy secretary said we talk a lot about NATO with the Indo-Pacific, but I would just you know highlight again the strength of those relationships going the other way as well and really the Outreach and engagement that we see from the Indo-Pacific from Tokyo from Seoul from Wellington from Canberra with Capitals in Europe both with NATO and again on a bilateral level And that strength the you know again can keep the analogy going all day But the the bindings there are just getting tighter and tighter Patrick Cronin Asia Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute. Thank you so much for great presentations and a great program today here at the Institute and great report What else can be done on the road to the NATO summit to ensure that this summit is not upended by events in? Ukraine fortunately the aid package passed But what else can be done to ensure that this summit is indeed not the fleeting moment But is part of an emerging trend in international security that these four countries are contributing and working closely with NATO in the future Thank you. Thank you Patrick Who would like to start? I think it's probably my turn I think there's a lot we can do you know summits are always sort of the waypoint For the Alliance that we build up decisions for and chart the way forward And so we should be charting the next steps also with the Indo-Pacific partnerships, I think But that probably looks less like some Normalizing of it and more about us trying to find ways where we might be able to enhance the cooperation that exists so a lot of what we do in the Indo-Pacific With Indo-Pacific partners right now is really just talking to each other exchanging information exchanging lessons learned that's like 90% of what is going on despite all the hoopla And I think we were starting to look at ways that we might advance that into more ways of actual cooperation Things like I think we're talking about having them participate for example on NATO's AI technology board things like that where they could make Contributions to the dialogue going on in NATO and benefit from it themselves as well John you want to add anything to that No, I think you know as as Doug said, you know these summits Sometimes cause the alliance to turn in a certain direction Normally after some kind of a shock, you know, I think during our time there, you know the rise of Islamic State for example cause NATO in the West to turn in a certain direction the invasion of Ukraine I think false falls right into that care category, but I think in many ways, you know this summit is Will be more of a continuation of work, you know to solidify The industrial base to make sure that that allies and partners are producing The weapon systems that they showed to defend themselves, you know this steady rise in Defense spending I think is something that maybe would be solidified in this in the summit But you know having worked there and and we've all gone through the pain at least I can I have Negotiating these these documents, you know it kind of it all presses against what the market will bear about What allies are willing to do in consensus, so I think just a continuation of strengthening resolve to defend is is what you'll see Allison just didn't know quickly it really highlights a messaging opportunity for us I think too along all of the lines that we've talked about here both to get the message out reinforce the language and you know The official documents themselves and reinforce as has been said they were building on something that we have done You know not for nothing that this will be the third Consecutive so I think it's an opportunity that we seek to take advantage of other questions Ian you've got to have a question over there. I mean, I know you too well. I Thanks in Brazil's from the Atlantic Council You know as United States in Europe works towards a more common approach to their shared interest in Indo-Pacific You would think a strategy should have you know multiple elements an economic dimension ideological dimension and perhaps a military dimension What do you envision that military dimension including and is there a role for it in NATO? Particular the fact that many of our European allies Actually contribute forces to reimpact they have a very active presence in the Indo-Pacific may not be huge But it's there so it makes eminent sense to me that as part of a comprehensive US European strategy towards That are interested in the Indo-Pacific. There ought to be a more robust Military dimension. They do would be a natural home for it. And maybe we ought to be thinking more More aggressively to lack of a better word more more ambitious late when it comes down to Leveraging the capabilities NATO can bring to the region in terms of military exercises and such So I'll jump on Ian's question. It's almost like he's reading my talking points for a couple years ago No, no, I I think you know Cooperation in the field at sea is invaluable. You know as a former military Guy as a brain infantry officer. I'll tell you that when you operate with another country you learn so much Seeing their their forces in action you develop relationships that that lasts, you know for years for decades Just by training with them you see equipment and how they're using it And that it all goes back to capitals and helps foster this political will Even above the military levels To do more so so absolutely, you know, even though I say I don't think you'd see NATO flagged exercises there Certainly the military committee at NATO Can and should foster more direct cooperation more exercising together Sharing technology sharing best practices more working together Anybody else want to say we're done that before we go to our next question I've got two more online. One is from Harrison Holman who asked How is NATO in the IP for thinking about a rise in Sino-Russian relations when it comes to the Arctic? Well, I can take that one I guess So Well, I should say first of all There's been a big change in NATO with Finland and Sweden joining so with yeah those two arctic nations now in NATO Seven of the eight arctic nations of the world are NATO allies So NATO there's a lot more of the Arctic in NATO now and and there's a lot more NATO in the Arctic so there's naturally more of a focus on arctic and Arctic security in NATO and We're watching Very closely. We'll first Russia as Russia has built up its military infrastructure in the Arctic and increased its presence and then we've seen in signs of increased cooperation between Between Russia and China we've seen them Exercise jointly even off of the coast of Alaska. We've seen joint maritime Exercises and we've seen them operating increasingly in the Arctic and so that is a major area of concern Because I think We still have the ambition to keep Conflict and tension low in the Arctic and it's a concern. What is happening with the increased militarization? From Russia and as Russia is sort of in a disadvantage as Russia basically is weaker and needs China more There's the risk that they feel they that Arctic is one place where they can give more and that would in terms of access Into the Arctic and that would be something that would be a concern to all of us so I think NATO is watching that closely and secondly There's just more of an imperative for strong deterrence and defense in the Arctic right now Given the Russian build-up that we've seen and I think that's something that you've seen NATO respond to This next one I think Elsa is coming your way One of NATO does in an honest question. No name attach One of NATO's members Hungary signed a security agreement with China What impact could such an agreement have on NATO and allies? I think you had on some of this Doug's way, but I think it you know understanding the complexities of You know working through issues on the European continent, I think we've seen this play out Several different issues again. There's we have bilateral Challenges pieces things that we've discussed around the board, so I don't think in this context The answer is any different, but Doug if there's an institutional piece Yeah, I have to say I'm not familiar with that particular agreement. So I'm not it's a little hard for me to comment on it but You know just to say you know NATO NATO per se doesn't have a You know can't direct to its member states what to do with their Approach to China we use it as a place where we can share our views and make our Assessments clear, and I think you've seen as you commented. We have seen actually a real convergence in recent years Mainly with a much heightened awareness In Europe on the challenges posed by the PRC and their Economic and foreign policies and the and the need to build collective resilience to all of those Obviously different nations may take a different approach to that, but I think collectively we've seen a big change a sea change in Europe And much closer alignment with the United States on that issue. Thank you Any other questions from the audience? All right, we're going to give you five minutes back on your day Me and I want to thank you for the report. I want to give you the last word if there's anything you'd like to say before we adjourn Sure. Well, first of all, thank you so much to the other panelists. You guys have really, you know Made our our event so much more interesting than it would have been otherwise We can't just have me talking about the report, but we do really encourage everyone to take a look at the report There's a lot of detail in there that I wasn't able to go into here And it's really something that I think as we head towards the summit is really going to be on the minds of American policy makers and certainly on the minds of our IP for partners, so If we can do one takeaway for you Don't don't forget that these relations continue to evolve and they continue to be important and we will all watch this space So let me thank you all for coming and participating in this event and please join me in thanking our panelists Thank you. Thank you