 Good morning. I'm Tara Sonnenschein, Executive Vice President here at the U.S. Institute of Peace and I'm delighted to welcome you to our program and to welcome also Chairman of our board, Robin West, who joins us with this distinguished panel. We are very fortunate this originally was just a security sector reform group discussion and how fitting that we could put on top of it. The results of the QDDR process. At our last security sector event, Karen Hanrahan of the State Department briefed on the process of the QDDR, but it's nice to see that process leads to product. I want to take a moment to thank those of you in the room and others who participated in endless external groups contributing to this process. And I know that those who had input were satisfied that we were able to feed that into the State Department process. I'm also delighted Bob Perito is here, who runs our security sector center, and he will be introducing the panel that will follow this one. There will be a coffee break and then the European perspectives on security sector governance. So with that, I am delighted to introduce firstly Annmarie Slaughter, who is one of the chief architects and conveners and implementers and appears to be a very happy woman today that she gave birth to this report. And most of you know her work on global governance from her work at Princeton, as Dean, and in other places. She will be followed by Don Steinberg, who is not only the deputy administrator of AID, but also an alum of the United States Institute of Peace Fellowship Program, and one of our key partners in the gender and peace building work. So I am delighted to introduce them and we'll have time for a couple of questions before they go out on their road show. Annmarie Slaughter. Thank you. Thank you. There's nothing greater than being able to finally talk about a report that exists, rather than one that is any day now. So it's a happy time, although I will say, I was telling Bob Perito that in my slightly befogged state, I woke up this morning and looked at the agenda and it said the QGDR and the EU in security and justice sector reform. But I could talk about the EU and I could talk about the QGDR, but I can't link them. But I'm – we're delighted to have a chance to open this morning. And this is – you know, it's a huge report. It's a 200-page report. It's online. As the Secretary said yesterday, should you not think that's what you want to do with your holidays, there is an executive summary. Although for any part that you're particularly interested in, I do recommend reading the chapter because there's a huge amount in the report that's not in the executive summary. It's impossible to really give you a full sense in the time we have. So what I'm going to do is give you the highlights on the diplomatic side and particularly the conflict prevention and response. I think this is the U.S. Institute of Peace. And Don will talk about what we're doing to elevate and transform development, which really fits very much into the broader sense of the broader conflict prevention agenda. Before I do that, though, I have my own thank yous. I was saying to Tara and Beth, this has been a process that works the way, at least at the Woodrow Wilson School. We imagine Washington is supposed to work, where A, it is focused on substance. And there is an active collaboration between government and the think tank world and the NGO world and even the private sector. And the USIP working group on conflict prevention and response was very important for our getting ideas. Beth played a very valuable role as my interlocutor on some key issues. And we could not have the report that we have now had we not had that collaboration. I also want to have a special shout out to Karen Hanrahan. I don't know why she's not here, but she was really into sleeping. She probably is sleeping, but she was indispensable in educating all of us about the entire sector of conflict prevention and response. And I'll talk a little bit more about that when I get to that section. But there was a tremendous amount of education that needed to be done before we could really figure out where we needed to go. So with that, the starting point for the QDDR is how can we do better? That is what motivated Secretary Clinton in launching the QDDR. Having been on the Senate Armed Services Committee, she had seen the Department of Defense launch the QDDR. They're on their fifth. And she felt both that this is something that is necessary for any strong institution to start an ongoing process of review and self-improvement. But also, as the politician that she has been and the senator, she understood that if we're ever going to get the kind of funding we need on the civilian side, we have to make the same case to Congress that the military does. We have to be able to stand up and say, here are our core missions. Here's what we need to fund those core missions. Here's exactly how we're going to spend them. Here's how we're going to translate our priorities into results. And the QDDR is the first step in what will ultimately be a fairly profound culture change and shift in the way we think about what we do and we present it to the public. There are three broad ways we answer that question of how can we do better. The first is the leading through civilian power. So in the 21st century, given the problems we face, given who we are as a nation, given budget constraints, the first face of American power has to be our diplomats, our development experts, our civilian experts across the federal government. Civilian power supported by the nation's and by the world's finest military, but we start with civilian power. Second point there is civilian power, as I just said, is more than state and USAID. We all know that over the past 20 and actually 40 years, the explosion in the amount of international work that formerly domestic agencies do is extraordinary. Indeed, when the White House calls a meeting of development agencies, USAID is the only one that has development in the name, but over 20 agencies show up. And if we were to convene a meeting of agencies that do foreign affairs, there's, I think, nobody in the government that wouldn't show up. And I have a very concrete demonstration. In the final throws of the QDDR, we had 20 pages of comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. They have a tremendous amount of work abroad. So civilian power is not just us. To really be the civilian power we need to be, we have to embrace all the power of our agencies throughout the government. And we have to find a way to work far better together. We're not going to ever be a seamless unit, but maybe we could at least be like a flotilla, heading in the same direction. You know, maybe under our own steam, getting there slightly different way and independent, but it has to be aligned. It has to be led within an overall strategic framework that the State Department provides on the diplomatic side and USAID provides on the development side. So that is the starting point. And it's really a sea change in the way we are now going to adapt to work with the rest of government. And as Secretary Clinton said yesterday, this isn't rhetoric. This is foreign service officers will now be evaluated for selection as Deputy Chief of Mission and as Chief of Mission based in part on how well they work with the interagency and their knowledge of the interagency. Have they spent time at another agency? Have they taken courses? Do they know really what the capabilities are? To the level that motivates all of us, how do we get ahead? We really are shifting how we think about what we do. The second broad answer to the question of how we do better is to elevate and transform development. Secretary Clinton has believed passionately in that since she came into office and Don will talk about that. And the third is that embracing conflict prevention and response within fragile states is a core mission of what we do going forward. That is essential to everything we do in terms of advancing our interests in the world. It is the classic ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. No one is stronger in support of this position than the Defense Department. They are very clear that going forward we need to build capabilities around the world to prevent conflict and to manage it when it breaks out rather than letting it get to the situation where ultimately military action is needed. So with that overview, let me tell you a little bit more about what is in the four broad chapters, one on diplomacy, one on development, one on conflict prevention and response, and then working smarter. On the diplomatic side, as I said, the first part is really is elaborating what this concept of civilian power means and spelling out very specific reforms to make it happen. In the field that includes seeing our ambassadors as CEOs of multi-agency missions, giving them the kind of training that they need, and as I said, the incentives to really lead the interagency in their countries. That doesn't just mean the country team members who work very well together, but when other agencies come into the country, it means being coordinated within an overall framework. There are many situations where the ambassador doesn't know precisely what's going on with different agencies and it means we're far less effective than we could be. That includes things like making sure that the ambassador is part of the evaluation chain of people from other agencies who are in country. It also means we are now committing to turn to other agencies when we contract before we turn to private contractors. There are legal restrictions on when you do this. This doesn't mean we're just automatically going to hire folks from the Justice Department instead of going outside, and if the costs are much, much higher, obviously we wouldn't. But it is a fundamental commitment to say we do better as a government if we can use other parts of the government to build relationships with their counterparts in the countries we work to gather the experience that we all need. And it is, again, a very significant change in the way we do business. Second, there are a set of organizational reforms. When we talk about this at the State Department, everybody leans forward at this point because obviously this affects them. We did not start with the org chart. We started with Secretary Clinton's sense of what has to go together to be effective in terms of the issues she addresses and all of us address going forward. And as she looked at what she does and then she looked at the organization of the State Department, she said this is not fitting. We have democracy and global affairs. That was created in the 1990s for the environment when we first started looking at global issues. So there are two broad clusters of issues that really we think need to go together. And the first set of issues are really around human security. The creating an undersecretary for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. That undersecretary will oversee all the ways in which we fundamentally focus on the protection of individuals. From protecting them from violence, that's where the new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations will go. Conflict prevention, when conflict breaks out, doing what we can to protect individuals. But also security and justice sector assistance. That is very much about protecting individuals. I mean, whether, you know, if you're in Mexico, the violence that you're experiencing is every bit as frightening as if you were in Kabul. It's a different source, but fundamentally those have to go together. And then we protect individuals through law. That is human rights and democracy. So democracy and labor is there. And finally, in situations of crisis, we meet humanitarian needs, so population, refugees, and migration. So this undersecretary, and we're not creating a new one, we're reconfiguring G&E, will oversee all those bureaus and will align what we do and our bureaucratic incentives and our ability to work together really in the direction the world is going, where we focus on state security and human security and link them. Second is the focus on global systems. So an undersecretary for economic growth, energy, and the environment. Here, there will be a new Bureau for Energy Resources. This is, again, a focus on energy security, but also energy access and power sector reform. Critical, again, to building fragile states without electricity, without reliable sources of energy. It can't happen, and the secretaries wanted to do this for a long time. We're also going to propose to Congress that the coordinator for counterterrorism become a bureau for counterterrorism. Ambassador Benjamin has 100 people working for him. That is the size of many of our bureaus. It is time to actually move that into the regular work of the State Department. It will make us better partners for other agencies. It will allow us to integrate what they do with what other people in the State Department do. We have to go to Congress to ask for authorization to do that. And then finally, establishing a coordinator for cybersecurity, which is something that we expect to actually be able to name fairly soon. Again, this fits with what the government is doing, and it's perhaps particularly timely when we need to review the protection of our confidential communications. The rest of the diplomatic chapter focuses on how we can do a better job of engaging beyond the state. This is, again, something that Secretary Clinton has emphasized from the beginning. We cannot partner with countries if their peoples are against us. That is, of course, what we do in public diplomacy, and we have a whole new public diplomacy strategy, but it's more than public diplomacy. It is interesting at a time of focus on diplomatic cables that as important as those are, really what has happened in the last decades has been the growth of functions other than reporting and writing cables, the actual operations on the ground, the running programs and projects. Secretary Clinton comes back from a strategic dialogue with China or India. The deliverables are things like river management programs or health programs or environment programs. They are things that we do often with other agencies on the ground, and our diplomats are engaging with people and groups and businesses across the country. We're trying to facilitate that. Now let me turn to the part that is particularly important for this institution. Secretary Clinton told us from the beginning that she wanted us to focus on how we could do a better job on the civilian side of responding to conflict and being able ultimately to work as a partner with the military, but also with other nations, with international institutions, with the private sector and the NGO sector on the issue of conflict within fragile states. And as we look forward, and we've learned a lot of this from you, the nexus between weak governance and violence is increasingly evident, and it's not going away. And if you look at any of the reviews of fragile states, you see somewhere in the neighborhood of 50 fragile states. We've always had fragile states, but in many ways post-Cold War we have more of them. And the consequences of collapse in those states, or even simply not being able to control their territory, are far graver for us. Terrorist havens, we read a lot about that, but it's not just about that. It's about being a place for global criminal networks, and that could be narcotics, but it can also be trafficking in migrants and women and children. These are sources of global problems that we have to be able to address, and they destabilize entire regions. If you think about the Great Lakes conflict and what that region could be, if that conflict were not there, you see the point. So the first step, as I said, is really to embrace this as a core mission. And what that means is recognizing that conflict prevention and response is becoming a distinct discipline. This is where I said Karen Hanrahan has done a lot of education. Diplomats always do conflict prevention and response. That's what we do. I mean, obviously, this is a terribly sad week with the loss of Ambassador Holbrook. He made his career trying to prevent and resolve conflicts. But there's a difference, and you know this well, within fragile states rather than between the classic conflict prevention and resolution between them. The complications of working with governments that don't have control over their territories or have collapsed completely. I've actually heard people recently at a conference describe themselves as conflict professionals. And that's very different than saying you're a diplomat. A conflict professional is somebody who has seen all the different dimensions from how do you demobilize and disarm and integrate armed forces to what's the sequencing of how to start building fragile institutions to what's the impact of too much money in actually making the situation worse rather than better. To how do you then transition to really longer-term development? You have been at the core of developing that body of knowledge. And if you think about, you know, my discipline in international relations wasn't a discipline until about 1930. Development has only been becoming a full-fledged discipline in the last couple of decades. We're now at the outset of this third discipline. And the State Department is recognizing that, creating a new bureau for conflict and stabilization operations, building knowledge and partnering with institutions like this one in understanding the expertise and the training we need, working much more closely with the Office of Transition Initiatives at USAID, with the military, and with other agencies. The final thing I'll say about that is we are also going to now work with the White House, the State and USAID will be working with the White House to develop an international operational response framework that will be like the national response framework on the domestic side. That really will give us the blueprint for how we respond to crises and what the division of labor is. And this is something that we think is overdue. It was one of the lessons out of Haiti, which Don can talk about. But it will take a while, but we are now committed to do it, and the process should start very quickly. Last two things I will say here are the next set of recommendations go to how, if we have this expertise, how do we get people into the field much more quickly, much more flexibly. Deputy Secretary Luce spent his two years in office getting 1,000 people on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. How do we capture those lessons and do what the Civilian Response Corps was intended to do, but for many reasons was not able to do. There are a number of specific recommendations. We'll have to work with Congress to see if we can convert the Civilian Response Corps into a much more a core that's based more on volunteers rather than the model of the military reserves. We can move more quickly. It's less expensive. But the key recommendation in this part of the report is that state and USAID have agreed on a lead agency approach where between us we know who will take the overall lead. And that's not who will do it because we will both be active in any conflict response or disaster response. It's who leads. And state will lead in the broad overall political and security crises. Aid will lead in response to natural or industrial disasters or disease epidemics, other kinds of natural phenomena. Now take an example like Sudan. It means state leads overall. It's a political and security crisis. The political implications are enormous. On the other hand, obviously, Dacha is doing enormous work on the ground. And this is not saying, you know, we would do that work or even we would tell Dacha what they ought to be doing. It just means that overall in that setting we have to provide the coordination just as in a natural disaster. You need a lot of political work. You have to work with the government all the time, but aid leads. So with that, I will turn to Don Steinberg to talk about development. I do urge you to actually read the report. You can tell that there's no way that one can give a full summary. But let me conclude where I started and thank all of you for really making this far better than it would have been otherwise. Thanks. Thank you. I wanted also to thank USAID not only for the work here but personally. When I left the State Department after 30 years, USIP was my sort of birthing into the NGO community through the fellowship program. As I've come back to government, this is the third time I've been here in the last two months. So I sort of feel like coming and going USIP has been a key for me. And thank you. As we talk about the QDDR vis-a-vis USAID, we're viewing this as a real vote of confidence in USAID as an institution, its capacity to serve the government as the development agency, and the ability to run our country's most important development initiatives. As you look at the QDDR on development issues, you have to look at it in the context of the President's policy directive on development that he announced at the United Nations in October. And that document was the first time a President has ever issued a PPD on development. And it basically outlined three themes. The first, as Ann Marie has alluded to, is that development is not just something that we do for our national interests, our national values, but it is a key to our national security interests and a key to our national economic interests, including through creation of markets for our exports, and that's all about jobs, jobs, jobs. So the QDDR takes that theme and develops it. Secondly, the PPD says that AID is our development agency and needs to be re-empowered to essentially be the world's foremost development agency. And it says we will devote the resources and the attention to institutional structures necessary to accomplish that. But third, it also says that we need to modify our model of doing this. It says we need to focus our attention in areas where we have the depth and scale to make game-changing opportunities for development. It means we have to focus again on accountability, measuring what we do, monitoring and evaluation, transparency, and most of all, sustainability. And in that regard with selectivity, the QDDR as well as the PPD identifies six sectors that we are going to be focusing on. Three of them are the presidential initiatives, areas that's global health, that's food security, and that's climate change. In addition, it focuses on economic growth, it focuses on democracy and governance, and it focuses on humanitarian response. So those would be the six key areas that we would be focused on. In addition, there is a sort of six-plus-one aspect because gender considerations have to be at the center of all of these initiatives, and it does talk substantially about empowerment, participation, protection, and most of all, mainstreaming. And mainstreaming in a way that doesn't really mean sidelining, as we all know often is the case. The question then becomes, does the QDDR actually meet that narrative? The narrative that says development is elevated, USAID is empowered, and there is a new business model. And indeed, I think the case is pretty clear. If you look at what this actually means in terms of changes, you would not have anticipated, given that this has occurred over the course of 16 months, that AID would have stood still during that period. As this process has produced clear indications of where we need to go, we've taken steps, and these are incorporated in the USAID reform measures, USAID forward that Raj Shah has implemented. And let me focus on a few areas there. First of all, we have regained our planning and policy capability through the establishment of a policy planning and learning bureau. It was very strange, AID did not have a policy office as of 2006 and in reality since about the late 1990s. I like to say this is the Wizard of Oz phenomenon. We always had a heart, we always had courage, but we had sort of lost our brain. And we've got it back now. And that policy planning bureau is already looking at the new generation of issues, it's looking at youth bold issues, it's looking at water, it's looking at education for the 21st century, and it's producing documents that are driving how we allocate our resources. On the resources area, we have regained our budget capacity. We now have an office of budget and resource management that in FY 13 will prepare a comprehensive USAID budget to be submitted to the secretary, deputy secretary, and incorporated in the broader foreign assistance budget that is submitted to OMB and goes forward. Again, as of three years ago, we did not have budget capability at this organization. And I'm constantly told an agency that doesn't control or at least have the capacity to analyze budgets doesn't really control its own fate. We've moved ahead by establishing a center for innovation. We've brought on science and technology advisors. The effort here is to make sure that we have a fact-based approach and that our investments all throughout the six areas that I was describing and beyond actually can make game-changing opportunities and incorporate generation-skipping innovations. We're going through a procurement reform exercise, which sounds technical, but what it really means is we're empowering foreign governments more and more to take over the business of development. We're empowering non-governmental sectors in country to take over some of the responsibilities that we've been giving to contractors in the past. We're trying to restructure ourselves to be better partners for our other U.S. government agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, foundations, recognizing indeed, as Anne-Marie said, that not only do we have some three dozen U.S. government agencies involved in the developmental sector, but we also have to recognize at the private sector that things like remittances, things like private contributions to NGOs are now equally important as official development assistance, and we need to be better structured to address that. And then finally, we are changing our staffing patterns. You may be aware that from 1990 to 2007, AID lost 40% of its direct hire personnel, and it fundamentally changed how we do business. I believe during that period, we did some pretty fabulous things around the world, but the emphasis was on getting assistance out the door. It was much less on development as a discipline. It was also focused on contracts with large contractors, where we not only had them do the implementation, but they did the project design, they did monitoring and evaluation, so they were developing the projects, they were doing the projects, and then they were telling us whether they succeeded or not. Not acceptable. And so we are re-empowering ourselves through hiring substantial numbers of people in procurement and reform and monitoring and evaluation in particular. We're also addressing a fundamental problem that we have at USAID in part because of that RIF, which is that a third of our people have been on the job for less than three years, while at the same time, 95% of our senior officers could retire tomorrow at full pensions. So we've got that middle-level gap, and it's a very serious problem for the institution. We're looking at bringing in new mid-level hires. The QDDR talks about tripling that. Scheduled B hiring authority, bringing on very talented foreign service nationals with a super grade now, where we can bring in doctors and PhD economists, et cetera, pay them, retain them, reward them, et cetera. Perhaps the two most important symbolic and practical changes in the QDDR, though, are related to food security and global health. The QDDR says that as of this second, AID will lead the Feed the Future initiative. It will develop the systems of budgeting and accountability for that. The coordinator will be housed at USAID. We have a bureau that we've established for this. On the area of global health, it says that within two years, basically at the end of FY 2012, this will transition to AID in line with the completion of some benchmarks that are spelled out very specifically within the document. And I think in each of these cases, this is not only practically important, but symbolically important, because as you know, over the past decade, all of the biggest development initiatives that have been developed, whether it's MCC or others, have gone elsewhere. And this is, as I said at the beginning, a reaffirmation of the confidence that the President and the Secretary of State have in USAID to run the two most important presidential initiatives that are out there. Let me just conclude by saying that we recognize this as a vote of confidence, but we also recognize it as a responsibility. And in a new era where AID has leadership on these issues, we need to ensure that that leadership is exercised responsibly, that we use the watchwords inclusive leadership. We're not in a period, as Anne-Marie said, where we're going to be rewarding people for guarding turf anymore. We're not an aid-centric leader. We need to be reaching out to our partners in the interagency, in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, as well as to our NGO partners, to our partners in the private sector, our partners in foreign governments, in international organizations, et cetera. Finally, just the final sentence, the QDDR is a powerful document indeed, but the real power is going to come from the implementation process, and we're going to be focused on doing everything we can to ensure that the promise that it gives to us as an agency is fulfilled. We have a few moments for a couple of questions before 10 o'clock, yes. We will bring a microphone to you, and if you would just identify, introduce yourselves. That would be helpful. I'm Dayton Maxwell, retired USAID Foreign Service Officer, and now working in the bowels of DOD, the Pentagon. Very interested in connecting QDDR with QDR, particularly because in the Pentagon now there are policies that says we in the Pentagon, we in the military will want to prevent conflict from happening rather than just respond. That's new, the new guidance for employment of forces says that right in it. But there are institutional difficulties in working across the river. I'm working particularly on a handbook for COCOMs to work more effectively at the country level, which is a deficiency in joint whole of government planning. But we're being told that we overwhelm, that the DOD overwhelms state and aid. So don't go across the Potomac yet. Don't talk with your colleagues. Even though this handbook is designed to work with the country team, with the MSRP, with AID's new strategy process, we can't institutionally talk yet. Is there any way that you can help fix that problem? Can you put somebody in Jeanine Davidson's office, for example, that helps her when she picks up the telephone and gets complaints rather than questions about how to cooperate better? Thank you very much. Interesting question. It is an interesting question. And I was careful to say that civilian power includes civilians in all agencies across the federal government. That includes in DOD. And your starting point is exactly right, that if you look at the QDR and the QDDR, and you just put them on paper, and we do understand the difference between paper and practice, they're aligned in conflict prevention and response. My answer here is the same that Don gave with respect to USAID. You know, as USAID became more defensive in light of many things that happened in the last two decades, the State Department similarly felt much more protective in vis-a-vis DOD and other agencies. And that's the attitude we're also saying has to change. This is a very good concrete example. Part of our answer is we can't do planning with you until we have planning on our own. And this is really about building a culture of planning at state. I didn't talk about all the planning and budgeting, but we've overhauled our processes. And that will mean many more detail ease. But I think the core of your question is an attitude shift. It is absolutely, you know, look, we did the QDDR with about 15 people. DOD does it with about 200. You know, we just can't keep up. But that's not the right way to think about it. Keeping up is competitive. This has to be really genuinely collaborating. And we are starting to do that in Iraq and Afghanistan. And this is a great example of where, yes, we should be talking even when we're not fully formed because if we wait until we are, we'll never get there. I would just add that I think the situation is actually getting substantially better We have working groups where Dacha and Jim Shear's office are just joined at the hip. We're, you know, just over the last couple of weeks, we've been working on the situation in Sudan to try to make sure that we are completely linked up. We're doing about $450 million worth of contingency efforts there. DOD is a key partner on that. I am meeting now on a regular basis with Michelle Flournoy to sort of make sure that effort. We do have state and aid people at the co-coms who are very valued in that process. We have the whole SERP process where we're trying to use commander emergency response funds effectively not only to address stabilization but to lay the groundwork for long-term development. So I think it is getting better. And frankly, if it can't get better under the three key players right now, Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Rod Shaw, it can't ever get better because they all have that common mindset that this is a whole-of-government approach. Take a couple more, one here. Yes, I'm Sarah Cobb. I'm the, in fact, I knew, met you. I used to be the Executive Director of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. Wow. And former Dean of... Many years ago. Yeah, right. And former Dean of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason. And one of the ways in which I imagine, of course, when you see things in terms of conflict prevention, I become like the hammer and everything is the nail or one of those metaphors. It would look to me as one of the ways to do this integration between the QDR and the QDDR is to develop collectively, through a conversational process, models for conflict prevention, conflict resolution. And unless we have, I believe, some kind of theoretical framework from which we can work collaboratively, then we won't be able to do this. And one of the critiques I would make of some of the work we've done in this area in the federal government, at least visible through their proposals, is that the models end up functioning as lists of things that need to be done rather than a framework for action. So if we apply conflict prevention and conflict resolution to this question that you've raised, sir, about the relationship between the QDR and the QDDR, then it would imply, you know, we need some kind of collaborative process for these conversations to occur. So my question then is, what is the, you know, the infrastructure behind all this that would allow the development and emergence of a conflict resolution, conflict prevention shared model? Thank you. So as I said, it's been a long learning process, and I think that absolutely is the next step. Again, by creating a bureau, you are not only creating more people but you're also creating something at the center of what state does under what I said is going to be a formal undersecretary, and I would have said to that new assistant secretary that's exactly the place you have to start because in the process of developing those models and learning from what other agencies already know, working with the NGOs and this burgeoning discipline, that's the way you get the framework that then can drive your operations. And again, we have, the words are there on paper, so if I've learned anything in Washington, it's a little like Supreme Court opinions empower very good lawyers to go as far as they can go. Well, now we have the authorization and we need the people who can then drive that, but we've taken the first steps, but I think you're absolutely right. Well, I know that these folks have to go on to the next stop and we are going to take a short break and then resume on security sector. I want to thank both of our guests and thank all of you for being here this morning. Thank you. On to the next stop.