 Thank you, Thierry, for the very kind words and for the invitation. This is always a difficult exercise to compete with the food, but I shall try. Let me start with two caveats. The first one is in my previous job at the IMF. I had 200 people feeding me daily information about the world. What happens when you leave the fund is that you find yourself to be a team of one and you have to do the work yourself. You cannot replicate what the 200 extremely competent people did for you. This implies that these are humble remarks. There are more remarks. I have no pretense in knowing everything which happens around the world and it may well be that when you ask questions I may say that I just don't know. The second remark, the second caveat, is something that echoes what Thierry just said which is that I was tasked with thinking about what happens over the next two, three years maybe. In a way, the excitement is really in the medium term, the long term. These evolutions that we've talked about, from inequality to populism and so on, they have implications for what happens now and soon but clearly the big issue is where do we end and this is what was taken on this morning in the various sessions and I'm going to avoid talking about these things and just focus on the next two or three years. Now, the question is how should we think about where we are and as people have said this morning, these are very strange times. These are indeed schizophrenic times. So on the one hand, if you look at the real economy and by the real economy, I mean output, inflation, things are basically as good as they get. You have to go back very far in history to actually find a situation in which the economy, the purely economic situation is as impressive, as benign as it is today. I think that's an important point because in the general climate of pessimism, these facts are often just swept under the rug but the reality is that at the same time, if you turn to the politics and the geopolitics which were discussed at much length this morning, I was going to say things are as bad as they get but it would be much too optimistic. I think they can get much worse than where we are. And so you have this tension between the two as an economist. You see the world as it is now as being in fairly good shape and obviously elaborate on that and then you see the geopolitics and the politics being terrible. And I think the big challenge for an economist is actually to think about how these political and geopolitical risks can translate into economics in the relatively short run. Again, there are larger issues thinking further out. So what I want to do is first talk about the real economy, where we are today, then talk about what I see as the economic risks. So by economic risks, I mean leaving aside the geopolitical risks and then come to the list of political and geopolitical risks and think about how they may affect things sooner rather than later. So let me do that. So let me start with where we are. So the economy today. Now again, if you're in that business, you know that the economy has, the world economy has slightly slowed down in the last three to six months, not by much but enough to make some people worry. So I'm not at that high frequency. I'm just thinking about where we are in terms of this year and next year. And there the numbers are very impressive. I mean if you go around the world, the U.S. has the best macro economy at this stage in a very long time. As you know, unemployment, we didn't know when the recovery was taking place how much, how far we could take unemployment down before we saw signs of inflation. Some people said six, some people said five. We're now at 3.7 and there is very little indication. We're probably fairly close to where we should stop but that's an incredibly good news. An economy at 3.7% unemployment is an economy in which anybody can find a job easily and you have to think in terms of that. And then in terms of inflation, so far so good. We haven't quite reached the target inflation of 2%. We're very close. So from that point of view, things are good. The last thing is if you... So sometimes recoveries are very unhealthy. You have the housing sector kind of ahead of every other sector and then you know it's going to turn bad at some point. Here it's not the case. It is one of the most balanced recoveries that we have had in the history of the U.S. All the sectors have basically gone at the right rate, the consumption, the investment, the housing investment. So again, it doesn't have... It doesn't pretend its own downside fate. There is no sector which is clearly out of sync and on the verge of collapsing. So clearly this is where the news is best. But if you look at Europe, it is also good news. So again, the growth has slowed down a little bit in the last three months. But if you look, it is now a part of the world which is recovering. Again here, the difference with the U.S. is that they are not at full employment. I mean, it's clear that there is some way to go. And there the news is I take the news to come from Germany in which, as you know, in Germany the unemployment rate is nearly as low as it is now in the U.S. And again, this was unexpected. We thought we would see inflation in Germany earlier. Now people who want more inflation are disappointed. But people like me who like low unemployment are quite happy. I think there is a larger lesson here which is for reasons which we may not like. Namely that labor is weaker and bargaining. The what economists call the equilibrium rate of unemployment, of the natural rate of unemployment, which is a terrible word, is lower. We see this in the U.S. We see this in Germany. And so I think the good news is that there is still some way to go before we have to kind of put on the brakes and try to slow down the machine. So my sense is unexpected value. As always, something can happen. But I can see how Europe can continue to recover for a number of years with accommodating monetary policy and accommodating fiscal policy. One remark on this is that, again, how recoveries go depend very much on the central bank. Sometimes the central bank gets scared and then tightens maybe too early. I think the good news is that the ECB, at least under current management, is actually quite convinced that there is a way to go so that interest rates will remain low for a while and allow the economy to keep recovering. So again, not everything is perfect. I've not mentioned Italy, but I come back to it in my risk section. But in general, if you look at Europe as a whole, the eurozone, things are better than they have been in a long time. Going outside, again, I'm not going to give you a 15 regions description, but I'm just going to mention two, China. So what is clear is that, and again, I'm talking to a room in which there are probably people who know much more about China than I do, but this is what I understand from my discussions and my readings. China has slowed down. It's now going to set 7%. Now the official number is 6.5%. I think there's a chance it goes a bit more slowly for the reasons which we have discussed this morning. But what we can see is that they're already measures taken by the Chinese government to basically push spending up either through tax reductions or more lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. So my sense is that there's a commitment on the part of China to actually maintain growth. I'd be very surprised if the growth numbers were terrible in China. It might be a bit lower, but nothing bad. Now again, this may create the seeds of something worse later, which is that as we all know there has been too much credit growth in China and they were kind of trying to take care of it. I think they are going to be a bit more relaxed about doing it. The plan makes sense, but there's a bit of a risk. But again, in the next one or two years, I don't see any catastrophe. Finally, emerging markets. So here again, there are some horror stories, not horror stories, but some countries which are doing poorly. South Africa, for example, is clearly not in good shape. Turkey is fighting a crisis. But in general, if you look at emerging market countries, despite the negative talk, they are growing at the same rate as they were last year, this year and in forecast next year, which is about 4.7% according to the IMF. So you don't see, again, you see specific problems in specific places, but again, it looks as if we are not on the verge of a major slowdown in emerging markets. So let me now turn to the risks that, again, leaving aside the geopolitical and the political risks. What are the risks which are inherent built in the system? So there's one line which is, well, the expansion in the U.S. has been going on for so long that it has to stop, because they just don't go on forever. It's absolutely true that they don't go on forever. Every year there's a chance that something derails it. But we have very strong evidence that there is no aging effect, which would be good news for people in this room and for me, but basically the probability that there is a recession this year doesn't seem in any way related to the number of years of expansion before. So expansions basically do not die of old age. It's difficult for us to accept, I think, as human beings and knowing that that's not the case for us, but it really looks like this. It could have been otherwise, but the evidence is very strong. So the fact that the U.S. expansion has been that long is probably not a reason to worry. There's another general line of thought for those who like to worry, and there are many, which is the so-called Minsky cycle. So many of you may know about Hyman Minsky. He was considered the complete heterodox for a very long time, but it turned out to be quite on the dart in the financial crisis. He was long dead. But his idea is that we have these credit cycles. If you come in as well for a long time, risk built, and then eventually it leads to a crash. And he had a nearly mechanical view of it, which is you can avoid it. It's just you're going to face credit cycles and they are going to come and go. So some people have said, well, maybe this is what's happening, a very long expansion. Credit is in worse shape than it was, and we're ready for a crash. I think when you look at the evidence, I have nothing against the Minsky cycles. I think they are sometimes relevant. I think sometimes you see a bubble and then you know that eventually there'll be a crash. But in the case of the U.S. or the European economies, I just don't see it. So let me just talk about a number of things that I mentioned. So one thing which is mentioned is the levels of debt. And that came up this morning, and it's true that if you look at debt to GDP, which is private debt from firms, from households, from governments, has gone up a lot. Is this reason to worry? It's reason for looking at the numbers, but not necessarily to worry. How dangerous that is depends on various things. It depends on who is the data. And it's much less of an issue when it's the state than when it is private individuals or firms because the state can mobilize taxes much more easily than we can mobilize funds. And then the ratios which actually matter from a conceptual and empirical point of view are debt to assets or debt service to GDP. Namely, you compare stock to stock or flow to flow. And if you do this, you're much less scared. Basically debt to assets has come down, not up. And debt service is relatively low by historical standards. Now, why is it low? Because interest rates are low. So you may say where interest rates will probably increase, which they will. But even if they increase by 100 or 200 basis points, debt service remains perfectly tractable and historically in line. So I just don't see any particular reason to worry, to give you examples. U.S. households have steadily deleveraged, deleveraged means the decrease in the proportion of debt in their portfolio since 2010. U.S. firms, because they have very large cash flows, have also basically been able to reduce their leverage in general. So this really doesn't worry me. Now, doesn't stop there. People say, well, you're not looking at the right things. The risk spreads are very low. So some of them are indeed low. The ones which were engineered to be low, namely the ones which were engineered by the central banks to decrease the price of long maturity assets are low. That's intentional. That's not a catastrophe. But if you look at assets which are not subject to that, you see that, for example, the credit spreads in general are not unusually low. They are low. They are in the 20% range historically. But again, nothing terribly worrisome. If you look at the stock markets, let me leave aside the last two weeks and come back to it quickly. If you look at the risk premium implied by the prices as they were, say the beginning of the year, where they are now, the so-called equity premium, the risk premium, is actually perfectly in line with history. In other words, seeing this is that given the fact that the risk rates are so low, the fact that the prices of stocks is very high is not a surprise. And when you can't get money, you can't get return from bonds, you go into equity and you pay more. So there, I think that there is nothing terrible about it. Are there pockets where we see risks? Yes, there are nearly always. I mentioned two. One is actually good news. It's cryptocurrencies. I mean, cryptocurrencies is nearly entirely bubbly based on fundamental values of zero. And most of them will go there very quickly. It's quite good because it really, at this stage, is not linked to the financial system. So it's like people playing a lottery. They may get poor. They may lose money. But it's not going to affect the financial system directly. If they were there in 10 years and they were much bigger, it might. But right now it's not. The other I'll just mention is the so-called CLO collateralized loan obligation market, which clearly has gone a bit too far. There is an interesting issue, which is an issue of securitization. So a lot of people came out of a crisis thinking securitization is a catastrophe. Securitization, as it was done, was a catastrophe. But securitization on its own is a good thing. It pulls risks. And if it's done right, it helps. So on the CLOs, I'm not sure where we are. Bottom line, I really cannot get scared. Something can happen. Something will happen. But again, it's not baked in. As always, we have to be very careful about what happened. Let me talk briefly about, even that that may be on the mind of some people and the stock market adjustments. Yeah, I just ended with a teaser, which is my interpretation of what has happened in the stock markets in the last two weeks. So now, I don't know, the US, it's not open yet. But basically, as of not yesterday, the day before, the standard and poor had decreased by roughly 10%. And this was in the rest of the world was between five and 10, some countries more. And the question, when this happens, you always have people say, well, this is the beginning of the end. And now it's going to crash. And then people say, no, by now, because it's going to go up. I'm not going to give you my predictions, which I don't have, but I'm going to give you my interpretation. So I think there are two hypotheses for what may have triggered the crash. The first one is the anticipation that the strength of the US economy is such that the Fed will not be able to slow it down. It is now going at about 1% above potential. And so the job of the Fed is to basically slow the economy down so that we don't get too low an unemployment rate, which would become an issue. And I think there's a number of people who think that that might be an issue. So what you saw is when the Fed actually indicated that the economy was very strong, interest rates, long rates went up, the stock market went down. And so the beginning of the decrease in prices, I think, was the realization that markets now had to expect higher longer rates. When you have higher longer rates, you have the bond markets doing badly and the stock markets doing badly. In the last week, this has not been the case. And there has been days on which both the stock market was coming down and the bond yields were coming down, which is inconsistent with that kind of story. And I think this reflects the notion that maybe the economy is slowing down, maybe it reflects the uncertainty about geopolitics, but it is a different type of animal. In general, my impression is that the stock market was more or less correctly valued as of the beginning of the year. And that there has not been a whole set of good news since then, not bad news, not good news. So at this stage, and again, I know the risk you take when you say things like this, I think this may well be a healthy adjustment rather than the beginning of the end. But, you know, as always, sometimes one is proven wrong. So let me turn to one more point about economic risks. So what I've said, I don't think that there is a lot of risk buildup which has to lead to catastrophes. I don't think the expansion will die of its own. However, I think one main risk it has been discussed, which is that it relates to what I just said, which is that the US economy is now doing very well and is going in a very strong way. The Fed thinks that it can slow it down so that unemployment doesn't go below, say, 3.5 and can do this with the current set of expected raises in rates. I think there is a very good chance that they find they actually have a much harder time using the brakes to slow down the machine. Maybe they're right, and if there was another 10 or 20% decrease in the stock market, this would probably decrease demand and do the job for them. But I think there's a genuine chance that markets are too optimistic about how low the yield curve is and that it may tilt up a lot. If it does, then anybody who is long is going to lose money. And emerging markets in particular may have a hard time to the extent that they have dollar debt, and some of them do. I don't see this as an enormous risk. I think that even if this happened, most players couldn't handle it. But that would be in the set of economic factors risks. This would be my number one. In the last maybe five minutes, turn to politics and geopolitics. So again, here you need expertise in many fields, which is there in the room, but I don't have one. And so I may say things which are not right. The first one is on the rise of populism, and that's clearly an incredibly scary trend, which will most likely continue. The question is, again, what about the short one? And here there's an interesting thing, which is populism has happened before. It used to be the rule in Latin America for a long time. And the populists basically promised everything to everybody, and still do that, and then tried to deliver by being totally fiscally irresponsible. And so what would happen is that they would have very large budget deficits, and that would lead to inflation, hyperinflation. And they would typically lose, because when inflation was very high, people became unhappy. We're seeing something quite different, maybe with the exception of the US. But if I look at Europe, if I look at the two populists I can think of, which are, you know, Hungary and Poland. In both cases, it's clearly populism, but it's very fiscally responsible. So we have a different type of populism, which is not more pleasant. Good. This one as well? Good. But it is from an economic point of view less dangerous. I just don't see Hungary doing anything crazy in terms of macro, which would lead to enormous problems. Again, I'll come back to Italy. So trade wars, trade wars, I've really discussed trade this morning, and it's clear that it's disrupting the life of many firms and some of the speakers. As we got very concrete examples of what it can do. The problem we have as economists is that the mechanical effects of trade wars of the size that seems to be developing is not very, very large. We cannot get a big world recession from the mechanical effects of trade. And we have a sense that we're losing something, but it's our fault, not that the world is really very good. One way in which we actually get bigger effects is when the discussion about trade creates uncertainty about what the tariffs will be in that country, in that part of the world, what the rules will be. Because in this case what you get is you get an effect on investment. You basically get what's known as the option value of waiting, which is you basically put the number of plans on hold because you don't know where it's going to go. You don't know where the tariff is going to be here or there, and if you build the plans you'd rather wait until you know. And so I think that's the channel through which trade wars can have very large effects in the short run. They have large effects in the long run, they affect growth, they affect productivity, but in the short run I think that's the effect. So there was an interesting simulation at the IMF, which is in the last World Economic Report, in which they tried to look at different degrees of trade wars and the effect on activity. So the first one was basically the tariffs as now presented by the Trump administration. So serious tariffs on China and serious tariffs on some goods imported in the U.S. Then various additional levels, the fourth level was the effect on investment and confidence, and the fifth was on the financial sector. I'm going to give you the numbers because it gives you a sense of where the economy is, which is if you just look at the mechanical effects of the trade wars, then the decrease in US GDP was 0.1%. So not nothing, obviously, but not enormous. The effect on China was minus 0.4%. Again, not nothing, but not the end of the world. If, however, you added all the additional elements, the psychological elements, the layer of investment and so on, then you got nearly 1% less for the US and 1.6% less for China. So a lot of the issue is going to depend not so much on the trade part but on the uncertainty part and how it affects investment. What we have to really watch out for is investment. Okay, let me end with specific issues about specific countries briefly. So Italy actually came this morning with a piece on Italy and I'll just say what it said. I think there is a fundamental incompatibility between the fiscally irresponsible populist government and the euro. It just cannot work. If such a government basically decides to embark on a fiscal expansion which looks dangerous, then it is going to face what was known in Latin America as a sudden stop. So both the domestic investors and the foreign investors are going to try to take as much of their money out as they can. If they think there is the slightest possibility that we get out of the euro, they will move enormous amounts. Why does it matter? Because within the euro, the size of the gross liabilities of a country like Italy is absolutely gigantic. It is far beyond what anybody could replace if these liabilities got out. The ECB cannot do it, the SM cannot do it, the IMF cannot do it. And so as soon as the investors become convinced that it's better to put your money somewhere else, there is nothing which can be done except declare bank holiday to limit the... And then reopen on the Monday with the lira or whatever currency it is that you want to have but outside of the euro. I'm not saying that the Italian government wants to do it. I think they really don't want to do it, but it's not the issue. The issue is if they do what they may do, it's not true. There is a risk. And I think it just doesn't apply just to Italy, but it applies to any member of the euro. So I think that's really a very dangerous issue. Let me... I had a few moments. I've been talking too long. On the Brexit... So again, I mean I heard the speaker this morning, and it's clear it's going to complicate life. It's clear it has medium-run issues. What is it going to do in the next few years? I think that's where the uncertainty is absolutely central. When Brexit was voted, I thought that most firms would just put plans on hold to see how it went. And investment would decline strongly. It didn't for a while, but now it does. Now it is a fairly serious effect on investment. And I think as long as the smoke has disappeared, then there will be very low investment. When it happens, some of the investment which had been put in reserve would actually happen, but then you'll have the adverse effects of tariffs. So my sense is lower growth in the UK in the short run is the most likely outcome. And the last thing I'll mention, because I think one or two were mentioned this morning. I don't want to go back there in China, US. It's oil. It's clear. We have learned, I think, two things, is that the supply of oil, and again I'm talking in this room to people who probably know much more than I, surely know. The supply of oil is now largely determined in the medium run by share oil, which basically can be produced at 60 to 70 dollars. And so in the long run, it probably is a hard time getting above that and it may, as technology improves, actually be a low and low ceiling. But in the short run, it takes just one million barrels less, out of more or less 80 billion a day, to actually lead to very large shifts in prices. So it's fairly easy to think of Saudi Arabia cutting production if it becomes they are happy, or Iran putting mines in the straight of all moves. There are many, many scenarios you can think about, which would get the price of oil to above 100. I think that's a genuine possibility. Economies are much better. Most of them are in much better shape to handle it. The US in particular, because it produces now such a large amount of oil, can handle it much better than in the 70s. But that would be an issue that we have to think about. Let me conclude. So I don't know how I sound it. I think I'm less pessimistic. I feel that I'm less pessimistic than some. At the IMF meetings in Bali, people were extremely pessimistic. I'm not there at all. I don't think that there is any recession baked in the current numbers. It may come, obviously, and it will come in some form at some point. But there is this, what again, as economists we call, nitrogen uncertainty, which is our inability to fully understand the effects of things that we haven't seen before from the geopolitical front, and we have to continue to worry. Let me stop here. I don't know if I take questions or not.