 We will further redo, give the floor to Mr. President. Thank you very much, Jean-Claude. What I'd like to do is, well, this is a very broad topic. So let me focus on the issue of financing for emerging markets and developing countries. And let me offer you two propositions with which I'm not sure everybody would agree, but I want to offer them in that spirit. First is that, as you know, we've just, after Marrakesh and the whole of last year's efforts, there's a broad consensus that you need to scale up financing for emerging markets and developing countries in part to continue to meet their own ongoing development needs, but also to enable them to deal with climate change, both in terms of adaptation and in terms of their contribution to mitigating the level of emissions going forward. And there are various numbers that float around. There may be three times larger by the end of this decade. And they're also being asked to mobilize much more private financing to go with that as part of their mandate. So let me say two specific things in that regard. First thing I would say is that the conversation about financing the climate-related part of emerging markets needs is quite confused because we think of climate as being both mitigation and adaptation, but in my mind they're very different strategies needed for that. Adaptation is just building into good development of schools, of roads, of hospitals, the extra cost of making them resilient to climate that applies to everybody, rich and poor, low-income countries, middle-income countries, and this should just become part of the mainstream of good development strategies. On the other hand, mitigation, which is the contribution that will come from the policies developing countries adopt that will have a global impact, is really only about a dozen countries, a dozen emerging markets. What the vast majority of countries in Africa do will have no impact of any measurable quantity on global emissions. And therefore, the only sensible way to allocate the financing for mitigation is to target the dozen or so countries whose actions will have an appreciable impact on global emissions. But the MTB system is very difficult for them to be able to do this kind of targeting. And the real risk is that we will end up spreading mitigation financing all over the world with very limited impact on global emissions and therefore waste some of that money. So what my first proposition is that we should think very separately about how to support adaptation, which should be across the board, and for mitigation we need to adopt an approach which maximizes the emissions impact globally rather than thinking of this as a sort of add-on for every country. The second point I want to make is that there is a expectation that now the multinational development banks, regional development banks will be successful in mobilizing much more private financing than they have ever done in the past. They have singularly failed to be able to do this. They set targets but almost never are able to meet them. And now they are being asked to do so with new instruments and a new willingness to do that. And the reason they are being asked to do that is because even if you multiply multilateral development banks, own lending by three or by four, it's just not enough. You have to bring in private capital because that's where the financing is. And people use numbers that become so large that they're not very meaningful. You can easily talk about hundreds of trillions of dollars that are sitting there waiting to be mobilized. But if you look at what's actually being mobilized, it's in a few tens or low hundreds of billions over some time. Now, my contention is that you can keep adding instruments and you can keep adding new initiatives. But the real problem why the multilateral development banks are not able to mobilize private financing is because they have a culture of risk aversion. So they're really not able to take on any of the risk that comes from doing things differently rather than just taking loans and putting them on their own books. And if you talk to anybody who is a private sector investor, actually there are some here who talk to the multilateral development banks, they will tell you horror stories of how the culture of risk aversion makes it impossible to mobilize additional financing. And this culture of risk aversion comes partly from within but it also comes from the instructions that they receive from their shareholders who at the ministerial level make proclamations about how they should be more risk tolerant, they need to go out and do these things. But by the time they those instructions filter down through the bureaucracy in each of those national systems to the directors who represent the same shareholders sitting on the boards of these institutions, it becomes quite diluted and then translated into don't take risks. And with that we can spend many years trying to come up with numbers and plans but unless we tackle the risk aversion issue in my view, we are not going to get very far in mobilizing private finance. So I would say that's the second point of what to make. Let me just end by making a small side point which is the risk aversion problem affects the multilateral development banks, but it also affects almost every public sector institution. That's the nature of public sector institutions is that they are penalized for making mistakes but they're not rewarded for making returns. And in some ways if you look at the IMF and John and I were both at the IMF for many years, if you look at the IMF, we are saying to the IMF that it needs to play a much stronger role as part of a global safety net, financial safety net in a world where there are going to be many more shocks. But again the design of those safety nets by the IMF runs the risk of being designed in a way that is so conservative that almost none of the potential beneficiaries of the safety net will be able to use it. And so like many of the problems that you would see is that the same approach to dealing with this obsession with risk aversion has to go across the street and into other financial institutions as well. So let me stop with that. Thank you Massoud. You were clear, crystal clear and extremely concise but with real issues.