 And today we will continue our posture hearings with you, Com. I'll provide members when we adjourn the hearing. We will immediately move upstairs for the close briefing. I want to thank our witnesses for being here and for their service to our nation. The United States is moving into an era of unprecedented danger. We've heard from the commanders of South Com, Apricom, Sint Com, and Indo-Pakom that each raised grave concerns about how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are working together to reduce America's global influence, harm our alliances, and undermine our national security. Nowhere is that more apparent than in Ukraine. Iran and North Korea are arming Russia with deadly effect. In return, they are receiving advanced technologies and other illegal aid from Putin. And while China has not yet provided weapons to Russia, Xi is providing Putin critical economic and security assistance. This includes dual-use materials and components for weapons. Kim, Xi, and the I.T.O.L.A. are eagerly aiding and abetting Putin's brutal invasion of Ukraine because they know a Russian victory there will seriously undercut the credibility of American deterrents and leave our security partners exposed. It is the green light these despots have been craving for for decades. A Russian victory will embolden Kim, Xi, and the I.T.O.L.A. to confront South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and ultimately the United States in new and fatal ways. And I fear Putin will use a victory in Ukraine as a springboard to invade Eastern Europe. We can't let that happen. We must restore American deterrence. It starts with this administration finally articulating a winning strategy. Since the start of the war, President Biden's Ukraine policy has been plagued by hesitation. Every major weapons system the United States has provided, from stingers to Abrams to attackums, only came after serious congressional pressure. And it usually arrived months late and in insufficient numbers. The President's hand-wringing has only prolonged the war and driven up cost in terms of dollars and lives. Meanwhile, the U.S. sanctions have failed to make much of a dent in Putin's war machine. The President should use the billions frozen in Russian assets to support Ukraine. And he should arm Ukraine at the speed of relevance. But in order for that to happen, Congress needs to pass the national security supplemental. If the United States isn't able to send additional weapons to Ukraine, Putin will win. And I would remind my colleagues that nearly all the money we're spending to arm Ukraine doesn't leave this country. It goes directly to U.S. companies and American workers to produce more weapons at a faster pace. This funding is revitalizing our defense industrial base after decades of atrophy. It's exactly what we need to do to prepare for a potential conflict with China. But we can't do it all. The President needs to force our European allies to do more. While the U.K., Poland, and the Baltic States and the Czech Republic are punching well above their weight, there are some European countries that can and must do more. We all want this war to end, but that can't happen if the West hedges. If Putin thinks he can win, he won't come to the bargaining table. The quickest way to end this conflict is to strengthen Ukraine's negotiating position by ensuring they are well-armed and well-supplied. I look forward to working with my colleagues to do just that. Finally, last week marked the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. NATO has been enormously successful at keeping America and our allies secure in providing the deterrence necessary to avoid another world war. But as we enter this new era, where China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are working together to flaunt international laws and destabilize whole regions, NATO needs to broaden its focus. It needs to secure its supply chains and reduce its dependency on China and Russia for goods and energy. And all NATO nations must meet their requirement to spend at least two percent of their GDP on defense. With a war raging in Eastern Europe, it's entirely unacceptable that a dozen nations are still falling short. When NATO meets in Washington this summer, the president should insist, should demand these nations present a clear plan on how they will meet the two percent benchmark as soon as possible. Every member state needs to fulfill its commitment because now more than ever, we need a strong NATO. I look forward to our discussion today and hearing from our witnesses about their security posture in Europe. And with that, I yield to my friend and colleague, the ranking member. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with almost all of what the chairman said, particularly about the importance of NATO and the importance of the fight in Ukraine. I definitely look forward to hearing from our witnesses who are very well positioned to update us on the specifics of that fight and on the alliance that is pushing back against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And I will just right off the top foot stop the point. The House has waited months now to approve the security package to help protect Ukraine. You know, weeks ago we were too late. And now every day is at an extreme cost to our ability to deter Russia. To deter Russia and Ukraine, but as the chairman correctly pointed out, to deter the whole broad alliance that is trying to basically tear down the international rules-based system. All of that pushes them forward. So we have the bill, the Senate bill that we can pass. I would urge every member of this body to ask the speaker and implore the speaker to bring that up for a vote. It would pass the House and be signed by the President in short order. All we need is a little democracy. Give us the chance to vote on that bill so that we can give Ukraine the help that they so desperately need. Would love to get an update today from our witnesses about the fight in Ukraine. You know, my personal opinion is that Ukraine is in a strong position to stop Russia where they are if we give them the help. And this is where I have a tiny little bit of disagreement with the chairman's remarks. I think the Biden administration has been very clear on their policy from day one, which is defend Ukraine, make sure that we maintain a sovereign democratic Ukraine while not stumbling into World War III with Russia. And that second goal is not irrelevant, OK? Making sure that that didn't happen is an important part of the policy, because that would make everything vastly worse. It is not simply a matter of we're going to war with Russia no matter what. There are very complicated calculations to make sure that we don't stumble into that broader war, which would definitely jeopardize our interests and the world's interests, which means that taking some care in how we do that was actually a very smart policy. But even with that, if we go back to February of 2022, when the war started, the assumption was it was over. There was nothing Ukraine could do. Russia would take them out in a matter of weeks. The coalition that was pulled together in large part by this president and by this administration that built a 50-nation strong coalition to support Ukraine is the reason, part of the reason, the other part being Ukraine's incredible courage and ability to fight, that that was stopped. I think we need to recognize that. We also need to recognize the other point, and I'll get back to agreement with the chairman at this point, that if we walk away from that mission, that will undermine our ability to build the alliances that we need to confront all elements of this, not just Putin, but China and Iran and North Korea and Hamas and Hezbollah and all the groups that threaten us. So you can't say, well, we need to walk away from Ukraine because China's more important. If China's more important, that just emphasizes the fact that we should not walk away from Ukraine as we go forward. The other piece that I'm interested in both of our witnesses' thoughts is on the sanctions piece. You know, part of the reason that sanctions have not been as effective as we would have liked is because China in particular has been there as an economic backstop, but not just China. Other nations like India, South Africa, Brazil have continued to do business. There was a fundamental shift in U.S. economic power globally and that there are other nations now that are stepping into that void. We don't have the ability to simply choke off another nation that we once had because of that alliance that is being built. And I think that means that we should start thinking about, well, how do we deal with that? What is a new strategy to recognize that we are definitely in a competition now for economic primacy in the world and how do we best confront that competition? I'm worried that we overly rely on sanctions, certainly not in this case, not where Russia is concerned, but a number of other cases that push nations across the globe away from us and into the arms of China and Russia, which only further weakens our ability to hold Russia to account for this war. But let me close where I started, and that is the importance of Ukraine. Ukraine can in fact win. They can maintain a sovereign democratic Ukraine and stop Russia, but only if we help them. And the implications of that certainly for NATO more broadly are profound. So I urge the speaker again, give us that vote so that we can help Ukraine defend the interests that are important to us as well as to Ukraine and the rest of the world without a yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the ranking member. We're now introduced to witnesses. We have the Honorable Celeste Wallender, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and also General Christopher Cavoli, is the commander of U.S. European Command. I welcome the witnesses. Ms. Wallender, we'll start with you. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. This is a great opportunity to testify, and I want to also thank you for the support of Congress and the committee to enable the Department of Defense's operations and posture in Europe. It is an honor to appear alongside General Cavoli. With its unprovoked invasion in 2022, Russia revealed its determination to revert to an international system that rewards aggression. In response to Putin's challenge and to ensure continued deterrence and defense of our collective security, the Department has enhanced its posture in Europe over the last two years. But we are not alone. I can report that our allies in Europe are sharing the responsibility for collective defense. Together with our allies, the Department is committed to reinforcing the lesson that aggression will result in very costly failure. American security and prosperity rely on that fact. In Ukraine, our strategic goal is to see a sovereign, independent, economically viable, and democratic Ukraine emerge from Russia's failure, a Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression. Russian forces continue their assault in Ukraine's east and south and target civilians and critical infrastructure across Ukraine. Ukraine's defenses and its population will face devastation without additional U.S. security assistance to join with Europe's. With congressional support, we will strengthen Ukraine in forging a strong defense industrial base that provides Ukraine with its required capabilities and resilience. Meanwhile, we have organized our allies and partners into coalitions focused on key capability areas for Ukraine's air force, ground-based air defense, artillery, maritime security, armor, information security, information technology, de-mining, and drones. Through U.S. leadership of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, we have provided more than $88 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. U.S. leadership is ensuring that Russia is bearing enormous costs as a result of its war against Ukraine. Russia has expended $211 billion to equip, deploy, maintain, and sustain operations in Ukraine. Resources that Russia's limited economy ill affords. Russia's armed forces have suffered at least 315,000 casualties in the fight. Yet because of Putin's obsessions, Putin's Russia will be a threat to European and U.S. security for years. DoD is focused on our defense and on deterring Russia from attacks on the United States and our NATO allies. NATO is stronger today than ever. Finland and Sweden are allies, and more allies than ever are devoting at minimum 2% of GDP to defense. Today, 18 allies meet the 2% requirement compared to only nine in 2020. Several more will meet 2% by the July Washington Summit. In 2024, NATO allies will invest a total of $470 billion in defense, which amounts to 2% of the aggregate GDP of all of the members of the alliance. NATO allies together are answering the call to meet this historic threat. The department will continue working with allies to defend our countries and our freedoms throughout Europe, including on its Eastern flank, those facing Russia, where American soldiers serve on the front line from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. America will welcome our allies this summer for the Washington NATO Summit to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty that established the NATO Alliance, founded on freedom and democracy. There are also states beyond NATO's Article 5 umbrella threatened by Russia. Moldova recognizes the threat posed by Russia and is undertaking significant defense reforms. Moscow continues its occupation of 20% of Georgia's territory and maintains an unwelcome military presence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. DOD works with all four to strengthen ties, build resilience, and advance Euro-Atlantic integration. I want to emphasize how important Congress is to achieving our strategic objectives in Europe and beyond. Your reliable, stable, and consistent support and funding are critical. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Dr. Wallander. General Cavoli, you're recognized. Thank you, Chairman Rodgers, Ranking Member Smith, Distinguished Members of the Committee. It's an honor to testify before you today on behalf of the men, women, and families of US-European command. I'd like to publicly recognize our service members' shared sacrifice, and I'd like to praise their devotion to the mission, and thank you for your support of them. I'm lucky to be accompanied by Command Sergeant Major Rob Abernathy here today, who represents those men, women, and families, and I'm honored to testify next to Dr. Wallander. We're facing challenging times, to say the least, in the European theater. Russia's brutal, unprovoked war has ravaged Ukraine for over two years. Their forces are demolishing cities and are destroying innocent lives on a scale we have not seen since the Second World War. Moreover, Russia is turning to the People's Republic of China, Iran, and North Korea to sustain its campaign in Ukraine. These countries are forming interlocking strategic partnerships in an attempt to challenge the existing order. This is profoundly inimical to US national interests, and Russia shows no signs of stopping, nor does Russia intend to stop with Ukraine. Russia presents a chronic threat. US-UKOM has responded to this Russian threat by enhancing our deterrence posture across Europe. We have strengthened our eastern flank with rotational force deployments. We have expanded preposition stocks, and we've modernized our infrastructure to enable rapid reception of reinforcing forces. We have demonstrated this capability to reinforce in all domains, through dozens of multinational training exercises. So we're ready to defend, and this allows us to deter, and we have deterred Russia from attacking our alliance. US-UKOM is also very proud to lead the international effort and support of Ukraine. We do this through the Security Assistance Group, Ukraine, SAG-U, which is led by Lieutenant General Tony Ogudo. In the past 26 months of this war, the US and our partners have delivered vast amounts of critical munitions and equipment to our Ukrainian colleagues. The SAG-U has facilitated a full range of training to promote unit readiness. We have ensured that Ukraine knows how to use their new equipment and knows how to maintain it. Nevertheless, Russia persists in its vicious campaign. And meanwhile, Ukraine remains almost entirely dependent on external support to stay in this fight. The severity of this moment cannot be overstated. If we do not continue to support Ukraine, Ukraine could lose. So our efforts are great, but in all of this, US-UKOM is not alone. War in Europe has given our allies and partners clear purpose and unity, and they've seized the opportunity presented by this catastrophe. Over the past year, there have been profound changes in NATO. We have new war plans for the first time in 35 years. We have a new force model and a new readiness model. It makes more than 700% more European troops available to the Supreme Allied Commander, me, than just a couple of years ago. We have a streamlined and focused command structure. We have new authorities that give me the ability to respond to crisis in a timely manner. And European governments are backing these organizational changes with a concrete uptick in investment. In 2024, at least 20 nations are expected to meet the 2% of GDP defense spending mark. This compares to only three that did so in 2014. Continued US leadership is essential, however. Our allies are stepping up, but they require and they hope for our continued leadership and example. By upholding our commitment to Ukraine and by demonstrating steadfast cohesion with the NATO Alliance, we provide a clear deterrent to our adversaries. Should that deterrence fail, US-UKOM, alongside our allies, is ready to fight and win. I thank Congress for your unwavering support to your servicemen and women, to our mission, to their safety, and to their wellbeing. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, on behalf of the entire European Command, thank you again for this opportunity today. I very much look forward to your questions. I thank the witnesses. I recognize myself for questions. General Cavoli, what would be the consequences for Ukraine, the United States, and NATO if Congress fails to, in a timely manner, pass the Supplemental Funding Bill? Chairman Rogers, I can't predict the future, but I can do simple math. And when I look at the supply rates, I look at the supply sources, when I look at the consumption rates, if we do not continue to support Ukraine, Ukraine will run out of artillery shells and will run out of air defense interceptors in fairly short order, Mr. Chairman. Based on my experience in 37-plus years in the US military, if one side can shoot and the other side can't shoot back, the side that can't shoot back loses. So the stakes are very high. We are the main supplier of ground-based air defense and artillery shells for Ukraine right now. It's important to note that our allies are increasing their production rates. They're just not able to take it all under their control yet. They just don't have the supplies. They're increasing rapidly. Both NATO and the European Union are working to increase European production. That will be the first part of a bridge to the future. And then, meanwhile, we're all working with Ukraine to increase their organic production rates. They're already producing about 11,000 artillery shells a year and some other things. So we're bringing that up. But in the meantime, they're really dependent this year on us, Mr. Chairman, and without our support, they will not be able to prevail. Dr. Wallander, some of our members are frustrated. They feel like the administration doesn't have a clear plan or objective in Ukraine. Could you articulate that for us? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The objective is Russia's strategic failure. Putin's goal is to subjugate Ukraine, to strip it of its sovereignty and independence, but also to weaken and subvert Europe, America, and especially, of course, the NATO alliance. So our objectives and what has guided our policies for the last two years is that Ukraine remains a sovereign, independent European country that is able to defend and deter and to deliver that failure to Putin. And Ukraine is doing that with our support every day. And it is to strengthen the NATO alliance, to defend America's European security, which is the core of our global security. Our alliance in Europe enables American military presence more broadly, globally, as well as to defend and deter against Russia. And China is watching how we perform in Europe because they are drawing lessons for how we will live up to our commitments to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. So we need to ensure that Putin also fail in his goal to undermine European security. We are doing this out of self-interest, out of American national security interests, as well as, of course, the admiration that we Americans feel for Ukraine. But in the end, we are doing this so that Americans can be secure at home and abroad. Okay, General Cavoli, if funding is not provided by the U.S. and NATO for Ukraine and that government falls, do you believe that Russia will take the entirety of the country or just a portion thereof? Mr. Chairman, I believe that Russia will take as much of that country as they can get. And if the Ukrainian armed forces are not able to hold, they'll take as much as they can. This could, in the worst case, put Russian soldiers throughout Ukraine, which would put them on many more NATO country borders than they are currently. And that would cost an awful lot for us to deal with. And do y'all have an expectation of what would happen next after assuming that Ukraine falls and Russia takes the entirety of the nation? At some point, do you believe there'll be further aggression or not? And if so, what would that be? I believe Russia would be emboldened, Mr. Chairman. And I believe at some point, they would commit further aggression. And if I may, I'd like to ask the Celeste if she has that as well. I fully agree with General Cavoli. Putin is not going to stop at Ukraine. Ukraine is a step towards undermining European security and the transatlantic alliance, and therefore American security. Thank the witnesses. The Chair recognizes the ranking. Member for any questions he may have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli, taking the flip side of that question, if we get assistance to Ukraine, as is currently outlined, what do you assess their chances of stopping Russia where they're at, at least right now? Sir, I think those chances would be very good. I think they would be able to do it. We worked very closely with them on their general plans and the way to accomplish them, and they have solid plans. They have a solid approach to their defense. It does need to be resourced, however. Right. Because, I mean, at the moment, Russia is trying to press the advantage they have because Ukraine is rationing what they use because of the lack of support. But even then, Russia seems to be struggling to break through. Can you give us your assessment as to why that is, what are the weaknesses or strengths of the Russian force and why they're still in the situation they're in? Absolutely. The first and primary reason the Russians are unable to break through is due to the tenacity of the Ukrainian defenders. They are defending very, very hard. They fight very hard. They fight every day. On the Russian side, the Russians are struggling to put together combined arms operations or operations at the battalion level, above the company level. It's very hard to aggregate very small unit actions into a larger offensive. They are trying. They're spending enormous quantities of material and enormous amounts of life to try to break through just by piling small attack after small attack. It has not worked so far. But in the end, numbers matter and warfare, of course, as you know, ranking member Smith and those numbers, if we don't support Ukraine, we'll favor the Russians over time. Thank you. And Dr. Wallender on a more difficult policy question, the other aspect of the Biden administration's policy here is to make sure that there was a sovereign democratic Ukraine. Yes, Russia focused, as you emphasized in your answer to the chairman's question, is there. But we wanted to make sure that Ukraine was there. If we were able to get them support and we stop Russia where they're at, that, of course, is not the ultimate objective of Ukraine. Ukraine would like to take back all of the territory back to the pre-2014 borders. At the moment, that seems unrealistic. What would you say is the scenario and the administration's position on negotiations? So we get them the aid, we stop Russia so that Russia cannot achieve their maximalist goals. I see risk if at that point we continue, no, we got to keep fighting because we got to get it all back. How do you have that very difficult discussion with Ukraine and also crucially with other Eastern European allies who are quite right? I mean, Ukraine should have pre-2014 borders, but should, and what should happen isn't the same as what can happen. How do you handle that discussion to get to a peace in Ukraine? Thank you, Congressman Smith. First and most important is we, our policy is to fight to preserve, to support Ukraine so that it is sovereign and can make its own choices. So we have to understand that in the end is the Ukrainian people and their leadership who will decide how, whether, and what terms they might be willing to negotiate with Russia. And it's very important to remember that. And we are supporting them in security assistance but also economic assistance and other parts of the US government so that Ukraine can be that sovereign country and have that decision and live to see that day. I do think there is a misconception that what Putin is after is territory. He's not after territory. He's not after Bakhmut or Avdivka or even Odessa. He's after Ukraine. Yes. And so we have to understand that while there may be a negotiation over territory at some point, some territorial resolution, we have to be ready for the fact that that probably doesn't mean that Putin gives up on the goal to subvert Ukraine and through Ukraine Europe. So we have to do both things. We have to support Ukraine in negotiations if it chooses to negotiate. But we must not be fooled into thinking that brings an air of peace and cooperation. Well, any negotiation would have to make sure that there were clear security protections for Ukraine going forward. We could not simply rely on Putin's word that he would not go further. I completely agree with that. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Chairman, I recognize this gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wilder, I have a tremendous honor respect for you. I would tell you, I disagree on the Odessa statement. I do think Putin wants Odessa. I think it gives him control of the economy of Ukraine. And that port is extremely important to him. And I think that he would like to charge a tax on everything leaving that port and give it to one of his oligarchs to keep a portion of it for himself. But my question gets to your statement about Russia's strategic failure being the Biden administration's goal. Certainly that's my goal. I want Russia to fail. I want Putin to fail. I want Ukraine to win. And you also talk about Russia's limited economy. But most numbers show that Russia's economy grew at a rate of 3.6% for 2023. Is that your understanding? Yes, and its inflation rate is 13%. Okay. So it's 13%? The inflation rate is 13%. Okay. But their economy is growing. And the Biden administration has looked the other way while India, whose economy is also growing at a pace that's actually about 7%, has bought billions of dollars worth of oil from Russia in violation of the sanctions. Is it correct? I want to ask you about the opinion on the Biden administration. I will ask you, though, is it correct that India has purchased billions of dollars worth of oil in violation of the sanctions from Russia? India has purchased oil from Russia? Yes. In violation of the sanctions? That would be a technical issue on whether they are paying more than the price cap. And I'm afraid I'd have to get back to you on that. Okay, fair enough. As I said, I respect you. Not trying to play got you here, but my concern is that there are things the Biden administration could do that would hurt Russia's economy and they have not done it. I'm also concerned with the fact that Russia, when the Ukrainians hit Russia's oil and gas infrastructure, the Biden administration came out and condemned the Ukrainians for hitting Russia's oil and gas infrastructure and suggested that they should not do that again. Can you tell me why, while Russia is attacking Ukrainians' oil and gas and energy sector, why shouldn't the Ukrainians attack the Russian oil and gas and energy sector? The issue on attacking critical infrastructure is when those are civilian targets, we have concerns because Ukraine holds itself to the highest standards of observing the laws of armed conflict and that's one of the elements of being a European democracy. But the Russians are attacking the oil and gas infrastructure in Ukraine, correct? Absolutely. And if you're going to win a war, you can't sit back and take punches and not deliver punches, so why shouldn't the Ukrainians attack the oil and gas infrastructure in Russia? Congressman, we have concerns about striking at civilian targets when we support countries. Again, this is Ukraine's sovereign decision, but we express those concerns. But those oil and gas infrastructures in Russia are owned by the Kremlin, correct? It's not like they're owned by a private corporation that have shareholders and private assets are being destroyed. They are owned by private Russian citizens who are part of the Putin regime, that is correct. I mean, it makes sense to me that we should destroy them. General Cavoli, you talked a lot about our NATO partners in their ascension to the 2%. Russia is currently spending, as I understand it, 6% of their GDP on their military. My question is, is the 2% enough? If your enemy is spending 6%, if your greatest threat is coming from a country that is spending 6% of GDP, should that 2% threshold, should we work to raise that 2% threshold for the NATO partnerships? Thanks, Congressman. So first of all, there is a lively discussion among the nations in NATO right now about whether 2% is even any longer the relevant figure, should it be higher? As you know, a number of our allies are spending significantly above 2%. I'd call attention to Poland here, especially, which is closing in on 4% of GDP. I personally believe in the absence of any North Atlantic Council decision or agreement. I do think we're gonna find that 2% is too low a figure. We have plans that have driven four structure requirements that nations are now gonna be asked to build towards. So there's a blueprint, there's a shopping list for that 2%, and I think we're gonna find that 2% goes pretty quickly, Congressman. Gentlemen, the time's expired. Chair, I recognize the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, just wanna join the chairman and the ranking member in terms of the urgency of getting this supplemental assistance package voted on. Again, I think it's important to remember that the vote in the Senate was 70 to 28, which in this polarized environment, that sends a very strong, confident message that the votes will be there in the House if we take this measure up and hopefully we could do it tonight. There is a discharge petition that's actually been filed to force a vote and it's just shy of 200. 218 is the magic number. And again, something hopefully members will think about as the clock keeps ticking in terms of the urgency of this issue. General, your testimony pretty powerfully described the fact that in pages two to five about the fact that Russia, despite the horrific losses that they're experiencing, that is not slowing down investment in their military and their defense sector. And you and I just had a brief conversation to talk about. One of the areas where they have been continuing to invest is in the undersea domain, particularly again, because of their presence and activities in the North Atlantic, they've been steadily increasing over the years with construction of more sophisticated submarines such as the Severed Events class and the Upgraded Kilo platforms. Again, I know a lot of this sort of topic has to happen or be discussed in a classified setting, but I guess the question is that in terms of your command, I mean, you and your predecessors have testified to this in the past. The Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic is steadily, surely in 2022, 2023, 2024 growing. Is that correct? Absolutely correct. And the, can you talk about the need for our Navy to again have adequate attack submarine fleet to be out there to again, safely and effectively conduct anti-submarine warfare? Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the opportunity in fact, because I think it's an extremely important topic. We absolutely have a need for a strong undersea warfare capability. As you pointed out, the Russian losses in Ukraine have been primarily in the land domain. We do not see significant losses in the air domain, especially their long range and strategic aviation fleets. Other than the Black Sea Fleet losses, we see no losses in the rest of the Russian Navy fleet. And in the modernizing, rapidly modernizing nuclear forces, we see continued investment and heightened level of activities, underwater especially. So our ability to handle that depends on a number of different things, but one of the primary things it depends on is our attack submarine fleet. And we have requirements that I share with US Northcom to defend the United States against the threat posed by Russian submarines. And we can always use more submarines to pursue that threat, sir. Absolutely. So to just put it more bluntly, I mean, your requests in terms of requirements are not met in terms of what is available in terms of the missions. My requirements exceed what I am provided on a regular basis. Great. Thank you. Again, you mentioned the Black Sea activities that are out there. I mean, in terms of people who are sort of have doubts about Ukraine's commitment to stay in the fight here, I mean, it actually has been just in my opinion, an underplayed success in terms of how they have, with no Navy, really been able to inflict incredible losses. 20% of the Black Sea fleet was the latest number I saw. And can you just sort of comment in terms of, you know, that sort of signal that, you know, they're in the fight and there is a plan. Absolutely. It's easy sometimes, I think, Congressman, for us to stare at the fight on the land and think that it represents the totalitary of the situation. It does not. The fight on the Black Sea and the fight for the Black Sea is an important part of this. It's especially important because of what it does for the Ukrainian economy. Without the rollback of the Black Sea fleet, we wouldn't be able to get as much of Ukraine's grain out and onto market. That would cause food security problems across the globe and severe and acute problems for the economy of Ukraine, which is obviously under great stress as it is. I think the Ukrainians have done a fantastic and groundbreaking job using largely unmanned systems to push the Russian fleet back east of Crimea. It is very rare that a Russian warship ventures past the western, the southern, ventures west of the southern tip of Crimea right now. It's a big success story and it's theirs. Go back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. Dejarlet. Thank you. Dr. Wallander, first I want to say thank you. I'm just pleased to see that the Pentagon's OIG launched a new website last month that will allow the American people to directly see where our tax dollars are being spent to support Ukraine, something we've been talking about, I think, for about six months in our briefings. It's still a pretty hard sell back home because people don't see a pathway to victory. Basically, what they're seeing is a stalemate that's drugged on for two years now. And with the continued problems in our own country with the border, et cetera, it's hard to justify this spending, even though most of us in this room understand the importance of it. One message it does seem to sell back home is when you talk about the evolving alliance between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea is almost an axis similar to World War II, Germany, and Italy and Japan. So that seems to get people's attention. What do you both see as a successful end of the conflict in Ukraine? And what more can the administration and the DOD do to message the reasoning for spending this money to the folks back home? Thank you, Congressman. In addition to the strategic objectives that I already identified as Ukraine remaining a sovereign, independent, European democracy, let me clarify that we are also supporting Ukraine to put it in the best possible position should Russia want to negotiate an end to the conflict on Ukraine's terms. In order for Ukraine to be in the driver's seat in any negotiation, they have to have the advantage. And the military and security assistance support that we've been providing to Ukraine has given them significant advantages, including controlling most of their Black Sea coast, as General Cavoli pointed out. So those are the stakes. And the answer also has to be that constituents need to understand that of the $60 billion in the supplemental that was requested, $48 billion of that goes to American industry to either replenish US stocks or to procure for the longer term, and to support General Cavoli's forces in Europe who are working to defend intertour. So that is money going actually to American companies and to American citizens to support the work that they are doing for European security. And I think that's a message that the President should deliver directly to the country. I've said that before and I still think that they're not getting that message. I hear and understand what you're saying and I think it would help to hear that. I wanted to get both your opinion on Secretary Blinken's announcement last week that Ukraine will become a member of NATO sooner or later. Seems like a pretty provocative remark and I want to see if you had any response to it. US policy since, I believe it's 2008, has been that Ukraine will be a member of NATO someday and we have focused our bilateral relationship as well as the work we do with NATO allies to bring Ukraine up to the standards of not just NATO membership but EU membership because that's the aspiration of the Ukrainian people. They've elected leaders again and again who have promised to keep Ukraine on that path. So that Secretary Blinken was reiterating a longstanding bipartisan policy. Okay, well if memory serves, just two years ago, that was a major red line for Putin. If Ukraine entered NATO, the escalation could go way beyond Ukraine. At least that was his threat and one of the reasons that I think even Zelensky said Ukraine does not want to be a member of NATO or at least at that time. So it just seems antithetical in a way to throw that out there right now what we're trying to secure peace and or victory in Ukraine. Maybe that's something that should have happened two years ago in hindsight, who knows, but it just seemed pretty bold. General, did you have any opinion on that? No, not with regard to US policy, Congressman. I would just add from a NATO's perspective, NATO's agreed policy among the 32 nations is that when the time is right and all allies agree Ukraine will become a member of the alliance, but those two conditions are an important part of NATO's position and they have not been met yet. Okay, I yield back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Geer-Mindy for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and a personal thank you to you for your strong statement about the necessity of passing the supplemental bill. Your leadership and the colleagues, all of us on this committee, play a critical role in getting that done. And my question really goes to General Cavalli. In your written statement, you continue to use, quote, despite its military evident efficiencies, dysfunction, Russia continues to pose an existential threat to Ukraine. Ukraine cannot sustain the fight alone. The United States, our allies and partners must continue to provide Ukraine with munitions, weapons and material. How dire is the situation in Ukraine and what is the role of the United States not providing support to that dire situation? If in fact it is dire. Thank you, Congressman. The situation is extremely serious. The best way to think about this is in terms of what are the specific things that Ukraine needs. Our allies provide for some of those things, right? For instance, tanks, 90%, more than 90% of the tanks that have been given have not been given by the United States. They've been given by allies. They're sustained by allies. 100% of the fuel, the petroleum products that Ukraine needs have been provided by allies, not by the United States. But there are two places where the American contribution is critical. They're in the provision of artillery munitions and interceptors for air defense. Those two things also happen to be the most critical things on the battlefield. The biggest killer on the battlefield is artillery in most conflicts, but in this one definitely. And should Ukraine run out, they would run out because we stop supplying because we supply the lion's share of that 155. Likewise, the air defense interceptors, sir. Russia launches very large scale attacks every few days, keeping with their production rate what we believe their production rate to be. They produce, they save up, they launch a big attack. Those attacks would absolutely cripple the economy and the civil society as well as the military of Ukraine if they were not defended against. Without US provision of interceptors, that will happen. And in closed session, Congressman, I'd be delighted to talk to you about the exact consumption rates and exactly how long I would predict things could go on without a supplemental. I think it's extremely important that in an open session, we fully understand the critical situation and the time frames associated with it. To the extent that you can describe it. You've already described it as an existential dire threat without the United States munitions. 155s and air defense plow that field another time. If you want to restate it, restate it. It's absolutely critical that this Congress and the American public understand the situation. So say it again if you need to and Ms. Wallander, if you would also chime in here from your perspective. Just two points to reinforce this. We are already seeing the effects of the failure to pass the supplemental. The Ukrainians are having to use less artillery. They're having, the Russians have made some advances and they're having to decide what to defend and that's why the Russian attacks are getting through and really harming the Ukrainian electricity grid. So we don't need to imagine, we're already seeing it. General. So the Ukrainians have been husbanding their shells in anticipation of the supply running out congressmen. They have been rationing them. They are now being outshot by the Russian side five to one. So Russians fire five times as many artillery shells at the Ukrainians than the Ukrainians are able to fire back. That will immediately go to 10 to one in a matter of weeks. We're not talking about months. We're not talking hypothetically. Again, I'd like to be detailed in closed session but we're talking about weeks congressmen. Thank you for the opportunity to underline that. I do not see how they can win. Chair now recognize the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon. Thank you both for being here. Appreciate your testimony. I was just meeting with Israeli families of hostages so I may duplicate some of the questions but first thing I'd like to know if Russians prevailed in Ukraine, what's the likely outcome from Moldova? Well, Russia already occupies Moldovan territory. It uses that military occupation to subvert Moldova's democracy and its economy. Corruption is rampant because of that Russian influence and Moldova is very much in Russian policy, unfinished business. They've been limited by being able to control more territory because Moldova, because Ukraine stands between Moldova and Russia but Moldova ranks high as part of Putin's unfinished business. It stands to reason if Ukraine falls, Moldova will be next. Also, Russian leaders have been threatening the Estonia Prime Minister, the Latvian Prime Minister fact a leader and the Kremlin called them fake states. How much threat will the Baltics be under if Ukraine falls? Again, Russian nationalists and Putin themselves are very public and clear that they believe that the status of the Baltic states as former elements of the Russian Empire remains unresolved and that is business that they intend to get to. I do believe that NATO's Article V commitment is strong and credible and we need to keep it so, but we also need to make sure that Russia's operations in Ukraine are a failure. But what we're saying here is this is not, this war with Ukraine, by the way, just on its own merits is barbaric. Russia's invading a country that was independent, wanted to go towards the West, wanted to go to free markets, was an unprovoked invasion by Russia, so it's banned in its own right. But this war with Ukraine is not just about Ukraine, would you agree? I absolutely agree with you, sir. Well, thank you. I am the Baltic security chair. I'd like to maybe ask General Cavoli if you could talk a little bit about what we're doing there. I know we're trying to get better air defenses, we're trying to get more a division equivalent there, but could you give us an update on how we're doing because I think it's very much in our national security interest I have a deterrence in the Baltics. First of all, Congressman, I agree with you on that last point, absolutely. I think our ability to help deter conflict in the Baltics is extremely important. It is a vulnerable part, geographically speaking, military geography of the Alliance. I would also point out that Dr. Wallander's comments about Russia's intentions, which reflected yours, those are shared by the leaders of those countries and they field them acutely and talk to me about them frequently and I agree with their concerns. So Congress has been very generous and provided for a Baltic initiative, security initiative. Let's point out our initiative, which I brag on it. We're about 1.4 billion into that right now. We have started with air and missile defense improvements. We've completed the sensor network and now we're moving into effectors or the shooters. I think it's having a big effect there. In parallel, we've got the plans in place for the other five components, which include land forces, medical forces and the other things you're aware of, sir. It's going very well. I mean, we have eager, eager partners there, right? The three Baltic countries in and of themselves just individually are very serious about their defense and have done extraordinary things to prepare. Different things in some cases, but extraordinary. In the case of Latvia, they've reintroduced conscription, for example, which is not something we would have been thinking about some years ago. In addition to the Baltic security initiative, we're doing a few other things. As the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, I'm responsible to put together a plan for rotational air and missile defense. One of the primary locations for those rotations is gonna be in the Baltic countries. And then we have bilateral agreements that have been made between our secretary and the ministers of all three countries. So as the US European commander, I maintain forces in each of those countries. They work to improve our interoperability and stiffen the defense capabilities. I don't have really time for another question, but I have to make a comment. So I'm afraid to chew on. I support having armored units in Poland and Eastern Europe, but being at the rotational, it's been a huge strain on the families. And we saw a report that suicide rates for folks in these armored units are significantly higher than the rest of the army. I think they need some kind of stability, maybe permanency there. We don't have time for you to answer, but this is a huge concern for many of us. Thank you, I yield. Yeah, and I would echo that. I would like to have more discussion with you, General, about exactly that point. But anyway, we'll recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli, you termed this as extremely serious. You said that the severity of this moment, this moment can't be overstated. And I've heard political deflection here in this committee today, and I hear it outside of this committee room on the floor. I hear it in all kinds of news reports. Deflection, deflection that mentioning President Biden that two or three years ago, maybe he should have done more. Deflection, that there's no policy in spite of the fact that Dr. Wallander just concisely laid out our policy very clearly. Deflection that Europe's not doing enough, and why should we do anything if they're not doing enough when we know that the GDP of European countries is greater than ours committed to this. We know that a new NATO country like Finland is committed to 10 years of their fight against Ukraine. We know even that historically Germany, for the first time since World War II, was deploying troops right in Lithuania, something that you wouldn't believe was possible even a year ago to put a line of defense up against Russia's aggression. And we've heard the name Biden again and Biden again, yet we're here right now in this Congress with our responsibility, and one person is holding this up. One person is holding up a huge bipartisan supported package in the Senate, supported by the president and the administration, supported by the majority of people in this committee across the aisle, and I think there aren't close to 300 members on the floor. One person, but I have never heard the name Speaker Johnson invoked once. Not once. The person that's holding this up, not once. And I hope through in the community that we'll hear that name because he is holding this up. And we need action right now, which you've made very clearly. One thing I wanna extend is the idea that China is looking. China is doing more than looking right now. Chinese have entered an agreement with Hungary led by President Orban, who the former president praises and emulates, into an agreement to allowing Chinese police to patrol the streets of Hungary, a NATO country. China's helped rebuild Russia's defense industrially and economically and militarily has helped them in this war providing non-lethal assistance in drones and computer chips and increased imports and Russian goods by 12% last year. China's no limit partnership has been parroting Russian disinformation about Ukraine. And several European ports have been entered into agreements with China's National Transportation Logistics public information platform where they present a risk, I believe, to U.S. and NATO allies that use these European ports to ship military equipment throughout the region. So all these things are real and we do nothing here in Congress. When we can do the one thing that'd be the most important thing at this moment that's so serious. Just wanna comment for those two that don't recognize the threat to the rest of Europe in terms of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. And that's the fact that just a few weeks ago, Belarus began military exercises on its border. Belarus, the ally of Russia in this, the proxy of Russia in this, they began military exercise on the border not just with Ukraine but with Lithuania and Poland. So I'd ask about the significance of this and to emphasize once again what the threat is to the rest of Europe here, including with this recent military exercise to NATO countries where we have an Article 5 commitment, a commitment that Europe and the rest of our allies came to our call after 9-11 to do everything we can, including deploying troops in the ground, U.S. troops on the ground, if you could. Thank you, Congressman. Yeah, so if Belarus is an extension of Russia and its military is an extension of the Russian military, that closes the gap between the Russian armed forces and NATO and that presents additional problems in terms of time, space, and strictly military terms. Our allies there realize that, our allies when faced with the weaponization of emigration last a couple of years, both state-sponsored pushes of migrants across the border into Poland and Lithuania, both responded by fortifying the border and closing the border with Belarus. So relations with Belarus are going in the wrong direction and it's because of Russia and it does have military complications and beyond that, perhaps Dr. Wallender has something to say. Thank you very much. I yield back. Mr. Moreland, you're recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General, for your leadership and working with our NATO allies. It's a lot of coordination to do, but obviously you're asking us to continue to support, which I absolutely do. Our allies, of course, are important in our future battles as well. And General, my first question regards just that and NATO's responsibility and what they're able to do for future battles, specifically as we look at Guam, Hawaii and other U.S. Pacific Island territories who are not covered under Article 5 of the NATO chapter, meaning if these jurisdictions were attacked, NATO allies would not be obligated to defend the United States. Now, while many countries have vowed, they vowed to defend the U.S. in the Pacific, what assurance can your comm give to my constituents in Guam regarding the relationship to NATO? Thanks, Congressman. First, a little bit about the coverage of the North Atlantic Treaty or the Washington Treaty, as it were. Article 6 lays out what the boundaries are that were agreed at the time and have been routinely updated over the years. It's north of the Tropic of Cancer is the first thing. That excludes French possessions in Polynesia, like French Polynesia. It excludes British possessions such as the Pitcairn Islands and it technically excludes Guam. However, that is changeable. It is amendable. All nations to include the United States have elected not to amend that over the years and opportunities have come up. So as a highly technical matter, that's correct. However, any nation under Article 4, any nation that's attacked any place can always invoke consultations under Article 4. Say, I have been attacked and I expect the rest of you to do something about it. And they may or may not choose to apply Article 5 no matter what the treaty says. So it is a technicality. Is it a technicality that's within our hands to amend? But I also think it's an extremely unlikely scenario and I know that our allies are committed to our defense just as we are there, sir. Thank you, General. It's very worth assuring and appreciate that. My final question is the future battlefields will present some unique challenges in the form of great distance in air and sea. On 2021, we're Admiral Duke Hines, chief logistic for URCOM, stated the contest environment demands swift adaptability and flexibility to develop new ways to address challenges. One of those challenges will be the medical evacuation of our service members. General, given the different environments and climates and geographic combatant commands, has there been talks of best practices for the most effective medical evaluation plans that will result in the continued tactical, operational and strategic advantages for our various commands and combatant commanders? Yeah, absolutely, Congressman. It's something we work on quite a bit. We work on it even harder now because of what we're observing in Ukraine, right? The casualty rates are just enormous. And if you contemplate a large scale war across the European continent, we can expect them to be greater. So medical evacuation and casualty evacuation inside the European theater would necessarily and inevitably include civilian infrastructure. And we have coordination cells in NATO that help us do that. And Duke Hines also was responsible for making sure that as US European command, we were plugged into that system. It is complicated because each country has its own national health system. Some don't have national health systems. So there's quite a patchwork to be put together. At the tactical level, I think getting a casualty off the battlefield is something we're entirely capable of doing. The further processing of casualties beyond that is where it would become complicated. The second point I would make on this has to do with the Defense Health Agency and the transition to a new health care system. The health care system, the military health care system in the European theater, and I believe Long Aquilino feels this way in the Pacific as well, is actually an inherent part of our combat capability. And so we've been lucky to be able to be sort of last in line for some of the transition there. And the final thing I'd say is I am concerned about this. One of the only things I offered as an unfunded priority back to the Congress this year, sir, was the construction of an aeromedical evacuation facility at Rammstein. Thank you for the opportunity, sir. I appreciate that. Thank you for your leadership and protecting our nation. Thank you. You're now recognized as a general lady from Michigan, Miss Slotkin. Thank you, Chairman. And I want to appreciate our chairman and ranking member for their bipartisan support for aid. We do need to get it over the finish line and supporting it here in committee and supporting it out in the world is great, but we need to get it on the floor. We've heard this repeatedly. Speaker Johnson has a choice to make. I accept that it's a complicated choice. I accept that he's at risk of losing his job over that choice. But that's what leadership is. It's the big boy pants and making tough choices. I also want to note that there's a discharge petition right now on the floor of the House. It's the exact bipartisan bill that the Senate passed that includes Ukraine aid. We have one Republican who signed it on his way out the door. We need, I think, two more in order to have a vote that will pass on the House floor. So we're not without action here or without actions that we can take to move this forward, even members of this committee. You've spoken eloquently about the consequences of not providing aid about what Putin will do or what he's proven to do. I mean, what he's demonstrated he will do. You've talked about how China is watching and the demonstration this is setting. To my knowledge, unless someone corrects me, the United States of America has never allowed a sitting democracy to be taken over by a sitting autocracy since World War II. Correct me if I'm wrong. So this would be precedent-sending and Ronald Reagan is right now spinning in his grave that we are giving up or threatening to give up on peace through strength. And I am super confused by the messages coming out of some of the members of the other side of the aisle, both here and in the Senate about how Vladimir Putin should get a choice on who gets in NATO, that somehow he has a veto over our alliances. And maybe that logic would make sense if we thought that it would prevent him from invading other countries. If a deal with him would prevent, but he's gone into Moldova and Georgia and Ukraine and Ukraine again. So like, he's done it people. There is no deterring him unless we take a strong stand and that includes USAID. I saw a report in the Washington Post yesterday that made my breath vacate my body, that while we're complaining about how the rise of Iranian weapons are being used by the Russians in Ukraine, that out of desperation the United States of America is now sending seized Iranian weapons from the Houthis from Yemen area to Ukraine. Please give me the details on that and help us understand just the depths of our desperation, I guess, A.S.D. Wallander. Well, I can talk more about the details of provisions of specific capabilities to Ukraine, but we have used every opportunity to find ways since December to find extra stocks to work with allies and partners. And we have had to get quite creative and the Ukrainians have made good use of that while we wait for a decision on the supplemental. I just, I think, again, if Ronald Reagan was spinning at our hesitance and providing arms to Ukraine, he is, I don't know what, exploding. If you would see that seized Iranian weapons are now helping a partner, you know, stave off further invasion of their country. Can you outline for us what you think additional air defenses could do? Or basically, can you outline what you think would be the next things that we would want to provide in terms of not quantity but quality to the Ukrainians that might have a decisive impact? We have lots of questions about air defenses, but can you walk me through certain systems that in this next tranche that would be decisive? So thank you for the question because I wanna highlight something that often gets missed which is the supplemental would include not just PDA, urgent, the capability we can deliver next week as fast as UCOM can move it, but putting on contract things like patriot systems, missiles for, replenishment missiles for NASAMs, replenishment missiles for patriots. And those are long lead times, but the sooner we can put them on contract, the sooner we can get them to Ukraine so Russia knows that they can't wait us out, that Ukraine will continue to be able to defend itself. I'll turn to General Cavoli to speak about priorities, but I think those are the stakes as well. Thank you. In addition to that, it's the monies that provide the demand signal that creates investment in the defense industrial base and that's one of our big challenges, getting our wartime production up, congressman. Generally, these times expire. Chair, now recognized gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Banks. Dr. Wallander, DOD admitted last month that it underestimated the cost of replacing American weapons we've sent to Ukraine leaving a $10 billion hole in our own stockpiles. The day after announcing that it was overdrawn, the DOD took $300 million that it found and immediately sent it to Ukraine. Why didn't that money go to filling the $10 billion hole in our own stocks? Congressman, I apologize. I believe what we did was we figure, we assessed that we had overvalued the value of the stocks that were given to Ukraine and that was what created, we hadn't used as much PDA authority as we had originally estimated. So the reference you've made to that particular package was that there had been an overvaluation of what the material in stocks were, so it gave us more headroom to be able to provide capabilities to Ukraine. What does that mean? The mysteriously finding the $300 million, you say overestimating, we unpack that more, what does that mean? How does that happen? Yes, sir. The procedures for PDA is you're supposed to value it at the value of the existing stock, not the replacement value. The replenishment value is absolutely key as you note and the replenishment money in the supplemental is calculated at the cost of replenishing, but in terms of the value of the under the PDA authority, I know it's very technical and mind-blowing, but the value of what we have authority from Congress to give Ukraine is supposed to be set at what the value of the stocks themselves was. Is this unusual? I mean, mind-blowing $300 million seems like that would be very unusual. That was over a period of two years of PDAs, so I can't give you the exact percentage of what that was of the value of the PDA, but I can follow up with you on that. This seems to me like funny math, so we overvalue $300 million, so we send more money to Ukraine. I'm trying to wrap my head around it and I can't. We sent more, not money, we sent more capability, more equipment. Why the emphasis on sending more money to Ukraine over replenishing our own stockpiles? There is not, those go hand in glove. In replenishing our stockpiles, we need the authority and the appropriation from Congress for the replenishment funds, as well as the authority for the PDA drawdown. You seem to be more interested in sending our stockpiles to Ukraine instead of replenishing them here. I'm not trying to make a point, I'm just really confused by it. We find an extra 300 million, and we shovel it to Ukraine. Again, that was the authority, and it is matched by the replenishment money that Congress has provided us, and that we need in order to be able to do more under the supplemental. So after you found this 300 million dollar, as you said, mind-blowing is a great word for it, did you do something to address that moving forward that we're not gonna find another, that the Pentagon's not gonna mysteriously find another 300 million dollars in extra money next year? I mean, how do you account for that moving forward? We do believe that that was a one-time opportunity that we were able to advance because of waiting for the decision on the supplemental. We do not expect that there will be similar findings and savings. So the public is hopefully paying attention to this hearing today, and they hear about the Pentagon. I mean, the media covered this as well. Headlines about 300 million dollars found at the Pentagon. I mean, is that embarrassing to you? I was relieved that we were able to provide capabilities to Ukraine. More money to do more for Ukraine, but the Pentagon is seriously finds 300 million dollars in extra money that we can give to Ukraine. I mean, it's really, is that embarrassing? I was relieved that we were able to find authority to be able to provide Ukraine with some artillery ammunition so that Ukrainian forces don't get overwhelmed on the front lines. Your colleagues said last year that it would be bad to send 650 million dollars of U.S. weapons to Taiwan without cash to replace them. Do you think it's dangerous to send Ukraine four billion dollars in weaponry without the funding? We would not send capabilities to Ukraine were it not for Congress passing appropriations for replenishment? I gotta say, I mean, I lose trust in you and the Pentagon when incredibly mind-blowing, 300 million dollars is found and sent to Ukraine rather than replenishing our own stockpiles. It's really bizarre. I yield back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Bolton for five minutes. Dr. Wallinger, I have a question about disinformation. You warn in your written statement that Russia's cyber and disinformation campaigns continue to threaten Euro-Atlantic security. We know that Russia has interfered in U.S. elections since at least 2016 and it's likely that Putin will ramp up disinformation campaigns as we move towards November's presidential election. Is Russia's disinformation machine trying to undermine U.S. support for Ukraine? Russia's disinformation machine is working not just in the United States to undermine support but throughout Europe and indeed globally and it is being magnified and picked up by disinformation operations in places like advanced by China as well. Is Russia's disinformation machine trying to undermine U.S. support for NATO? Russia's disinformation machine has been ramped up to undermine support for NATO to try to raise doubts in Europe and in the United States about the value of the alliance to American security. So would you say that when Republicans echo these sentiments trying to undermine support for Ukraine, trying to undermine support for NATO, they're essentially echoing Russian propaganda? I think it is extremely important to make sure that the American people know when they are being influenced by Russian disinformation and exposing that disinformation is something that we work on in the interagency, not just DOD, but we work with state and with other agencies of the U.S. government so Americans understand very clearly where that disinformation is coming from. Well, the Kremlin has made it very clear in a recently released trove of documents that they know exactly what they're doing in trying to get Republicans to support their cause. I'm also concerned about China's increasing willingness to conduct disinformation and electoral interference campaigns against the U.S. General Cavoli, how is China coordinating with Russia to spread disinformation throughout the U.S. and Europe? Congressman, China coordinates both in general terms that is sort of echoing and sort of spontaneously echoing. They echo each other's messages in that regard and we also believe that there's some specific coordination and closed session. I think we could discuss the specifics of that, but your general point I think is absolutely correct. This is a concerted effort and it's not a single nation doing it. Well, I mean, just I want to be clear so everyone understands, Russia has a clear policy of trying to get conservative elements in the United States to trumpet their propaganda and they're coordinating with China on this propaganda. So some members of Congress are becoming mouthpieces for Russian and essentially Chinese propaganda in the United States. I want to turn to a few lessons learned from Ukraine. The conflict is providing an important insight into ways that electronic warfare and drones are used on the battlefield and obviously we have to learn from these examples. I mean, we've seen $5,000 drones take out $5 million tanks with ease. So General Cavoli, what are some of the lessons that DOD is learning from the use and counteruse of drones and electronic warfare in Ukraine and how are we quickly adopting those lessons for our own troops? The Department of Defense and the services individually are very closely studying what's going on in Ukraine through a variety of overt and not overt means, Congressman. We're studying it very closely at a technical level as well as at a tactical level. Drones do seem to be a feature of this war that is unexpectedly significant. I personally think that it's, we have to be a little bit careful over drawing conclusions about it. Many of the drones involved are not very destructive, especially the small commercially available ones or homemade types. And we don't yet see them being able to, drones being able to replace concentrated artillery fire, for example. But it's a great supplement to what's going on. With regard to electronic warfare, a lot of it we're familiar with. We've waged electronic warfare in the past and we know how to defend against it, but the quantity of it and the ubiquity of it across the battlefield is important. And we're working on a lot of technical solutions, Congressman. So General, if I go and visit some of your troops training in the field, are they gonna be training in an environment with a lot of drones and a lot of electronic warfare or are they gonna have a few token drones flying around? Yes, I think throughout the Army right now, especially in the Marine Corps, the ground forces, you would find a great deal of experimentation as well as rapid fielding of small drones across the force. Both electronic warfare and drones are difficult to train with because of civil restrictions in airspace and things like that and spectrum management, but we managed to and we're very enthusiastic about it. Gentlemen's times expired. Chair now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Walts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanna talk today about NATO contributions to its own defense. And you both stated in your opening statements, kind of patent ourselves on the back that we're going from the pathetic number of 11 out of 30, 31 member nations contributing its bare minimum of 2% to its national defense that, wow, we're going to 20 now and we're on the right path. I think, frankly, that is the tyranny of low expectations and it has infected our national security apparatus for many, many decades, including the many years that our European, look, we can be friends and allies and have tough conversations, but if we don't start imposing real consequences and we don't start using the leverage we have, we literally cannot afford to subsidize European defense. Any longer and what we often talk about, I mean, we're talking about the frontline European nations, they're contributing, the Baltics, Poland, but when we're talking about France, when we're talking about Germany, when we're talking about Spain, when we're talking about Italy, they're not and all of those heads of state will be here in Washington for the Washington Summit this summer. Dr. Wallander, how are we as a matter of policy going to go from 11 to 31 contributing the minimum, the bare minimum? Not half, not a third, because we're continuously and you're asking us to go to the American people again and again and we'll be having this same conversation at this posture hearing, Mr. Chairman, next year, American people dig deeper in your pockets because European politicians can't and won't get their people to dig deeper in their pockets, a good deal for them, it's a bad deal for the American people. This is pathetic, half. Half is what we're congratulating ourselves for. Do you think that's a good deal for the American people, Dr. Wallander? No, I fully agree with you, it should be 32 and we press and work. What is the administration's plan aside from asking to get them to do it? So the plan has already yielded improvement and we can share with you the updated numbers. There are, as of today, 18 NATO allies who meet 2%, which is 14 to few. We expect several more by the time of the summit to announce publicly that they have met 2% and we expect several other allies to have met 2% or that they're on some kind of future. That they have reached 2%, we expect the number to be larger by the summit. We have Chancellor Schultz in his famous speech in 2022, just after the invasion, promised to enshrine the 2% in law, the German Chancellor, he did not. In fact, they voted it down in their parliament. Italian Prime Minister Maloney promised in 2023 Italian defense spending would increase, saying, quote, freedom has a price. Italian defense spending is actually declining. Spanish Prime Minister promises by 2029, 2%, it'd have to double its defense budget, it's not. Well, you know who is doubling their defense budget in relation to the threat? Japan is, their prime minister is here. They're living up to their shared burden commitment. The European nations are not. Mr. Chairman, it's not only the defense spending, what they are giving is in horrible condition. I'd like to enter into the record, Ukraine rejects German leopard tanks due to their poor condition. Without objection. In this article by Reuters, the tanks currently stranded in Poland constitute the second part of a large-scale supply of German leopard tanks. By the way, these are the ones that they leveraged to give us to contribute ours. The tanks were retired from active service more than a decade ago. So, our European allies are under giving. What they are giving is often late. What you see in the charts are often commitments and promises. We saw that in Afghanistan for years. And then what they are giving late and too few is often in poor condition. Dr. Wallander, how are we going to get to 32? Will you commit to get us to 32 within the next three years? Is that possible? We will commit to work with those allies who have not met their commitment, their required commitment that they agreed to at Vilnius and get to 32 one by one. Gentleman's time's expired, although he makes an outstanding point. A gentle lady from New Jersey, Ms. Cheryl, is recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And it's really, I think, as we've heard today, necessary that we get a vote on the floor of the bipartisan supplemental. We have been waiting now for far too long and every day that we wait Ukraine suffers and those fighting for Ukraine suffer. And it's estimated that since Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine, our allies and partners have actually committed around $44.3 billion to direct security assistance to Ukraine. In fact, as a percentage of GDP, the United States only ranks at 16 among all of the countries in NATO. So our NATO allies have also made significant plans and commitments to improve the alliance's collective defense and deterrence through defense spending improved capabilities and nested strategies. So we see many are in fact doing their part for the collective security of NATO and ensuring Ukraine maintains their right of self-determination. But Ukraine's running low on ammunition for essential artillery air defense systems and all while Russia's receiving shells from North Korea and Iran. So the speaker has got to bring this vote to the floor. Time is of the essence, has been of the essence and we must pass the supplemental. It is time for him to show true leadership despite his own political concerns and to really stop playing politics with this and start ensuring that Ukraine can effectively fight because our allies and partners have stepped up in the absence of US support but the United States is failing as a leader of the free world and a vanguard of democracies worldwide and our adversaries around the world are taking note. So Dr. Wallander, can you share your assessment of what the inaction of this legislative body will mean? Not only for the survival of Ukraine but also the dangerous precedent that this would set for the status of the United States as a leader for democracy to our allies, partners, potential partners and importantly to our adversaries. Thank you Congresswoman. We are very, we are viewed with and greatly positively by Europeans for our leadership in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. But unfortunately the fact that we have been unable to provide capabilities to Ukraine since December when the previous supplemental funds were used up has created a challenge in our leadership of that group. Fortunately Europe has stepped up in the four months since we have been unable to provide capabilities and have announced billions of dollars of additional security assistance. That's not enough as General Cavoli has made clear but we have worked with Europeans and they have stopped gapped us. However, they've stopped gapped us in the anticipation that we will get that supplemental and we will get that capability for all the reasons that General Cavoli pointed out. They are unable to provide especially the ammunition, the artillery ammunition and the air defense interceptors that Ukraine requires. So we need to be able to do our part because we haven't been doing our part in this collective support of European security through supporting Ukraine. Thank you in general Cavoli, can you share your assessment of Ukraine's ability to defend their territory and airspace without this vital US security assistance? Sure Congresswoman. Their ability to defend their terrain that they currently hold and their airspace would fade rapidly, will fade rapidly without the supplemental, without continued US support and it will continue to fade until such time as somebody else is able to provide those munitions to the Ukrainians as Dr. Wallander just pointed out. That production level is not in sight right now. We think it's at least months away and that is why this is such an important time right now. That's why this is such an important time. Thank you and I have to say personally to see members of the Ukrainian military in my district seeking medical help who have lost their legs, who have lost their eyesight, who have been on the battlefield for hours and lost a leg because they simply didn't have an armored vehicle to come pick them up is devastating and to think that as a foreign adversary to the United States of America attacks a democracy that we might stand in the wings and not fully support this is offensive, offensive to this nation's traditional support for democracy around the world. Thank you. I yield back. General Levy yields back. Chair now recognize General Levy from Michigan, Ms. McLean. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And I would agree with my colleague that we need to stop playing politics. And I would agree with you Dr. Wallander but maybe not in the same perspective as you say. We haven't been doing our part. I take a little bit of offense to that. I wanna talk about this article. U.S. urges Ukraine to stop attacking Russian oil refineries, the report says. In this piece the U.S. government sources are said to be concerned with Ukraine targeting of Russian oil production facilities. Listen to this because it could drive up gas prices. I quote, ahead of a knife edge presidential election where prices at the gas pump are bound to be a contentious topic. This report seems to show that while the White House has incessantly demanded Congress pass additional Ukrainian funding, they are tying the hands of the Ukrainians for political purposes. And I agree we need to stop playing politics. If the president truly cared about defeating Russia he would be acting as a leader and not as a political hack worried about his next election. Mr. Chairman, this president has shown time and time again that politics are more important than our own national security. He is now giving Russia the green light to continue to destroy Ukraine. Six months ago this president said October 10th in his October 10th speech, he said we stand with Israel and we will make sure Israel has what it needs to take care of its citizens and defend itself. Now the president has been threatening Israel if they don't stop defending themselves. On Iran the president has chosen to side with their Iranian regime over all of our allies in the region. This decision has made the Middle East less safe but American service members at risk. And given the regime room to provide deadly drones and munitions to Russia for their war in Ukraine. Again, the same war this president is demanding Congress provide more American tax dollars to, right? I take offense that we haven't done our part. Our southern border, the president chooses to play politics with our nation's security by opening the floodgates to illegal immigrants simply because President Trump had the border secured. I wanna remind my colleagues what President Obama's Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said about the then Vice President Biden in 2014. I quote, I think he's been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades. A well-respected Secretary of Defense, a man who has held in high regards on members on both sides of the aisle, has said our president is always wrong when it comes to our national security. Mr. Chairman, I think it is imperative that this committee investigate whether President Biden is playing politics with the lives of Ukrainians and our NATO allies and the rest of this, the rest of the Western world. I ask unanimous consent to include the article in the record. Without objection, so ordered. And with that, I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Walton. Dr. Walton, we have statistics here that our allies have contributed 44 billion in direct security assistance to Ukraine. And we've talked about the accounting differences in the Pentagon that have yielded 6 billion, 300 billion. What's the common accounting standard? Does NATO have a common accounting standard for how it's valuing its assistance? NATO does not have a, NATO doesn't organize or advance that security assistance. So it's conceivable that it could be overvalued as our equipment contributions were overvalued? Values provided by the countries providing the value of the equipment. So they could be using, I mean, we've got, what, 30 different countries. They could be using 30 different standards. I cannot speak to their national standards. These are democracies. But we're, we're, you just, you stated on the record in front of the American people, they're doing their fair share. We have figures saying they've contributed 44 billion. But you don't know how they're coming up to that 44 billion? Those are the figures that they report to their parliaments. So they're grading their own homework. Fair? Yes, those are our allies. And when they report numbers, we take them seriously. We just take it a face value. We take them seriously. Mr. Chairman, I think we should look at legislation to understand what our allies are actually contributing is a replacement value. Is it new value? Is it some value that they've valued because they think it's valuable? We just, maybe they want to appear to be doing more than they are. I think this is a serious issue. And I find it concerning, Dr. Walander, we don't have a common standard for a number that we're putting out to the American people. Jim's time has expired. Here I recognize Jenley from Texas, Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I'd like to thank our witnesses. Thank you for your service to our country. We are definitely in living through very precarious times. And it is disheartening to see politics coming from this dais and this committee at a time when we really need to be united around our common goals and united for our common vision for the globe. One of the areas of great concern that I keep hearing about on cable TV and coming from members of Congress is, and I heard it today from the dais from one of our colleagues that we are in effect sending bags of cash to Ukraine, that it is Congress that is being asked to approve money for Ukraine when in fact the truth is we are approving funding to replenish stocks and munitions. I think it's really important for the American people to understand what supplemental funding goes to specifically. Not specifically in enumerating everything that it is funding, but can you please explain to the American people what the supplemental funding request from the president would fund for Ukraine? Dr. Wolner. Thank you, Congresswoman. So there are three buckets to understand. First is presidential drawdown authority and the associated replenishment appropriation to replenish U.S. stocks. The authority allows for pulling capabilities from U.S. stocks based on an assessment that readiness requirements are maintained and then the contracts are made to replenish the stocks for the American military forces to be able therefore to move on to new production, new capabilities in many cases more modern new advanced versions of existing stocks. The second is Ukraine. And who is building, I'm sorry, I don't mean to interrupt, but I think this is an important point. Who is building the replenishment of the stocks? Who, that money goes to American defense contractors to supply the American military with the most up-to-date capable requirements that the combatant commanders have identified in need in their stocks. So that funding is being invested in American jobs, American companies. Across 40 states of the United States. Thank you. And then the second bucket, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative is direct procurement from defense, American defense industrial companies in those 40 states. So going for paying for contracts and capabilities that then on a longer term are delivered to Ukraine for building that future force for defense and deterrence. But again, that is not money that goes to Ukraine. That is money that goes to American defense contractors to American workers in those companies. All that money stays in the American economy. And the third bucket goes to support UCOM, its operations, its presence, its activities in support of Ukraine. So they learn how to use that equipment. So they're trained, so they know how to repair it so that they are able to field it and also to support all the work that General Cavoli's team is doing in support of Ukraine. Thank you so much. I think it is so important every time a member of Congress talks about sending money to Ukraine and uses that term. I think it's so important that we remind the American public where that money is actually going to, the jobs it creates in our own country, in our own states. Otherwise, this is part of, I'm concerned, it's part of the Russian disinformation effort to mislead the American public about that funding. Very, very quickly, the house has been frozen for months on this request. It's up to one man, the speaker of the house, or colleagues on the Republican side who will sign a discharge petition. Only 30 seconds left. If we were to approve that supplemental request in the next week or two, how quickly would help get to Ukraine? We would be able to, with UCOM support and TransCOM support, begin immediately within a week or two to provide the ammunition, the artillery ammunition, to provide interceptors to Ukraine. And I think it's important to underscore today the Ukrainian defense is being outshot five to one. That will change pretty quickly if the house remains frozen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Generality yields back. Chairman, I recognize as the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mills, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, my colleagues have said a lot, and I just wanna kinda make sure that we're referencing those comments. You know, a few of them said that all we need is a little democracy. Well, I wish that there was significantly important a vote by the Senate and Chuck Schumer to bring HR to secure the border act when we got hundreds of thousands of Americans who are dying, fentanyl overdoses, child and human sex trafficking, not to mention 178-plus countries that are crossing our border and over 400-plus known individuals on terrorist watch lists that are coming across, but oh, wait, that's not the priority, let's secure Ukraine's borders. You know, it's just politics as usual. I wanna also go back to something one of my colleagues had talked about, which is in 1947, NATO was created for the ideas of stopping Soviet Union expansionism. And the idea was that we were so in fear of the idea that Soviet Union would continue its encroachment, and yet the countries that are most at risk of this, Germany, France, Italy, others, for how many years wouldn't even pay 2% of their actual dues? And America's left holding a bag at 3.47% in addition to the 114-plus billion dollars that's already been allocated. With Ukraine, who on multiple occasions hasn't presented a military strategic plan that would show how they win this war or even what is the definition of what winning the war means. And so I have a big difficult problem with this, not to mention the fact that the EU member states under David O'Sullivan, the EU sanctions chief, has admitted that they have frozen assets from Russia exceeding 206 billion dollars, US 190 billion euro, that they now are netting profits on at three and a half billion dollars that should be utilized if they're so concerned with a lack of ammunition. You know, this premise that we're gonna go ahead and spend this 60 billion dollars in America and that's somehow gonna be great for the industrial base, they're still looking at the ideas that you're adding money in that we don't have which increase our inflation. And one of the things that we just talked about, Dr. Wallander, you said that Russia's inflation is 13%, is that correct? That is, yes. Can you tell me what America's is? No, I cannot. Would you want to take an, like just a shot at the dark at what you think America's inflation that? I prefer not to guess. Yeah, try about 20 plus percent and try 34 trillion dollars, almost 18% plus 2% reduction in minimum wage. So we can go ahead and put those figures together, not to mention, roughly 27% increase in fuel costs, costs of good allowances. Yeah, inflation is one of those things that we admit is bad for Russia and also bad for America. You also made a comment recently when you said that we have concerns on hitting civilian targets with oil terminals. Was that the same concerns that we had in the 2003 Iraq war when we were bombing oil terminals and we were hitting areas there? That is the concern in our discussions with Ukraine. Was that our concern when we were at war in Iraq? I do not know, sir. I was not in the US government at that time. I was, because I was actually deployed to that war, as well as for the additional seven years in Iraq, three years in Afghanistan, the coast of Pakistan, North Somalia, blown up twice in 06, all to do what? To play interventionism? To play neocon, neo-lib ideas that we don't understand the evolution of warfare is beyond kinetics and now into the ideas of resource economic supply chain and non-kinetic influence operations that have been not only vastly more successful, but also safer and not costly to the American people. You know, next year at 34 plus trillion dollars, we're gonna spend more in interest payments than the entire budget for our national defense annually. We need to start thinking about three priorities for a change, America, Americans, and American interest. And if we're talking about building coalitions for allies, then we need to be putting the pressure that President Trump put on our NATO allies to say you need to be paying 2% of your GDP, which we agree now needs to be even more than that when you're looking at Russia's increase to 6%. But instead, we're continuing to play politics. Let's bring this vote to the floor, even though it's not a bill which has all the necessary things and hasn't addressed the corruption, hasn't addressed the failure for 100% audit on Ukraine funding, hasn't addressed what does success look like for Ukraine. And this idea that whatever happens in Ukraine is somehow gonna happen in Taiwan. It's a false premise. It's the same idea as the George W. Bush model of we can fight him over there, we can fight him here. Well, guess what? Our borders are open and we're allowing him to come in not to mention this great successful airlift operation of the 2021 botched withdrawal in Afghanistan that actually brought over 73% of the people on that aircraft that wasn't vetted, didn't have biometrics, wasn't SIVs. It's funny how we cherry pick what is beneficial, but we don't address the facts. I put America first and I'm gonna continue to put America first without a yield back. Gentlemen yields back. Chair and I recognize the general lady from Virginia, Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Dr. Wildlander and General Cavoli for being here. Russia has sought to use irregular warfare and cyber weapons to bolster its aggressions in Ukraine and so division and undermined democracy among our European allies and some would argue here. How is UCOM working to address this particular threat and what do you need from Congress to support those efforts? Thank you, Congresswoman. UCOM has a very active strategic messaging apparatus. We have teams that analyze news and spot disinformation and then we get the truth to usually a country's public affairs apparatus and they promulgate the real story. A very simple example would be if we were having an exercise and somebody falsely posted a picture of a bicycle accident and said that an American truck ran over that. We spot that, we get the truth to the country very quickly, they turn it around and put it out. I think more to your point though, we work very closely with nations at both an overt and a secret level to help them analyze the information environment and then to help them combat disinformation and misinformation and we do that country by country under the supervision of the chief of mission in that country, the US chief of mission in that country and we also do that regionally under my authorities and supervision. It's a well-funded program. We could always do more but nevertheless I think it's well-funded by the Congress right now and it's very, very effective, Congressman, thank you. Thank you. With Russia's illegal evasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have now officially joined NATO and drastically increased both the fighting force and defense manufacturing capability of the alliance. How is the United States working to swiftly integrate our new allies into the alliance and how can we here in Congress better facilitate those efforts? Thank you. First of all, NATO is primarily responsible for that integration. NATO has already pulled both of those countries into our regional plans and we had been working with them for some months to prepare to do that so that's going very quickly. As you're well aware, Congressman, those both of those countries have very advanced and sophisticated militaries that have a long operational history with the forces in NATO so their interoperability is already sky high so it's a very, very easy pull in that regard. The US proper, US-UCOM, has conducted exercises with them to make sure that our interoperability is high. We have worked with them to gain access to their airspace to conduct intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance flights. Those have proven very successful. It's a real estate that we didn't have too much access to previously and in addition to that, we've made agreements with both countries for the prepositioning of material in those countries. So not only are we helping NATO to integrate them but they are helping us to integrate into places that we were previously unable to. Thank you, ma'am. Thank you. I would just, our part of this at DOD is to support the policies required to enable General Cavoli to advance all the exercises, the capabilities, the diplomatic relationships and I would just say that Finland and Sweden will at the heads of state and government at the summit be fully part of all the decisions on NATO's futures and the obligations and responsibilities of all the allies going forward. Thank you and I don't know if you'll fully have time to answer the next one. So if not, maybe if you could submit it for the record. But with Russia pulling out of the New START Treaty which is an incredible blow to the system of nuclear arms non-proliferation that has been a guiding light of the post-Colt War era, what does that decision mean for prospects for future nuclear non-proliferation efforts and how concerned should we be about what this signals concerning Russia's strategic weapons goals? I will submit a full answer. The top lines would be we are very concerned about the signal it sends to the international community that Russia does not respect or live up to its international obligations in the case of nuclear arms treaties as well as the invasion and other instances. So, but I will submit a full answer. And as part of that, if you could discuss the risk of returning to a nuclear arms race, I'd appreciate it. And with that, I yield back. Generally these times expired. Chair, not recognized. Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. In 2014, NATO countries, as we all know, agreed to invest 2% of their GDP on defense. And that was a commitment that wasn't unfortunately followed through with expediency. There were a lot of words and not actions. And particularly, I feel, what's egregious and I think was touched on by Mr. Waltz were some of the larger European nation states. Spain, Canada, Italy, France hovered around 2%. But the greatest, I think, egregious violator was Germany, a fourth largest economy in the world and they weren't stepping up. So I have a two-part question for General Cavulli. Had, let's live in a different world, 2014, that that commitment was met with expediency. And our larger nation states in NATO followed through, the ones I just mentioned, with some timely decisive mission. Could the Ukrainian war have been deterred altogether? Do you think if that happened, General? I'm sorry, Congressman, are you asking, had nations, especially the larger allies, been spending that or above the goal, would that have deterred you? If they had made their commitment with expediency, say in 2015 and 16, and said, you know what, particularly after Crimea, we're gonna spend two and a half, whatever percent, and they followed through with it. And Germany said, we're in a different world now. We're gonna take the lead. And France followed as well. Italy, Spain, Canada. Do you think that Vladimir Putin would have invaded anyway in 2022? Yes, I do. I do not think we were extending mutual or collective defense guarantees to Ukraine at that time. Do you think it would have given some increased pause? Sure it would have. Okay, so it would have been a good thing, but the lack of action certainly encouraged it. If you say you're gonna do something, and then you don't do it, I think it's worse if you hadn't said anything else. You would have better off not saying anything at all. And in NATO in 2014, a lot of our allies said they were gonna do something, they didn't do it. And I think that was a breeding ground for an authoritarian land grab, quite frankly. One other question, General. I notice that when you look at the closer you get to the threat, which is Russia, the more the defense spending tends to go up. In fact, I don't think there's a country, a NATO country, that borders Ukraine or Russia that has not met that 2% commitment. And the further you go away, it seems the less spending you get. Having said that, do you think it makes sense for us to move United States troops closer to the threat? So my question is, should we, in your opinion, make the Eastern European basis permanent? First of all, Congressman, the United States has and is moving forces closer to the Eastern flank. As you're aware, we've got an agreement signed a couple of years ago with Poland before this conflict began in Ukraine, signed with Poland to, Poland provides significant infrastructure and we will rotate forces through there. The additional forces that we surged to Europe during the immediate aftermath of Russia's invasion, those have all gone to the Eastern flank, principally the Baltic countries, again Poland and South Eastern Europe and Romania and Bulgaria. So there is an effort, there's also an effort on the part of nations in the alliance to go farther east. So in the immediate aftermath of the invasion NATO, before I became the Allied Command Operations Commander, took the decision to establish new battle groups on a standing basis. They rotate, but they're permanently there for additional ones, so there's a total of eight. But to design that they all can go up to brigade size at time of need. And a number of nations have elected to go up to brigade size earlier than that. So there is a definite shift eastward in the alliance, sir. Thank you. Dr. Walleter, unfortunately, would you agree that the Western sanctions on Russia haven't worked, economic sanctions? Western sanctions have imposed costs, but they have not stopped Putin. Okay, I think they've unfortunately, I mean unfortunately they've made a dismal failure. I would love to have had them work, but when you've got nations like the Communist Chinese, you got Iran, North Korea, in some ways even India, dealing with Russia, they circumvent us. So we talked a lot about Western European reliance, some call it an addiction to Russian energy. You would be in favor of the United States doing all we can to wean their dependence, our Western European allies are in particular off of Russian energy? Yes, they've taken steps and they can do more and we fully support that and actively work with them. Because we have a lot of natural gas in this country, for instance. The number one customer for LNG is that we export is Europe. So I was perplexed, confused and otherwise befuddled when this administration and President Biden put a whatever you want to call it suspension, stopping pause on our LNG exports. Did you advise him to do that? That is not my area of responsibility. Okay, so would you agree that that was not a wise considering that it was really and essentially a gift to Putin? I cannot speak to that policy. It's outside the scope of DOD. But you're a very intelligent young woman. I think that and you have a DR in front of your name. I do not. Gentlemen's time's expired and she is very intelligent, I agree with you. Gentlemen from Nevada is recognized, Mr. Horsford. Thank you Chairman Rogers and to the ranking member for holding this important hearing. It has been over two years since we saw Russia launch a brutal invasion of Ukraine. But for many Ukrainians, this conflict began a decade ago with Russia's continued occupation of Crimea. It has also been six months since President Biden released a national security supplemental that would reinvigorate the United States defense industrial base, while also providing much needed support for our closest allies and partners. President Biden's supplemental request would provide billions in direct industrial investments in the United States, including over 4 million in my home state of Nevada alone. However, instead of putting this critical bill to a vote, the House majority has stalled and even worse repeated Russian propaganda on the House floor. It was reported this week that US Central Command has sent a stash of Iranian munitions. It captured from Houthi militants to Ukraine. General Kovali, I understand that desperate times call for desperate measures. Can you provide examples on how Ukrainians are continuing to stay in the fight even as support from the United States has lagged? And can you expand on how crucial it is that Congress passed the national security supplemental? Yeah, absolutely Congressman. The first and most clearest and present example is the self rationing of artillery rounds that the Ukrainians are using right now. So they know that they have a limited supply until we are able to begin supporting them again. And in the meantime, they have self restricted the amount of artillery they use. This has significant consequences on the battlefield. Of course, they're already at a five to one deficit in artillery fires as compared to the Russians. And that will obviously increase dramatically in the absence of a supplemental, sir. Thank you. Assistant Secretary Wallander, several of our European allies continue to rely on Chinese made logistics networks, ports and 5G capabilities. I'm concerned that this leaves these countries vulnerable to economic pressure coming from the PRC. How are you assessing the threat of overreliance on Chinese infrastructure in Europe, especially in the telecommunication space? And how can we work with our allies and partners to give them an alternative? Thank you Congressman. Yes, absolutely. Reliance on Chinese provided technology or capabilities and logistics as you note creates a vulnerability among NATO allies, European countries. It undermines their resilience. It creates challenges for them to be able to advance strong policies. Countries like Lithuania, who have taken a very principled stand on China, have fortunately already divested themselves of those dependencies. And we use that as an example when we talk to European countries to show how reducing or even eliminating those kinds of dependencies actually is a security step. Often it's framed as an economic benefit. And what we work with them is to understand the security risk that they undertake when they follow that path. Congressman, it might be useful to note also that US-UCOM designs exercises or aspects of its exercise program specifically to test infrastructure and to flush out problems with its ownership. That gives us the opportunity to do everything from work on the networks, you know, the communications networks and infrastructure as well as the physical infrastructure and the manpower of a port, for instance. And then we work very closely with the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically Dr. Wallander, to address our concerns with countries. It's actually a very successful program, I think, so far. But it is a big task that we're trying to push back on. Great, and in my final time, General, what are the lessons that UCOM has learned about the use of these autonomous capabilities and large-scale combat operations? And has it changed the way we think about the use of unmanned capability specifically? Not completely, not yet. It hasn't changed everything, Congressman. We're watching it very closely because there's clearly something there. But I would note that the principal decisions on the battlefield for both sides are made by legacy systems. It's tanks and it's artillery. All the drones and stuff have not yet produced that. The one area, two areas where I'd say are the most promising, long-range penetration from the air to substitute for ballistic missiles. And what the Ukrainians have done in the Black Sea with unmanned systems is ground-breaking. The gentleman's time has expired. Chair, I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Jimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wallander, let's go back to energy. It takes money to perpetuate, you know, to promulgate a war. What is the leading moneymaker for Russia right now? It is oil exports and natural gas exports primarily to China. OK, so if the United States were to produce more oil and gas and drive down the cost on a worldwide basis, would that affect Russia's ability to perpetuate this war? On the margin it would, but China is a energy-hungry, greedy country and it's willing to pay. It has long-term contracts with Russia and Xi does not want Putin to fail. All right, fair enough. Now, Russia has been targeting Ukraine's energy, right? And sources of energy, et cetera. Is that true? Yes, that is true. Has Ukraine been targeting Russia's energy production? There are public reports that Ukraine has done so. Have we tried to stop them from doing that? The U.S. has raised concerns with Ukraine, which is a sovereign country and can choose its own targets, but raised concerns about targeting civilian critical infrastructure. Well, yeah, but the Russians have no problem in targeting Ukrainian energy production. Now, if the Ukrainians were able to disrupt Russian energy production, would that significantly alter their ability to perpetuate this war? So far, the strikes that we have seen against Russian energy sources have not significantly altered Russia's ability to prosecute the war. That's so far, but if they're actually able to do it successfully, would that alter the economics of this war? I am not an expert on energy infrastructure, but the evidence we've seen is that the Russians have been able to rapidly repair the facilities that were struck. What would happen if we don't support, General, what would happen if we don't support Ukraine and they actually run out of bullets? In my military experience, Congressman, if somebody's shooting at you and you can't shoot back, you lose or you die. Where's Ukraine now in terms of its arms supplies and the ability to fight back? Sir, could I tell you about that in closed session, please? Absolutely, okay, thank you very much. Look, a lot of folks, even on my side of the aisle, somehow equate the lack of the Biden administration securing our border, being a reason why we can't help Ukraine secure their border. The facts are that Ukrainians are spilling their blood to secure their border. And then the fact that our administration does not secure our border shouldn't be the reason why we don't help people that are trying to fight for their freedom. As somebody who came over from a communist country some 60 years ago, somebody who's not a fan of Russia, I think that we need to support the Ukrainians. All they're asking for is our aid. All they're asking for is bullets and armaments. And for the life of me, I just don't understand why we don't support them and we should. Some analysts believe that the F-16 could help Ukraine. Do you share that, General? The F-16 will help. Any aircraft will help congressmen. It's a particularly difficult jump to go from the older Soviet-era stuff, that aircraft that the Ukrainians had been flying especially had been maintaining and supporting. It's tough to go from that to a modern fourth-gen aircraft like the F-16. As you know, we're working on it with them. There's an entire coalition of countries working on it with them. But ultimately, it will be a valuable thing for them to have. I understand that we are actually training them, training them to fly the F-16s and that there are some countries that will be supplying F-16s to Ukraine. Is that true? Both are correct, yes. Why isn't the United States giving them F-16s? We are supporting the provision of F-16s by European countries and the numbers that they are going to provide. Meet the requirements for the Ukrainians at this time. All right, thank you. I yield back. Chair now recognizes General Lady from California, Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And first, I'd like to thank the chair and ranking member for their bipartisan support of the security supplemental. I think it's incredibly important that we get Ukraine the assistance that it needs and also that we make sure that humanitarian assistance in that supplemental package is passed. I was just on the border of Chad and Sudan and saw the Sudanese refugees whose food is running out because we haven't yet passed that humanitarian assistance. General Cavoli, I want to ask you, in the operation Atlantic Resolve quarterly report to Congress, it stated that the security assistance group Ukraine reported that it had no information to suggest that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were using US-provided weapons and equipment in any way other than intended. Can you provide more details about the reporting mechanism utilized to monitor the usage of US-provided weapons and equipment and are there mechanisms in place for independent verification or assessment of these findings regarding the usage of US assistance? Yeah, Congressman, thank you very much for the opportunity to talk about this important topic. First of all, it continues to be the case since the publication of that report or since the authorship of that report that we just don't have evidence that there's widespread diversion or anything like that. Now I have to admit that that's different. That's different from whether or not things get efficiently from the stockpiles to the soldiers' hands in the squad on the front line. But we do work on logistical distribution with our partners in Ukraine quite a bit. So things leave the United States accounted for by the service that provided it in the case of something from a PDA where we're giving something from our stockpile according to the amount of money provided under the authority and then receiving money to replenish that, right? So that comes out. That's accounted for by the services and I think we have a very, very good control over that. When things hit the ground in Poland, either by truck, plane, or train, they come into the hands of our soldiers in southeastern Poland. They get accounted for there and I'm very confident. We had some missteps early on when we were rushing to get things done but we've got systems in place. I know we know what we've got on our hands and that it's faithful to what was sent. Then we consign it to the Ukrainians and they sign for it item by item. So I know as it goes on to trucks that we've accounted for it. After it crosses the border, it gets harder for us. So we barcode things and we have issued the Ukrainians scanners. We have automated the process of tracking things as it goes forward. We share our databases with them and they share theirs with us so we can track. It's really when you get down to the tactical edge that it starts getting a little bit harder, ma'am. And it's complicated by the fact that we can't go to a lot of those places simply because of the level of danger and we've restricted ourselves from doing that. So in those cases, we do ask the Ukrainians to self-report. An incredibly important part of this system though is contractors that we hire to provide for us an outside view on frontline units accountability. Those contractors are paid for with supplemental money. And when the supplemental, if it's not renewed, I won't be able to perform that level of fidelity of outside third-party verification of what the Ukrainians are claiming is their accountability. I hope that answers your question, ma'am. I, that is my understanding of the system and that we also then have a duty at DOD to report those findings and that tracking to Congress. Thank you. I also wanted to ask about the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. Could you just talk about how we're working with Ukrainian defense manufacturers to most effectively use the assistance we're giving? We are working with the Ukrainians and a number of European countries to create reassurance about the size of contracts because what we need is for potential investors in Ukrainian defense industries to see not just the immediate need but a multi-year requirement. So we are working with Ukraine on locations, on what is required on our embassy works with potential investors to support those capabilities in Ukraine. But, and we are also sharing with them the lessons we have learned on rapid acquisition on multi-year contracts to inform them from the lessons of our success with congressional support that we've experienced over the last two years. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I go back. General Eddie yields back. Chair and I recognize a gentleman from Georgia, Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's good to see you both here today. I have some specific questions that actually arose from some of your statements earlier. First, I will address the Supreme Allied Commander, which I think is the coolest title ever. This is an important question. When it comes to Ukraine, which I think is an incredibly strategically important country in the world, is this war for the Allies winnable? Yes, it is in a couple of ways. The first, if we go back to, the first is if we go back to what Secretary Wallender was talking about earlier, denying the Russians a strategic victory or imposing a strategic defeat on, that in itself is a victory, even if a temporary victory for the Alliance. So in that sense, it is winnable. We can do that with our Ukrainian cause. So I would agree, and here's my point on this, because I think this is really important. You mentioned the F-16s, and what's being supplied is adequate. I don't like that word adequate because that doesn't go back to what we learned in command and staff in a war college, which is overwhelming force. Klaus Witzing in warfare. We have a GDP of around 25 to $27 trillion. Combine that with Europe, around $45 trillion. Russia has $1.77 trillion for a GDP. This shouldn't be a contest. It shouldn't be, but we're slow rolling our support. Not just what we already committed, which has been slow rolling, getting our tanks over there, getting our airplanes over there, getting our munitions over there, the things we've already committed to, but also we continue to hold this up in Congress, which drives me crazy because this is a winnable war. This idea that's being propagated on both sides of the house, that we can't win this war is insane. We outnumber them dramatically, but quite frankly, Ukraine, with a GDP of only $200 billion, has been able to hold out against a first world country army and sustained 50% casualties to their armor and 350 casualties overall, with a third rate army that's very ill trained. That's success by my measures. And if we give them surge capabilities, which by the way, in Iraq and Afghanistan, I don't know if you'd agree with me, General, but we didn't do very well until we had surge capabilities and we are the big boy on the block, but we didn't succeed until we had surge ops and we're the first world country when it comes to military capabilities. How do we expect a third world country to succeed against a first world army if we don't give them surge ops in real time? We are not giving, we can't give them adequate. We have to give them superiority. That's my point, nobody's talking about that right now. We have to give them what it takes to get this done. This is a winnable war. Would you agree? Yes, I agree, I agree, Congressman. And much of the conversation, much of my testimony today has been about the minimum about avoiding defeat for Ukraine, which does not necessarily immediately lead to the accomplishment of our strategic interest, yeah. And when you talk about strategic interest as Secretary, would you agree that Ukraine is probably the top five country when it comes to resources? You're talking about 70% of Europe's green grain, you have titanium, you have steel, you have cobalt, you have rare minerals and including some of the radioactive stuff that actually powers the world, all in this country that could be taken by Russia and then that stuff could be moved over to China, North Korea, and Iran instead of our allies, it will have consequences for generations to come that people aren't really taking an account when they talk about the economic impact of this. I think you've laid out the stakes extremely well, Congressman, I agree. Great, so I think if we're going to fulfill our word, by the way, that's the third part of this, we actually gave our word, not just in one time, but actually real time, NATO, as a unanimous vote, said we're gonna support you during this. I think it's unwise to turn your back on the rest of the world. Reagan, 40 years ago at the 40th anniversary of D-Day, from Normandy talked about the consequences of isolationism, how it's a failed policy, especially against an expansionist Marxist government, which is exactly what NATO was made for. This is the time to stand now, I agree with both of you. This is a winnable war and strategically important to the future of the world. We have a 50% increase necessary in food stores by 2050. We have to secure our resources. This is strategically important and it's important to us to fulfill our word to our allies overseas and with that I yield. Ladies and gentlemen, yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentle lady from the great state of Alabama, Ms. Sewell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to add my voice to the chorus, thanking you, Mr. Chair and our ranking member for your bipartisan support of the Ukraine supplemental package. As we've heard today, Congress must act. We must act to get Ukrainians the tools they need to defend their country. It's a strategic ally of ours and to allow the necessary tools not to be given is just unacceptable, frankly. I had an opportunity last year, General, to visit Poland on a bipartisan delegation to see firsthand the tracking and accountability systems that you all have put in place in order to make sure that we at the American people know that the resources that they're sending to Ukraine are being utilized. I get that you can't see once it's past the border, but overall, have you been pleased with that system and what can we do to strengthen it? Thank you, ma'am. To be clear, we don't go blind when it goes across the border. We have folks in Kiev who inspect depots and we have folks in Kiev who venture out farther, like to address some places like that to inspect depots. It's really what it gets down to front lines that it gets a little bit tougher for us and I explained how we're doing that. Am I satisfied? No, I'm not satisfied. I mean, in the U.S. Army, when you change over command of a unit, you have to sign for every single screwdriver, every single screw in that unit, you have to account for it or you have to pay for it. That's where I'd like to be. We're just finding that it's difficult to be there right now. I am satisfied under the conditions that we're doing a good job. I'm not satisfied under the conditions that we're doing a perfect job or even the best job we can and we strive to improve it every single day. Of course, we strive to improve it. I just want my constituents in Alabama to know that we are doing everything we can to track it and to be accountable. One of those NATO allies and anchor of stability in the region is Romania. And last year, the Alabama National Guard and Romania celebrated 30 years as partners through the state partnership program which has enhanced both of our country's armed forces. As part of this program, the Red Tails at the 187th Fighter Wing in Montgomery which I am so honored to represent, partnered with the Romanian Air Force to share best practices related to the F-16 and the F-35 as Romania modernizes its fleet. So General, can you speak to the benefit that the Alabama National Guard's partnership has on Romania's military readiness and how does this partnership bolster our position in the region? Ma'am, first of all, just for all members from all states, the state partnership program is just an incredibly valuable part of our strategy to be able to support the alliance and to create strategic bonds between the United States and given countries. In many cases, it pays off tenfold in terms of access, in terms of basing, in terms of influence and things like that. It's extremely practical but it's also just strategically valuable. I work very hard with Dan Hockinson on making sure we've got exciting new developments in the state partnership program. It's helping us consolidate the position of formerly neutral or neutral and wondering about it countries right now. My Sergeant Major Rob Abernathy here routinely engages with the soldiers from the various states and he routinely attends the state partnership conferences and everything like that. It's extremely important. With regard to Alabama and Romania, particularly a huge success story, so the Romanians are having a moment, their economy's doing well and it's going into their military. They've beaten back a lot of corruption problems their military is surging right now. It's going to become really an anchor of our alliance in the Southeast. They're spending well on defense. They're buying all US equipment, very high end stuff but to use that equipment, you've got to have a mentor. It's not just a member of going and learning how to fly the F-35 or learning how to use this piece of equipment. You really got to understand how to employ it in an organization, how to take care of it and the Alabama National Guard has been fantastic in that regard in all domains, by the way, on the ground as well, working with multinational corps southeast to put that together. So I can't thank Alabama enough or the National Guard in general enough for what they do. It has a material impact on the combat readiness of our alliance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to make sure that we were supporting these state partnerships. It's really the Alabama-Romanian partnership is a model to be followed. Thanks. It is. Chair and I recognize Jim from Florida, Mr. Gates. Dr. Wallender, you've testified that the goal in the war is Russia's strategic failure, right? So I want to drill down into what that specifically means. Does Russia's strategic failure require repatriating Crimea back to Ukraine? That is for Ukraine to decide whether that is their absolute required achievement to define this war. You're a senior administration official in the Biden administration. I just want to note to you, does Russia's strategic failure require the repatriation of Crimea? To me, reinforcing the international law that borders cannot be changed by force is absolutely vital to teaching Putin a lesson. So ultimately, yes. Yes, the objective of the United States through your eyes, and Ukraine can have their own objectives, totally concede that, but in your eyes, as you testify to us, until Crimea has been repatriated, we have not achieved what you say is the goal in the war, which is Russia's strategic failure. That Russia does not gain territory through the use of force is a strategic success for Ukraine and the United States. I know, but that's very amorphous. I'm talking about a specific piece of geography, Crimea. You're testifying that Russia's strategic failure has not been achieved until Crimea is back under Ukrainian control. I think that's what you've said. I just, I want to draw the finest possible point on it. I appreciate that. I said that Russia will not succeed in seizing territory and having that recognized through the use of force. All right, so now let's do the Donbas. And is your testimony the same that Russia's strategic failure can only be accomplished through a repatriation of the Donbas region back to Ukraine? Russia's strategic failure requires that Russia not gain territory in Ukraine through the use of force. And they've done that in the Donbas, right? We do not recognize that and Ukraine does not recognize that, so no. They occupy the territory. I'm really interested in how Ukraine has historically recognized the Donbas. Have you ever heard the Donbas described as the ungoverned region by Ukrainian officials prior to the invasion? The Donbas? You mean Donetsk and Luhans? Yeah. I personally have never heard that. Really? I have. I heard the Ukrainian ambassador describe it as the ungoverned region before and now we're acting as though its repatriation is necessary to achieve Russia's strategic failure. Do you think setting such a high bar, like the repatriation of Crimea that's been under Russian control for some years now and the repatriation of the Donbas region, do you think that's a really high bar for us to achieve? I think that Russia is going to fail. I think the international community at large does not support this and they see a stake in an aggressor being able to invade a neighbor and slice off territory and claim it as its own. Here's what I think. I think that we're never repatriating Crimea back to Ukraine. And I think that if you set that as the objective, then we perpetuate this new forever war that's going to have a lot of death and a lot of destruction and it's for an unachievable goal. And I worry that's driving our thinking. General, you said any aircraft will help. Well, I mean, I take some exception with that. I want to quibble with that, right? Like aircraft that can't fly don't help, do they? Right? There are aircraft that can't fly and they're not helping. So they wouldn't help and then if you weren't able to properly operate an aircraft and it were to create some sort of escalatory accident, that would be problematic too, right? Okay, so just for the record, Mr. Chairman, I seek unanimous consent to enter an April 5th publication from TheDefensePost.com, F-16 fighter jets no longer relevant according to Ukrainian official. Without objection, so ordered. Do you have any reaction to that reporting? Sure, that's not what the Ukrainian officials I talked to think. That's not what they tell me. Well, yeah, I guess then we shouldn't represent that there's unanimity on that position. There are some who think they'll be helpful, some that think they won't. Just real quick, you guys are gonna have folks leaving Cyprus and going to these operations in the Eastern Med in Gaza. And I think the Biden administration wants us to become the port authority in Gaza, presumably forever. But do we know yet where we're gonna build this pier in Gaza? So that's not in my area of responsibility, sir. Okay, so you're not supporting that out of Cyprus just because on page 15 of your testimony. No, no, I'm supporting it. Yes, I do know where it's gonna be. I do know where the pier is going to go, but it's not my area of responsibility, and I'd refer you to General Corolla, sir. I'll check with him. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. It's a fascinating world we live in because I actually agree with Mr. Gates on something around Ukrainian policy, which I would not have thought of. And this is a really important point. Right now what we need to do is get money to Ukraine so they can defend themselves. I'm 100% with you on that. I think all the arguments that we've heard today dance around that fundamental reality, that giving Putin Ukraine is an enormous mistake and not giving Ukraine the money right now to defend it, that's giving Putin Ukraine. But we have gotta get off of this Crimea trap that we walk right into like you just did. Realistically, Crimea is not coming back to Ukraine. And we can absolutely win this war and absolutely make a difference even in that reality. We do not have to have Crimea to make it a thousand percent worth it to give Ukraine the money, okay? We need a sovereign democratic Ukraine that can survive. We have a sovereign democratic Ukraine that can survive right now. We do, all right? But if we are telling the world, you must support us, Ukraine taking it all back, that is an entirely different proposition. And I have never liked, I've heard this phrase over, nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. Forgive me, that is a ridiculous thing for any US diplomat or person in US policy to say, okay? We have partners all over the world. And yes, we listen to them. But when we're footing the bill, when we are spending so much money over there, we have a say and to act like we don't, I get it, I know why you don't want to act like you're bullying Ukraine into something, but let us walk down that road as Mr. Gates just walked you down that road and see that that initial instinct that's saying, well, we're not, we're gonna just make sure that Ukraine has the say is a problem. So I don't really want an answer to this. I just want everybody listening within the Biden administration to walk down that road a little bit more effectively from this point forward so that we don't wind up abandoning Ukraine because we're defending something that is largely theoretical, basically, and we get ourselves in that trap. And I just wanted to get that on the record at this particular moment. I yield back to the chairman. I completely agree with the ranking member. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, ranking member, for your comments. Dr. General, thank you for being here. Appreciate your testimony today. I also want to harken back to the gentleman from Georgia's testimony. I appreciate how he did sort of sum it up in that last summer we sort of had high hopes about potentially using the vernacular of winning. But unfortunately now we're sort of in a situation where we're definitely not as optimistic and we're getting to the point where we're going to be very, very pessimistic. I had a conversation with a couple of my colleagues who had just traveled to Ukraine last week. And their attitude was that the situation was tense, stable, but they're very, very worried about what's going to happen. Like I said last summer, we had high hopes that Ukrainian troops could punch through Russian lines. But unfortunately, the counteroffensive failed and we got to a point where we started to accept that Ukraine was settling into a stalemate. Now we're starting to worry it's going beyond that, especially with a potential for a big Russian push this summer that could punch through Ukrainian defenses and deep into the country. And what we're seeing is that Ukraine is suffering from quote, unquote, shell hunger, where Russia is firing five shells for every one Ukrainian shell that Ukrainian, that Ukraine can fire. In addition, Ukraine is low on air defenses, the low on air defense interceptors, the low on cruise missiles, the low on tanks, the low on fighting vehicles. It's not just leading to a stalemate, it could be leading to a loss. Straight forward question, what can Congress be doing that we change, not just the vernacular, but we change the outcome? The, what we need right now to prevent Russian success and Ukrainian defeat is passage of the supplemental. It is critical for the reasons General Cavoli has made clear. We are able to get to a longer-term solution by working with Europe that is well underway, but none of that work that we've done for two years in investing in Ukraine's future will pay off unless we get them through the next few months. General. Congressman, I really don't have anything to add to what Dr. Wallander just said. I thought it was very well put. We've spoken at length today about what the critical steps are and why it's the U.S., so a very valid question that I've heard from members both in the hearing today and previously, sir, is why can't somebody else fill in this requirement? And on those two items, the artillery shells and ground-based interceptors, we are really leading the world in the production of those right now for 155, especially for the NATO standard. Nobody else is producing it in the quantity necessary. They're trying to get there, but they're not there yet. So this supplemental at this time to get us to that day when others are gonna be able to be producing, to include Ukrainians producing their own, which is their and our goal together, I think that's really why this is a critical moment for this supplemental, sir. Thanks to both of you. General, obviously what we've seen, and I think you talked about this earlier in one of your answers, the war in Ukraine has been one of both advanced technology and conventional warfare. The Russians have been relying on the age-old tactics, including mines, tanks, and layered defenses, but Ukrainians have actually been merging both advanced technology and conventional warfare. In some cases, Ukraine has been losing some of these technologies in high volumes to combat Russia's sheer number of firepower. What is your assessment of Ukraine's use of emerging technology to reduce some of the asymmetric advantages against Russia's military and war economy, and how do you anticipate that this can be sustained? It's quite innovative, Congressman. They successfully brought into their military in the very early stages a large, large number of engineers and scientists from what was a very highly developed technical education base. So their tertiary education system was very long on engineers and scientists, and those folks have made a big, big help inside the military. Adapting technologies, both new military technologies and grafting it onto old systems, or civilian technologies and finding military use for them, very innovative, very useful, difficult to scale. Great, difficult to scale. Thanks again to both of you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Jimmy yields back, I would advise members and their staff that are watching that after Mr. Davis, we are gonna recess and go to 2212 for the classified portion of this hearing, but right now we recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Davis. Thanks so much, Mr. Chair, and to the witnesses here today, Dr. General. Seymour Johnson, Air Force Base, is a crown jewel in Eastern North Carolina. Plays a key role in our national security and defense. General Cavoli, can you explain the role that strike eagles in particular, or playing in the European theater, and in particular how divesting a fighter squadron at the base would impact operations in Ukraine? So the strike eagle is a very capable aircraft. It's one of the, it's at the very top end of the fourth generation of aircraft. It carries a very large payload and can deliver it in very, very difficult, difficult places. So it has proven it's worth over the years, sir. It is one of the aircraft that figures heavily in my plans, in the plans at USUCOM. It is an aircraft that will continue to be valuable for some time. I do recognize that the Air Force is trying to replace them with more capable aircraft, and it will be very important for us not to have a gap between the retirement of one and the arrival of the next. With regard to the particular squadron at Seymour Johnson, I don't know off the top of my head, and I would refer that question to the Department of the Air Force, and I'll get that to them if you'd like, sir. Absolutely. And just to follow up here, how did the F-15E station, in particular, lake and heat directly, the supporter indirectly support Ukraine right now? They form an invaluable part of our air policing and our air defense system, and that's proven very important in a couple of locations where it's been necessary to have an active missile and air defense, and I'd like to be more detailed about that in closed session if you can, and if you're not gonna be at the closed session, sir, I'd be happy to answer you in a classified setting elsewhere. There are other very important uses before it. Okay, thank you. I visited Ukraine a few weeks ago, and one of the takeaways for me, I'm sticking along this aircraft theme, so to speak, and that is not just the aircraft that they're receiving, but going through the training, getting their, getting pilots trained through the pipeline. Could you speak towards your knowledge of all of, are we able to help get through, help the Ukrainians get through this process that is meaningful in a way that's still gonna help us meet all the demands in terms of the national security demands here? Sure, Congressman. The first it's worth pointing out, I think, that we're not the only ones training Ukrainian pilots and working on fourth generation aircraft for them. The co-lead of the coalition that OSD has put together with our allies are Denmark and the Netherlands, and they're doing the preponderance of it right now. We are training some pilots in the US, and we're working on some of their maintenance programs and everything in the US also. Just a couple of notes, an important feature of this, believe it or not, has been English language capability and English language training. If all the manuals and all the instructions and all the buttons are written in English, you at least gotta know that much English. By the way, it's also the international language of flight, and so it's just necessary to have some level of language skill. That's the first step. The second step is to determine whether or not the pilot has sufficient basic pilot training. If the person is an accomplished pilot already, go straight to an F-16 transition, and that brings some challenges of our own, because these are very different aircraft from what they've been flying in the Ukrainian Air Force. Otherwise, you go to basic flight training, and we do have some aviators in basic flight training as well in a couple of different countries, and then they'll graduate to an F-16 transition. Hope that answered your question. And just one follow-up here in a few seconds left. Do we have the capability, the capacity to train more Ukrainian pilots, in your opinion? Yeah, the limiting factor on how many we're training right now, sir, is Ukrainian pilot availability. The Ukrainians have carefully calculated how many pilots they can spare and still maintain an adequate level of combat activity inside Ukraine, and that's what's driving the actual size of the pipeline, or how many are in the pipeline. Thank you. You'll bet, Mr. Gentlemen, yields back. The committee will now stand in recess for five minutes as we move to room 2212 for the closed portion of this hearing.