 The Future Warfighting Symposium responds to the 2018 National Defense Strategies focus on great power competition and the changing character of war, while advancing the service chief's goals of greater attention to emerging technologies, cyber, and space operations. In past years, the Future Warfighting Symposium has gathered over 500 students in Spruin's Auditorium for a three- to four-day event comprised of multiple speakers and panel discussions on technological change and the future of armed conflict. Today that mission continues despite COVID. The purpose of this year and the purpose of this Future Warfighting Symposium is to begin to establish a pattern of critical thinking, and this will help as you approach problems at the strategic and operational level. For the outset, we want you to be exposed to new ideas and new frameworks, and these three new threats, whether it's cyber, space, or artificial intelligence, we want this to be built into your vocabulary and built into your toolkit in how you integrate across domains, integrate across the joint force, and integrate conceptually what are our coming challenges, opportunities, and where threats may arise. The rate of technological change is truly staggering. It's an accelerating pace, and it challenges each of us to be able to notice and keep up with and understand the implications of new applications. This understanding will influence the development of strategies and, in the future, the way we fight. We get a wide variety of sizes, whether they are teeny-tiny, like these systems here, or grand and scale. This system, for example, is the size of about three houses put together. The biggest change, though, is not in the physical form. It's in the software running it, the intelligence, and, more importantly, the autonomy. Think about a system like here, you have the Global Hawk, the Navy version, the Triton. What makes it different from the systems that it's coming after is not that it flies further. Yes, it does that. Not that it flies faster. Yes, it does that. It's a system that has a lot of capabilities, but really the change is that it's more intelligent, more autonomous, able to do more and more on its own. So it's a huge, huge shift when you think about this in terms of not just the single technology, but the overall story of military technology itself. The original role of space was for things like strategic missile warning, strategic command and control, strategic intelligence, treaty verification, monitoring. And by strategic, we're talking about really the president as the customer for a lot of those things. What we've seen over the last two decades is a shift from just strategic to space basically playing a role at all three levels, strategic operational and tactical levels of military activities. It's not an overstatement to say that right now there's hardly a military operation that happens around the world. That doesn't include space to some degree, whether that's for communications or imagery support or navigation or some other function. Historically, if you go back and look at great power competition, it often involves territorially focused, overt, violent, armed attack or physical invasion. What we're seeing is that authoritarian countries today can leverage a wide array of tools that erode our national sources of power without resort to kinetic force. They can do it remotely. They can do it directly. And it doesn't have to be kinetically. And we're all familiar with examples of this. Intellectual property theft at scale and the theft of research and development erodes economic competitiveness, competitiveness, the economic sources of power. Military capabilities are vulnerable to supply chain manipulation. Disinformation campaigns are weakening domestic political cohesion, undermining confidence in democratic institutions. So this is great power competition indeed. But I would argue of a different sort because it's focused on degrading those national sources of power remotely and directly. I think if we take these three elements together that I've talked about, the framing of great power competition, the recognition of activity below the armed forces threshold and the unique qualities of the cyber domain. And the problem that we bring these together, what that leads us to is a situation of strategic cyber competition. That is the problem that we face, okay? Great power competition in and through cyberspace that is creating strategic effects cumulatively through nonviolent campaigns below the threshold of armed conflict.