 Welcome to Political Science 303 for the one-to-third time. So now that the ad-drop period is over, I'm very glad to have you here all. And remember last time we were talking about certain introductory concepts, certain introductory issues. And today the plan is that we continue with the modern state. We did a quick introduction last time on Tuesday on the modern state. Now that we've talked about certain concepts, some historical origins. Remember the feudalism business that I showed you, a map of manor and the thronement of a king, by that king, the primus interparis. And then we talked about Steinrocken's very famous, very influential political scientist, Norwegian political scientist, stages of state formation, patterns in stages of state formation. Remember we talked about four different stages of state formation. It all started with the penetration state, well actually state formation stage, then comes penetration stage, then the process ends with the welfare state stage. We become or states become advanced industrialized countries. Now this morning we shall be talking about different theories. How do scholars conceptualize or how do scholars think back and try to understand the historical origins of the modern state? And when I refer to the modern state, I refer to a specific type of state. This is the type of state that emerged in the aftermath of the absolutist state. Remember absolutist states were territorial, that they were characterized by strong bureaucracies. Now we're talking about the emergence of a certain type of state whose penetrative ability is way much higher than earlier forms of statehood. So my plan this morning, ladies and gentlemen, is to go over these two theoretical explanations of what constitutes the origins, the emergence of the modern state. And depending on our time, we'll start talking about our second chunk of topics, democracy. That's the plan. And in democracy, I hope to cover a conceptual introduction, some definitions talk about a little bit on the process of democratization, which we shall be talking about in political science 304, next term, hopefully. And then we'll talk about the procedural approach, depending on our pace. I don't want to rush this. So let's start. We've covered all this, and that, rockens. OK, two theories, two explanations, two conceptual definitions, or two conceptual approaches to the emergence of the modern state. Scholars, when they were trying to find how did states emerge, they thought, OK, let's look at the functions of the states. Let's look at the functions of the modern state. So what kind of functions emerged, what changed, and what brought about this new type of state, a certain type of state, which is historically specific, and it's also geographically specific. This emerges in mostly, well, largely Northwest Europe from the 16th and 17th century onwards. And it crystallizes by about the 18th and 19th centuries. Once again, two explanations. One is, how did these functions emerge? One is the first function, warfare, war-making. According to this explanation, which, by the way, I am relying on Henvik Spruit, who is a very influential political scientist, Dutch political scientist, who teaches in North America. You have a reading by Professor Spruit in your course pack, which is also available on Moodle. Please, please have a look at it. It's very informative. It's a very good review piece. I am quite sure that you'll enjoy reading it. It's quite dense, but it's very informative. You'll learn a lot from it. OK, once again, changes in warfare. Spruit says that there are two theories, two conceptual approaches to explaining the emergence of the modern state. And he says, scholars conceptualize this by looking at the functions of the modern state. And the first function they depict is war-making. When you think about history, what do you remember? It's all about wars, right? So in diplomatic history, in political history, in even economic and social history, as high school students, and also as university students, you've learned about political history and you've learned about wars, OK? So war-making is or has been a central function, a basic function, a fundamental function of states, early modern and also modern states. So some scholars looked at this particular function and they wanted to explain the emergence of the modern state in relation to making war. So making war is the first very important function that states brought about. So state capacity increased as there were changes in warfare, OK? So state capacity increased as there were changes in warfare. Advances in military technology. There used to be, remember, I showed you a depiction of the king and the lesser king. There was the knight, in fact, the mercenary Tudel mountain knight. And the king was, in a way, throning the lesser king, OK? So there the knight was there, but the knight was largely independent of the king. Yes, there were contractual relations, bundles of rights, we called it last time, but the knights were, in a way, independent of the king, in the sense that they were privately owned, OK? So large mercenary contingents replacing those knights. And for the first time, we see the emergence of systematically organized, very well organized, large standing armies. And in addition to all this, we see the emergence of handheld guns. So this is all happening starting with the 14th century. And when you look at the 16th and 17th centuries, these are centuries of war making. It's all about wars, OK? And there was constant warfare between the empires, what were these empires? Which empires do you remember? 16th and 17th century. Spain, very good. The Ottomans also very good, but let's look at the Northwestern European empires. Spain is, yes, Southern European, which has areas up north. So Spain, very good. What about the others? Holy Roman is dead by then. Austro-Hungarians are starting to emerge, 16th and 17th centuries. They're there, but one of the most influential. The French and also among the, I mean, right across the English Channel, who was there on an island, highly protected, but has very strong navigational fleet. England, OK? So England, France, Spain, and also the Dutch Empire, OK? Which had a merchant fleet, which was top notch of the time, OK? Unequal, unmatched. So these empires, these large empires, very strong empires with humongous naval powers, humongous technology, very advanced technology, were fighting against one another. So this is the time of constant warfare. And the crux of the point is, in order to achieve this function, these scholars argue, you needed a certain type of state. You needed what's called, what they call, what we now call, the modern state, OK? So in order to achieve those functions, you need a certain type of modern state, which did not exist before. The absolutist state is not the same thing with the modern state of the 16th and 17th centuries. Then comes, around this time, well, in the 18th century, mass mobilization, which was made possible after the French Revolution. The idea of total war, total war. So a state going into war with another state, OK? So now we see all states, I mean, some states engaging in warfare with another, OK? So all of these processes led to a centralization of the state. They also required massive resources to back all this up. In order to purchase all this, you needed the prehistory of an absolutist state. Remember, absolutist states were not only territorial, but they were also characterized by large, strong bureaucracies. And these bureaucracies were of two types. They don't know what were they, military bureaucracy, and tax collection, OK? So military bureaucracy here, tax collection here. So you needed to build on the previous type, previous pattern of statehood. So all of this required mass mobilization, massive centralization. And these guys argued, for example, Charles Tilly, very influential political sociologist, argued that or concluded that war makes states. So states emerged through warfare, and states make wars. And states rebuilt, reproduced, bolstered, reinforced its structures through war making. Is this clear? Any questions? So this is approach number one, OK? These are, once again, approaches to the origins of the modern state. How did the modern state emerge? And scholars, once again, tried to depict all this by looking at the functions of the modern state. So warfare was function number one. Another function, remember the bureaucratic functions of the absolutist states? The first was military. The second had something to do with the economy or with the markets, well, in terms of taxes, OK? So a second definition or second approach to the origins of the modern state is or rests on economic variables or socioeconomic developments. Theorists have argued that rise of capitalism, was the rise of capitalism that necessitated a certain type of state. So the modern state went hand in hand with the rise of capitalism. So a particular, a new, a novel form, a novel mode of production. Before capitalism, there was which mode of production? Did we talk about last time? There was feudalism. But now a new type of, a new mode of production emerges. And in that new mode of production, we require or the system, the structure, requires a new type of state, OK? And it is in this respect that scholars argued that the modern state emerged in order to serve a very different, but very influential, very important, very significant, again, very basic function. Capitalism as a mode of production requires an agency, requires a player in the system at the center, which would serve certain functions. What are these functions? The state, the modern state, this new actor agent, which has, which is to serve certain functions, is to secure investments by whom? Investments, who is making investments in capitalism? Is it the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, the merchants? So the states, the state, the modern state, was to secure investments by the bourgeoisie. So it had to enact certain kinds of rules and regulations. So it had to define and enforce rules. One rule is private property, OK? Without private property, can you exchange goods without the definition of private property? If this is mine and the state sanctions it, defines and enforces it, if I want to sell it, I can sell it. But if there is no definition whatsoever about the property, then how can I sell it? So in order for markets to function, you need certain rules of the game written in stone, certain rules of the game to be institutionalized. Remember, we talked about institutions, so that they are there, they are stable, they are knowable to most of us or all of us, and they are predictable. So this specific function of the state, the new type of state, securing investments is very important. It's upholding the system. The state in this way is upholding the system. The state also should or has been providing social and physical infrastructure, builds bridges, builds or maintains fleets, merchant fleets, makes, I mean, builds roads, and all of these infrastructure. And these are mostly physical infrastructures. And also, it starts, just starts investing into its workforce. It starts investing into its bourgeoisie, by protecting them, by also educating them, which comes much later in history. But these are all important functions that modern states served. A third function is regulation of conflict between capitalists and other classes. So bourgeoisie versus the proletariat, the rules of the game are there, the rules of the game are written in stone. The state, in a way, serves as an arbiter, a judge between this class and other classes. So the state is there to protect the interests of some class at the expense of others. And therefore, so in case of conflict, the state regulates it. The state steps in and says, I'm going to be the mediator here. And I make the rules, I define the rules, and I enforce the rules. So that's the third function. And this state, this kind of state, which starts emerging in the 16th century and continues well into the 17th and 18th centuries, starts protecting the capitalist class. These scholars argue, by the way. So how does a state protect capitalists against others? The state, for example, suppresses competition from two sources. So domestic competition, the state says, I confer upon you the rights and the privileges and also the responsibilities of producing iPhones. So I give you a specific license to produce this. None of you can produce this item. So I give this bourgeois, this my favorite capitalist, a certain privilege. And I, therefore, protect her from competition stemming from you guys. So you cannot produce this. So she's got private and also, in a way, monopoly rights. She's got licenses to produce this. And only she can produce this. No one else can in this system in this country. Therefore, I protect her against your competition stemming from you. This is domestic competition. I also protect her from international competition. I build industries here. And I say this other country, they also build iPhones. Look, here is another model. They want to sell it to this country, my country. I say, hey, if you want to sell those, those can come in only with certain taxes, like tariffs, or quotas, or whatever. So I protect my own industries against their industries. This has been going on since the age of mercantilism, which rains between 1500 to 1750, so early 1600 till about mid-18th century. This is a doctrine, an economic doctrine, an economic philosophy, and also a policy prescription, which rests on the motto that more wealth will bring about more power. More power will bring about more wealth. So wealth will bring about power. Power will bring about wealth, a virtuous cycle. So mercantilism was the name of the game for about two and a half centuries, dominant in Europe. And the rulers here had vested interest in protecting their own industries against others. And through these processes, these protectionist processes, my industries will flourish. We will be a stronger country. I will be able to collect more revenues in the form of taxes. I'll be richer. They'll be richer. We can conquer other lands. So wealth, because wealth brings power to us, we can conquer other lands. And we can be all richer in this country. So this is in a way that the state, this is the way the states, the modern states, this specific type of state, stimulated their own economies, their own markets. And wealth will bring power. But in order for me to conquer, I needed military technology. So industries, but also military equipment, military industries too. So this was in the eyes of many monarchs of the time, many emperors of the time, was a doctrine of a virtuous cycle. So wealth would bring power. Power would in turn bring about more wealth. And in this ballgame, states lacking, states which could not develop these functions, could not make it in the international system, would be swept away by those who made it in the system. OK. So the modern state, therefore, according to this second approach, the first was the modern state emerged in order to make wars. The second approach were those scholars argue that the modern state emerged in order to uphold the system of capitalism, in order to make or create a productive mode of production, so that they'd be richer and they'd be more powerful. And this, in turn, made states what we know as states. OK. So the modern state emerged according to these two theories. One set of scholars argue that it's about warfare. The other argues that it's about capitalism or economic explanations. How would these advanced powers make it in the system? They would be building and maintaining maritime technology. They would be building and maintaining financial technology like markets, financial exchanges, and others. Private property, trading skills, as well as a merchant fleet. So the state had basically two central functions that we see. And the scholars are divided into two. One set of scholars argue that it's about the early modern states. The modern states emerged with this function, war-making, and the others are arguing that the modern state emerged through capitalism, the rise of capitalism. That, I think, concludes our discussion on the modern state. Now, a new part on democracy. Let me go over very quickly. Most of you are third-year students. So you know what I mean by democracy quite well. But let me emphasize that this is a term which evokes strong emotions, democracy. People die for it. People die in it. People die against it. But we know that this is a universally popular concept. All political leaders would want to see their regimes as democratic. This includes Ahmadinejad of Iran. This includes Suharto of Indonesia. This includes Mugabe of Zimbabwe. So strong emotions. We want to be, we want to look at least, democratic. There are empirical as well as normative approaches to understanding democracy. By empirical, I mean, what is out there? How do we see? How do we define a democracy? If we see a democracy, would we be able to define it? So what is democracy? And normatively, what ought to be? What the system ought to be? So democracy, we can approach it from a positive or empirical point of view to understand democracy, how it works, how it functions, what kind of features does it exist? How do we define it? How do we conceptualize it? How do we measure it? How do we compare it with other forms? Versus normative approach to understanding democracy. What ought to be? We know that we all want to be democratic. We all regimes want to be democratic. So there is that interesting distinction between what ought to be versus what is. In the discipline of political science, we focus on two approaches to conceptualizing democracy. One is the procedural approach. The second approach is called the outcome approach. So the procedural approach is all about the rules of the game. What are the procedures should we find in a political system to name that political system democratic? So what are the prerequisites, rules, procedures, regulations that need to exist for me to name that political system democratic? So those scholars that emphasize procedures looked for those rules of the game that make up or they think that makes up a democracy, a regime democratic. So the major elements in a political system, what are those? The second approach is the outcome approach. And in this ball game or in this view, this is mostly about distribution of benefits, distribution of goodies in the sense that material benefits, distribution of power, distribution of justice, equality, freedom, do they exist? They argue that these guys, so this approach, argues that or scholars within this approach argue that for democracy to exist, we need to identify not necessarily those rules and procedures that have to be exist, as the other guys are saying. But instead, we should look at outcomes. Whatever the rules, whatever the rules of the game, whatever the procedures, whatever the norms are, we just don't care. Those rules may exist and there may not be equality. Those rules and procedures may exist and they may still not be a fair system. Those rules may exist and the system may not necessarily be just. These guys are saying what we're after is for us to call a regime democratic, we need to see how our resources distributed. Is there equality? Is there fairness? Is there justice? So as long as those outcomes are there, can we call this system democratic? In political science, in mainstream political science, we generally focus on the procedural approach. Because measuring procedures, whether they exist or not, or the extent to which they exist, is much easier. So it's measuring outcomes such as equality, such as fairness, such as justice, is way much more problematic than measuring whether there is elections or not. So in mainstream political science, in mainstream political science, we feel content, most of us, by looking at the procedures, which are sometimes referred to as prerequisites of a democratic system. So as long as these procedures are OK, so we tick procedure number one, tick procedure number two, tick procedure number three, tick. If they exist at the same time, simultaneously, then we call this system democratic. One main example of this thinking, one of the horse's mouths here, is Philip Schmitter and Terri Lynn Carl, two very influential political scientists, comparative political scientists who've been writing on democracy, emergence of democracy, and democratization, all these processes. So these very influential two scholars came up with an article, which was published in 1991, which I invite you to read, which is one of the required readings in this course. So the title is, What Democracy Is and Is Not. So this is one approach to democracy once again. Before I delve into, before we go into the details of Schmitter and Carl's work, those rules of the game, let me briefly talk to you about the process of democratization. I'm sure you have a good idea about how democracy's emerged, but let's do a refresher. One influential economist, Annabel Laureate, Amartya Sen, was asked when he was conferred upon the prize, I'm sorry. How would you describe the 20th century? How would you describe the 20th century, the past century? When you think about the 20th century, what comes to your mind, huh? To distract your warfare. Warfare, wars, total wars. Millions of people decimated. What else? As political science students, what else do you remember from the 20th century? So if I were you to ask, what describes the 20th century, please? Drastic effects of capitalism, very good. So the expansion of capitalism worldwide, right? And it has massive effects, please. Very good, very good. Clash of ideologies. What kind of ideologies have we seen throughout the 20th century? Socialism, communism, fascism, huh? Liberalism, clash of all ideologies, any other hands, any other ideas? Nation states? Nationalist, reactionist ideologies. Conservatism, very good. So when he was asked this, how do you define the 20th century? He said this century was the century of democracy. And this is an economist, a Nobel Prize winning economist. He, when you think back, when you relax a little and think back, you really share his ideas. This was the century of democracy, the number of countries which became increasingly democratic increased massively. And this is how it happened. The first wave of democratization, mid-19th century, till about the mid-20th century, in that 100 years, that time frame, we had 25 to 30 states achieving what's called democratic stability. We would not call these 25 to 30 states democracies with our own conceptions of democracy now. But by then, we call them, they have achieved a level of democratic stability, 25 to 30 states. So that was the first wave. The second wave, which was, of course, well, the post-World War II era, 1950s till about mid-1970s in about two and a half decades. That was called the second wave. 22 out of 80 states by about 1950, just 22 out of 80 states. The total number of states was 80. Was considered to be democratic. So end of World War II, decolonization is starting. But at the beginning of this period, so less than 30% of all states were democracies. The third wave, this is historical procession. So the third wave after decolonization, so 1960s, 1950s, 60s, states emerged in Africa. States emerged in Latin America. States emerging in Asia. And 1990s, collapse of communism. Central, Eastern European states joining the bandwagon of democracies. So by about 2000, the turn of the century or turn of the millennium. 120 out of 190 plus states were called democratic. So which makes about just less than 60%. So 21st century did not start well. There were backlashes. There were reverse waves. We see de-democratization in advanced industrial law societies as well as developing world. But still, when you look at the 20th century, that was a century of democracy. That was a century of increasing or expansion of this certain specific type of political regime. So I really enjoy Amartya Sen's ideas about democratization. Perhaps I should stop here. But next class, my plan is to go over Schmitter and Carl's work. So may I kindly invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to go over the article. Just read it. Just skim through it. It's about 10 pages. It's very well written. It's very fluent. It reads very well. And the concepts are not alien to you as third-year political science students. So have a look at them, and then we'll discuss the details. Next class. See you guys.