 Open the second hearing of the Senate Economics References Committee into Digital Currency. The Senate referred this inquiry to the committee on the 2nd of October 2014 for a report by the 2nd of March 2015. On the 2nd of March 2015, the Senate granted an extension to report by 10th of August 2015. The committee has received 46 submissions which are available on the committee's website. I would like to thank this opportunity to thank those who made submissions to the inquiry and the witnesses who have taken time to appear before the committee today and at the previous public hearings on the 26th of November 2014. These are public proceedings or the committee may determine or agree to have a request evidence-hearing camera. I ask anyone, everyone to ensure they have switched off or turned to silent their mobile phones. I ask photographers and cameramen to allow the instructions of the committee's secretariat and ensure that senators that witness laptops and personal papers are not filmed. I remind all witnesses that in giving evidence to the committee, they are protected by Parliamentary privilege, it is unlawful for anyone to threaten or disadvantage a witness on account of evidence given to a committee and such actions may be treated by the senators contempt. If a witness objects to answering a question, the witness should state the ground upon which the objection is taken and the committee will determine whether it will insist on an answer having regard to the ground on which it was claimed. If the committee terms to insist on an answer, a witness may request the answer be given in camera, such a request may of course be made at any other time. A witness called to answer a question for the first time should state their full name and the capacity in which they appear. I now welcome Mr. Anton Antonopoulos for the hands-on record, could you state your full name and the capacity in which you appear? Hello, my name is Andreas M. Antonopoulos. I am an author and computer security expert. Thank you so much and thank you for taking the extra effort to participate in our inquiry. I want to invite you to make a few brief opening remarks and I think we have a few questions for you. Thank you. Thank you, Chair and committee members. I appreciate this opportunity to contribute to these proceedings about digital currency. My experience is primarily in information security and network architecture. I have a master's degree in networks and distributed systems and have worked in this field since 1992. I spent 20 years working on networks and data centers for financial services companies before I found Bitcoin in late 2011. I have been working full-time in the Bitcoin space for the past two years and written a book for software developers with the title Mastering Bitcoin. Bitcoin's unique architecture and payment mechanism has important implications for network access, innovation, privacy, individual empowerment, consumer protection, and regulation. I welcome the opportunity to talk to you about these issues today. For Australia, Bitcoin represents a unique opportunity in two areas. Firstly, Bitcoin can introduce much-needed competition in the retail payments industry, undercutting the expensive systems offered by credit and debit cards, while significantly improving security and privacy for consumers. Secondly, the Bitcoin industry can establish Australia at the forefront of the next wave of innovation and financial services, a wave that can extend financial services to more than two billion people throughout Southeast Asia who are currently underbanked. Just like cellular telephones allowed billions to become connected with the world entirely bypassing the need for fixed line telephone infrastructure, Bitcoin can do the same for banking. Australia is already the home of a thriving Bitcoin industry and can become a leader in the region and the world. Until the invention of Bitcoin in 2008, security and decentralization seemed like contrary concepts. Traditional models for financial payment networks and banking rely on centralized control in order to provide security. The architecture is built around the central authority, such as a clearinghouse. Those within the center of the network are vested with enormous power, act with full authority, and therefore must be very carefully vetted, regulated, and subject to oversight. Bitcoin is fundamentally different. The security model of blockchain currencies is decentralized. There is no center to the network, no central authority, no concentration of power, and no actor in whom complete trust must be vested. In Bitcoin, security is an emergent property of the collaboration of thousands of participants in the network and not a function of a single authority. If a bad actor infiltrates a traditional financial network, the network itself and all of its participants are at risk. In contrast, if a bad actor has accessed the Bitcoin network, they have no power over the network itself and do not compromise trust in the network. The Bitcoin network, therefore, can be open to any participant without vetting, without authentication or identification, and without prior authorization. This freedom of access creates freedom to innovate without permission from the incumbents, the same fundamental force that has driven internet innovation for 20 years, creating enormous value for all. Centralized financial networks can never be fully open to innovation, because their security depends on access control. Incumbents in such networks effectively utilize access control to stifle outside innovation and competition, falsely presenting their anti-competitive actions as consumer protection. Bitcoin's decentralized nature affords consumer protection in the most powerful and direct way, by allowing Bitcoin users direct control over the privacy of their financial transactions. Bitcoin transactions never expose vulnerable account identifiers, and Bitcoin users can protect the privacy of their transactions without relying on or trusting any intermediaries. Contrary to popular misconception, Bitcoin is not unregulated. Rather, several aspects of the Bitcoin network and financial system are regulated by mathematical algorithms. The algorithmic regulation in Bitcoin offers predictable, objective, measurable outcomes. Algorithmic regulation provides certainty without nationalist or geopolitical influence. In a time of unprecedented currency wars, mathematical neutrality is a safe haven. In trying to understand consumer protection oversight, audit, and regulation of Bitcoin, there is a risk that many will try to apply familiar models of the past, this new digital currency system. I urge you to resist the temptation to apply centralized solution to this decentralized network. Centralizing Bitcoin weakens its security, dulls its innovative potential, and removes its most disruptive, yet also most promising features. Centralization will disempower its users while empowering incumbents. Consumer protection will not be achieved by removing Bitcoin's built-in privacy characteristics. We cannot protect consumers by removing their ability to control their own privacy, and then asking them to entrust it in the same intermediaries who have failed them so many times before. In this new decentralized financial network, we have the opportunity to invent new decentralized security mechanisms based upon innovations such as multi-signature escrow, smart contracts, hardware wallets, decentralized audit, and algorithmic proof of reserves. These are the new decentralized regulatory and security tools that are most appropriate for a decentralized digital currency. Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. Okay, thank you so much. Thank you for that fantastic opening statement. I've got a few questions before I get to them. I think Senator Canavan had a few a couple of questions. Senator Canavan? Thank you, Chair, and I want to thank Mr. Antonopoulos for making yourself available. We recently were in Canada, and I know you've given evidence to their Senate committee, and they mentioned you as somebody who was one of the more impressive witnesses they've had. So it's fantastic that you've been able to join us as well. I wanted to just really drill down on your last comments there about avoiding imposing old school regulatory models, so to speak, on a newly emerging technology. I mean, how do we draw the line? Now, I've noticed in some of the other comments you've made that there is a distinction between the use of Bitcoin, between individuals, and on a personal basis almost, and perhaps some of the infrastructure that might grow around Bitcoin, including custodial accounts, banking-type services. I mean, do you still see the need that there is some regulation needed for Bitcoin companies that might provide more than just access to currency? Yeah, thank you, Senator. Custodial accounts, as you mentioned, are of particular concern, and in fact, any accounts that take control of Bitcoin keys and therefore remove them from the protection and security of the Bitcoin network create areas of centralization. And we have seen before many times that such environments are prone to hacking, theft, and in many cases, what we suspect to be embezzlement and insider action. Those types of organizations that have custodial access have all of the problems of traditional centralized financial networks. In short, if you give someone your money, they will run away with it. And so the need for regulation is paramount and for oversight and audit, and all of the traditional financial controls that are imposed in those situations. The key is to recognize the fundamental difference between custodial accounts and decentralized access and control over finance that Bitcoin offers in its decentralized model. So say, in your situation, I presume you're more familiar with Canada than here, in Canada, would you think it is possible to apply the prudential and consumer protection laws that exist for traditional banks to Bitcoin-type banks or digital currency-type banks without major modification? Could they be brought into your financial regulatory space quite easily and treated just as like they've got to have reserves against liabilities and deposits? They need to provide consumers with product disclosure and all those aspects. Could that happen? Could we do that easily? I am more familiar with the United States regulatory framework and I would say that many of the existing regulations apply quite comfortably to Bitcoin. It can be treated similarly to any foreign currency brokerage account with all of the requirements that come from the use of that type of instrument or account system. However, there are some unique things that can be done in the Bitcoin space that can be done in traditional financial environments and I think there is an opportunity to take advantage of those. For example, in a traditional financial institution, internal audits and third-party audits must be used in order to prove reserve adequacy and that is subject to manipulation and in fact can be falsified if the auditors are not eagle-eyed. We've seen in fact several scandals, especially in the United States where the auditors were complicit with financial shenanigans leading to falsified audit accounts. Now, in Bitcoin, mathematical proof of reserve can be created whereby the reserve accounts of Bitcoin of each and every participant who has a custodial account on the service can be added up and that result can be verified independently by each customer without revealing anybody's balance. So there are some unique cryptographic solutions that are very innovative and would allow for much more flexibility. So do you see at the moment in the United States companies offering fractional reserve banking for Bitcoin accounts? I hope not. In fact, I believe that most of the things we see in the United States are not fractional reserve. They're full reserve situations. In fact, in Bitcoin, there is a very, very high risk with fractional reserve arrangements because of the fixed nature of the currency and the inherent volatility and exchange rate risk. Such a scheme would be very dangerous. Now, the problem is whether these organizations can in fact prove that they have full reserves or not. And that is a question that still is not answered to the satisfaction of most consumers. I think the other thing to note very briefly is the potential existence of hybrid models. So accounts which appear on the surface to be custodial but in fact where the exchange or bank or financial institution only has control of a minority of the keys in a multi-signature environment. In that case, a financial institution that has say one key out of three can authorize a transaction and sign for it but cannot do so on their own. They need a second signature from another key. So those hybrid environments require special consideration as well because they offer all of the flexibility of managed banking and financial services without any of the risks of custodial control because quite simply the bank can't run away with the money. And just my final question on this topic. In the Northern American Bitcoin industry, are they calling for or do they want to have the, your financial regulators have oversight over them? Do they want that third party assurance from the government to say, I forgot the name of your security commission in there in America, sorry, SEC, the SEC. They want the SEC to come and give them a stamp of approval so they can go to market with that. Some companies certainly are asking for regulation and oversight in order to provide certainty. However, one of the major challenges in the US and one of the reasons that this is such a challenging environment to operate is the overlap between federal, state and local regulations. Money transmitter licenses are regulated on a state level which exposes companies to 50 different licensing requirements in 50 different states. Between the SEC, the Financial Crime Enforcement Network, FinCEN, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, state regulators, banking institutions, FINRA, and various other organizations, there are probably two dozen different regulators all jumping in and trying to regulate or not understanding Bitcoin at the moment. So one of the big problems occurring in this jurisdiction is fragmentation and overlap of jurisdiction. In fact, that's why environments or jurisdictions that can offer much more clarity in regulatory affairs and less of a quilted environment will actually have an advantage versus the United States. So if I can just ask one full up there, do you think Australia has that potential advantage? Well, I would have said that several months ago. However, I believe that recent decision applied to sales tax to every Bitcoin purchase and sale, which I think fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the system ascribing it to the properties of a commodity, which it is not, and as a result, adding significant friction. So that may be a major disadvantage for Australian Bitcoin companies. I'll leave it there, Chair. We might fill up on that later. Yeah, look, Ms Antopoulos, today, so far, the way we've kind of conducted these hearings, we had a group of people from the industry come and speak to us and kind of talk about the potential and the opportunities and the growth potential. Today, after we hear from you, we're going to have the Australian Security Agencies in. So our equivalent of the kind of, you know, the equivalent of kind of the FBI in that, our equivalent. We have the Australian Federal Police, the Attorney General's Department, and the Australian Crime Commission coming in next. Now, they seem to kind of regularly cite this FBI report that I think was done in about 2011 regarding the kind of security kind of concerns regarding Bitcoin. I just wanted to get, before they kind of come in, I wouldn't mind getting your take from, on those kinds of security concerns, because obviously they're going to be coming in, I think, presenting a view of the security risks associated with it. I wouldn't mind getting your take on that. And I know it's not the area you've kind of specialised in, but I wouldn't mind picking your brain about how legitimate some of these concerns are and how much of them are overblown. Could you be more specific about which security concerns you refer to? I'm not sure I'm familiar with a specific FBI report. Look, largely, the concern that largely has been expressed, and again, I'm paraphrasing the words of others here, from the security agencies, has been, effectively, this is something that gets used for dark and horrible things on the internet. This is used for drug trafficking, for terrorism financing, and the lack of controls that they have, as opposed to other currency exchanges, means that there are greater risks associated with this than there are with other matters. And as a result, I think there's a hesitation for the security agencies to create a framework where these industries can grow. Very good. I think really that argument in my mind is false, and I'll give you a number of reasons why I believe it's false. First of all, it's an argument that we've heard before. In fact, we've heard it extensively about the internet itself. The internet in the early 90s was seen as a den of pornographers, thieves, and terrorists, and all kinds of horrible stories about how the future would unfold. The truth was that as it gained mainstream adoption, it reflected the desires and needs of mainstream society. Most people are more interested in posting videos of their cats than using it to communicate with terrorists. The truth is that people will use Bitcoin to feed their families, to send their kids to school, to pay for healthcare, to get their payroll. And they will do so because as it grows mainstream, so does the use of this currency. The currency itself is inherently neutral. I think there's also a massive misconception about this idea that Bitcoin is anonymous. In fact, Bitcoin is not anonymous. What it doesn't offer is a totalitarian model of surveillance where every financial transaction can be tracked from origin to destination without suspicion, without due process, without reason to suspect, treating everyone as equally guilty in engaging in financial transactions. In fact, we have seen in specific prosecutions, especially here in the United States, that when calls for concern or suspicion exists and due process is followed, the Bitcoin ledger actually offers a forensically accurate registry of every transaction that has happened, which has been used very effectively by law enforcement. So traditional law enforcement practices of using informants and constructing trails by collecting information through due process and warrants are much more effective in the Bitcoin environment. Let's take, for example, a transaction that involves multiple parties involved in a conspiracy in a traditional financial network. In many cases, that will involve wire transfers across multiple jurisdictions. Collecting a forensically accurate trail of these requires serving subpoenas in multiple jurisdictions with a collaboration of Interpol and related agencies. In Bitcoin, you just download the blockchain onto your laptop and you have a forensic trail of every transaction that has ever happened. So all you need is a thread, one thread to pull and through due process to be able to link that to an identity. And you will be able to see a full list of all the transactions that has happened. And law enforcement had no problem using those techniques to deliver prosecutions in the US using Bitcoin as evidence. So I think the fear is very overrated. In fact, when I speak to law enforcement agents, they think that Bitcoin is a rather benign form of digital currency. There are others that are much stealthier, much more anonymous, and in fact, may be encouraged to grow if owner's legislation is passed. Now, certainly Bitcoin has been used for criminal purposes. That is a fact. To use a slightly humorous analogy, it has come to my attention that the vast majority of criminals also use shoes. That doesn't mean that shoes are the problem, right? Bitcoin is money. It is a means to an end, and the end to which it is put will depend on who's using it. As it becomes more mainstream, that use will gradually change and obviously become much more benign. It is natural that in an environment where cash is used for the majority of criminal enterprise, a form of digital cash which offers lower friction will be attractive to certain elements. But I think if they make the mistake of thinking it's anonymous, they will find out very soon it is not. What Bitcoin is, is it is resistant to totalitarian and holistic surveillance, and I think that's a good thing in a democratic society. I'm just trying to square that, though, you're saying it's resistant to totalitarian surveillance, but you can download the entire blockchain onto your laptop. Now, I don't understand all the cryptography behind this, but presumably governments who employ very smart people could find a way to still survey all of our transactions if we were all using digital currencies. Is that not a risk? Given they're all out there. Sorry. Certainly the transactions can be surveyed, but they cannot be attached to identities. And in most cases, in order to attach it to an identity, you need to do something else. Usually that involves seizing equipment from the person of interest, and that would require a due process action of a court. So it works pretty well in terms of the difference between secrecy and privacy, really. Privacy as an individual right can be maintained, while secrecy overall cannot. On Bitcoin, it is much easier to achieve radical transparency than it is to achieve radical anonymity. And again, Bitcoin cannot be seen on its own without the context. The context is 750 other digital currencies that have been created in the last two years, based on that recipe, many of which are much more anonymous, much more stealthy than Bitcoin, and which will continue to thrive, regardless of what regulation is placed on Bitcoin. In fact, if anything, the risk is that Bitcoin can be pushed into a corner, very much like the music industry pushed Napster into a corner and ended up with much more troublesome file-sharing networks as a result. Do you think, I mean, even if we decide that this is too risky, that it creates too great a security threat and we wanted to try and stamp it out, we can only pass laws for Australia, how effective can we, even if we were in coordination with other countries, stop digital currency? I mean, where is it located right now? Presumably, it can always go to a country where there aren't regulations and those that want to do bad and do wrong can still access it. Honestly, Senator, Bitcoin and the decentralized innovation behind Bitcoin have turned money and transactional exchange into a form of information content. You can no longer stop information from flowing that carries Bitcoin, then you can stop information from flowing that carries a subversive tweet as the Prime Minister of Turkey realized recently, or you can stop any other form of information flowing in a free society where the internet exists and can be accessed or even other forms of communication. Bitcoin will continue to exist and as long as there are a number of network nodes that support its propagation, it will continue to exist. Regulation of the protocol itself is really not possible at this time. That says, do you want to jump in? Look, if you want to continue with that line... I'm happy to ask one more question. It's slightly moving along on the law enforcement front to tax, so not necessarily nefarious or criminal activity. I have seen you mention Google, for example, could use Bitcoin to do its payroll all around the world and save a lot on transaction costs. Google, of course, have also been subject to a fair amount of controversy about how they pay tax and where they pay tax. If they pay tax. We have a related inquiry into corporate tax. I don't know if you have any information on this, but do you think digital currencies are another order of difficulty for taxation authorities in terms of tracking transfer pricing and related issues about the jurisdiction of profits? I don't think so. In the case where services and products can be delivered, in many cases, from anywhere in the world, and payments can be transferred over any network, there's no fundamental difference in using Bitcoin. From my experience, I think it's important to realize that most taxation systems are based on honesty and severe punishments if you fail to meet that standard of honesty. When I submit a tax return, my bank account is not audited for every transaction I've made. That's not how it works. However, if I lie on my tax return and I'm caught, then everything I've done will be audited, including the transactions I've made in Bitcoin, which are available on a public ledger. Again, it doesn't really change the basic social contract between a people and their government, which is that most people report their taxes honestly and try to get services from their government in return. Their use of Bitcoin will only increase their economic opportunity to do international trade and commerce with people from other parts of the world, and it doesn't really change the mechanics of taxation. What it gives is it allows an individual to act more like a multinational company in terms of trading internationally, but certainly the unique advantage of multinational companies to tax evade, cheat, and not pay any taxes anyway will remain as they are today. Um, sorry. Senator, just, um, I know that we're running out of time, but you've just been through the Canadian inquiry. What evidence did you hear in that inquiry that most alarmed you? I participated only in a short part of that, and actually I was very pleased with the outcome of that inquiry. It seemed that the Canadian Senate was very open to understanding the nuances of this currency to making the type of fine distinctions that are necessary between fringe uses of the currency and the system overall and its behavior, as well as between the types of activities that need to be regulated, like custodiality counts, versus the types of activities that put power in the hands of individual users, such as multi-signature technology and individually controlled wallets. So I was very pleased with the outcome of that. I don't think anything I heard there concerned me. Okay. Just one final question if it's okay, and then I think McKenna may have a final one as well. Um, you said in your opening statement that it's important to get the balance right between providing a, or I'm paraphrasing part of what you've said, is providing the right regulatory framework to provide some kind of business certainty, but at the same time as not stifling the kind of, I think your words are, the attractive qualities of innovation. I think the challenge for us, and I wouldn't mind putting this to you, is how do we get the balance right between what the industry naturally wants, which is some kind of regulatory framework to provide some certainty so that, you know, people like your visas and MasterCards and others start, you know, properly investing into the industry. And at the same time, not creating too rigid a framework that effectively places some of the benefits, all kind of displaces some of the benefits. So I wouldn't mind, I know you touch on that as being the kind of the challenge for regulators, I wouldn't mind just picking your brain a little bit on that before you leave. Well honestly, I think one of the big problems in this particular area is that we're dealing with a very disruptive and very fast moving technology that has only recently emerged into the limelight. And as a result, there's a lot of uncertainty. We don't really know where Bitcoin will be in a couple of years in terms of whether it will be used primarily as a long-term store value akin to a digital gold for transactions involving large parties, you know, or as I would like to say, the kind of currency used by aircraft carriers with, or if it will turn into a currency that is used for microtransactions and retail transactions and consumer online commerce, the kind of currency you buy a cup of coffee or perhaps filling both of those at the same time. There are many unanswered questions at the moment and we're seeing at the same time many of the problems or perceived problems in the industry are being solved with innovation instead of regulation. Just in the last two years, we've seen tremendous development in security mechanisms for individuals to protect their Bitcoin holdings against hacking and thieves, and to allow them to control them directly so that they don't give them to custodial exchanges and other organizations where they can be stolen. So I think probably, as I said at the Canadian Senate, a wait-and-see approach is the most likely to be successful. We saw in the early internet, in fact, that the wait-and-see approach allowed the network to thrive and change and morph into various different models based on consumer adoption. Bitcoin consumer adoption has barely started. We don't know yet how the network will reflect mainstream adoption and the values of a mainstream community behind them, and what uses they will put to this network. That is the most exciting aspect of this new technology. I would caution one thing, however. It would have been very dangerous to allow in the era of the internet its own companies to set the rules by which the internet would operate. They would make sure that it wouldn't operate. It was very dangerous in the era of the automobile to allow the railroads to set the rules, yet that's exactly what they did in the United Kingdom with the Red Flag Act, which stalled the development of the automotive industry for decades. It was wrong to allow the oil industry to regulate electricity generation in the United States in the early years. The incumbent industry always wants to write the rules for their new competitors and make sure that they don't get a foothold, allowing Visa and MasterCard to define the rules by which this new payment network will work, will ensure that they will write such rules that will not allow Bitcoin to disrupt what is a very cozy, very staid and solid multi-billion-dollar industry that has been able to shield itself from competition effectively for more than 50 years, and which desperately, desperately needs very strong competition right now because it has failed consumers all across the world. Have we got time, Chair? Yeah, a little bit over. Sorry. If that's okay, Mr. Antonopoulos. I've just got two more questions. One, in your view, you obviously believe that Bitcoin or digital currency will achieve a greater penetration than it is today. Do you think people will move to use financial accounts or custodial accounts rather than maintain their own keys and cash, if you like, on their own computers? Do you think they will use third parties to manage that process? And I asked that question related back to the regulatory issue we had before. If they do that, presumably the fingerprints and transparency available to authorities now will be not much different from what they currently have with banks. I think in some environments they will and in some environments they will not. In consumer environments where banking relationships exist and when banking relationships can be extended to existing populations, custodial accounts are probably going to be the easiest way to get involved in Bitcoin, which is a shame. In fact, I'm hoping that we see enough innovation in security and user experience and user interfaces to allow more people to have decentralized control over their money through Bitcoin because that is the best model by which Bitcoin and digital currencies work. However, one of the interesting things that will happen, I think, is the deployment of smart phones with digital currencies in places in the world where banking relationships do not exist, have never existed, and cannot exist simply because of the lack of infrastructure, political turmoil, unwillingness to extend services to billions and billions of people. I am far more interested with the possibility of Bitcoin being used on text messaging phones and very, very cheap Android phones throughout Southeast Asia, throughout Indonesia, throughout China, throughout many of the places that are very close to Australia, where billions of people are currently using very primitive cash-based or barter-based systems of exchange where the economies are suppressed as a result of that friction and where a smartphone, a very simple smartphone or a feature phone could simultaneously represent not just a communication mechanism but a bank service window, a credit service window, a mortgage origination and credit origination terminal, a Bloomberg terminal, a stock market trading terminal, an import-export business. I can imagine a kid driving around on a scooter with an Android phone and running a remittances business that can deliver billions of dollars into a local economy with an army of such kids. In my view, that is the enduring promise of digital currencies. Banking today is available to just over three billion people on a very basic level, but only about a billion and a half people have the kind of internationally capable, currency-control-free power banking that you and I enjoy, and that leaves four to six billion people outside of the loop, and that's where I think digital currencies will be best used. And the last question is, what are the requirements? There is no custodial relationship. Those people will hold the Bitcoin directly on their own devices. So, my last question, how long do you think it will be before Bitcoin becomes mainstream? The internet took 15 years. Cellular telephones took 10. The web took seven. I think Bitcoin is going to be perhaps even faster. It depends on what you mean by mainstream adoption. I use it, and so do a couple of million other people already. I think we're going to see probably 10 or 15 years before it's used by people who are not technically savvy broadly across all of society. But I think you're going to see significant penetration in the next five years. Okay, thank you. Okay, thank you so much, Mr. Antonopoulos, and thank you again for making yourself available. And I know it's not kind of easy with the technology and that we had to use to make this work. So thank you so much, and I can't thank you enough for your participation in our inquiry. Fortunately, the phone companies didn't get to write the regulation for the internet, and that's why I was able to do this today. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Good on you. Good luck. Thank you. Thank you, Andreas.