 Good morning. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you all very much for coming out on a wet August – mid-August morning. I'm Bill Taylor, here at the United States Institute of Peace. Very pleased to welcome back Ambassador Christopher Hill. As everyone in this room knows, just completing an eventful tour in Baghdad, Ambassador Hill had a long career, starting with Peace Corps, actually, in Cameroon, a long time ago. He has been Ambassador in many places, including Korea and Macedonia and Kosovo, Poland, and Iraq. He's been the leader of the Six Party Talks in North Korea. He's been Assistant Secretary of State. So this is the end of one chapter, but he now goes on to the next chapter in his career, where he will be the Dean of the Corbelle School of International Studies at Denver University, starting very soon. So we're very pleased to have him here. He takes off very shortly to go back briefly to Little Compton, Rhode Island, well kept secret in Rhode Island, the home of the best ice cream parlor in the country. I'm convinced. Graze ice cream. If you go to Little Compton, you should visit. Also, avid Red Sox fan will be watching from a distance from Colorado. So we're very pleased to, ah, another Red Sox fan here, without any hesitation. We're very pleased to have Ambassador Hill. I'm hoping he will be able to look forward, some lessons learned, but visions of where we're going with this relationship to the United States and Iraq. We will have a good opportunity for questions. There are people in Baghdad and people in Beirut who are watching us online. We may get some questions from them as well. Look forward to questions from this group, as well as an overflow audience in a close by room. So, please silence your phones and welcome Ambassador Hill. Thank you very much, Bill, and thank you for inviting me to the old USIP building, showing its age, I guess. But I know you're all looking forward to this building, which sort of is, what, larger than the Houston Astrodome. No, no, no. You know, one of the eight wonders of the world, you know, under budget, though, right? Absolutely. I hope. Anyway. Anyway. So, yeah. So, I am leaving the State Department, not only because our view of the Potomac has been obstructed by the new, you know. I've always liked the views of the USIP, I just didn't know that was literal, but let me just say, it is really a great pleasure to be back here. I wound up 16 months in Iraq, as they say, in the World Cup. I went into extra time there, I was planning to make it 12 months, but I did try to want to see if I could be helpful on the issue of government formation, which is a bit of a labor of love because it's, from day to day, it's a very, very painful process, but it will get done. It will get done. Let me just say that for those who have served there, there is no more sort of searing time in one's life than to work in Baghdad or in one of our many provincial reconstruction teams. We have a very strong team there. Ambassador Jim Jeffries is, I think, arriving probably as we speak in Baghdad. I think it's a place where I think the Foreign Service has really embraced the monumental challenge of this civilian military transition, but also the transition of Iraq more broadly and the transition of the U.S. relationship in Iraq. And I'm very proud of all the Foreign Service officers who have gone there. As you know, people don't go with their families, so instead of living with one's wife and children, you live with a roommate. You've filled out a form to make sure the roommate doesn't smoke or doesn't party late or doesn't wake up too early or wake up too late. It's quite an experience. And you also experience the thrill of getting a so-called duck and cover alarm at certain periods. In fact, we've just come off of several weeks in which we had rocket fire just about every day on the green zone, and so you get this duck and cover. The new people leap out of bed and hide under their beds, the old people just sort of keep on going, and then if you're there for just a couple more days, you also start leaping out of your bed and jumping under your bed. So it's an experience to live there, to be sure. But I really do believe that if you look at sort of where we've been there and where we're going, that it is definitely going in the right direction. I arrived there in April. I remember arriving at 8.30 at night. I presented my credentials to the Foreign Minister, my copies of my credentials to the Foreign Minister at 9.30 at about 11 o'clock. I presented the actual credentials to the President at midnight. I sat down to a banquet of Turkish food, I mean, I'm sorry, Kurdish food, which included a serving of turkey. And then about 1.30 in the morning, I returned back to my home. At 7 o'clock, I think I had Leon Panetta to breakfast at 8.30, Secretary Clinton arrived. And by the end of the day, about when she left around 8 o'clock at night, that was on a Saturday night, and I said, well, gosh, I'm glad tomorrow is Sunday. And they said, no, that's the first day of the work week around here. So it's kind of, you get there, it kind of grabs you by the throat and doesn't let you go. It's an extremely energetic, very busy place where, I mean, you just kind of throw yourself into things. And as I said, I'm just very proud of the Americans who've come there and who continue to go there to make it all work. In Iraq, it's one sort of series of problems after the next. When I got there, we were dealing with the fact that we had our U.S. troops still in numbering at about the 140,000 level, and we were beginning the process of relocating those troops out of the cities, out of the towns, out of the principalities, into the countryside and sort of turning over responsibilities to the Iraqi army. And I know there was a lot of concern at the time. Could the Iraqi army manage this process? And indeed, soon after the completion of this process, there were a number of high-profile bombings. How high-profile bombing is an awful way to put it, but the point being that they took down the foreign ministry and the finance ministry in a single day in August of 2009. Couple months later, there are additional bombings of public buildings, and still a couple months later after that. And yet, I mean, the Iraqi military has kind of stepped up. If you look, if you go back and Google the moments of those bombings, like in August and in October, read, you know, mainstream media on them to see what mainstream media said, you would see a lot of arguments that somehow Iraq isn't going to survive these bombings and it's just not going to be there after a while. These would imperil everything we're doing, et cetera. And yet, you look at Iraq today and it is still, it is still very much moving forward. So I think there's a resiliency, there's a resiliency in any society that I think is difficult to predict, but I think in Iraq's society, there's a particular resiliency that I think people need to, need to understand is very much there. As I left last week, I checked on the number of U.S. troops because when I arrived it was over 140,000. And now that I'm leaving, I realized it was around 55,000 and on a glide path to make the 50,000 level by the end of August. The U.S. troops have already turned over, have already really switched their mission to moving from combat operations to advise and assist brigades that is assisting the Iraqi military. It's really been the mission for several months. It's been, it was implemented first in the south. It's being implemented in the rest of the country. So it's not like anything big is really going to happen on the 31st. In fact, on the 31st of August, you look pretty much like the 30th of August. And frankly, in most places, pretty much like the 31st of July and the 30th of June. That is, they've already made this, made this transition. So I would say the security situation, which is very difficult and one that is not going to be at a completely satisfactory level for, at a completely satisfactory level will be, will continue to improve. The Iraqi forces are capable of handling the security problems. They will have problems. There will be mistakes. We have made mistakes too in how we've handled it. They will learn from their mistakes as we learn from our mistakes. And I think you will see a continued improvement in the security situation. I think similarly, we are in the midst of a very difficult process of government formation. And this is a process that if you have the stomach to follow it every day, you'd better take some Pepto-Bismol because it is not easy. I mean, every day you will see, you will see setbacks. You will see sort of clutchless shifts in people's positions where you thought they were in one place on Tuesday and there were quite another place on Thursday. It is frankly, you know, hard to follow, let alone hard to stomach through these, through these periods. But I think one has to kind of step back from it now and again and sort of look at the overall situation where Iraq is and where it's going to go. And I think once again, you can see that with respect to the government formation, as difficult as the process is, as heated as the process is, and I would seriously recommend not trying to follow it just from the press because you will find it even more heated through that medium. You will see that at some point, like every country, Iraq will have a government. And so the real question for us is not whether they're going to have a government, they will. The question is, how is the United States going to interact with this country? Can we say that we will have the kind of long-term special relationship that we've been talking about for many years? A couple of months ago I was privileged to go to the Korean Embassy and meet some people who were the first educational exchange people, Fulbrighters, what later became known as the Fulbright program in the 1950s. And to talk to some of these Koreans who had come to the States in the 1950s, I asked one of them. What was the biggest task for you to come to America in the 1950s? And one of them said to me, it was to convince Americans that Korea is not a war, Korea is a country. And about a month ago I had the occasion to meet with Iraqi Fulbrighters on their way to the U.S. And I told them that I think one of your big tasks in the United States will be to convince Americans that Iraq is not a war, Iraq is a country, albeit a struggling country, albeit with many problems, but nonetheless a country that is really very much a map of the Middle East, and one that I think will at some point assume its role and responsibility to commensurate with its size and with its very dynamic population. It is today a country of majority rule. That is, the Shia, who are the majority there among the Sunni and the Kurds, have the Prime Minister's ship. It is hard to predict who will have the Prime Minister's ship in the future, but most I think Iraqis expect to see that the Prime Minister of Iraq and the next Prime Minister will in fact be a Shia. Now for many Americans they look at this and they say, well, does this mean that somehow sectarianism has prevailed in Iraq and that your identity as a Shia is somehow a setback from what the sort of civil society that one hopes to create? And I would argue that the civil society in Iraq is growing. The tendency is to have more secular than sectarian tendencies, but that political identity will be an identity based, for the time being, based on Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish affiliation. Rather than complain about this or say that somehow you'd prefer that identity be based on something else, I think it's simply the reality. When people look at the United States and they say blue states and red states and they say regional identities and whatnot, I think you can argue that politics is going to be based on some kind of identity. And as long as Shia, Sunni, and Kurds know how to work together and as long as they can reach across this identity divide and cooperate, that this is not something that we need to fear. And in fact, when you look at the politics in Iraq, you see Shia having differences with other Shia. You certainly have Sunnis having differences with other Sunnis, and of course anyone who knows the Kurdish regional government area, the KRG, also knows that the Kurds have their own issues. So I think the overall structure of it is not to be feared by us. I think we can work with this overall structure in Iraq, because when that government is finally formed, whether Iraqiyah prevails, whether it's state of law, whether it's some amalgamation of other regrouped entities, hard to say at this point, but when it emerges, you will see the Kurds will have an important role in the Baghdad government. You will see that the Sunnis have an important role. Nobody in Iraq, no serious observer of the situation in Iraq, is suggesting that somehow you can run Iraq except through the full participation of these, as they call them, three components of the Iraq's polity. So I think that will get done. From the point of view of the United States, is this country going to embrace the democratic principles we need them to embrace? And even though this political process has been very difficult, if you look at what happens in Iraq in terms of the free press, in terms of freedom of speech, there is a lot of this. That is, people have absorbed the concept of these individual rights. Are there human rights abuses in Iraq? Of course, like in any country. But the question is not whether they're human rights abuses. The question is, what is the trend line? Are they getting better? Is it getting worse? And I think most observers of the situation would argue that despite the horrific violence, which certainly has unnerved many people, overall the trend lines in Iraq's human rights are improving. What is Iraq trying to do with its neighbors? And is Iraq trying to be a stable and good neighbor in the region? And I think there again, you can look at the situation and take some sense of optimism from the fact that Iraq has worked very hard to tamp down regional problems. There are arguments that Iraq needs to do more. Maybe Iraq does need to do more. But it doesn't mean that Iraq is setting itself up in any kind of historical adversarial role with its neighbors. In fact, it's looking for ways that can work better with those neighbors. So I think all of these ingredients would argue for the fact that the United States can have a longer term and a special relationship with this country. It's a relationship that's going to depend on our own people's willingness to see Iraq more than a war. And rather as a country, it's going to depend on our willingness to work and to stay the course in Iraq. I mean, obviously we are facing many budgetary issues today. It is not easy at all. But when you look at the overall national security costs of our staying in Iraq, every time a striker brigade leaves Iraq versus every time we stand up another rule of law module or something like that, you can look at the overall national security costs to the United States and you can see it falling dramatically. Even though the civilian component is coming up, the military component is going down faster than the military component is coming up. In short, this is not some never-ending obligation. Rather, we can see that overall our outlays to this country are falling and that we can look forward to the day. It will take a few years to be sure, but we can look forward to the day where Iraq will be self-sustaining, will be able to pay its bills, and will really, I think at a time in historical terms, whether it's eight years, whether it's 10 years, will be in a position really to pay all of its bills and be a substantial economic player. When I got there in September and April, there was a lot of talk about the hydrocarbon law. We made the judgment at the embassy that we said to ourselves, what is the purpose of the hydrocarbon law? And the answer is the hydrocarbon law is necessary for foreign investment. Well, I think what we determined, and I think the Iraqi government was determining this, is if we want foreign investment, why don't we get foreign investment? And so they went ahead with some oil contracts that is production contracts with the oil service contracts with major oil companies, and by the time this process was done by November of 2009, Iraq has now contracted with 11 major companies, representing all of the major oil companies in the world, oil companies from diverse countries, whether China, Russia, and the U.S., Britain, France, all of the countries of the UN Security Council, but many others as well. And that Iraq, if all of these contracts are realized by the end of this 10-year period, we can see Iraq will be producing oil in the neighborhood of what Saudi Arabia produces oil. That is, it's going to be a major player in the oil market and a player with its own oil. This was never about the U.S. taking its oil. Indeed, the U.S. share of these contracts is fairly small. We have one, albeit a big one, but only two of the 11 major oil companies are actually U.S. So Iraq is going to be a big player. Iraq I think will be economically successful. It is a matter of time. You can see the economy growing day by day. You can see the nascent development of Basra going on. If you go up to Erbil, you can see the developments in Kurdistan. At one point in Kurdistan up in Erbil, I went to see a shopping mall there which had a food store on the ground floor and on the third floor, believe it or not, there was a bowling alley. So things are happening in Iraq. There are continuing pockets of very difficult security issues. Mosul is one. If you talk to the U.S. military in Mosul, they would argue that it was never handled properly from the beginning. There have been difficulties from the beginning there, but that the Iraqis know what those issues are. They are managing the security. And I think you'll see that in these remaining areas where security has been a problem, you'll see it continuing to trend in the right direction. The U.S. is looking forward to this relationship with Iraq. It will be based on these economic relationship, and it was really quite gratifying to be hosting in Iraq some 22 U.S. agriculture firms that were there. There will be another major trade mission this fall. These are firms that are in a number of infrastructure and telecommunications, not necessarily in oil, so you will see some diversification in Iraq. I think we have stood up the largest academic exchange program in the Middle East as in Iraq. The government has written very committed to it, and when you look at the amount of funds that the Iraqi government has put out for Iraqi students studying abroad, you see it's about the highest in the region that is through a bilateral program with us. So I think we've looked to develop across a range of cultural activities. We work with our sporting teams. We have really looked to make sure that we have a balanced and full relationship with Iraq. I think the Iraqis want to make sure that we care about Iraq, not just care about it as an element of the war against terrorism, but also we care about having the relationship with the country and with its people, and I think we're very much on the way to doing that. So I think we will get a government. I'm not going to predict when. I can predict that it will be difficult and painful, but we will get a government there, and I think the U.S. can look forward to a very important relationship with this country of some 30 million people. I think it is a country that will be, because of its mix of Shia, Sunni, and Kurds, is quite unique in the Middle East and one which we, it's in our strategic interest to pay attention to it. If you look at a map, if you look at where it lies, that is next to Iran on the one side and the Levant on the other side, Turkey on the north and Saudi Arabia on the south, you can see the importance of its strategic location. Therefore, I think the importance for U.S. policy. So I think we can, there will be a lot to do for our diplomats there, and I want to stress that as the U.S. military draws down the U.S. interests in Iraq very much remain. We have a great interest in its success, and thanks to their own efforts in terms of these oil contracts, it's not just the U.S. interests, many other countries have a great interest in Iraq's success, and I think one of the first things that will need to be done when there is a new government is to try to go out to the region and make sure that Iraq has a good relationship with the region as it can. Iraq has had to overcome terrorism, it's had to overcome dictatorship. It needs more fundamentally to overcome a sense of isolation, a sense of being estranged from its neighbors and from the region. So I return from Iraq with a real sense of optimism about its future. When you're there, you do get enmeshed in the day-to-day events, but when you step away from that, I think you can see the progress. We argue we've gone from 140,000 down to 50,000 troops just in the 16 months that I was there. We've gone to a situation where they have, their local governance is very much engaged in the process of getting investors in. The U.S. has, we have many, we have relationships with many of their universities. Thanks to the security situation, I've been able to travel outside of Baghdad into all the provinces of Iraq. I'm sure my successor will be able to do the same. So I think when we look at where this place has been and where it is today, we can, I think, extrapolate that it will have a very good future. So why don't we do the questions? Thank you very much for that overview. Both a review of what has happened during your period there and your expectations about the future. Let me open it to questions. We are very pleased that the Iraqi ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Somadhi, is here with us again. Welcome back, sir. A pride of place if you would like to make any statement or ask any questions. You have the first opportunity, but I will look for your hand. And we have, the first question is in the back here, sir. There's a mic coming to you. Yes, good morning, sir. My name is Sayed Erikaf from Al-Quds daily newspaper. My question to you, sir, is where does national reconciliation fall on the priorities for Iraq and what kind of advice did you give your successor on how to forward an agenda of national reconciliation? Because you mentioned hydrocarbon law as if it's just a contractual thing, while in fact it really is very deep and very important for all Iraqis. First of all, they need a hydrocarbon law, but I think the effort at getting this omnibus framework was actually one that was impeding the actual purpose of the framework law. The purpose of the framework law, I mean, you point out it's national reconciliation, that's one purpose. Another purpose was to attract foreign investment and get it moving. And so holding up foreign investment for the sake of this framework law didn't seem like the right approach. So now the foreign investment's there, and I think the need for this framework law is clear. I mean, they need to do something about the institutional infrastructure for dealing with oil. It's also moving on these contracts also had the effect of getting the problems of Erbil and Baghdad, that is the problems of contracts that Erbil reached separately. Those have also moved and there's been some agreement on those issues as well. So I think the result of just getting the process moving has resulted in some success in terms of, first of all, investment and secondly, national reconciliation. But I think national reconciliation needs to be looked at more broadly than just the hydrocarbons law. I think there are a variety of issues, including territorial issues on the edge of the KRG, the so-called disputed internal boundaries. This is something the UN has been working at something that the U.S. military has tried to facilitate through confidence-building measures including joint patrolling and joint checkpoints. These have been very good initiatives, but frankly, much more needs to be done, not only in terms of CBMs, confidence-building measures, but also including trying to address the governance issues in these disputed territories. So I think that's something the U.S. can do. In fact, the U.S. can be helpful in doing. I think the UN needs to be very much engaged in this and they are. I think you'll see the U.S. continuing to engage. We will have a person who is doing the sort of northern issues, as they're called, who will be engaged very much. In fact, he's sitting in the room, George Sibley. George, great to see you. But you've got to get to Iraq. What are you doing here at the USIP? All right. Okay, next week. So I think we'll continue to be engaged on that. But reconciliation, I mean, when you look at some of the problems in Anbar lately, this isn't Sunni-Shia issues. These are Sunni-Sunni. So if you look at some of the problems that were going on in Saladin in the spring, again, they're Sunni-Sunni. If you look at some of the problems that were going on down in Karbala in the spring, they were Shia-Shia. And so I would caution against thinking that national reconciliation is a Shia-Sunni issue or a Sunni-Kurd issue, in the case of the disputed internal boundaries. I think overall the best thing that can be done for Iraq is to strengthen its institutions, strengthen its independent judiciary, strengthen the ability of its service providing institutions. Because at the end of the day, I mean, what Iraqis need from their government is not sort of sectarian cheerleading, but what they really need from their government is a provision of more services. And I like to think that some of the pressure to get on with government formation is coming from the public that is demanding that they get on with providing more services to the people. You know, electricity production is still woefully low. They're continuing to have water issues. So investments in these areas need to be made. And the trouble with these issues is you invest one year and it's not going to be for a couple of years that you'll see your return on the investment. So they've got to get moving on these issues. Thank you. We have a very wet Marine here who came through the rain with, as Marines do, no umbrella. They never do that. But there are other people who have got my eye on for questions. But, sir. Thank you, Ambassador Taylor. It's been a long time since we worked together, sir. Good to see you again. It's been four years altogether in Iraq concurrently with you. All right, sir. My question is a little bit complex and it may touch upon some things that most of the people in the audience don't know about. So forgive me. I'll give just 20 seconds of background, maybe. It strikes me that the problems that we're seeing in the formation of the central government stem from the fact that constitutionally, the Constitution of Iraq is designed, sir, to serve a monolithic totalitarian regime where you have ministerial control of budgetary authority right down to the local level from the center through the ministries. Local office for every ministry, provincial level office that administers that budget right down. There's been some effort to overcome that through regionalization. The Kurdistan Regional Government gets a slice of the budget. The tension being at the center, as far as I can see, stems from the fact that even though the provinces and the regional government are fairly stable, politically stable, the center is struggling over those ministries who's going to control the money, including anything raised through the hydrocarbon sales. So with that fundamental tension between political stabilization at the provincial and sub-provincial level and the struggle for power at the center that we see playing out, do you see them overcoming that? Do you see a resolution of that anytime in the near future? We saw a breakdown just this week between Ayatollahoui and the other parties walking away from each other. This seems to me to be a big part of the reconciliation that we see apart from the episodic stuff that goes on with bombs going on. That can be overcome eventually. But that tension at the center does not look to me like it's going to resolve itself very easily without a modification of the Constitution. Can you comment on that? Well, first of all, I think they can achieve a new government without modifying the Constitution. I think one of the issues that has come up is the question of whether the Constitution, which envisions a kind of council of ministers, whether there has been too much authority that has somehow gravitated to the prime ministership as opposed to his council. So you have situations where some security structures that should be under the Ministry of Interior move to the prime minister. Now, if you're Nuri al-Maliki, you will make the point that, look, I don't want to have security structures under me, but we were facing a life-and-death insurgency. We had to move fast. We had to deal with a tough situation. And so, yes, I brought some of these under me. But I want them back in the ministries where they belong. But what I also want, if you're Nuri al-Maliki, what I also want is to see that not only is power redistributed in that sense, but responsibility redistributed. That is, what he doesn't want in a situation is you create a power-sharing government and then people from another party say, well, that's up to the Shia. They're in charge of this thing. He wants to say, no, if you're from Iroquia and you're going to have Ministry X and let's say state of law is going to have the prime ministership, you need to take ownership. You need to take responsibility and ownership for these issues. So part of it is the responsibility-sharing, and I think Maliki has a point on that. I would disagree with your notion of the Constitution being some sort of totalitarian concept. When you look at many countries in the world, well, first of all, the central issue that every country in the world deals with is the power of the center versus the rights of the regions. And this is not unique to Iraq. I mean, any country you go to, including our own, has this whole issue of how many powers do you have in the center versus in the provinces or in our case, in the states. The issue is always to find a balance. Certainly, in Iraq's case, there were concerns that the drift was going to be toward too many powers in the regions and somehow this would weaken the center and create a situation where the cohesiveness of the country might suffer. And so they tried to deal with that in the Constitution to make sure there's a strong center. When you look at the kinds of issues that need to be addressed in Iraq, when you look at the investment laws, when you look at the various problems of services and things like that, a case can be made for needing a strong center that can do this. But when you look at the issues that you alluded to, and in fact, anytime you visit a place like Nasiriyah or wherever, people will say, well, we don't have, our provincial councils are not properly funded. All the money is in Baghdad, and so the only way to deal with that is to go to the ministry, and once you're into the ministry, you're not going to get the services, and therefore, this is a problem. So it is a problem, and probably that needs to be corrected, but I would differ. I think the provincial powers law can address some of these things. I would not suggest it needs to be a new constitution. But so I think like any country under a new constitutional order, they have had to strike this balance, and it is not easy to do in any country, and I would argue it's especially difficult to do in Iraq where there were some centrifugal forces at work that were seeking really to pull the place apart. So when we looked at some of the things that need to be done in the context of government formation, we felt that a lot of things that could be done did not involve constitutional changes that is reopening the constitution. I think there are a lot of things that could be done by statute. And one of the problems with this prolonged period of government formation is we haven't had, you know, essentially, technically, the council representatives or their parliament is in session, but in fact, it's really not in session. I mean, no one's proposing new laws, nothing's moving ahead. So that's another reason to get moving on this process. I'm going to recognize right here, but let me just follow up on this issue. The issue of distributing powers within the center, there have been proposals recently about a new political committee for national security or maybe it's called the National Council for Strategic Policy that would establish a fourth center of power. You talked about the Soonishia Kurds and they would have, each would have one of the president, prime minister, speaker. And this would be a fourth. What's the current thinking on that? Is that our resupporting, please? That's different, of course, different from the issue of region versus center. But certainly, when you look at, you have these main political groupings. You have a concern about how power has evolved under Nuri al-Amaliki, with a lot of power coming to the prime minister. You're concerned that maybe the prime minister position, whether it was the intention of the Constitution or not, the prime minister position is sort of looming large. And then you look at some of the other elements of the system, including the political committee for national security, where you have the prime minister convening a meeting that would involve the collective presidency, the three-member presidency, and the leaders of the blocks, the parliamentary blocks. And then you realize that's been kind of moribund that hasn't really been called on a regular basis. So then you start looking at the question, well, could that element be strengthened? Could you, and strengthen in a way that you preserve the prime minister as commander-in-chief, but strengthen the ability of the broader government to be providing policy guidance? And so I think a number of people have looked at this with the understanding that you don't want to go into a new constitutional arrangement. And I think the feeling is that you could create a sort of souped-up political committee for national security without changing the constitution, but maybe in being souped-up, you could also put it in statute, where the political committee for national security was something that was done basically through an agreement, through people, but not through a statute. So if you look at whether they've got the right national security structures for what they're dealing with, I would argue they could make some improvements there, but I would argue that just as the U.S. in 1947 put together the National Security Act without changing one word of the constitution, that you could do something like that in Iraq. The problem is there's a mountain of mistrust to deal with, and there is a kind of zero-sum notion that somehow if you do X, you must be weakening Y. I mean, Win-Win, which I know is such a USIP concept, Win-Win is considered a Burmese dissident in Iraq. They don't quite get the Win-Win thing. The Red Sox fan here. Well, Euclid said if they get to the playoffs, he'll be back in. He may be on crutches. We've been through this before. Barry Schwatt associated the press. You talk about security problems and all. Is the situation fertile for the coup? Do you have concerns that might be one way that Iraq, of course, wouldn't be a good way? My turn? Do you have concerns about which way they might turn? No. Is there a cause for concern of the danger of a coup in Iraq? Well, I don't think the issue of a coup is really an issue that comes up or is on the table. I mean, I don't think there's any realistic scenario at this time that would involve that sort of problem. The problem they have is they have these continued terrorist attacks. And I don't believe that terrorists are exploding car bombs and killing women and children because they're dissatisfied with the course of government formation. I do believe, however, that Iraqis have an expectation that they will have a government. Frankly, it's the kind of place where they expect a strong-ish government. And so I think the longer this goes on, the more people will ask the question whether it's affecting the security situation out in the streets. I must say the police are working very hard. The army is working very hard. Our forces are working very hard with the Iraqi forces. So I personally cannot point to examples where government formation is impeding the law and order effort. But certainly one wants to see government formation sooner rather than later and security is one such reason. Ambassador Hill, we have a question from an Iraqi woman in Baghdad who asks on this question of government formation, what happens if no government is formed soon? Will the U.S. intervene? You know, I guess I would have to ask her the question, what does she mean intervene? The U.S. Embassy, I can tell you, has been working daily on this issue. I mean, there were days when Gary Grappo, the political counselor there, Gary who left just a week ago, I would say Gary had upwards of 10 meetings a day with every single Iraqi political party or political coalition. I myself would frequently have meetings with all of the leaders on a, you know, at times almost a daily basis. So some people would call that intervention. I would call it trying to be helpful. I don't think it's in our interest to be pushing ourselves on people who don't want us to be involved. I think we need to be respectful of their sovereignty. I think when you look at Iran's efforts in Iraq, you see that they have not done very well and one of the reasons they've not done very well is they haven't observed that first rule, which is to be respectful of the country's sovereignty. So I think we are respectful, and I think as such, we are listened to, but I think we need to be very careful here because it's a, you know, there are a lot of minefields in that country, literally and figuratively, and I don't think we want to put ourselves in the position where we appear to be somehow taking sides in a way that simply will not be understood by the Iraqi public. So to the questioner, I would tell her there will be a government. I mean, there will be a government. I mean, I can't think of too many places, I mean, maybe Somalia is an example, but not too many places where there haven't been a government. There will be a government. The question, and there will be a government that will include Kurds, Sunni and Shia, the question is who's going to do what? We're back here. My name is Connie Zulama. I'm with the American Kurdish Information Network. I know Bible is not a required book for Foreign Service exams. What is not required? Bible. The Bible? Yes. Oh, okay. And sometimes I think it should be, but it has an injunction that U.S. policymakers forget it at their peril. The injunction says, Clyde Potts should not be placed next to Iron Kettles. I know you're not responsible for the fact that the Kurds and the Arabs are neighbors of each other, but as someone who's getting ready to make a transition to academia, what can you tell us about the Kurdish Arab Impasse over the issue of Kirkuk? Do you really think the 80% Arab population is going to be respectful of the rights of 20% Kurds? Can a culture of tolerance be imposed on the Arabs and the Kurds without the balance of power? I kind of lost you on the Clyde Potts thing. But look, Kurds and Arabs have been neighbors for centuries. I mean, this didn't just start. I think the Kurds have achieved a broad autonomy in the Republic of Iraq. And moreover, the Kurds have been part of the solution rather than the problem. I think the fact that President Barzani is one of the most respected politicians in Iraq, the fact that all of the political leaders in Baghdad, whether it's Samar Hakim or Ayatollah way or Nuri al-Maliki, all of them have been up to reveal to discuss the issues. I would say the Kurdish, the KRG, the Kurdish regional government plays an important and a positive role. I think they have, the autonomy has enabled them to create a region that I think meets the aspirations of its people to achieve their freedoms and to be able to live their lives free of oppression. When you travel with President Barzani, as I have many times just in the last few weeks, going up to Barzan or over to Dahuk and over to Ahmedi or over to Mount Korak, and he points out the sights of where the Peshmerga met with the Iraqi army over those very difficult decades, you can see that the KRG is in a much better place than it's ever been before, a much better place than it hasn't even moved. So when you look at the investments, I mentioned the mall and Kirkuk, you should go up to Dahuk and see the university there as I did or see the investments going on. I think the KRG is doing pretty well. How do we address Kirkuk and how do we address the whole issue of the disputed internal boundaries? These are not easy issues and these are overlapping claims. One side does not necessarily it's hard to deal with the other side's claims and so I think what we need is a long-term process. I think we need to build trust. I think the people in the KRG need to believe that the rest of Iraq is really truly embracing democratic principles and frankly when you look at the history we're talking more about hope than history here. What I do know is the KRG leadership understands these issues very well, communicates very well with their people and is a force for progress and solutions in Baghdad. I think we will continue to work with the KRG. The United States I think has a very special relationship with the Kurdish people. We're very proud of that and we've made very clear that we see the KRG as part of Iraq and we want to continue to engage it as part of Iraq and as part of the solution rather than the problem. Ambassador, we have two related questions. One from Jay and Beirut and Ray Jarar, Iraqi living in D.C., both online and they're on this issue. Do you think the U.S. should intervene in Iraq, domestic politics and support partitioning Iraq into ethno-sectarian regions or keeping Iraq a united country with one central government, which you have addressed? And Jay says the same question. Does the Ambassador believe the breakup of Iraq into three states, Kurdish Sunni Shia, is a viable solution in case of continued sectarian rights and struggles in Iraq? Is a Lebanese-like solution an option? And that was a question from Beirut. That latter was from Beirut and the earlier one about the intervention was from an Iraqi living in D.C. You know, I love Beirut, I love Lebanon, but you know, the rest of the world cannot be like Lebanon and Beirut. I mean, it's just, you know, I wish the rest of the world had the same food as Lebanon, but I mean, not all of their political solutions can be replicated starting with Iraq. First of all, I think the notion of partition has been raised and resolved. I don't think anyone, any serious person can really support that. It would involve horrendous sacrifice. Frankly speaking, it would involve horrendous violence. So I don't think any serious person today is talking about that. I tried to address earlier the concept of identity politics. People do have an identity as Shia or Sunni, but I think those identities will evolve over time. So I don't think that's immutable. I mean, you may have people who gain a greater sense of identity as a Southerner as opposed to a Shia. I don't know. I think that's being developed, but I do believe that the Iraq as a nation, I mean, people as a, having a concept of being Iraqi is also very strong. And I think, you know, people can have more than one identity. I mean, we do it in the U.S. all the time. You know, you see many, you know, hyphenated Americans. They have one identity on Sunday afternoon. You know, when they go and eat pierogi or whatever. And then the rest of the six and a half days, they're just completely American identity. So I think that kind of thing can be managed. So, you know, look, this is, this government formation has taken a long time. And it hasn't set the record, by the way. I think the Dutch still have the record on that. I think they were up to seven months. But it's painful, but I don't think people need to start pulling out of the drawer some, you know, really bad ideas yet. I think, you know, I'd keep them squirreled away. Very good, very good. Yes, sir, here. Yes, hi, Ambassador Hill. My name's Jesse Bernstein. I'm from Human Rights First. And I have two questions. One, I was very pleased to hear in your remarks your comments about Mosul. I think a lot of us were concerned about the forced displacement of Christian minorities in Mosul. And I wonder if you could talk about the protection of religious minorities. I was recently in Jordan and Lebanon, and I met with a number of Iraqi refugees. And they all said that they would never, ever want to return. Most of them were religious minorities. And my second related question is about U.S.-affiliated Iraqis, people who experience persecution on account of their affiliation with the U.S. And I'm sure you know, I know you know there is an in-country refugee program in Iraq, but it has a year-long backlog. So I wonder if you could talk about the steps that the U.S. is taking to improve processing for this population. Yeah, I think, first of all, on the issue of the Christian minorities, I've had our regular meetings with the leaders of these Christian minorities, with the Chaldeans, et cetera. And I've also been out to some of these towns in Mosul, including to see this monastery outside of Mosul. And you know, these are ancient communities. I mean, this is really going back to the 2nd century AD. And you know, the Assyrians, for example. I think it has been very difficult for Christians during this period in Iraq history. Many of them were accused unjustly of somehow supporting Saddam. There's no evidence to support that contention. Yet, many of them have been accused of that. And then I think when you talk to the leaders of these communities, one of the things they are most concerned about is the fact that western countries in making room for Iraq refugees have made room for Iraq Christian refugees, meaning that the Christian populations continue to be decimated by people who are trying to help them. So, you know, it's not an easy issue. I mean, one of these Christian leaders told me you should refuse visas for them, even though these are perfectly legitimate programs or, you know, done, you know, whether it's Germany or France or the U.S. You know, we're not going to refuse visas to people who have an eligibility to go. So I would just caution that these are kind of tough issues to manage. We have worked in the area of Mosul to make sure that, you know, you get local police who reflect the local conditions. And I think we're doing okay on that. Occasionally, when churches have been attacked and they have been attacked in Mosul and elsewhere, we have worked with the Iraqi government. I'm pleased to say the Iraqi government has reacted to that, has reacted well in terms of providing protection. I would say these problems are by no means government-inspired. These problems are not government there. They come from other elements of the society. So I think it has to do with, you know, we need to stay engaged on these issues. I have no doubt that Jim Jeffrey will do what the sort of things I was doing, and I know Brian Crocker did those sorts of things where you meet with the communities, try to determine their needs, see if you can be helpful to them. With regard to discrimination due to affiliation with Americans, we do have these programs. I know we have these backlogs. I know we're trying to deal with that. And I think if you talk to the people in refugee affairs, they would say it's a lot less, but, you know, all I can tell you is we're very aware of it. We talk about these issues within the embassy. You know, we don't want a situation where, you know, the affiliation with Americans is, you know, we want to see examples where people are actually being threatened for their affiliation. That is, affiliation with Americans should not just be ipso facto justification for leaving, but we certainly monitor these questions. And as your question implies, there are many examples where people have been treated poorly as a result. There's a related question from our overflow room, Adam Kugel, also with Human Rights Watch. What steps is U.S. government taking to ensure the Iraqi police and security forces have been trained to respect basic government? Well, we have quite a robust training program going in all the provinces, and that's something we've spent a lot of time to make sure that as the military leaves that the civilians, particularly through the State Department, continues this training program. And so we have set up all these hubs for training centers. We're doing, it's not just training police on the beat, but rather, you know, forensics and issues like that. So I would say police training is one of the major elements of the U.S. of the civ military transition. Very good. Sure. Yes, you do, you do, and it's coming. And you'll be next. Warren Strobel with McClatchy Newspapers. Chris, you mentioned several times in your opening remarks the need to remind or convince the American people that Iraq is a country not a war. I'm curious, how concerned are you that the Congress and the American people might not be willing to provide continued resources for a large-scale civilian presence in a war zone going forward, particularly keeping in mind that we are where we are now in Iraq but seven years ago this was a controversial, unpopular war. Yeah. Thanks. I think, you know, we work a lot with congressional staff. We work with congressional members. You know, I think Iraq was a, you know, it's been a difficult seven years and quite an emotional seven years when you look at the thousands of Americans that have been killed and the concern that the objectives or that the causes bellows, you know, as in many people's minds has changed. You know, that is why we went in there. So, I think, first of all, you have to respect the person on the other side of the issue here. You know, you can't just dismiss these concerns about Iraq as coming from people who are uninformed. I mean, it's been a tough issue. I mean, I would argue that we've gotten to the point where our programs are slimming down and where our, even though there are different committees doing this, that is, defense appropriations is different from state ops, state department appropriations. And so, the state department, state ops may think that the numbers are going way up, but if they look at what the overall hit is in terms of national security, the numbers are definitely coming down. And I would just argue that, you know, we live in an era now where we're doing these so-called fourth phase, you know, civilian ops, and I think it's time that people kind of took out a more holistic view of how to measure our engagement. And if you just consider, you know, military operations and civilian operations as apples and oranges, I don't think that's the right way to look at it. I mean, I think we are taking over a number of duties that were previously done by the military and because they are appropriately civilian missions, such as police training. I think the military has done a fabulous job of police training, but it can't keep doing that. That has to be done by civilians. And so, what I don't want is a kind of situation where, because the civilians can't get the money to do that, we have to keep tasks on the military side. I think the... These are... It's not easy because, you know, the military, for example, has, you know, a couple of major deployments, Afghanistan and Iraq. The State Department needs to be there, needs to be there in a big way, but, you know, we have about 178 other deployments. I mean, we are not... You know, we don't just all go to Iraq and Afghanistan. We have major relationships, you know, China, you know, Indonesia, you know, even the much maligned Embassy Paris. That's a major relationship we have there. I mean, you know, France is a very important place for our interests, not only in France, but our interests in many other parts of the world. We need a first-rate Embassy in Paris. So we have to balance all of these things while stepping up and making sure we get done what needs to get done. And so it isn't easy, but, you know, we have some extremely talented people working on these issues, working with the Congress. And so, in answer to your question, I think we will figure it out because I do think it makes sense. Staying on this topic of the transition from military to civilian operations. We have a question online. I'd like to ask Ambassador Hill's perspective on the use of PRTs as the U.S. drawdown continues. And more broadly, we understand that there had been the plan for five of the Embassy branch offices, and that may be down to four, as you indicate the resources may not be there. As you've indicated, a lot of talented people thinking about this transition. If you could say a little more about that. You know, I thought this whole issue of five to four was being handled in very hush-hush meetings. But here we are on television discussing it, so why not? Boy. You know, to manage your relationship in Iraq, you can't just do it from one place in Baghdad. You've got to be kind of forward deployed in a number of areas. In an ideal world, you'd like to be forward deployed in Anbar. You'd like to be in Najaf. You'd like to be in Diyala. You'd like to be in Kirkuk, Mosul, Erbil, Basra. When you start costing these things out, they're not cheap. And the issue really is when you start looking at so-called life-sustainment, if you look at some of the transport issues, it's not easy to put people out there. I mean, it's one thing to put people in harm's way. It's another thing to put people in a place where you don't have the means to defend them. And this is all assuming that we, this is a period after the military, the SOF agreement expires, and with the expiration of the SOF agreement, there can't be any U.S. forces unless they're there under a legal agreement. So when the SOF agreement expires, you have to assume that there won't be U.S. troops. So when you look at some of these things, and some of these, to take a provincial reconstruction team and take it out of the sort of military cocoon that it's in and try to have the State Department do some of the sustainment, you start running into a lot of heavy costs. For example, some of our PRTs, our people are transported, courtesy of the military and MRAPs. Now, do you want to have, once the military is gone, do you want to say, well, you don't really need MRAPs, you could probably do it in a suburban, I guess, or can you? So you've got to make some assumptions about what the security situation is. So before you know it, you start costing in MRAPs. You've got to start costing in what it costs to maintain an MRAP. And before you know it, you're into some big numbers. So I think it's one of these things where, to Warren's previous question, you've got to kind of work out what is the most crucial? Can you handle some issues via sort of a more robust travel plan from the embassy? Where do you really need people stationed all week long or all month long or all year long? I mean, those questions. And so, you know, you come up with like a lot of things in life. I mean, I'll bet the USIP building was twice as large as the one that was finally built. So you have to make some adjustments. But what I can tell you is that whatever finally emerges in our sort of footprint in Iraq, and by the way, we've informed the Iraqi government on this, we have permission to move on this because this is not just some unilateral decision on our part, but I can assure you that we will have a footprint where people, we will have the right people in the right place. They will be protected. We are not going to put people at any undue risk, and that it will be commensurate and consistent with our country's objectives in that country. Just a minute. Hi, I'm Elizabeth Lee with Voice of America. There are some in Iraq who, when they look at their history of conflict when it comes to political, religious, and cultural, wonder if the current system of government is going to work, and they look at how painful this government-building process is now. They fear that when there is a government in place that it might be weak and unstable, are these fears justified in your opinion, and what can be done to ensure that the government is effective? Yeah, it's sort of, I mean, it's kind of a broad question, but Iraqis are very used to strong government, but for obvious reasons, they fear strong government as well. So the alternative to strong government is weak government, and then they worry about that as well. So it's... I'm convinced that, to use the old line that democracy is the best form of government because it's difficult, but it's better than all the others. I don't see any other model out there for Iraq. I mean, the notion that, well, this is difficult, let's go back to mass murder, which is essentially what Saddam Hussein... The trouble with a little authoritarianism is it's tough to keep at just a little. So the notion that you can go to some kind of other model and say, okay, it'll be benign authoritarianism, it's hard to keep it benign. So I think they got the right system. And the issue is to try to make it work. Like whether it's a marriage or anything, you just try to make it work. And so obviously it's going to be difficult, but I think in this government formation, I am sure that people will look back at this period and there will be lessons learned from this period. So I don't panic about this at all. I think what needs to be done is people need to stay calm and it's hard to do and it's 125 degrees out. It's tough to do right now in Ramadan where no one's eating until after sundown. So I think they just got to get through this. And as for what Iraq had in the past, you know, in most countries, most countries in the world, if you look at their past, there's not a lot of inspiration there for good governance. I think this is one of these things where you have to look forward. Sir. Thank you, Mr. Siddar. I'm Najmi Djibouti, the former mayor in Tel Aviv in Iraq. I have two questions. Yes. About the democracy in Iraq, many Iraqi insiders believe that whoever becomes the next prime minister in Iraq will ensure that he stays in power for many years, like any leader in the region. And because that al-Maliki captured the chair and he don't want to leave the chair, you think the democracy in process in Iraq in the future work, this one? And how you read both America and Iran won't al-Maliki stay in the power? Thank you. I'm sorry. Iran, did you say? How both America and Iran want al-Maliki stay in the power? It's not up to us and it's not up to Iran. It's going to be up to what the Iraqis decide on how long they want Prime Minister Maliki to stay. I mean, the other question you ask is a very interesting question because it really goes to the question of term limits. We've had this issue come up in the U.S. about term limits. That is, the longer people stay, the longer they'll stay even further and then you worry about issues like corruption, etc., etc. So should you have term limits? And a lot of countries looked at it. We didn't have term limits for the U.S. president until after World War II when we passed constitutional amendment at term limits. So it would not surprise me if the Iraqi people had a debate about this and it would not be astonishing to me if there were some effort to have term limits because of the sphere that you mentioned and a fear rooted in how governance is often done in the region. That is, once you're in, you stay. And I'm not sure that's necessarily good for any country. What the term limit would be? Do you have two terms, three terms? I mean, what do you do? Again, I think people need to look at it and they're pros and cons of it, you know, too because running a rock is not for amateurs. I mean, you know, running that country, as you know, it's a complicated matter. So you can't just say, okay, you know, you'll have six months and out you go and we'll put someone else. I would be careful about that. I think you need some real professionalism in how you run it. But I think the concern that somehow, whether it's a Maliki government or some other government, that they stay and stay, I think it's something the Iraqi people ought to have a discussion about and make a decision on. So it's been done in many other countries. You know, I say this to the point where I've bored myself, let alone the people I'm talking to, but you know, Iraq is unique, its problems are not unique. And this notion that somehow Iraq has discovered that there's such a thing as term limits and that no one else has ever contemplated that issue wrong. I mean, there are a lot of problems that are all over the world and Iraq can learn from how other countries have dealt with them. So now I've bored you with that, too. But I really, I know it's blindingly obvious, but it needs to be restated. There are a couple of questions from representatives of embassies here in Washington and from overseas, about through Hill. Embassies overseas? No, no, embassies here in Washington and then a couple of overseas questions as well. The overseas question relates to the Iran issue. Does the, what is the political role of Iran in the future of stable Iraq? Does there aforementioned lack of respect for Iraqi sovereignty pose a threat to a newly formed government? That's kind of one. Lack of respect for Iraq's sovereignty. Coming from Iran. Does that pose a threat to a newly formed government, which you have said is coming? So that's one question. Then a related one from the embassies here, one from embassy Poland, embassy Israel, having to do with kind of coordination among allies. And this one talks about the engagement in the next phase. Is the U.S. going to work closely with NATO training mission in Iraq, and particular with the EU lex mission, just lex as justice sector reform is concerned in order to coordinate the efforts? And is the U.S. working with other countries, Saudi Arabia, Turkey to make sure the interests are the same that is a stable Iraq in a regional framework? Okay. So kind of show a related question. On Iran, I mean, actually there's more talk about this in Washington than there is in Baghdad. I, you know, Iraqis, I don't care who you are in Iraq, you don't plan to sell your country to Iran. I mean, it's, so I hear a lot of people described as pro-Iranian. You know, when you talk to them, they're not pro-Iranian. I really think there's a lot of exaggeration in that. In the degree to which there are Iraqis who are looking to sell the country's interest to Iran, what is not exaggerated, unfortunately, though, is the degree to which the Iranians have engaged in mischief in Iran, in Iraq. And the fact that these, some of these extremist groups get training, get equipment from Iraq is, is, from Iran is a fact. A 107-millimeter rocket that landed in my yard a few months ago, it had Iran markings on it. I mean, they come from Iran. And, you know, if I were the Iranians and I looked at Iraq and I thought to myself, you know, whatever we do is not going to be, whatever we the Iranians do is not going to really determine that country's fate. That country's fate is going to be determined by its own people as they, you know, get their oil sector going on, et cetera. And if I were Iran, I would be looking to build a good relationship overcoming one of the most horrific wars in the 20th century, the Iran-Iraq war. And if I were Iran, I'd do a much better job of sort of looking at what my long-term interests are in Iraq. And Iran's long-term interests in Iraq are not served by allowing Qatusha rockets to come over the border. And they are coming over the border, and they continue to come over the border. So I think the Iranians have acted recklessly with these sorts of activities, this support for their malign influence and support for these radical groups. When I look at their efforts to affect the political situation, they have not been very successful. Iran made it very clear that they opposed open lists in the elections. This is early on in the election law. The Iranians made it very clear they didn't want to see open lists. They wanted closed lists. It didn't happen. They were open lists. Then they wanted all Shia together and tried to turn this into a Shia versus Sunni issue. It didn't happen. The Shia did not come together. Then the Iranians were clearly the inspiration for some of this politicized debathification. By the way, I say politicized because there are statutes for debathification, as there are denazification in Germany and elsewhere. But the Iranians clearly engaged in trying to aid and abet politicization and wedge creation on debathification. It didn't work. They have, at times, tried to put their weight behind various candidates. It hasn't worked. They have invited, at one point, they invited all the Shia parties and some of the Kurdish parties to have a government made in Tehran. It didn't work. When you look at how influential they are, I'd be careful with the notion that they somehow call the tune or call the shots in Iraq. I'd be careful with the notion that Iraqis, even Iraqis who want to have a good relationship with this neighbor that's been their neighbor for centuries, I'd be careful with the notion that those people, even though they want a good relationship with Iran, are somehow doing Iran's work for them. They're not. So I think if I were the Iranians, I'd sort of take a deep breath and look to see what my long-term interests are and behave a little differently. And U.S. coordination with allies, both in Europe and in the region? Yeah, these are really good ideas. And General Barbero has been working this in some of these NATO training missions, and we've been very pleased with some of the NATO countries that have been interested in working on to help the Iraqi army. We think the more exposure Iraq gets, again, I want to emphasize, terrorism and dictatorship, we know about those. Isolation has been a very serious problem for that country. And to the extent that they can be exposed to NATO training missions, I think we think it's all very positive. The Poles have been there as part of it. We've seen some of the Scandinavian, I mean the Danes involved, I think. The French have been very interested in this. I think this is very positive, and I would look to see more of this kind of thing. I think what is most gratifying is to see that as the years go by, the months and years go by, Iraq is more and more understood to be the important player that it is in the region, and it's not just a U.S. issue. I mean, when I went to the opening, the convocation of the new Swedish embassy, it was attended by the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bilt. Inevitably, we said it was the house that Carl built, but it was a, you know, it was a really very serious embassy. It was great to see. I mean, the Swedes are talking about doing, you know, other things up in northern Iraq, and you know, very engaged, and I think the more European countries get involved with Iraq, the better. Very good, very good. Sorry. No, you were. I'm sorry. Yeah, right here, and then coming back. Yes. Ah. Oda Aberdeen. Ambassador Hell, you gave us an optimistic scenario. I always do. My question to you, based on your experience in Iraq, do you see on the horizon an Iraqi Lincoln or bold moves and look up to the inside? An Iraqi Lincoln? The car or the president? You know, I think not to tamp down that sense of optimism, I'd like to see actually more Iraqis engaged in the political process. And frankly speaking, seven years into their democracy, albeit a democracy that is, you know, work in progress, one would have liked to see some new faces after seven years, and yet, there are not a lot of new faces there. So, I think it's important for young people in Iraq to understand this is their Iraq, this is their country, and they have a great opportunity to build a very, very new state. And I must say, when I've gone to some of the universities, I don't hear Iraqi kids talking about Shia and Sunni and, you know, Article 140 issues, I mean, most of them are saying, do you think my engineering degree will be good enough for when the ExxonMobil comes? Do you think they'll accept my engineering degree? Which I think is a great question. I didn't know the answer to it, but I hope that, you know, democracy will spawn a kind of interest in political activity in a civil society. It is encouraging that the Iraqi government last year went ahead with an NGO law, because, you know, I mean, in many of these new democracies, the development of the NGO sector, NGOs are sort of the protoplasm of democratic structures. I mean, these are activists, people who go out there, care about the community. In the Middle East, sometimes those have been not positive structures. With some of the approach of some of these kids, I see it as very positive. And I hope that that will, you know, that we will see some of these political parties, some of these political coalitions get some new fresh blood in them. And maybe out of this next generation, you will see, you know, some great leaders emerge. But, you know, it's very easy to be critical of the current crop of leaders. I mean, you know, you can complain that many of them spent too much time out of the country. You can complain that some of them spent too much time in the country. You know, it's easy to criticize. But, you know, a lot of these guys risk their lives, you know, doing these things, being involved politically. You know, they take a lot of criticism. No matter who does what, you know, the person will be accused of being pro-Iranian or, you know, pro-Saudi or something. You know, it's not an easy job. And yet, somehow, as my optimistic take on this, I do believe the country's going in the right direction. And it would not just be going in the right direction. If we're up to the American Embassy or the U.S. military, we're the only players. We need to have the Iraqis, you know, blazing the trail when they're doing it. That would be critical. And... But I think we ought to cut them some slack here, at the same time encourage a new generation of leaders to emerge. We're going to do... The last question from the audience is to be here. And then I've got two online and that will... If you have time for those, that will be great. So, right back here. Good morning, Ambassador. My name is Armando Rojas and I'm a grad student at Texas A&M University. Texas A&M? Sure. Well, Ryan Crocker is the dean of the School of Government there now. And my question is about... Going back to the question about NATO members in Iraq, Turkey, it seems like, is pursuing a more assertive foreign policy in its backyard. What sort of effect do you see this having on the development of a new government in Iraq and its stability? Turkey has a great interest in how Iraq develops and is expressed in great activism. I mean, they are inviting the leaders to Ankara, to Istanbul. They're very much engaged. I think from U.S. policy perspective, Turkey is a positive influence in Iraq. You look at Turkey's economic, you know, their investments in Iraq. I think it's all... It's positive and I think we should encourage that. More of a regional interest on the part of the Turks means necessarily less of a, how to put it, western aspiration. You know, we are very much engaged with the Turks on these issues. Our president talks to Prime Minister Erdogan. I know that Secretary Clinton talks to Davutoglu. I talked to the Turks ambassador a lot. I used to deal with him on the Balkans in Washington. I think we've got a really good ally in Iraq. They have a history there. I mean, it is amazing when you talk about the Turks and their why some Iraqis might be critical about what Turkey is... some Kurds might be critical about what Turkey has done in Ninoa in terms of their engagement with some of the parties there, and then when you start looking into the history of Ninoa and the Ottoman Empire you see the complexity of it. It's always difficult to deal with neighbors where there's quite a historical component to it, but I think by and large we've got a great relationship with Turkey and we welcome Turkey's interest in Iraq. John and Cairo has the next last question. At the beginning of the occupation, Paul Bremmer said that his primary focus is, if not the primary focus, was to remake Iran's socialist economy into a model free market economy. Do you think the plan is still being carried through and what will be its legacy for post-occupation? I wouldn't call Iraq a socialist economy today. In some respects it's a kind of race between the dissipation and even collapse of the sector and the rise of the private sector. And I think the private sector is winning there. So I think it's sort of going in the right direction on a path that's very narrow and you stub your toe a lot on it. I avoid sort of wide sweeps of socialist versus capitalist. I'd rather just talk about the direction it's going. I think it's basically going in the right direction. But it's not easy. The last question from Hamouzou in Baghdad is, what is the extent of Ambassador Hill's optimism for Iraq after his deployment there? Is he more or less optimistic now than at the start of his deployment? You know it's like a lot of countries you're deployed to. First you get there and you say, this isn't so bad. Figure this out. And then you get to know more people and then you kind of start understanding the dimensions of the problem and then you kind of go into a view that nothing's ever going to get better here. And then after a while you kind of figure it out and you kind of sort of sort out what the issues really are versus what issues are going to take more time and you get more realistic about how you view things. And so finally it's time to leave and you kind of look back and you say well, I think they're going to make it. And it's usually because you can't quite see the alternative to making it, not making it. What does that mean? Iraq is in no danger of being a failed state. I mean this is a state that is going to insist on a certain order. So I think they've been through the toughest time. And so I have a sort of optimistic sense that they know what they need to do. And I'm not sure us wagging our finger at them every day and telling them what they need to do is necessarily going to get them to do it. I think they're going to have to sort these things out on their own. I think the Iraqi people need to be quite positive that they kind of get some things done. And I think you're seeing some of that pressure building. But I think it was an interesting piece over the weekend in the New York Times. I think Shadeed did a thing about American clocks and sometimes I don't understand half the stuff he writes, but the it was a very interesting piece that it's not going to be done on our time schedule necessarily. And I think that's a very important point to make. So it's never going to be when you want it. And I think I made the point the other day if it's instant gratification you're looking for, you better look elsewhere. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.