 that term, you know, it's someone like, and I now have a website that I decided to dedicate specifically to this, say, constellation, not a movement, it's called alternativeright.com. When someone like Mari Annetti, you know, wrote a manifesto or something, I think he kind of created a movement with that manifesto. I didn't do anything like that. I think I was trying to put a name on something that was, that's already developing. It's a constellation of writers and thinkers. The alternative right is by no means a mass movement. It sadly is not one possessing think tank money and big foundation donors and all that kind of stuff. It's basically a constellation of a lot of different thinkers who have gone completely AWOL from the duopoly of conservative or Republican politics in America. They've gone AWOL from the kind of lesser of two evils. Who are we going to support this year? Politics. And I think on a deeper level, they, the alternative right questions the real fundamental egalitarian and democratic assumptions of both the left and the right, both Democrats and the Republicans in the United States. Alain de Benoit, who's a member of the so-called, you know, Nouvelle Duat, the new right in France, he once addressed the French Communist Party and he said that really left and right are no longer operative. What's operative is the center and the outliers. The center being egalitarianism, being democracy, being mass consumerism, so globalism, so on and so forth, and people kind of being on the outside. Another one of my friends and someone who's contributed to the website, Jim Cowell, he said, you know, what the alternative right is, is really is thinking the unthinkable, thinking something that's dangerous. And I think that's a very good definition. It's also worth pointing out that if you think about other, let's say, deviations from political norm in American history, they very often agreed on fundamentals with the party from whom they were deviating from. If you think of Robert Taft or someone like that question, Cold War, question the Korean War, things like that, he basically agreed with the Republican Party, you know, conservatism on the big issues. We don't. And again, I think that's a very important thing. If I were to describe the alternative right in one way, I could list a number of people and websites and publications. Certainly many of them are here today. I would certainly talk about Peter Bremelow and Vider and Paul Godfried as our theorist. Also, I would, there's another thing that I'll stress, and I'm going to return to this a little bit later in the talk, but there's a whole blogosphere that's developed around Steve Saylor. And basically something that I think now is being called HVD, which is Human Biodiversity. It was formerly called Sociobiology, and it also is related to what might be called race realism, and in some ways related to white nationalism, if you think of Jira Taylor and people like that. But there's a whole blogosphere focused around HVD, and this is again something that is, without question, taboo in the mainstream of both left and right. And I think it's something that is certainly a kind of engine drive, the alternative right, and something that separates us from pretty much everyone else. And there's also the other aspect, which is some very crucial insights from Austrian economics. And I'm going to particularly stress a certain kind of apocalypse is later in the talk of what that means for us. I'll really, before I begin, I'll just quickly lay out some groundwork. Although maybe I don't need to do that. I think Hans is very good at talking about the paleoconservative movement as kind of a rearguard, hastily assembled action against neoconservative ascendancy within the conservative movement of GOP. You also have something that certainly also that influences us, if you think of the old right. But in some ways, that's a bit of a myth. The old right consists of great literary stylists and philosophers like H. L. Minkin or Albert J. Nock, Garrett Gerratt, Rose Wilder Lane, maybe even I am Rand. But this is something that was in some ways it was invented by Murray Rothbard after the fact. Most of these people did not know one another. They certainly were not working in any kind of movement. And so to say that that was betrayed or to talk about, you know, with Justin Raimondo wrote a book under Rothbard's guidance about the lost legacy of the conservative movement, to call the old right a lost legacy of the conservative movement, I think is a bit wishful thinking. Not to say that any of those people aren't great and influential, but you know, but again, that's, you know, to think of us continuing the old right or something like that, I don't think that's possible. There's also the French new right, which I of course mentioned, and there's also something that I'm going to dwell on today, which is the American conservative movement and what's a kind of buckly eyed movement. I think also what is important with that is that people, contemporary conservatives are either completely unaware of something like the old right, the French new right, or even the paleos, or else they totally reject them as somehow anti-American or anti-Semitic or racist or evil or left-wing or something like that, and I think that's fairly important. There is a very strong hegemony in the American discourse on both sides that is simply not going to recognize in some ways these other divergences and things that are much more intellectually stimulating in my opinion. Let me talk a little bit about conservatism in general and also I'm going to talk about a certain kind of problematic relation that, or a problematic position that the American conservative movement and the buckly eyed movement has taken, and I think that's actually very good at really getting to where this new alternative right is diverging from the mainstream conservative movement. Conservatism, perhaps despite its pretensions, is a scandalously relativist mode of thought. A conservative conserves something and he's thus inseparable from the social order and the class, usually a ruling class, that he has chosen to defend. Karl Mannheim, the Hungarian Jewish social scientist, discussed the fact that conservatism really lacks a priori, but it has great abundance of hick and nuke, perhaps also ad hoc. It's a form of thought where you are really defending a specific social order in a class, so thus Edmund Burke is without question a conservative, but then so is Brezhnev, is also a very conservative thinker. He was a, he consolidated an empire. The 1991 hardliners who attempted a coup in Moscow were deeply conservative people. They were trying, they were kind of a last gasp of a particular version of the Russian Empire. And so what I think in some ways these conservatism was always relying on a certain revolution. And in some ways the way, the way I would think about this is that there's, with conservative thought, there's a, there's a kind of cancellation effect where in some ways cause sometimes, sometimes the effect precedes cause. They kind of have things backwards. And you know one, one joke that I, I, I, or one you know anecdote that I like is from a movie called To Be Or Not To Be, which was a, is a 1940 comedy. It's very, very good. It's kind of an improbable comedy about a husband and wife acting team in a Polish theater troupe in Occupy Warsaw. And as the joke goes, the, the, the husband comes back, he sees his wife and he says, oh I just got back from the poster maker and I just insisted that your name get top billing above mine in our next production. And, and she said, oh you know, you deserve it darling. And you know she says, oh that's, that's so wonderful. I appreciate that. But you, you really needn't do that. It's, it's simply not necessary. And he goes, oh I knew you were gonna say that and that's why I told the poster maker to put my name back on top. And I, I think that kind of psychological cancellation where some previous revolution, some previous social deviation is kind of reimagined as conservative is, is an essential characteristic of conservative thought. And so you know, if we, if we look at what, you know, who are the conservatives today, you know, in some ways you could probably say the, the liberal establishment as a deeply conservative. I mean David from David Broder, The Washington Post, all of Keith Overman, various, various, you know, big-name liberals are really deeply conservative people. They, they are, they are consolidating and fighting against people who are going to upset their order. They, they love moderates, moderates are beloved, conservative moderates, particularly our beloved figures. And you know, and if you, if you really question anything about the welfare warfare of state, you must be kind of delusional or, or perhaps evil and racist or you should be, you know, maybe jailed or locked up. I, I, you know, I think that, that is basically the, the, the mode of thought. And I think that's a, that's a very deeply, deeply conservative. Also the, but of course we do have conservatives in America. And I think in some ways their function is what Murray Rothbard described them as in the 1992 John Randolph Club speech, which, which Hans has alluded to, says a genuine conservative, the kind of liberal establishment loves doesn't want to repeal or abolish anything. He is a kind and gentle soul who wants to conserve what left liberals have accomplished. And thus, you know, well my, my friend Paul Godfrey might rage at the conservative movement for its constant outreach to, to various minorities, for its, its discovery that Martin Luther King was actually a conservative theologian for its support of not only the New Deal, next thing, they support LBJ in the welfare state. You know, someone like Paul might, might be outraged by that. But in some ways it is the conservative movement is serving its function when it does like that. It's that constant kind of cancellation in a, in a Hegelian sense of the past and the kind of sliding forward. Real quickly, there of course was, there is another conservative movement. And oh, well, maybe before I say that I'll mention, well, I'll just skip, skip over that. There is another conservative movement. And, and that's something in America that is actually, it's, it's one that's very flexible. And you know, it's a, it's a kind of grassroots conservative movement that you can trace back from, say, immigration restriction in the 20s. You could probably connect it with prohibition. You could connect it with the American First Movement. You could connect it with various grassroots populist appeals. You could even connect it with the Scopes, so-called monkey trial. You can accept it with basically populist appeals to the heartland. This notion that one, one, one needs to be a kind of a dignified religious person in order for this constitutional democratic capitalist system to work. And in various kind of grassroots popular appeals, I think in some ways left and right is a very visceral thing and might very well be a genetic thing. And, and certainly supporting America in the Cold War and elsewhere was just something that one did as a, as a kind of, you know, upstanding person. This, this, this kind of, this in many ways wasm, in many ways a kind of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, a group that was the, the grassroots of, of conservatism. They are a very unpredictable, but I think someone like Sam Francis, you know, in the, in the 80s and 90s, he believed that these Middle American radicals would might very well kind of go and take their country back. And he wanted to appeal to them. This is a kind of a dangerous appeal. I, I think there was a, a Mars revolution, as he said, but it sadly occurred in 2002, 2003, and they're eating freedom fries and, and supporting George Bush's war in any rock and elsewhere. So this is a, you know, this, this kind of grassroots, populist, white Christian, you know, kind of thing. It's not led by intellectuals and it's, it can be turned in various directions. Certainly it's, it's very excited by the Tea Parties. It's also very excited by Sarah Palin and things like that. What I think is interesting about the conservative movement, and this is the, the Buckley-eyed one, the one, one by intellectuals, is that they, they certainly relied on this grassroots WASP base for people who would, who would certainly vote for their candidates, who would perhaps subscribe to their magazines and so on and so forth. And yet, they never really wanted to defend this group. They never explicitly wanted to defend it as a class or as a people. And you see this throughout the, the people most admired by the conservative movements, such as Russell Kerker, Harry Jaffa, and various other luminaries like this. They basically wanted to, they had a kind of anti-historicist notion that they weren't actually defending the WASP founding stock of the United States. That in fact, they were defending these kind of eternal values that, or actually what Russell Serps said, they had an ontic status. That is, they were independent, a kind of internal, and that was regardless of the people holding them. So they basically had these notions of themselves. I think Harry Jaffa had a determined that really to be an American, you needed a commitment to equality. And commitment should be a, you know, should be a remind one of Enganger, a kind of leftist appeal. So in some ways, the, what you see with the conservative movement is this attempt not to defend bourgeois America and instead to kind of have these pretenses of defending eternal values. And in some ways, they became a kind of conservative version of the left. They had their own rights of man. They had their own demands that to really to be an American is to embrace equality and things like that. And they, and they didn't in some ways stick up for us, so to speak. They stuck up for some value system that they were creating. And you can also see how easily a movement like this, well before I say that, but also see that in some ways when you have this left liberal value, we have this kind of eternal value system that you create, this ontic system of values. And in some ways has nowhere else to slide but left. You know, a lot of the left liberals love to point out how these crazy reactionary opinions that William Buckley had when he was a young man and things like that. They, you know, the conservative movement opposed civil rights. They wanted to repeal the new deal and so on and so forth. But I think what's actually more telling is not so much that they had these opinions at one point, but that they're so easily, they could so easily slide to new ones. You know, it's the the Buckleyite movement could at one point say we're going to get rid of the new deal. We just like this MLK guy. And then a mere 10 years will pass and they'll be deifying Martin Luther King as a conservative theologian. And talking about, you know, how we need to preserve the welfare state and preserve medicare. These, this, when you, when you're a conservative yet you're really not defending a particular order or social order. You have these values that can just flow, you know, which way, this way, and that. And certainly in our context they have just, you know, almost inevitably shifted left. Of course there is one thing that the conservative movement has defended staunchly and that is the welfare state aspect. And if you think of, if you think of the new right as it came with gold water and things like this, they obviously, they spoke a lot about constitutionalism, about, you know, getting rid of the welfare state. They also spoke a lot about rolling back communism, they just transferred it to rolling back Islam or something like this. And if you really, if you want to think about cultural or libertarian conservatives who latched on to this movement, they in many ways should be considered as full idiots to use the lininist term in an ironic manner. The conservative movement has done absolutely nothing for them and they've done pretty much everything for things like the military industrial complex. Okay, so that's basically, I think that's how I talk about conservatives in America. And I want to focus on a few things that really separate the alternative right and why we're different and why we are kind of questioning these values of the conservative movement in a very fundamental way. And I'm going to talk about this in terms of HVD, human biodiversity. You know, the information age has certainly become an age of public outrage. You have every, certainly every week there's some various race or gender scandal that goes on if you, you know, perhaps the Duke La Crosse case would be one that happened a couple years ago that's pretty evident. And usually the right wing in America can be relied upon to criticize these things. You know, you can usually rely upon them to kind of point out the obvious and say that, you know, no, Al Sharpton's a bad guy, he's ridiculous. You shouldn't just indulge in white guilt and say that it's really slavery that keeps everyone down and that's why we have income or educational gaps and that no, you know, a new social program is actually not going to help black people. It might add very well these new welfare programs or very well birth them and so on and so forth. They can usually be relied to point out the obvious. But what's important here is that the right always criticizes the left's race of recessions within the context of its own lysincoism and version of multicultural togetherness. And if you put it another way, the right criticizes the left only within the horizon of egalitarianism and therefore what you really need for say African Americans if they're not, you know, achieving to the level of whites or Asians is not a new welfare program because that won't work but instead you need a kind of values therapy on them. They need to be taught about family values and constitutionalism and soon they'll kind of rise up to the top. So basically what the conservative movement has is its own egalitarian multicultural image of basically this kind of society of interchangeable individuals that are basically classless and ethnicity and raceless. And again this goes back to this point of the American conservatism as basically a kind of version of the left. They have their own rights of man and they have all this kind of stuff. I think basically what is very important, one important way to fight against this and to fight against this on the most fundamental level is a rational and a realistic understanding of race differences. And certainly Richard Lenn will be speaking on this so I don't think I need to to go into this much further. There's obvious overwhelming amount of evidence of IQ differences between you know Africans, African Americans in America having usually IQ of 85, Latinos, Hispanics somewhere in the 90 range of white Americans as a kind of mean 100 usually Asians a little bit about that and Jews a little bit about that. There's an overwhelming amount of evidence that this exists. There's also an overwhelming amount of genetic evidence that this exists. Now I don't say any of this. I don't think understanding say IQ differences is going to be very good at white consciousness raising or thinking things like that. I think that is something that's the domain of poetry and literature and philosophy maybe. I do think that having an understanding of this is essential as a counter attack against this ever encroaching welfare state and the ever expanding egalitarian ideology. I won't go in this as I don't want to I don't want to go over but certainly Marx in his Goto program basically set out very explicitly that equal rights are these are basically bourgeois rights and they are they're unequal rights in the sense that there is a natural aristocracy of talent. There is a natural aristocracy of ability and that basically they're this these equal or bourgeois rights are going to lead to unequal income unequal outcomes and incomes and in a sense what he wanted in a communist society is that we would move beyond mere bourgeois equal rights and we'd you know soon fly the banner from each according to his capacity to each according to his need. In some ways Marx should be praised for his honesty in a sense that he he was cute you know when you the typical leftist now whenever you talk about say race differences or IQ they think you're delusional or you're hateful or you're you're somehow crazy and should be locked up. Marx actually very much acknowledged the natural aristocracy of talent and ability and he claimed that it should it must be crushed and you know when you think about Murray Rothbard was certainly well aware of this fact and the the importance of of understanding race differences if you look at his his praise of say Charles Murray and Richard Hernstein's the bell curve he asked the question of why we talk about race and he said if and when we as populists and libertarians abolish the welfare state in all its aspect and property rights in the free markets are a triumphant many individuals and groups will predictably not like the end result and that is the case you know certainly a great deal of the there might not be a black middle class certainly without the the welfare state and and federal employment there are many people who benefit from that and in this case those ethnic and other groups who might be concentrated in lower income or less prestigious occupations guided by their socialist mentors were predictably raised the cry that the free market is evil and discriminatory and that therefore collectivism is needed to redress the balance in that case the intelligence argument will become useful to defend the market economy and free society from ignorant or self-serving attacks in short racialist science is properly not an act of aggression or a cover for oppression of one group or another but to the contrary an operation in defense of private property and against assaults by aggressors and I would just add in closing of this of this section that I would really say that the left liberal establishment for them race is of paramount importance they think about it they might not think about anything else it was kind of interesting the there's a former Tony Blair speechwriter and he admitted that their immigration policy in the late 90s and early 2000s was 100% about race it had nothing to do with the economy they actually hoped that the economy wouldn't was big enough to kind of absorb all these third world undesirables that were brought into the country and basically he wanted to in his words rub the right's face and diversity to kind of build up so much diversity that they couldn't possibly get rid of it after about 10 years so basically the left is always thinking about race many right wing people don't want to think about it because it's mean and nasty or it might mean you're a Nazi or something like that and so you you know the right might not want to think about race but race is thinking about them and you really can't choose where you fight battles if you're being attacked by sea you have to fight by sea and you're being attacked by sea you can't decide that you're going to raise an army on land and if you're being attacked in the racial question you need to to do a counterattack and the most fundamental aspect of that and and not you know as I as I mentioned before just split out this conservative movement version of egalitarianism which is that other races just need new values and they'll become Americans and if you see also this is this kind of egalitarianism on the domestic level is in some ways a kind of inside out or a microcosm macrocosm of American foreign policy where it's anyone can become an American if they have the proper democratic values and as well we want to turn everyone into an American by you know you know declaring war on them and establishing new parliaments and and and what not okay I'm gonna I might go over by a couple of minutes okay I'm gonna end up just on talking a little bit about Austrian economics and and how this also is is connected with the alternative right as it's emerging in the United States you know sir sir Robert Walpole was probably the he's a British Prime Minister in the 1720s he's probably the inventor of imperial finance and what he he came up with this idea if you have a a steady stream of income i.e taxation then you can basically keep buying you can keep issuing bond after bond and keep paying the interest of these bonds and every time the bond matures you can just issue a new one and it actually you never have to ultimately repay the debt and this can go on for infinity and this is something that America has certainly learned this imperial lesson well and if they've in some ways just put this on steroids and if you add that with the the kind of post bread and woods system of the dollar as a world reserve currency they have the ability to issue almost towards and they think infinitely you know perpetually issue more and more bonds and perpetually inflate and that they're going to kind of get away with it the only problem with this is that you see you see the kind of 12 to 13 trillion dollars of national debt but that actually doesn't even come close to the some 70 to 100 trillion dollars of unfunded liabilities the only possible way that the government would take care of that debt would be either to default which i don't think they would ever do or to print out of their way out of it i think they think they're going to get away with that printing but you know sad to say the laws of gravity the laws of physics and the laws of the economics they apply to the United States just as they apply to anyone else and so basically what i i think if you you begin with an insight like that you're able to understand the degree to which there is going to be a a really a great monetary fiscal funding crisis in the United States future and you know lots of lots of libertarians have imagined what it would be like if the state were to collapse if say if we can just imagine this together if the United States were unable to fund its imperial army it was unable to keep the the union together what would happen many might imagine a kind of individualist order that would that would arise but if we really think about this realistically if this the situation occurred where there is a serious monetary crisis there would not we would not break down to a kind of kato institute fantasy of of of individualist capitalist selling things to one another and and there'd be no no no we're totally interchangeable we would actually experience whole new advancements in social intolerance if the if the the army were not able to be funded they were not able to preserve order you might very well have latino nationalist communities kind of almost arising in in california in the southwest you might have various things arising in the inner cities that were that were again you know race-based and in terms of black blacks you might you know gerry north might actually be able to establish a christian reconstructionist protestant state somewhere in the middle west that would make calvins juneva seem like cancun you you know you you would have these basically with the the class of the state you would not have a kind of regression to this you know individualist libertarian kind of fantasy you would actually have whole new forms of of authority and identity that would arise you know out of that chaos and that in many ways these will be based on identity and ethnicity they might be based on race they'll be based on religion and so basically the way I would I would end with that is that so many conservatives have always wanted to kind of turn back the clock you know in Rothbard and in his speech in 1992 he he spoke about how you know some people want to you know repeal the great society you know some others really want to repeal the new deal you know I others want to repeal lincoln's administration you know some of us want to go back to the constitution where we rocker want to push further and go to the articles in federation there's also this tendency to always kind of want to keep turning back the clock and I think in some ways with the alternative right if you take this insight of the coming monetary crisis the united states you see that it's really not a question of turning back the clock but it really is a that possibility of imagining something very new something new in the future and so while you know Murray promised that he didn't want to just turn back the clock of social democracy you wanted to break it I think the alternative right might be in a situation where we won't no longer be bound by that clock of the 20th century and we'll have something completely new so I'll leave it on that and thank you for inviting me