 The need to separate those out so that the implicit taxpayer guarantee which was and should be given to the retail banks isn't used by the banks to bail them out when they behave recklessly within the investment arms of their banks. That's what they concentrated on. Unfortunately, they fluffed it. They got the question wrong. And even the one they did try and answer, they fluffed because they have what they've actually done is to set up what are best described as Chinese walls. Between so that it's not a complete split. But there are supposed to be divisions between them, which are going to be sufficient to maintain that separateness. I bet you within five years and probably considerably less the banks will have found a perfect answer to get rounded. Secondly, the Basel three proposals decided that the main way to control the banks was increasing the capital ratios. The amount of capital they have to have relative to the amount of lending that they make. They propose that it should be written increased from 7 to 10%. For all the reasons you will. I think I've heard about this morning. Capital ratios are not going to be an adequate way or whatever figure you choose to control the banks. And when you think this is going to come in, because we've just had a financial crash, a lot of people are talking about a possibly equally serious one, not very far hence. So what did our politicians and our regulators decide it should come in in 2019? What does that tell you? So what should be done? Right, control of the money supply should be brought back into the public domain. That is the central requirement. Direct credit controls and this is not a partisan objective. This is not a lefty vaguely progressive idea. This is something that has been tried by many of the most successful countries in the 20th century, by Japan, by Korea, by Taiwan and many others which have had phenomenal success using this particular requirement. The only way to control credit is direct credit controls, not by imposing fancy financial instruments of one kind or another in respect of the banks. The so-called window guidance is perhaps a bit more than windows. It's pretty, pretty strong, but it is necessary central as a central bank would determine the desired nominal GDP growth. If you work out what you expect or want the GDP growth to be, you then estimate the amount of credit creation which is necessary to achieve that and you then allocate this credit across various types of banks and across industrial sectors. It is a form of dirigism. That's perfectly true. I think it should be kept to a minimum, but that minimum is I think what is necessary compared to the exact opposite that we've had which is total unregulated unfettered freedom in the terms of market forces. Now, unproductive credit creation under this system, for example speculative transactions like today's lending to hedge funds, was firmly suppressed in these countries and consumer loans on any significant scale which would trigger an inflationary demand for consumer goods and would certainly draw in more imports. We're discouraged, not impossible, but certainly discouraged and pretty hard to get, but the priority was given to productive investment, to plant and equipment, to key services, to enhance productivity with new technology and R&D and I simply say if we want to escape from the unsustainability of our current economic course. If we are going to be able to justify our standard of living by the goods and services that we produce and sell, I simply submit that some system of this kind has got to be introduced into this country. It is probably, I know we'll be talking about the NHS, we'll be talking about jobs, no doubt we'll be talking about Europe and this is probably the single most important issue at the next election for a genuinely reforming political party. I can't actually see one on the horizon at the moment, but the state of events does produce the consequences that are needed. The powers of public institutions in credit creation and allocation have clearly got to be greatly increased and there are very good reasons for that. Banking crises are basically down to credit driven asset bubbles and it is the role of public monetary policy to be able to prevent these and to have the powers in order to be able to do that. Secondly, restrictions on direct government credit creation imposed by the Maastricht Treaty I think should be reconsidered. I recognise that that has very significant EU implications but those, after all, the Tories are very keen on renegotiating Maastricht in order to get back powers over social, environmental and labour legislation. Well, I think we can equally be looking for major changes in a very different direction. But partly, I think it has to be reconsidered because the system has been put under enormous strain by the Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis, but also the main reason is because the direct creation of money by government itself may well be needed to ensure that the economy reaches its full growth potential. And there couldn't be a better time for saying this than now because I think with the last speaker where you had a question about growth, where's the growth? I think it was saying, or perhaps you were saying you didn't want growth but a lot of people are saying they do want growth and where is it? And the answer is in a recession, the private sector is never going to invest because there's no demand, there's no aggregate demand for its goods and services. The only way you can get out of a recession is when the public sector, when the government or backed by the government, generates those demands by creating jobs, creating infrastructure improvement, improvements in the digital and green economy, all the rest. That's the way in which it needs to be done and the government needs to have the power to do that. And there are very good reasons why the government should have it because there are no servicing costs in terms of interest or interest upon interest, what's called compounded interest, which makes it a lot more efficient and cost effective. And the last point I want to make is why we need greater powers of public institutions is control over financial derivatives. The structured investment vehicles and collateralized debt obligations and above all the credit default swaps. The size of credit default swaps in the city of London would stagger you. It is well over 60 trillion pounds. It is absolutely staggering. I'm not saying it's all wrong or all bad. I'm saying quite a lot of it is corrupt and bad, but it needs to be effectively controlled, either prohibited or certainly tightly controlled. Now, I've probably gone on for my time. I will just say this because certain things I've not mentioned, this is going to take 30 seconds and no more. There are, of course, other issues with regard to the banks. The full separation of retail from investment. We need specialist banks, not just four big banks, banks that deal with infrastructure, banks which deal with knowledge and R&D, banks which deal with mortgages, perhaps Northern Rock for low income households, banks that deal with the green economy, which is coming and specializing in that. There are problems, of course, over credit agencies, credit rating agencies. I didn't go into that, but it's a really serious problem. Proprietary trading by the banks and, of course, bonuses. But the key issue, the central issue, the overwhelming issue, which this country has got to face up to, is the restoration of democratic accountability via the control over the money supply. And I must say, I play a tremendous tribute to Ben Dyson and the other people in positive money, New Economics Foundation, because I think they are saying something of enormous overriding importance for this country, with the politicians, the opinion makers in the media and everyone else have ignored. And I am very grateful that you are finally bringing it to public attention. Thank you.