 So what we're going to do is talk about particular areas of incoherence in the way that finance connects to these common goals we've been discussing about sustainable development or climate change. I'll begin at the macro level and Albert will then take us down to ground level and look at it from the perspective of developing countries. So we're going to do this with about 10 points of incoherence in finance as something for you to think about. The first one is probably obvious to most of you. There's analysis that shows that the emission pledges or the kind of mitigation pledges we've had so far will maybe get us to around a three degree world. And then the flip side of that is the adaptation finance that we have on the table so far maybe get us to about adapt to about one and a half degrees. And these are both in UNEP emissions gaps and adaptation gap reports. So the cost of adaptation compared to the amount of finance we have available is a big gap. And this creates a really big problem for us. It's sort of an incomplete equation because mitigation ambition plus adaptation finance is supposed to add up to safety for us. The second one, I was pleased to hear Charlotte to talk about CEDA rethinking the delivery of development aid and development finance. And the second point of incoherence for us that we see is really between the needs of developing countries or their priorities and the way that finance is being delivered, either climate finance or development finance. At present we have a situation where for various reasons climate finance is being delivered separately from development finance. And this is having a distorting effect on the kinds of investments that it's being used for. So countries and donors in fact are being sort of encouraged to invest in things that look like climate change, flood prevention or irrigation perhaps. But that may be not what developing countries most prioritized in terms of setting themselves up for a long-term future where climate change is one important uncertainty, which might be investments in health or education, for instance. You also have in this very complex architecture, global architecture of financial flows, the problem of, as you can see, it means virtually impossible at the bottom of that chart for a developing country government to align finance properly with its real sustainable development priorities. And also it's increasingly projectized, this kind of projectization of finance, meaning it comes in small short-term parcels and that's very difficult to connect to long-term transformation agendas. What might an alternative model look like? Well, I mean, we could spend days trying to think about that and one thing, if you can integrate climate change and disaster risk planning and SDGs, international development planning, maybe then you can sort of align finance better through the national development planning process, but there's no one perfect model. Okay, now we get to all the ones that I think are probably more interesting, but no less important. If adaptation finance is supposed to be ensuring that we can adjust or withstand future climate change, then it's really important that we understand what we're spending adaptation finance on. And so even if we don't feel a personal responsibility for the other species on the planet that we inhabit, our livelihoods and our prosperity is intrinsically connected to them. So if you take the example of plants, this comes from the Kew Gardens, did a state of the world's plants report which came out this year. And the red pictures indicate how many plant species we depend on for different kinds of uses, so foods, fuels, medicines, poisons, fibres, so on. So it's a very concrete example of the way in which our prosperity and our livelihood depends on the adaptation of natural ecosystems. And so then we might expect to see in this expenditure of adaptation finance quite a significant chunk going on adaptation for biodiversity, for instance, which is not happening. And if that continues, I think it's a very big, very big problem for us. The last one was just to show you that from the same report, more than 10% of the Earth's vegetated surface is highly sensitive to climate variability. I was also listening when Charlotte said that the private sector, I mean, we can't expect them to be a charity, so they only get involved when it's a business for them. And it turns out that investments in sustainable development or climate activities, in particularly the least developing countries, don't appear to be very good business for them. So we see an incoherence between the increasing rhetoric around private finance, filling the investment gaps and helping us to make this transition to sustainable development and climate, to our climate goals, and the sort of investment patterns that are actually experienced by least developed countries in small island developing states in particular. So some years ago, I looked at foreign direct investment in international bank lending patterns, and it's no surprise perhaps to see that most foreign direct investment goes to upper middle income countries, and where it does, the little bit that does get to least developed countries connects with natural resource extraction usually. If you think about the sectors that might be key from an SDG perspective, like agriculture, for instance, most FDI in agriculture goes to a very large industrial scale agriculture and to cash crops rather than food staples. If you think about the tourism sector, most of it goes to large hotels. If you think about water, I mean, outside of East Asia, there's very little private investment in the water sector, and so on. So I mean, and there's virtually no evidence of investment in education and health sectors, for instance. So that's a very worrying trend. What it perhaps does mean is that we need to start thinking about this a little bit differently, and how do we allow greater mobilization of finance within the least developed countries, which is either strengthening tax collection systems, lowering the transaction costs for remittances as a couple of examples, stimulating the domestic private sector. This slide is only to show you that we can look just at the inflows side, if you like, but it's also important to think about what money is coming out of countries. And for some, particularly the LDCs, again, there's more money coming out of the country through debt repayments, illicit financial flows. So it also increases that problem for them. Okay, now we get to one of the, what I think are actually two elephants in the finance room. One is between, there's an incoherence between the incentives and structure of the financial sector itself, and these global goals that we've been talking about. Or put differently, there's an incoherence in the expectation that green finance, if you like, is supposed to change the trajectory of development when it has to compete with a much larger volume of brown finance. And this is just an example from Carbon Tracker to show the amount of asset investment that is within the world's major stock exchanges that is connected to fossil fuels now. And it's just a way of showing that there are these deep structural incentives in the global investment system that keep patterns of brown finance, much larger than green finance. And another example is just between 2013-14, the amount of bank financing for coal mining went up 20%. The good news is, there are things like green bonds being talked about, an emerging trend of, a different instrument for raising funds for sustainable development or climate related activities. There are divestment campaigns going on where you have major institutional investors like pension funds pledging to pull finance out of particular fossil fuel, fossil fuel sectors. NSCI is about to do some work to look into those, those emerging trends. But at the same time as you have this as another worrying trend which is the overall stability of the global financial system. So if you have analysts talking about, worried about, for instance, rising debt levels, bubbles within the financial system, this poses a real risk to sort of the long-term availability of finance for the kinds of goals we're talking about. And lastly, the other elephant which was mentioned before is there's neat coherence between tax policy and this recognition that we need more money for tackling climate risks. The Guardian was reporting that offshore finance siphons more than 12 trillion out of emerging economies alone. And just, this was a great quote I think, just charging 1% tax on this siphoned wealth is equivalent to global ODA budgets. So it's fairly significant. And with that I'll hand over to Albert. Thanks, Aaron. The next set of policy in coherence are based on discussions and conversations we had with local stakeholders in Asia. The first set of incoherence is between urgency and responsibility. We understand that the threat of climate change is urgent. But the funds available to help countries in the region to adjust to the impacts of climate change are not really that easy to access. They need to demonstrate what they called as fiduciary responsibility. So in Asia right now, the only national implementing entity for the adaptation fund is the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development of India. The Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund tried to apply, they failed, because they couldn't demonstrate fiduciary responsibility. Among the things that's being required, for example, they have to have whistleblower policies. They need to have gender policies. Among other policies that are required by the funds to be able to be accredited as a national implementing entity. So again, the threat is urgent, but the funds are not really easily accessible. I remember a conversation I had with a Department of Finance official who came to a workshop in Bangkok who said, in the Philippines, we were able to access loans from the World Bank, from the IMF, and we get five times investment upgrades, but we couldn't even get an adaptation funding. And if I may remind you, the Philippines is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world, but funds are not really available. Last week, we organized a workshop for SIDA and in one of the conversations during the workshop, one partner said, it's interesting because the Green Climate Fund is based on the adaptation fund framework. Largely, it's learning from that particular implementation of the adaptation fund because it happens much earlier. And one of the things that really required all the proponents to have is gender policy. But Dib said, looking at the 24 board members of the Green Climate Fund, only four are women. So another setup and coherence between need and accountability. Much of the forms of accountability that's really happening in climate financing are more upward-looking. They're more to satisfy the demands of the different donors and their governments. But the accountability is not meant to address the needs of the beneficiaries, whom the financing is supposed to help them, but their needs are not there. Another one is between the global and the local. So again, this relates to the previous one. It needs to be linked to what's really happening globally. But the appreciation of what's really happening globally is different from what's the appreciation among communities on the problems. Because for them, there are far more urgent problems that they encounter. So while climate change is important, there are urgent issues that they need to contend with. So in the case, for example, of adaptation funds, they think that issues, locally-based issues are procurement issues. That's why they have to ensure that the fiduciary responsibilities are being executed or available with the national implementing entities so that they will be able to respond to local needs. But again, to be able to develop a proposal that's worth millions of dollars, it's something that communities don't have access to. They're not in that position really for the problems that they encounter to have huge amounts of money. And I don't think, and I'm sure you agree, it's not also really possible for communities to devise the solutions or the proposals that's being required by these funds so that they can access them. Finally, there is also this incoherence between the norm of promoting gender equality and the way this is being operationalized. So in the Green Climate Fund, the climate financing had to respond to the needs of the underrepresented, especially women. But according to an experience of a preparation facility for adaptation financing based in Bangkok, much of those policies really involves a lot of box checking. In other words, they're not meaningful and productive. So this year and in the coming years, SEI Asia and my colleagues through the Climate Financial Initiative will develop tools and approaches on how we can bring in meaningful engagement with gender in climate finance. And just to tell you a bit about this picture, there's a picture taken in a floating village in Cambodia. So notice the woman registering the business of the day while the men are playing cards. Thank you.