 My name is David Dodd or David Davernpool. I'm a research scientist at Protocol Labs. I'm one of the inventors, as Marta pointed out, on a couple of Protocol Labs' patents. But more relevant as I've been thinking about mechanism design, and I did some of the crypto economics in Filecoin, and I've also been thinking about alternative structures for planning and incentivizing research and development. In a bunch of different ways, including certificates of impact and different kinds of committee mechanisms for allocating prospective funding to research initiatives and doing quantitative causal modeling of the R&D roadmaps using technology trees. And then there's this stuff, which is about intellectual property management. So the motivation for my thinking in this zone is that the way that patents try to incentivize innovation is with monopoly. And there's some problems with monopoly. The obvious one is that it prevents innovative competitors from building on what you do without your permission. Another one is that there's big transaction costs. That was mentioned in one of the earlier talks about big transaction costs for making patents and litigating patents. There's also big transaction costs for licensing patents, which is the thing that I'm more directly concerned with. And then finally, the monopoly pricing mechanism is actually an imperfect way of capturing all of the value that you provide to society because you have to set one price level and you can't do price discrimination. So there's this thing, I guess, from Peter Thiel and some other VC-type people who are like, yes, monopoly. If you don't have a monopoly, you don't have a business. That's what you're trying to get. But actually, the most successful tech startups don't use monopoly pricing. They use something more efficient, which is Vickry Groves Auction. So Google and Facebook both, like the way their business model actually extracts value, is by running an incentive-compatible auction to allocate advertising slots to relatively sophisticated customers who are advertisers rather than consumers who, of course, pay nothing except their eyeballs. And so that's sort of why I've got this book here. It's a game theory mechanism. There's a whole chapter in here about sponsored search auctions. And that's actually more or less an applicable idea to intellectual property licensing. And so the high-level concept that I want to introduce is this notion that there's an analogy between creating a limited supply of advertising slots on a website and creating a limited supply of dollars of revenue that people are allowed to make using a certain patent pool. And then those slots, these slots for revenue can be allocated in an auction. Also kind of similar to a spectrum auction or other kinds of continuum auctions that are used in various fields. So there are a bunch of different ways of implementing this. So I said Vickry Groves, but Google actually uses a different mechanism called generalized second price, which technically is not Vickry Groves. And they have reasons for doing that mostly because they've done it historically and their customers are used to it. But there's also the Mejersen Optimal Auction, which maybe provides more revenue to the holder of intellectual property. So the upshot of all that is there is not like one best mechanism. There are a bunch of different mechanisms to experiment with in terms of how to allocate the licensing revenue. So what I want to push forward is a platform that enables a bunch of different kinds of experimentation with different mechanisms for managing intellectual property on a Web 3 distributed ledger system. So four basic kinds of tokens or sort of access control bits that I want to talk about and there might be, I'm not completely sure that this is the right way to break it up, but this is an initial proposal. So there's the kind of token that entitles you to a royalty stream like the actual stream of income that is being extracted from society for this piece of intellectual property. That token can be divisible. So inventors in some cases can hang on to some fraction of it or it can be traded as a kind of project token style thing where there's a market price that people are predicting what the future cash flows will be. Anyway, so that's one kind of token. It's like the passive income. There's another kind of token which probably would not be divisible in the same way which represents the control over the economics, namely deciding when and how much of the revenue to allocate into the auction or into whatever kind of market is being used for that. So that token basically has the rights to mint a third kind of token which is the licensed token which entitles the holder to one dollar of revenue that derives from a certain IP portfolio. And then there are different ways that we could talk about implementing that. Like maybe you have those tokens and then in a transaction redeem some set of tokens for an actual legal document that gives you the license with a revenue cap or maybe as the previous talk discussed we could actually write up a license in such a way that it points at the chain as if you have the tokens, you have a license, you don't even need to produce a document. But one aspect of this that I want to incorporate and then experiment with later is that those licensed tokens could be limited to a particular span of time. So like a start date and an end date could be now until infinity as a degenerate case but I think that's an interesting piece of flexibility to build in there. And then the final token is a sort of, I almost want to say political control but more like governance regulatory kind of control that the holder of that token gets to approve or deny whether people get to use the technology. And the degenerate case of that is that upfront the inventor burns that token so it never gets used. But this is like another sort of piece of flexibility that we want to have because there are certain sorts of technologies like strong AI technologies or brain computer interfaces that are dangerous and we want to be able to use IP as a safety mechanism to say okay, if you're going to use this invention then you have to file an application to prove that you have the right kind of safety protocols and so they sort of create a private regulatory regime in that way. So that would be a fourth kind of token which I want to separate like in many cases it's not appropriate for anyone to have that kind of control. That's sort of one of the main problems that I personally have the biggest issue with in the current patent system is that the economic rights to seek rent or get passive income from an invention are coupled to having to, being the person who you have to get permission from in order to do anything with it at all. I think that's about all I wanted to say. So yeah, thanks for your attention.