 Question 110 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 110 of the Vices Opposed to Truth and First of Lying in four articles. We must now consider the Vices Opposed to Truth and 1. Lying, 2. Dissimulation or hypocrisy, 3. Boasting and the Opposite Vice. Concerning lying, there are four points of inquiry. First, whether lying as containing falsehood is always opposed to the truth. Second, of the species of lying. Third, whether lying is always a sin. Fourth, whether it is always a mortal sin. First article, whether lying is always opposed to truth. Objection 1. It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible with truth, since he that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine, in On Lying 3. Therefore, lying is not opposed to truth. Objection 2 further. The virtue of truth applies not only to words, but also to deeds, since according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.7, by this virtue one tells the truth both in one speech and in one's life. But lying only applies to words. For Augustine says, again and against lying, that a lie is a false signification by words. Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth. Objection 3 further. Augustine says, again, that the liar's sin is the desire to deceive. But this is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore, lying is not opposed to truth. On the contrary, Augustine says, in against lying 10. Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive, wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie. But this is opposed to truth. Therefore, lying is opposed to truth. I answer that a moral act takes its species from two things, its object and its end. For the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde, Question 18, Article 6 and 7. Now it has been said above in Question 109, Article 1, Third Reply, that the virtue of truth, and consequently the opposite vices, regards a manifestation made by certain signs, and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified, because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of reason. Wherefore, though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything, but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false, and the intention of a bad will may bear on two things, one of which is that a falsehood may be told, while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely that someone may be deceived. Accordingly, if these three things concur, namely falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood, materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood. However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact, namely, that a person intends to say what is false, wherefore also the word mandatium, lie, is derived from its being in opposition to the mind. Consequently, if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker, so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is besides the speaker's intention is accidental, for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one udders falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially, and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie, that a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking. For instance, a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore, it is evident that lying is directly and formally opposed to the virtue of truth. Reply to Objection 1. We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and essentially, rather than according to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence, it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 2, Words hold the chief place among other signs, and so when it is said that, a lie is a false signification by words. The term words denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore, if a person intended to signify something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying. Reply to Objection 3. The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belonging to the species of its cause. Second Article Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, your cause, and mischievous lies. Objection 1. It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into officious, your cause, and mischievous lies. For a division should be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the philosopher states in Metaphysics 7.43. But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect. For a your cause lie is told in order to make fun, an officious lie for some useful purpose, and a mischievous lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way. Objection 2 further Augustine in Against Lying 14 gives eight kinds of lies. The first is in religious doctrine. The second is a lie that profits no one and injures someone. The third profits one party so as to injure another. The fourth is told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving. The fifth is told out of the desire to please. The sixth injures no one and profits someone in saving his money. The seventh injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death. The eighth injures no one and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body. Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is insufficient. Objection 3 further The philosopher in Ethics 4-7 divides lying into boasting which exceeds the truth in speech, and irony which falls short of the truth by saying something less. And these two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate. On the contrary a gloss on Psalm 5-7 Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie says There are three kinds of lies for some are told for the well-being and convenience of someone and there is another kind of lie that is told in fun but the third kind of lie is told out of malice. The first of these is called an officious lie. The second a Yoko's lie. The third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three kinds. I answer that lies may be divided in three ways. First with respect to their nature as lies and this is the proper and essential division of lying. In this way according to the philosopher in Ethics 4-7 lies are of two kinds namely the lie which goes beyond the truth and this belongs to boasting and the lie which stops short of the truth and this belongs to irony. This division is an essential division of lying itself because lying as such is opposed to truth as stated in the preceding article and truth is a kind of equality to which more and less are essential in opposition. Secondly lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated if by lying a person intends to injure another and this is called a mischievous lie while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good either of pleasure and then it is a Yoko's lie or of usefulness and then we have the officious lie whereby it is intended to help another person or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds of foresaid. Thirdly lies are divided in a more general way with respect to their relation to some end whether or not this increase or diminish their gravity and in this way the division comprises eight kinds as stated in the second objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under mischievous lies which are either against God and then we have the lie in religious doctrine or against man and this either with the sole intention of injuring him and then it is the second kind of lie which profits no one and injures someone or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting another and this is the third kind of lie which profits one and injures another. Of these the first is the most grievous because sins against God are always more grievous as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde question 73 article 3 and the second is more grievous than the third since the latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another. After these three which aggravate the sin of lying we have a fourth which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution and this is the lie which is told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving. This proceeds from a habit where for the philosopher says in ethics 47 that the liar when he lies from habit delights in lying the four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying for the fifth kind is the Yoko's lie which is told with a desire to please and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards either external things and then we have the sixth kind of lie which profits someone in saving his money or his body and this is the seventh kind which saves a man from death or the morality of his virtue and this is the eighth kind which saves him from unlawful defilement of his body. Now it is evident that the greater the good intended the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity where for a careful consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good and life of the body than money and virtue than the life of the body. This suffices for the replies to the objections. Third article whether every lie is a sin Objection one it seems that not every lie is a sin for it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the gospel yet they seem to have told something false since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account therefore not every lie is a sin Objection two further no one is rewarded by God for sin but the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie for it is stated that God built them houses in Exodus 121 therefore a lie is not a sin Objection three further the deeds of holy men are related in sacred rites that they may be a model of human life but we read of certain very holy men that they lied thus in Genesis 12 and 20 we are told that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister Jacob also lied when he said that he was Esau and yet he received a blessing as is written in Genesis 27 verses 27 through 29 again Judith is commended in chapter 15 verses 10 and 11 although she lied to Holofernes therefore not every lie is a sin Objection four further one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater even so a physician cuts off a limb less the whole body perish yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind than by someone slaying or being slain therefore a man may lawfully lie to save another from committing murder or another from being killed Objection five further it is not a lie not to fulfill what one has promised yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises for Isidor says in his synonyms to break your faith when you have promised ill therefore not every lie is a sin Objection six further apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbor where poor Augustine says in on lies 21 whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shamefully since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives others yet not every lie is a cause of deception since no one is deceived by a Yoko's lie seeing that lies of this kind are told not with the intention of being believed but merely for the sake of giving pleasure hence again we find hyperbolic expressions in holy writ therefore not every lie is a sin on the contrary it is written in Ecclesiasticus 714 be not willing to make any manner of lie I answer that an action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect because good results from a complete cause while evil results from any single defect as Dionysius asserts in On the Divine Names 4 now a lie is an evil in respect of its genus since it is an action bearing on undue matter for as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind hence the philosopher says in Ethics 47 that lying is in itself evil and to be shunned while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise therefore every lie is a sin as also Augustine declares in against lying one reply to objection one it is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the gospel or in any canonical scripture or that the writers thereof have told truths because faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of holy writ that the words of certain people are variously reported in the gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie hence Augustine says in On the Consensus of the Evangelists 2 he that has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense will conclude that he must not be the least troubled no matter by what words that sense is expressed hence it is evident as he adds in the same place that we must not judge that someone is lying if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or heard reply to objection two the midwives were rewarded not for their lie but for their fear of God and for their good will which latter led them to tell a lie hence it is expressly stated in Exodus 221 and because the midwives feared God he built them houses but the subsequent lie was not meritorious reply to objection three in holy writ as Augustine observes the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue and we must not believe that such persons were liars if however any of their statements appear to be untruthful we must understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic hence Augustine says in online five we must believe that whatever is related of those who in prophetical times are mentioned as being worthy of credit was done and said by them prophetically as to Abraham when he said that Sarah was his sister he wished to hide the truth not to tell a lie for she has called his sister since she was the daughter of his father where for Abraham himself said in Genesis 20 verse 12 she is truly my sister the daughter of my father and not the daughter of my mother being related to him on his father's side Jacob's assertion that he was Esau Isaac's firstborn was spoken in a mystical sense because to it the latter's birthright was due to him by right and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy in order to signify a mystery namely that the younger people that is the Gentiles should supplant the firstborn that is the Jews some however are commended in the scriptures not on account of perfect virtue but for a certain virtuous disposition seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue things it is thus that Judith is praised not for lying to Holofernes but for her desire to save the people to which end she exposed herself to danger and yet one might also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense reply to objection four a lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor but also on account of its inordinateness as stated above in this article now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently by keeping it back as Augustine says in against lying 10 reply to objection five a man does not lie so long as he has in mind to do what he promises because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind but if he does not keep his promise he seems to act without faith in changing his mind he may however be excused for two reasons first if he has promised something evidently unlawful because he sinned in promise and did well to change his mind secondly if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the business in hand for as Seneca states for a man to be bound to keep a promise it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged otherwise neither did he lie in promising since he promised what he had in his mind to circumstances being taken for granted nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise because circumstances are no longer the same hence the apostle though he did not go to Corinth whether he had promised to go in 2 Corinthians 1 did not lie because obstacles had arisen which prevented him reply to objection six an action may be considered in two ways first in itself secondly with regard to the agent accordingly a Yoko's lie from the very genus of the action is of a nature to deceive although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive nor does it deceive by the way it is told nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolic or any kind of figurative expressions with which we meet in holy writ because as Augustine says it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively because every statement must be referred to the thing stated and when a thing is done or said figuratively it states what to those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify fourth article whether every lie is a mortal sin objection one it seems that every lie is a mortal sin for it is written in Psalm 6 verse 7 thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie and in wisdom 111 the mouth that Boliath killeth the soul now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul therefore every lie is a mortal sin objection two further whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a mortal sin now lying is against this precept of the decalogue thou shalt not bear false witness therefore every lie is a mortal sin objection three further Augustine says in on christian doctrine 136 every liar breaks his faith in lying since for sooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him and yet he does not keep faith with him when he lies to him and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity now no one has said to break his faith or to be guilty of iniquity for a venial sin therefore no lie is a venial sin objection four further the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin now for a lie the eternal reward was lost being exchanged for a temporal mead for Gregory says in his commentary on Job 18 that we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves since the reward which they deserved for their kindness and which they might have received in eternal life dwindled into a temporal mead on account of the lie of which they were guilty therefore even an officious lie such as was that of the midwives which seemingly is the least of lies is a mortal sin objection five further Augustine says in on lying 17 that it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all but not even to wish to lie now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin and consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others on the contrary Augustine says on Psalm 5 7 thou wilt destroy etc there are two kinds of lie that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin when we lie either in joking or for the sake of our neighbor's good but every mortal sin is grievous therefore Yoko's and officious lies are not mortal sins I answer that a mortal sin is properly speaking one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God as stated above in question 24 article 12 and in question 35 article 3 now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways first in itself secondly in respect of the evil intended thirdly accidentally a lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false signification for if this be about divine things it is contrary to the charity of God whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity but also to the virtues of faith and religion where for it is a most grievous and a mortal sin if however the false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's neighbor since it causes him to have a false opinion where for it is contrary to charity as regards the love of our neighbor and consequently is a mortal sin on the other hand if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence then the lie in question does no harm to one's neighbor for instance if a person be deceived as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him where for a lie of this kind considered in itself is not a mortal sin as regards the end in view a lie may be contrary to charity through being told with the purpose of injuring God and this is always a mortal sin for it is opposed to religion or in order to injure one's neighbor in his person his possessions or his good name and this also is a mortal sin since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbor and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin but if the end intended be not contrary to charity neither will the lie considered under this aspect be a mortal sin as in the case of a yoko's lie where some little pleasure is intended or in an officious lie where the good also of one's neighbor is intended accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting there from and thus again it will be a mortal sin for instance if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly replied to objection one the passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie as a gloss explains the words of psalm five seven thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie reply to objection two since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbor as stated above in question 44 article one third reply as well as in the past premise of kundek question 100 article five first reply a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue insofar as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbor reply to objection three even a venial sin can be called iniquity in a broad sense insofar as it is beside the equity of justice wherefore it is written in first john three four every sin is iniquity it is in this sense that agustin is speaking reply to objection four the lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways first as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the jews and the reverence and fear of god for which their virtuous disposition is commended for this an eternal reward is due wherefore Jerome in his exposition of isaac 65 21 and they shall build houses explains that god built them spiritual houses secondly it may be considered with regard to the external act of lying for thereby they could merit not indeed eternal reward but perhaps some temporal need the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie though this was inconsistent with their meriting and eternal reward it is in this sense that we must understand the words of gregrie and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already merited it by their proceeding kindliness as the objection understands the words to mean reply to objection five some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin but this assertion is unreasonable for no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person for instance if it be against his vow and this cannot apply to an officious or yoko's lie wherefore an officious or yoko's lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal we may take in this sense the saying of august and that it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all but not even to wish to lie although august and says this not positively but dubiously for he begins by saying unless perhaps it is a precept etc nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters end of question 110 read by michael shane craig lambert lc question 111 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a liberox recording all liberox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liberox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by saint thomas equinus translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 111 of dissimulation and hypocrisy in four articles in due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy under this head there are four points of inquiry first whether all dissimulation is a sin second whether hypocrisy is dissimulation third whether it is opposed to truth fourth whether it is a mortal sin first article whether all dissimulation is a sin objection one it seems that not all dissimulation is a sin for it is written in luke 24 verse 28 that our lord pretended he would go further and ambrose in his book on the patriarchs says of abraham that he spoke craftily to his servants when he said in genesis 22 verse 5 i and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder and after we have worshiped will return to you now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation and yet it is not to be said that there was sin and cry store abraham therefore not all dissimulation is a sin objection to further no sin is profitable but according to gerome in his commentary on galatians 211 when peter was come to antioch the example of jayhu king of israel who slew the priest of bal pretending that he desired to worship idols should teach us that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed and david changed his continents before akis king of geth as is related in first kings 2113 therefore not all dissimulation is a sin objection three further good is contrary to evil therefore if it is evil to simulate good it is good to simulate evil objection four further it is written in condemnation of certain people in icf 39 they have proclaimed abroad their sin as sodom and they have not hit it now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one sin therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate but it is never reprehensible to avoid sin therefore dissimulation is not a sin on the contrary a gloss on israel 1614 in three years etc says of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness but to sin openly is always a sin therefore dissimulation is always a sin i answer that as stated above in question 109 article 3 and in question 110 article 1 it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward signs to be such as one is now outward signs are not only words but also deeds accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something different from that which is in one's mind so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself and this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation consequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way as stated above in question 110 article 1 objection 2 wherefore since every sin is a lie as stated above in question 110 article 3 it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin reply to objection 1 as agustin says in his questions on the gospel 2 to pretend is not always a lie but only when the pretense has no signification then it is a lie when however our pretense refers to some signification there is no lie but a representation of the truth and he cites figures of speech as an example where a thing is pretended for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of something else that we wish to say in this way our lord pretended he would go further because he acted as if wishing to go farther in order to signify something figuratively either because he was far from their faith according to Gregory or as agustin says because he was about to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven he was so to speak held back on earth by their hospitality Abraham also spoke figuratively where for Ambrose in on Abraham says that Abraham foretold what he knew not for he intended to return alone after sacrificing his son but by his mouth the lord expressed what he was about to do it is evident therefore that neither dissembled reply to objection 2 Jerome implies the term simulation in a broad sense for any kind of pretense David's change of continents was a figurative pretense as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of Psalm 33 I will bless the Lord at all times there is no need to excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie because he was a wicked man since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam as related in 4th Kings 10 verses 29 and 31 yet he has praised with all and received an earthly reward from God not for his dissimulation but for his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal replied to objection 3 some say that no one may pretend to be wicked because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds and if you do evil deeds he is evil but this argument proves nothing because a man might pretend to be evil by doing what is not evil in itself but has some appearance of evil and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil both because it is a lie and because it gives scandal and although he is wicked on this account yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he simulates and because the dissimulation is evil in itself its sinfulness is not derived from the things simulated whether this be good or evil reply to objection 4 just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which he is not yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is for this is sometimes lawful so also does a man dissemble when by outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is hence one may hide one sin without being guilty of dissimulation it is thus that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isaiah 3 9 that the second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one sin lest to wit others be scandalized thereby second article whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation objection 1 it seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation for dissimulation consists in lying by deeds but there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly according to Matthew 6 2 when thou dost an alms deed sound not a trumpet before thee as the hypocrites do therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation objection 2 further Gregory says in his commentary on Job 31 7 there are some who wear the habit of holiness yet are unable to attain the merit of perfection we must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites since it is one thing to sin from weakness and another to sin from malice now those who wear the habit of holiness without attaining the merit of perfection are dissemblers since the outward habit signifies works of perfection therefore dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy objection 3 further hypocrisy consists in the mere intention for our Lord says of hypocrites in Matthew 25 verse 5 that all their works they do for to be seen of men and Gregory says in his commentary on Job 31 7 that they never consider what it is that they do but how by their every action they may please men but dissimulation consists not in the mere intention but in the outward action where for a gloss on Job 36 13 dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God says that the dissembler simulates one thing and does another he pretends chastity and delights in lewdness he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation on the contrary is it or says in his etymologies 10 hypocrite is a greek word corresponding to the latin simulator for whereas he is evil within he shows himself outwardly as being good hippo denoting falsehood and creases judgment i answer that as is it or says in his etymologies the word hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who come onto the stage with a disguised face by changing the color of their complexion so as to imitate the complexion of the person they simulate at one time under the guise of a man at another under the guise of a woman so as to deceive the people in their acting hence augustin says that just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act on the part of those they are not since he that acts the part of agamemnon is not that man himself but pretends to be so too in the church and in every department of human life whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite for he pretends to be just without being so in reality we must conclude therefore that hypocrisy is dissimulation not however any form of dissimulation but only when one person simulates another as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man replied to objection one the outward deed is a natural sign of the intention accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to be the service of god and seeks by their means to please not god but man he simulates a right intention which he has not where for gregory says in his commentary on job that hypocrites make gods interests subservient to worldly purposes since by making a show of saintly conduct they seek not to turn men to god but to draw to themselves the applause of their approval and so they make a lying pretence of having a good intention which they have not although they do not pretend to do a good deed without doing it replied to objection two the habit of holiness for instance the religious or the clerical habit signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform works of perfection and so when a man puts on the habit of holiness with the intention of entering the state of perfection if he fail through weakness he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness if however he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to make a show of righteousness he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler reply to objection three in dissimulation as in a lie there are two things one by way of sign the other by way of a thing signified accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified which does not tally with the sign and the outward words or deeds or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign third article whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth objection one it seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of truth for in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing signified now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue for a hypocrite simulates any virtue and by means of any virtuous deeds such as fasting prayer and alms deeds as stated in Matthew 6 verses 1 through 18 therefore hypocrisy is not specially opposed to the virtue of truth objection to further all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile where for it is opposed to simplicity now guile is opposed to prudence as above stated in question 55 article 4 therefore hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed to truth but rather to prudence or simplicity objection three further the species of a moral act is taken from its end now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vain glory where for a gloss on job 27 verse 8 what is the hope of the hypocrite if through covetousness he take by violence says a hypocrite or as the latin has it a dissimulator is a covetous thief for through desire of being honored for holiness though guilty of wickedness he steals praise for a life which is not his therefore since covetousness or vain glory is not directly opposed to truth it seems that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation on the contrary all dissimulation is a lie as stated above in article 1 now a lie is directly opposed to truth therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also i answer that according to the philosopher in metaphysics 1324 contra variety is opposition as regards form that is the specific form accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways in one way directly in another way indirectly its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the very species of the act and this species depends on that acts proper object therefore since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation whereby a man simulates a character which is not his as stated in the preceding article it follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he is as stated in ethics 47 the indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered in relation to any accident for instance a remote end or an instrument of action or anything else of that kind reply to objection one the hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his end not in respect of its existence as though he wished to have it but in respect of appearance since he wishes to seem to have it hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue but to truth in as much as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue and he performs acts of that virtue not as intending them for their own sake but instrumentally as signs of that virtue where for his hypocrisy has not on that account a direct opposition to that virtue reply to objection two as stated above in question 55 articles three four and five the vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose that are apparent and not real while it accomplishes that purpose by guile in words and by fraud in deeds and it stands in relation to prudence as guile and fraud to simplicity now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception and sometimes secondarily to injury where for it belongs directly to simplicity to guard oneself from deception and in this way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above in question 109 article 2 fourth reply there is however a mere logical difference between them because by truth we mean the concordance between sign and a thing signified while simplicity indicates that one does not tend to different things by intending one thing inwardly and pretending another outwardly reply to objection three gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as also of the liar hence it does not take its species from this end but from the proximate end which is to show oneself other than one is where for it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things of himself for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy as the philosopher says in ethics 47 and is also we have said above with regard to lying in question 110 article 2 fourth article whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin objection one it seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin for Jerome says on Isaiah 16 14 of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness and a gloss on Job 121 as it hath pleased the Lord etc says that pretended justice is no justice but a twofold sin and again a gloss on lamentations 46 the iniquity of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom says he deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin objection to further Gregory says in his commentary on Job 31 8 that hypocrites sin out of malice but this is most grievous for it pertains to the sin against the holy ghost therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally objection three further no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from seeing God save on account of mortal sin now the anger of God is deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36 13 dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing God according to Job 13 16 no hypocrite shall come before his presence therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin on the contrary hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of dissimulation but it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin further the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good but this is not contrary to charity therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin further hypocrisy is born of vain glory as Gregory says in his commentary on Job 31 17 but vain glory is not always a mortal sin therefore neither is hypocrisy I answer that there are two things in hypocrisy lack of holiness and simulation thereof accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to both the above one namely who cares not to be holy but only to appear so in which sense sacred scripture is want to use the term it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin for no one is entirely deprived of holiness saved through mortal sin but if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness which he lacks through mortal sin then although he is in mortal sin whereby he is deprived of holiness yet in his case the dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin but sometimes a venial sin this will depend on the end in view for if this be contrary to the love of god or of his neighbor it will be a mortal sin for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment the one worthy or that he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end if however the end intended be not contrary to charity it will be a venial sin as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself of such a man it is said in ethics 47 that he would seem to be vain rather than evil for the same applies to simulation as to a lie it happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin always nor is it always associated with mortal sin this suffices for the replies to the objections end of question 111 read by michael shane greg lambart lc question 112 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a liber vox recording all liber vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liber vox.org summa theologica secunde secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by saint thomas equinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 112 of boasting in two articles we must now consider boasting and irony which are parts of lying according to the philosopher in ethics 47 under the first had namely boasting there are two points of inquiry first to which virtue is it opposed second whether it is a mortal sin first article whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth objection one it seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth for lying is opposed to truth but it is possible to boast even without lying as when a man makes a show of his own excellence thus it is written in s there one versus three and four that a sueros made a great feast that he might show the riches of the glory and of his kingdom and the greatness and boasting of his power therefore boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth objection to further boasting is reckoned by Gregory and his commentary on Job 23 for to be one of the four species of pride when to it a man boasts of having what he has not hence it is written in Jeremiah 48 verses 29 and 30 we have heard the pride of Moab he is exceedingly proud his haughtiness and his arrogance and his pride and the loftiness of his heart i know seeth the lord his boasting and that the strength thereof is not according to it moreover Gregory says again in his commentary that boasting arises from vain glory now pride and vain glory are opposed to the virtue of humility therefore boasting is opposed not to truth but to humility objection three further boasting seems to be occasioned by riches where for it is written in wisdom 58 what hath pride profited us or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness which is opposed to justice or liberality therefore boasting is not opposed to truth on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 27 and ethics 47 that boasting is opposed to truth i answer that yaktantia boasting seems properly to denote the uplifting of self by words since if a man wishes to throw yaktare a thing far away he lifts it up high and to uplift oneself properly speaking is to talk of oneself above oneself translators note or tall talking as we should say in english end of note this happens in two ways for sometimes a man speaks of himself not above what he is in himself but above that which he is esteemed by men to be and this the apostle declines to do when he says in 2nd Corinthians 12 6 i forbear lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth of me in another way a man uplifts himself by words by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality and since we should judge of things as they are in themselves rather than as others deem them to be it follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself than the uplifting of self above what others think of one although in either case it may be called boasting hence boasting hence boasting properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess reply to objection 1 this argument takes boasting as exceeding man's opinion reply to objection 2 the sin of boasting may be considered in two ways first with regard to the species of the act and thus it is opposed to truth as stated in the body of the article as well as in question 110 article 2 secondly with regard to its cause from which more frequently though not always it arises and thus it proceeds from pride as it's inwardly moving and impelling cause for when a man is uplifted inwardly by arrogance it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things about himself though sometimes a man takes to boasting not from arrogance but from some kind of vanity and delights therein because he is a boaster by habit hence arrogance which is an uplifting of self above oneself is a kind of pride yet it is not the same as boasting but is very often its cause for this reason Gregory reckons boasting among the species of pride moreover the boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting and so according to Gregory it arises from vain glory considered as its end reply to objection 3 wealth also causes boasting in two ways first as an occasional cause in as much as a man prides himself on his riches hence in proverbs 818 riches are significantly described as proud secondly as being the end of boasting since according to ethics 47 some boast not only for the sake of glory but also for the sake of gain such people invent stories about themselves so as to make profit thereby for instance they pretend to be skilled in medicine wisdom or divination second article whether boasting is a mortal sin objection one it seems that boasting is a mortal sin for it is written in proverbs 28 25 he that boasts death and puffeth himself stirreth up quarrels now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels since God hates those that so discord according to proverb 619 therefore boasting is a mortal sin objection to further whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal sin now a gloss on ecclesiasticus 6 2 extol not thyself in the thoughts of thysoul says this is a prohibition of boasting and pride therefore boasting is a mortal sin objection 3 further boasting is a kind of lie but it is neither an officious nor a yoko's lie this is evident from the end of lying for according to the philosopher in ethics 47 the boaster pretends to something greater than he is sometimes for no further purpose sometimes for the sake of glory or honor sometimes for the sake of money thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a yoko's lie and consequently it must be a mischievous lie therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin on the contrary boasting arises from vain glory according to gregory in his commentary on job 3117 now vain glory is not always a mortal sin but is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid for gregory says again in his commentary on job 830 that it belongs to the very perfect by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author that they are not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them therefore boasting is not always a mortal sin i answer that as stated above in question 110 article 4 immortal sin is one that is contrary to charity accordingly boasting may be considered in two ways first in itself as a lie and thus it is sometimes a mortal and sometimes a venial sin it will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that which is contrary to god's glory thus it is said in the person of the king of tyre in ezekiel 28 verse 2 thy heart is lifted up and thou hast said i am god or contrary to the love of our neighbor as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out in invectives against others as told of the Pharisee who said in luke 1811 i am not as the rest of men extortioners unjust adulterers as also this public in sometimes it is a venial sin when to wit a man boasts of things that are against neither god nor his neighbor secondly it may be considered with regard to its cause namely pride or the desire of gain or of vain glory and then if it proceeds from pride or from such vain glory as is a mortal sin then the boasting will also be a mortal sin otherwise it will be a venial sin sometimes however a man breaks out into boasting through desire of gain and for this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor where for boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin hence the philosopher says in ethics four seven that a man who boasts for the sake of gain is vileer than anyone who boasts for the sake of glory or honor yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain maybe such is not to injure another man reply to objection one to boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin but it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels not intentionally but accidentally and consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that account reply to objection two this gloss speaks of boasting as a rising from pride that is a mortal sin reply to objection three boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie but only where it is contrary to the love of god or our neighbor either in itself or in its cause that a man boast through mere pleasure in boasting is an inane thing to do as the philosopher remarks in ethics four seven where for it amounts to a yokos lie unless perchance he were to prefer this to the love of god so as to condemn god's commandments for the sake of boasting for then it would be against the charity of god in whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end to boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve an officious lie provided it be done without injury to others for then it would at once become a mischievous lie end of question 112 read by michael shane craig lambert lc question 113 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by saint thomas equinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 113 of irony in two articles translators note irony here must be given the signification of the greek eronia once it is derived dissimulation of one's own good points end of note we must now consider irony under which had there are two points of inquiry first whether irony is a sin second of its comparison with boasting first article whether irony is a sin objection one it seems that irony which consists in belittling oneself is not a sin for no sin arises from one's being strengthened by god and yet this leads one to belittle oneself according to proverbs 30 verses 1 and 2 the vision which the man spoke with whom is god and who being strengthened by god abiding with him said i am the most foolish of men also it is written in amos 714 amos answered i am not a prophet therefore irony whereby a man belittles himself in words is not a sin objection to further gregory says in a letter to augustin bishop of the english it is the mark of a well-disposed mind to acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty but all sin is inconsistent with the well-disposed mind therefore irony is not a sin objection three further it is not a sin to shun pride but some belittle themselves in words so as to avoid pride according to the philosopher in ethics 47 therefore irony is not a sin on the contrary augustin says if thou liest on account of humility if thou were not a sinner before lying thou hast become one by lying i answer that to speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two ways first so as to safeguard truth as when a man conceals the greater things in himself but discovers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which in himself he perceives to belittle oneself in this way does not belong to irony nor is it a sin in respect of its genus except through corruption of one of its circumstances secondly a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the existence of which in himself he does not perceive or by denying something great of himself which nevertheless he perceives himself to possess this pertains to irony and is always a sin reply to objection one there is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly for there is a wisdom according to god which has human or worldly folly annexed to it according to first Corinthians 3 18 if any man among you seem to be wise in this world let him become a fool that he may be wise but there is another wisdom that is worldly which as the same text goes on to say is foolishness with god accordingly he that is strengthened by god acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation of men because to it he despises human things which human wisdom seeks hence the text quoted continues and the wisdom of men is not with me and further on and I have known the science of the saints it may also be replied that the wisdom of men is that which is acquired by human reason while the wisdom of the saints is that which is received by divine inspiration Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth since to wit he was not of the race of prophets hence the text goes on nor am I the son of a prophet reply to objection two it belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness and consequently deem himself guilty not only if he falls short of common righteousness which is truly a sin but also if he falls short of perfect righteousness which sometimes is not a sin but he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge to be sinful which would be a lie of irony reply to objection three a man should not commit one sin in order to avoid another and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid pride hence Augustine says in his commentary on the gospel of john shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth and Gregory says in his commentary on Job 263 that it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies second article whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting objection one it seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting for each of them is a sin through forsaking truth which is a kind of equality but one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting objection two further according to the philosopher in ethics 47 irony sometimes is boasting but boasting is not irony therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting objection three further it is written in Proverbs 26 25 when he shall speak low trust him not because there are seven mischiefs in his heart now it belongs to irony to speak low therefore it contains a manifold wickedness on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 47 those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious seemingly in their manners i answer that as stated above in question 110 articles 2 and 4 one lie is more grievous than another sometimes on account of the matter which it is about thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most grievous and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning thus a mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or yokosa lie now irony and boasting lie about the same matter either by words or by any outward signs namely about matters affecting the person so that in this respect they are equal but for the most part boasting proceeds from a vile motive namely the desire of gain or honor whereas irony arises from a man's averseness albeit in ordinate to be disagreeable to others by uplifting himself and in this respect the philosopher says in ethics 47 that boasting is a more grievous sin than irony sometimes however it happens that a man belittles himself for some other motive for instance that he may deceive cunningly and then irony is more grievous reply to objection one this argument applies to irony and boasting according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its matter for it has been said that in this way they are equal reply to objection two excellence is twofold one is temporal the other in spiritual things now it happens at times that a person by outward words or signs pretends to be lacking in external things for instance by wearing shabby clothes or by doing something of the kind and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence thus our lord said of certain men in Matthew 6 16 that they disfigure their faces and they may appear unto men to fast where for such persons are guilty of both vices irony and boasting although in different respects and for this reason they sin more grievously hence the philosopher says in ethics 47 that it is the practice of boasters both to make over much of themselves and to make very little of themselves and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby because by both do men seek glory reply to objection three according to the words of ecclesiasticus 1923 there is one that humbleth himself wickedly and his interior is full of deceit and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who through deceitful humility speaks low wickedly end of question 113 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert lc question 114 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 114 of the friendliness which is called affability in two articles we must now consider the friendliness which is called affability and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling concerning friendliness or affability there are two points of inquiry first whether it is a special virtue second whether it is a part of justice first article whether friendliness is a special virtue objection one it seems that friendliness is not a special virtue for the philosopher says in ethics 83 that the perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue now any virtue is the cause of friendship since the good is lovable to all as Dionysius states in on the divine names for therefore friendliness is not a special virtue but a consequence of every virtue objection two further the philosopher says in ethics 46 of this kind of friend that he takes everything in a right manner both from those whom he loves and from those who are not his friends now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to those whom he loves not and this is incompatible with virtue therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue objection three further virtue observes the mean according as a wise man decides as is stated in ethics 26 now it is written in ecclesiastes 75 the heart of the wise is where there is mourning and the heart of fools where there is mirth wherefore it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure as is stated in ethics 29 now this kind of friendship according to the philosopher again in ethics 46 is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures but fears to give pain therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue on the contrary the precepts of the law are about acts of virtue now it is written in ecclesiasticus 47 make thyself affable to the congregation of the poor therefore affability which is what we mean by friendship is a special virtue i answer that as stated above in question 109 article 2 as well as in the par's prima secunde question 55 article 3 since a virtue is directed to good wherever there is a special kind of good there must needs be a special kind of virtue now good consists in order as stated above in question 109 article 2 and it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another in point of both deeds and words so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order and this virtue is called friendliness reply to objection one the philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his ethics one consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves another and may result from any virtue we have stated above in treating of charity in question 23 article 1 as well as in article 3 first reply as well again in questions 25 and 26 what things belong to this kind of friendship but he mentions another friendliness which consists merely in outward words or deeds this has not the perfect nature of friendship but bears a certain likeness there too in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in contact reply to objection two every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain general love even so it is written in ecclesiasticus 1319 that every beast loveth it's like this love is signified by signs of friendship which we show outwardly by words or deeds even to those who are strangers or unknown to us hence there is no dissimulation in this because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by special friendship reply to objection three when it is said that the heart of the wise is where there is mourning it is not that he may bring sorrow to his neighbor for the apostle says in romans 14 15 if because of thy meat thy brother be grieved thou walkest not now according to charity but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful according to ecclesiasticus 738 be not wanting in comforting them that weep and walk with them that mourn again the heart of fools is where there is mirth not that they may gladden others but that they may enjoy others gladness accordingly it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells not lustful pleasures which virtue shuns but honest pleasures according to psalm 132 verse 1 behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity nevertheless as the philosopher says in ethics 4 6 for the sake of some good that will results or in order to avoid some evil the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives hence the apostle says in 2 Corinthians 7 8 although I made you sorrowful by my epistle I do not repent and further on in 2 Corinthians 7 9 I am glad not because you were made sorrowful but because you were made sorrowful unto repentance for this reason we should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin in order that we may please them lest we seem to consent to their sin and in a way encourage them to sin further hence it is written in ecclesiasticus 7 26 hast thou daughters have a care of their body and show not thy continents gate towards them second article whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice objection one it seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of justice for justice consists in giving another man his do but this virtue does not consist in doing that but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we live therefore this virtue is not a part of justice objection to further according to the philosopher in ethics 4 6 this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in fellowship now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures as stated above in the past premise agound a question 60 article 5 and in question 61 article 3 therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice objection 3 further to give equal things to those who are unequal is contrary to justice as stated above in question 59 articles 1 and 2 now according to the philosopher in ethics 4 6 this virtue treats in like manner known and unknown companions and strangers therefore this virtue rather than being part of justice is opposed there to on the contrary macrobius accounts friendship a part of justice I answer that this virtue is a part of justice being annexed to it as to a principal virtue because in common with justice it is directed to another person even as justice is yet it falls short of the notion of justice because it lacks the full aspect of debt whereby one man is bound to another either by legal debt which the law binds him to pay or by some debt arising out of a favor received for it regards merely a certain debt of equity namely that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell unless at times for some reason it be necessary to displease them for some good purpose reply to objection 1 as we have said above in question 109 article 3 first reply because man is a social animal he owes his fellow man in equity the manifestation of truth without which human society could not last now as man could not live in society without truth so likewise not without joy because as the philosopher says in ethics 8 no one could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless therefore a certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his fellow men unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for their good reply to objection 2 it belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the senses but this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship which have their origin in the reason in so far as one man behaves becomingly towards another such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they were noisome reply to objection 3 this saying of the philosopher does not mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and strangers since as he says in ethics 46 it is not fitting to please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way this likeness consists in this that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner end of question 114 read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert LC question 115 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 115 of flattery in two articles we must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue one flattery and two quarreling concerning flattery there are two points of inquiry first whether flattery is a sin second whether it is a mortal sin first article whether flattery is a sin objection one it seems that flattery is not a sin for flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him but it is not a sin to praise a person according to Proverbs 31 28 her children rose up and called her blessed her husband and he praised her more over there is no evil in wishing to please others according to first Corinthians 10 33 I in all things please all men therefore flattery is not a sin objection to further evil is contrary to good and blame to praise but it is not a sin to blame evil neither then is it a sin to praise good which seems to belong to flattery therefore flattery is not a sin objection three further detraction is contrary to flattery where for Gregory says in his commentary on Job 22 5 that detraction is a remedy against flattery it must be observed says he that by the wonderful moderation of our ruler we are often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises the tongue of the detractor may humble but detraction is an evil as stated above in question 73 articles 2 and 3 therefore flattery is a good on the contrary a gloss on Ezekiel 13 18 woe to them that so cushions under every elbow says that is to say sweet flattery therefore flattery is a sin I answer that as stated above in question 114 article 1 3rd reply although the friendship of which we have been speaking or affability intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good or of avoiding a certain evil accordingly if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly to others he would exceed the mode of pleasing and would therefore sin by excess if you do this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be complacent according to the philosopher in ethics 4 6 whereas if he do it with the intention of making some gain out of it he is called a flatterer or adulate or as a rule however the term flattery is want to be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows reply to objection one one may praise a person both well and ill according as one observes or omits the due circumstances for if while observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by praising him in order thereby to console him or that he may strive to make progress in good this will belong to the aforesaid virtual friendship but it would belong to flattery if one wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not to be praised since perhaps they are evil according to psalm 9 24 the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul or they may be uncertain according to ecclesiasticus 27 8 praise not a man before he speaketh and again in ecclesiasticus 11 2 praise not a man for his beauty or because there may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vain glory wherefore it is written in ecclesiasticus 11 30 praise not any man before death again in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity so that he may make spiritual progress therein but it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of vain glory or gain or to please them in something evil according to Psalm 52 6 God hath scattered the bones of them that please men and according to the words of the apostle in Galatians 1 10 if I yet pleased men I should not be the servant of Christ reply to objection 2 even to blame evil is sinful if do circumstances be not observed and so too is it to praise good reply to objection 3 nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one another wherefore even as detraction is evil so is flattery which is contrary thereto as regards what is said but not directly as regards the end because flattery seeks to please the person flattered whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed since at times he defames him in secret but seeks rather his defamation second article weather flattery is immortal sin objection one it would seem that flattery is immortal sin for according to Augustine in his incorridion 12 a thing is evil because it is harmful but flattery is most harmful according to Psalm 9 24 for the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul and the unjust man is blessed the sinner hath provoked the Lord wherefor Jerome says in his letter nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery and a gloss on Psalm 69 4 let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that they say to me Tiswell Tiswell says the tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor therefore flattery is a most grievous sin objection to further whoever does harm by words harms himself no less than others wherefor it is written in Psalm 36 15 let their sword enter into their own hearts now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally hence a gloss on Psalm 140 verse 5 let not the oil of the sinner fatten my head says the false praise of the flatterer softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it subceptive of vice much more therefore does the flatterer sin in himself objection three further it is written in the decretals chapter three the cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office now such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin therefore flattery is a mortal sin on the contrary Augustine in a sermon on purgatory reckons among slight sins if one desire to flatter any person of higher standing whether of one's own choice or out of necessity i answer that as stated above in question 112 article 2 a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not it is contrary to charity in three ways first by reason of the very matter as when one man praises another sin for this is contrary to the love of god against whose justice he speaks and contrary to the love of his neighbor whom he encourages to sin where for this is a mortal sin according to Isaiah 5 20 woe to you that call evil good secondly by reason of the intention as when one man flatters another so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in soul this is also a mortal sin and of this it is written in proverbs 27 6 better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy thirdly by way of occasion has won the praise of a flatterer even without his intending it becomes to another an occasion of sin in this case it is necessary to consider whether the occasion were given or taken and how grievous the consequent downfall as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal regard question 43 articles 3 and 4 if however one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others or again in order to avoid some evil or to acquire something in a case of necessity this is not contrary to charity consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin reply to objection one the passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises another sin flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the sword of the persecutor since it does harm to goods that are of greater consequence namely spiritual goods yet it does not harm so efficaciously since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively being a sufficient cause of death whereas no one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another sinning as was shown above in question 43 article one third reply as well as in the parse prima secunde question 73 article eight third reply as well as in question 80 article one reply to objection two this argument applies to one that flatters with the intention of doing harm for such a man harms himself more than others since he harms himself as the sufficient cause of sinning whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others reply to objection three the passage quoted refers to the man who flatters another treacherously in order to deceive him end of question 115 read by michael shane craig lambert lc