 So, we have these moral theories, and they managed to avoid the consequence of either being arbitrary or independent, with the exception of human Sumner over there. But the question is, can a divinity fit into these moral theories? So for Hume, what is moral just depends upon what you want, and for Sumner, what is moral just depends upon what the culture says is moral. Can we fit a divinity into this? Well, yes. I mean, this is just basically divine command theory. Remember the divine command theory states that what is moral is moral because the divine commands it. So this is roughly a divine version of Hume's subjective relativism. We can even talk about the different religions as espousing different moral codes as a kind of culture, and this is given by the divinity. So that would be a divine version of Sumner's cultural relativism. So if there's any viability at all for subjective relativism or cultural relativism, then there really isn't any sort of conceptual worry or problem talking about divine command theory. Well, what about Hobbes and Glaucon? What about the idea that your interests are most important? Can we talk about a divinity with this sort of theory? Well, probably, maybe. I guess it depends upon what divinity there is. I mean, so far we've been dealing with Helios here, and I guess there's something of what it is to be in Helios interests. The Greek gods are basically just really, really powerful human beings. So if that conception of a divinity is accurate, then sure, we could talk about moral theories where the main point of them is that you put your own interests first. In fact, well, you listen to some of the Greek myths, that's exactly what those divinities did. Whether and how well this works probably depends upon what sort of divinity you're talking about. I mean, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Moses, the Judeo-Christian concept of God has interests in a sense, but it's not as if anything can hurt that divinity, including the divinity itself. That divinity can't wound itself or put itself in danger. So maybe a strange result then, and if something like this theory is correct that you must put your own interests first, then no matter what the divinity does, well, it's moral because there's absolutely nothing that the divinity can do that would hurt itself. It'd be a strange result, but it could fit within the theory. Let's think about good old Epicurus here and Aristotle. Epicurus is going to tell us what has more worth as pleasure, and Aristotle is going to tell us that what has more worth as eudaimonia or fulfillment. If we're dealing with something like Epicurus's pleasure, can we talk about a divinity? Well, again, I suppose that depends upon what sort of concept of divinity you're dealing with. With the Greek pantheon, there's really powerful human beings. Okay, yeah, we could talk about the pleasures of the gods. Again, the Greek myths do talk about such things. And if we're talking about Aristotle's eudaimonia, it sure seems like the Greek divinities were a little conflicted and could stand to have a little peace in their own life, or maybe if they set their minds to it that could have achieved such thing. If we go outside these conceptions, again, maybe something like Judeo-Christian concept, it's hard to, you know, we could have this sort of thing of moral value as pleasure, and that's great. But weirdly enough, again, that divinity could probably do anything. The divinity, according to the Judeo-Christian concept, is the high point, the fulfillment, the completion of happiness or pleasure. There is no way it can feel bad. So whatever it does, it's happy. I mean, it's strange, but it's not inconsistent within the theory. Something similar happens with Aristotle's eudaimonia. The Judeo-Christian concept of the divinity is it's very difficult to talk about this divinity being conflicted or even in any need of fulfillment or perfection. It's the height of such things already. So these theories are consistent with the existence of a divinity, but it's an interesting question how it's supposed to inform us in any way about what the divinity can or can't do and be moral. Maybe the point is supposed to be, as Epicurus states in the beginning of his letter, that we should be more like the divinity. Well, that's a challenge to be sure. One wonders if it's even possible. Moving on to Locke's theory, there's probably no difficulty in thinking that a divinity can be sovereign over itself. Of course, the interesting question then is where do we fit into this sort of sovereignty scheme and are we owned by the divinity? Does the divinity owe anything to us? Locke tried to fit it into his theory, specifically within a Christian concept of the divinity. It's an interesting question of whether it works. But if we are going to talk about something like Locke and natural law and the existence of divinity, what is moral, what our rights are and what rights the divinity has is going to depend a lot upon the nature of that divinity. If Mill is right and that what is moral is determined upon the production of the greatest amount of happiness, well, if the ancient Greeks had it right and who the divinities are or the Greek panting of gods, then they have a lot of explaining to do. And indeed, the Greeks thought so themselves. That so much isn't weird or inconsistent within the theory, and we've never particularly thought of the Greek gods as a high point of morality. Well, then one wonders what the result is going to be when we consider the Judeo-Christian concept. Initially, we'd probably have to say that this divinity has a lot to answer for. After all, there's a lot of suffering in this world. In fact, it's a classic argument against the existence of such a divine being. But there's a twist to this. I mean, if Mill is right and the most moral act is the one that produces the greatest overall happiness, this divinity may not have much to answer for. Under such a conception of the divine, it is always in a state of pure joy, pure happiness, pure bliss. It cannot be harmed. Its state cannot be diminished. So no matter what it does or what happens in the world, there's always an infinite amount of joy and always an infinite amount of happiness. After all, you cannot decrease an infinite by taking off a portion. You cannot increase an infinite by adding to it. So if Mill is right and there is this Judeo-Christian god, anything it does produces the greatest overall happiness. So literally, morally speaking, it can do anything, which is probably a little scary. And finally, this brings us to Kant. Now there are several difficulties to work out here. People have struggled for a long time to take Kant's theory and even make it applicable. After all, if you try to understand it with a very simple reading and you try to buy a loaf of bread, well, not everybody can buy a loaf of bread. And now it's immoral to buy a loaf of bread. And that's probably just a very uncharitable way to understand Kant. Or you try to take it and massage it and nuance it to make it a more palatable moral theory. And you probably wind up with something that doesn't really look like Kant's theory anymore. Well, supposing you are able to make a version of Kant's theory that doesn't have any significant problems, a question remains, well, is it possible even for a divinity to will something that is not a universal law? After all, it sure seems like willing into universal law is part of the job description of being the divinity overall. So then perhaps weirdly enough, yet once again, whatever the divinity does is moral. Now we've seen some strange consequences of including a divinity into a moral theory. And it's given us a lot of food for thought about what is possible or what the result would be and by what would happen if there is a divinity involved. But we began this investigation wondering whether we can fit a divinity into these different moral theories. And strange results are no, we can. Now what does that mean? Well, since we are able to fit the divinity into the moral theory, we can avoid the consequence of the original youth of pro dilemma. I mean, we might side with humans, some say morality is simply a product of one's own individual beliefs and okay, then in that case divine command theory reigns supreme. And if you have no problem with subject to relativism or cultural relativism, then there's just no problem with divine command theory. And if you're either an atheist or agnostic, well, you don't have to accept divine command theory. You just simply reassert that you don't think that there is a divinity or don't have enough evidence for a divinity. And as for the rest of the theories, Glaucon, Hobbes, Epicurus and the rest, we were able to fit the divinity into the moral theories. We got strange results, that's true, but we're able to put it into the moral theory without any inconsistency. And if we could do that, then that consequence, either morality is arbitrary or it is independent of the divine, well, that's false. And what do we replace with the dilemma? Was the third or fourth or fifth or sixth possibility? Well, it probably depends upon which moral theory is true. And this may even have an impact on premises two or three. After all, with premise two, if you are, if you have no problem with subject to relativism, then premise two is just true. And that's what morality is, a product of an arbitrary decision of the divine. Of course, this leaves open the question of which, if any of these moral theories is correct, not to mention the very large question about whether there's even a divinity. But contrary to what you might think, or the first glance at the Yiddafro dilemma, it's not as if we could just simply say there's no relationship between a divinity and morality. After all, there's a significant relationship between morality and us. So if we are somehow able to manage to answer two very large questions, the first one being, is there a divinity? And the second one being, what's the nature of the divinity? I'll make no mistake, that's gonna have an impact on morality. But let us not think that we must include the thoughts of a divinity if we're going to do any kind of moral theory. If somebody manages to answer the question of whether there's divinity, that will be a very interesting day. And if somebody manages to answer the question of the nature of the divinity on the presumption that there is one, that will also be a very interesting day. But people have been trying to do this for a very long time. I'm not saying the endeavor should stop, but we can do quite a lot of theorizing about the nature of morality, just dealing with us and dealing with our nature, trying to figure out what our nature is and the relationship to morality in the end of that.