 in America as in us, and I like to do that when I'm in Europe, although it doesn't always go over well. And yet I am baffled when you speak of Asians as of them, and Japan and China in the same boat as countries that'll follow along after us if we set the standard. Japan is very similar to us. It's a part of OECD. And I wonder what you would think of the central thought of this conference, expressed by the gentleman to your right in the opening or second session, which is that the trilateral us is the us. Our presence in Asia, Europe, and America is organic, and Japan's presence among us is also organic as a part of the us. And perhaps one more? All right, well, why don't we take those two and then we'll give you a moment to think about your next questions. Thank you for your questions, and they are profound indeed, and I can't guarantee my answer will be just as profound as your question. I think geopolitics, and I grant you, this is a very Eurocentric remark to make geopolitics is gone. Geopolitics has certainly gone from my neck of the woods from Europe for a long time. And I think the end of the European divide is the reason for this, because Europeans have been struggling with the consequences of the end of the European divide for a long time in terms of what this means for their geopolitical position. And we've been very much inward looking because of that and neglecting our role in geopolitical terms. You know, this whole idea of America being Mars and Europe being Venus is also a reflection of the fact that Europe should not be involved in the murky business of geopolitics. We should leave that to the Americans who will not just act, but they will also finance it and they will take the blame if things go wrong. I think we were very comfortable with that position. And I think it is a position that is both not fair and it's not smart in the long run. And I believe that the realization that geopolitics is back for Europeans came with an increasing number of steps on the side of Russia that started, I think a couple of years ago that we've neglected for a long time and now just to give you one example, even after 2008 and the crisis in Georgia, energy dependence on Russian energy in Europe increased, didn't decrease, especially in those countries who feel very often very vulnerable to Russia's political influence. Their dependence on Russian energy is 85, 90% of their energy mix. Because of what's happened now, there's going to be a fundamental re-evaluation of energy patterns and energy mixes in all European states. In that sense geopolitics is back in those considerations because they don't want to be at the beg and mercy of Russia in the future. I think that secondly, what is geopolitics? Geopolitics, I think in essence, is the realization that to safeguard your fundamental interests in terms of stability, in terms of rule of law, in terms of economic development, you will have to act individually or collectively on the world stage. And if I say geopolitics was absent, I meant that many European states thought that just leaving things be, letting things take a natural development would bring things our way. In that sense, it's not the end of history but the end of geopolitics and it's just a stupid. So I think that for Europeans to come to terms with the fact that if you really want long term to safeguard your interests, you need to be active in geopolitics as something that in America you don't need to explain to anyone but in Europe it needs to be understood better than it was before and it's going to take time because our population has not grasped the importance of this yet and it's going to take us time to convince them. If you wish I can elaborate on that because there's another specific challenge but I might do that later on. Japan, question of Japan, I'm sorry to have created the impression that I would put all countries in one batch. I think Japan stands to profit more than anybody else from TTIP because Japan is an integral part of our economy. Look at this country, how many Japanese cars are built in the United States, how many of them are built in Europe, how intertwined our economies are. So if I created the impression that I was sort of putting them in a different corner, certainly not. I think TTIP could set the standard and the Japanese will not be, I'm sure, sorry to see that standard set because for them it's relatively easy to also join the same form of cooperation. My political remark was geared at the fact that you've seen what for instance Tanu Kissinger has said about the situation in Southeast Asia. I think this internal political gambit of using nationalism as a way of galvanizing public support, something Europeans have a lot of experience with. Just read Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark about the run-up of the First World War is something that is happening now in Southeast Asia and if we could share our experience and perhaps explain to our friends how dangerous this game is because you can't keep this. You know, this world is too interconnected. You cannot play an internal political game and hope that nobody in the outside world would see this and whether it's a prime minister, Abe or whether it's in Korea or whether it's in China stirring up nationalistic sentiment is one of those things you can do but it quickly gets out of control. Thank you very much, Minister. My name is Ram Kortevech at the Center for European Reform in London. I wholeheartedly embrace your appeal for greater strategic dialogue with Asia as well as with the United States. In a way, Crimea and events in East Asia are related and if you ask Asian commentators they will point to Crimea and say what's happening in Crimea could happen here. They look at the South China Sea and they see expansionism taking place by an undemocratic country and they say, well, how has the West responded to what's happening in Ukraine? Secondly, later this month, Putin is in all likelihood going to ink a gas deal in Shanghai. That touches upon the energy relationship that you were talking about. That's a very strategic issue. The EU apparently has a strategic partnership with China. Is the EU talking to China about this? The implications it might have for the broader Eurasian continent. And secondly, how do we ensure that in Europe we have that strategic dialogue that you so warmly appeal to? Thank you. My name is Tim Worsman with the Brookings Institution. Thank you, Minister, for your comments. I've really enjoyed them. I wanna ask a question about energy resources as well. This may not be a surprise. You talk about energy patterns and things that are changing. I would say in Ukraine, what I find remarkable is that the conflict essentially is not about energy resources. It is not at all. Yet, the European Union explicitly chooses to make it about energy resources. The backbone of how energy supplies have been organized in the European Union has not changed so far. Governments set rules and regulations and private sector companies basically arrange. We've had number of decades of market liberalization efforts. Now, in Europe, there are increasingly voices. The President Tusk of Poland was most explicit in this, saying maybe we should reverse this. Think about this in a different way. When you say that you wanna reevaluate what we're doing and how energy flows come to Europe or not, is that the path you're thinking and is that the type of change you're looking for? Thank you. Thank you. My name is Zhang Hong from China's Caixi Media. Minister, I appreciate your highlighting the strategic importance of TTIP and TTP in combination they can change the rule of the game. But I just wonder what makes you so confident that once these two trade packs are in place, it will make China and other countries to follow suit because it was perhaps the same kind of optimism in 2001 when China first came and joined the WTO. That was the same kind of optimism that China would play by the rule of the game. But today, we're seeing a quite different picture. So what made you so confident? Thank you. Thank you very much. Crimea, Asia, strategic dialogue. You know, there's not just in Asia that people are seeing similarities or are afraid of the consequences of the logic applied on Crimea. But I want to point to the fact that although in political terms and other issues, just as Syria and others, Russia and China seem to be strong allies. Here, China has been extremely reluctant, extremely reluctant to follow Russia's logic because I think that the main difference between those two countries is that the Chinese for many reasons have learned that this Russian approach of taking tactical decisions with strategic consequences is something that would be very dangerous to China, not just in terms of accepting the fact that some parts should regain sovereignty or just imagine what this implies for certain situations in China or across the Chinese straits. But also for the internal social and political development within China. So, you know, this is what President Putin's been doing in the last couple of months. I think alarm bells are going off in Beijing even if we don't hear them because it is, you know, it is threatening to the way they try and organize things and try and create stability internally, as well as in their own environment. Just, you know, the fact that Russia is so easy in changing its arguments fundamentally, you know, going from one lie to the other in a blink of an eye, you know, fighting the issue of Kosovo for years and now using Kosovo as an excuse for what they're doing. I mean, it's almost mind-boggling and you've seen a very, very careful and restraint reaction in China to this. So I believe there is a lot of reluctance to follow suit. And not just in China. Look at the Central Asian countries, how they watch Russia with a lot of reluctance. Now with very, very careful distance. Not even Belarus wholeheartedly and fully supports what is happening. So here again, you know, it sometimes seems that, you know, Putin is cutting off his noses by his face. You know, it's going to be very difficult to see and I think Asia is more patient and therefore is able to think more in strategic terms in general, but certainly China. So I believe that the strategic dialogue we should be having with China on these issues could be productive for both sides. You know, not wanting, we don't need to convince them or draw them into our camp, but just exchanging views, listening to each other, taking these Chinese points very seriously indeed, I think is a very, very important investment, transatlantic investment in our relationship and in the development of the situation in Southeast Asia because it will also make it easier for us to discuss issues that are difficult in our relationship with China, geopolitical issues such as the behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea. I think these are things we need to look at with a strategic outlook. Now about energy. I don't agree with, frankly, with the approach by President Tusk because I believe the best thing we have done as European Union in the last couple of years and has strengthened our position vis-a-vis the Russians is the third energy packet. So liberalizing our energy markets strengthens our position. You know, going back to traditional centralized government-run energy policy is not going to strengthen our position and I think what we need to do is to come up to quickly devise a European energy strategy collectively that has as its basis liberalization and let the markets run the energy field. Secondly, that creates networks that would spread the risk in Europe. You know, the overall European dependence on Russian gas is at 32, 33%, which is I think acceptable, not a strategic danger, but in some individual countries it is 90%. In others it's only 10%. So we need to spread the risk as Europeans. That is something we need to do. We need to save much more of our energy. I mean, energy is wasted in some European countries in a way because it's cheap in a way that is unacceptable and we need to have a very aggressive sustainability agenda in especially solar energy, wind energy and other forms of sustainable energy. WTO, it's not just China that joins the WTO and then neglects the rules. Look what Russia's been doing in a tremendous, very harmful way. But I think frankly that TTIP would create more discipline also vis-a-vis WTO because if you have TTIP, you would be in a stronger position to convince your trade partners that it is also in their interest to abide by the rules. It is still the nature of the game, also in the relationship between China and individual European countries is that, be careful, if you don't behave in our direction, we will pick on you. And I have some experience in that field, if China decides to pick on individual European countries, the others will say, oh, we're so sorry, oh, we feel your pain, but they will not step in to help them. And I think in a situation where we have TTIP that would be more difficult to do. Any other final questions I have? I'd like to ask myself. Minister, a question on what you said about Mr. Putin, you described him as being tactical instead of strategic. And just a few days ago, I heard Stolptobot make the same remark. By saying so, is Mr. Putin... Stolptobot. By saying so, are we underestimating Mr. Putin? Absolutely not. By saying so, we are saying that the risks of this are bigger than if there were a strategy we could prepare for. If there isn't really a strategy you can see in the long run, you have to prepare for a multiple outcome possibility. So, you know, I take Mr. Putin very, very seriously, President Putin. But I also see that it increases our difficulty in devising a response if we're not sure where this multiple tactics approach will lead. And that's been the difficulty for the outside world vis-a-vis Russia for 30 years. You know, I remember I tried to write a report when I was working in Moscow after the summer push where I argued it would be entirely possible that the Soviet Union would collapse. And then I was not allowed to send that report. And the reasons given were logical, completely logical. First of all, they will never do this because it's not in their interest. And secondly, they will never do this because it's not in our interest. I think that wasn't really a strong point. But the first point was a strong point, always assuming that countries act rationally upon their interests. And that is unfortunately not the case. I think there is in world history a plethora of examples of countries acting upon hubris, acting on the spur of the moment with incredible consequences to them, destructive consequences. Operation Barbarossa, you could name just one example. So, you know, I think I'm not underestimating, President, put it on the contrary. I'm trying to raise awareness of the challenge we're facing. And I still hope we can create a platform where both Russia and Europe and the United States could see mutual interest in a rational way. But here again, rationality in international relations is not always predominant. With those comments in mind, let me take you to the NATO summit, which is coming up in four months. A few months ago, people were wondering why we were having a summit. It was about what do we do after ISAF? Well, now we have a very sharp focus. And I think there is an opportunity at the summit to create that sort of strategic narrative that you were referring to, but then underneath that strategic narrative to take also a number of steps. You mentioned one yourself, which was to create more synergy among European armed forces. Could you elaborate a little bit on, as you look forward to this summit, what would you like to see coming out of it in terms of both the broader narrative and some more specifics? Well, if you accept my logic that the strategic outcome of what is happening now is not very predictable, then we need to force ourselves not to react to things that look like the Cold War with strategic reactions as though we are in the Cold War. So we should not mirror something that looks like the Cold War on the Russian side with a Cold War attitude on our side. That would be, I think, a silly mistake to make. At the same time, I believe for internal developments in some of our NATO partners and for the credibility of the alliance, we need to reinforce our presence in some of our partners because we need to show physically that Article 5 of the NATO treaty is indeed something we all abide by. And that means that I think one of the outcomes of the summit could be that we codify the presence in NATO allies or that we create a mechanism of being able to increase the presence. Because the whole idea that we needed to do this has sort of left us. I remember that in NATO, only half a year ago, people were thinking, oh my goodness, what is this new Secretary General going to do? I mean, post-Afghanistan, I thought, what is NATO for? I mean, nobody's asking that question anymore a couple of months later. So I think one of the issues will be how do we create instruments and mechanisms and presences that will take away any doubt any NATO member state might have that if they're in trouble, the rest of NATO will come to their rescue. So that is the first point. Second point is, I believe it is high time that European countries started to think about organizing their military capabilities jointly more than before. I think this is high time. In the past, the idea was, and there was reluctance in our armed forces. I've been advocating this for 20 years with a lot of reluctance in our armed forces. But the driving force for this now are our soldiers. No longer our politicians. Our soldiers are demanding this. And I think it is wise that they do so. And I think we should act upon this because there is no European taxpayer that will agree with increased defense spending if we cannot show that we do something about wasting so much taxpayer's money because we have tanks we no longer need, but we don't have refueling capability. We don't have recce capability. We don't have intelligence capability. We don't have deployable forces capability. I think these are the things we need to be concentrating on as Europeans and sort of overcome our hesitation to do this jointly simply out of ideas of national sovereignty. I mean, national sovereignty will not amount to much if we are not able to defend it collectively. I think those are very important points for the NATO summit. And I hope, let me add this, although it's sort of in the deep freezer now that we can get the nuclear disarmament agenda back on track. And perhaps, although this seems contradictory in this situation, there might be a beginning of a platform to talk about the disarmament again. I mean, I think it's a bloody shame that we have left the disarmament agenda unattended for so long. We should go back to that agenda. It will be painstaking. It will take a long time. We're frustrating, but we owe it to our children and grandchildren that we take the nuclear weapons out of the equation for good. Minister, thank you so much for a tremendous hour. Before I go further, let me just note that for those of you who stayed throughout the session, we have a reward for you. There are books out there for you to take. There are limited number, so I expect to see a rush for the door. But if you don't get one, it is online at CICE-CTR. So minister, again, it has been just a great pleasure to listen to you for the last hour. You are really a wonderful strategic thinker. I just wish we had many more like you in Europe to be able to do what you just did in the last hour. So thank you once again. Thank you very much. I know as everyone dashes to the door, four quick thank yous. Thank you, Mr. Minister. Thank you to the staff of CSIS, my staff, the Center for Transatlantic Relations. We couldn't do this without them. Thank you to the Dutch Embassy. Thank you to the Center for Transatlantic Relations. Thank you for brutal truth. Thank you for new ideas and new language. And thank you for being with us today. Have a great day. Thank you.