 Both by reducing the risks of escalation in a crisis or conflict and also by stemming proliferation. And from that perspective, a lot of our work over the last few years, my work looking into the future, focuses on Northeast Asia. There's the publications table outside, which has a number of examples of our product that focus on this area. And so when my colleague and friend Fumi Yoshida from Nagasaki University approached me and suggest that we jointly organize a conference focusing on these issues, it was of immediate interest to us. I'm just here to welcome you on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment and to also thank Nagasaki University for their co-sponsorship and their co-organization of this event. It's been a great partnership, one that I thoroughly enjoyed working in. And, you know, a partnership that I very much hope we will continue into the future as well. And now, to say a few words on behalf of Nagasaki University, it's my pleasure to welcome Susumu Shirabe. Thank you. Good morning, everyone. My name is Susumu Shirabe. I'm from Nagasaki City and Nagasaki University. And as an executive advisor for the president of Nagasaki University, I'd like to express my gratitude to the prestigious Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for allowing us to co-host today's event, Nuclear Risk and Northern Asia. As we are witnessing attention over North Korea's nuclear program being intensified, there is no more appropriate timing than today when we have fruitful and suggestive discussion to figure out common way out. So, in today's event, we also intend to announce the launching of our new English publication, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament. The journal aims to serving as a vehicle to put forward proposal to policies that other ideas could contribute to nuclear disarmament. Nagasaki University, which is a church of editing this journal, has suffered from the terrible disaster of new Nagasaki atomic bombing. Former Nagasaki Medical College, which is the origin of our university, was located within only half a mile from the Hypo Center. And nearly 900 physicians, nurses and students were killed at the time and because of the atomic bomb. Actually, my grandfather was also a professor at that college and devoted himself to relief activities in nuclear waste land. Having said that, the Journal of Peace and Nuclear Disarmament welcomes to a wide range of perspectives including from the full advocate nuclear deterrence for our security. As an apparent in second section of today's event, the journal will also receive papers on civilian use of nuclear energies as well as nuclear weapon policy. We will publish a report on the event in issue two of this journal. And I hope all the participants here enjoy today's discussion. Thank you. And also, we wrote these papers, small papers, posters, and this is pamphlet of institute in Nagasaki University. And also, this is a little bit tough to explain PCUMC. I am president of this. This is made by Nagasaki City and prefecture government and our university made this. Please bring back. It's in the outside the door. Otherwise, we have to bring back to Japan. Thank you. Thank you very much, Sharabe-san. Now, without any further ado, let me hand over to Toby Dalton, who is the other co-director of the nuclear policy program, my partner in crime. If anyone is here from ICE, not actual crime, to chair the first panel. I prefer a better half, but in any case, welcome everybody. I'm Toby Dalton, as James said, the other co-director of the nuclear policy program here. It's my pleasure to kick off this first panel where we'll dig into a number of issues related to the topic of extended deterrence in Northeast Asia. And in particular, we'll try to get into the role for nuclear weapons in extended deterrence in Northeast Asia and whether the changing circumstances in that security environment demand a greater role for nuclear weapons, a lesser role for nuclear weapons, and we'll try to in particular highlight some perspectives from the region, as well as here in Washington. And time permitting, we'll try to look at some non-nuclear options for bolstering extended deterrence as well. Obviously, the extended deterrence relationships that the United States has enjoyed with South Korea and Japan have multiple reasons for them, not only for the protection of allies, but the protection of U.S. forces and U.S. interests in the Western Pacific. They've had important non-proliferation benefits and rationales over the course of these relationships as well. But they're undergoing new stresses, these relationships, whether it's the threat from North Korea, the rise of China, and some increasingly aggressive military posturing. Revisionism is maybe too strong a word to characterize Russia, certainly concerns their technology is changing. And the domestic politics in all three of these countries are increasingly raising questions about the viability and survivability of these long-standing relationships. So to explore all of these issues, I'm very pleased to have this expert panel before us. Friends and colleagues all, I'm pleased to have them here. Let me start on the far end, colleague John Wolfstahl, who is the director of the Nuclear Crisis Group and senior advisor to Global Zero, also a non-resident scholar here at Carnegie. He has extensive experience in U.S. government, working on threat reduction programs at the Department of Energy, and most recently a senior director for WMV issues on the Obama Administration National Security Council staff. Next to him is Gina Kim, who is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis. A lot of her work is on U.S. ROK alliance issues, North Korea and regional security. She's also on the faculty at the Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies and a member of several governmental advisory groups. Next to Gina is Fumuyoshida, who's now with the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition at Nagasaki University and the editor of this new journal, The Journal of Peace and Nuclear Disarmament. He's a long-time journalist with Sahishinboom in Japan, also a historian and a scholar and a non-resident scholar here at Carnegie. And last but certainly not least, to my left is Rebecca Herzman. She's the director of the project on nuclear issues, probably better known as Pony here in Washington, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She's spent also much of her career in government and on the Hill at the Pentagon, including in the Obama Administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for countering WMV. So it's hard to imagine a more expert and appropriate group of individuals to help explore these issues today. To start, I figured I would talk a little bit with this group here about the credibility challenge and maintaining extended deterrence. And Gina and Fumuyoshida, I thought I would start with you to get perspectives from the region on what are the main variables or the contributors to the credibility of extended deterrence as they're seeing today from Seoul and Tokyo. So Gina, or more appropriately Nagasaki, I guess in Fumuy's case, but Japan in any case. So Fumuy, you want to go first? Thank you. Well, thank you very much for coming to this session. And I really appreciate Tobi and my colleagues in Carnegie to have this opportunity. Well, let me briefly speak of my consideration about extended deterrence. Well, in case of Japan, I have never had serious doubt about U.S. commitment to extended deterrence to Japan. Let me tell you the reason. As you know, the commitment, I think the political incentive of the United States and also strategic necessity of the United States to defend Japan is quite critical for U.S. national security and also the U.S. global projection capability. So that means U.S. needs U.S. bases in Japan and that means U.S. needs to respect our security allies. So in this context, if the United States loses Japan, then that means you will lose all the U.S. bases in Japan and that's going to largely and intensively and extensively undermine U.S. global projection capability. It is hard for the United States to accept that situation, considering in changing global order. So in this big picture, Japan is a key part, a core part of U.S. strategic map. So considering this kind of factor, I have never doubted about U.S. commitment to Japan, to defend Japan and also this security in the U.S. and Japan. It's stress, not only the defense of Japan, but also keep peace and order in the region at large, including North East Asia, North Pacific, and also possibly Indian Ocean area. This is expanding actually. So we have already, it's more than 60 years, we have this treaty and as time goes on, its law and emissions have been changing, but it's true that it's expanding and that implies this is more important, becoming more and more important for both of us and that means more stronger commitment by the United States to its extended deterrence to Japan, that's my thought. Having said that, let me point out two things about nuclear extended deterrence. Well, first point is, well, in case, just suppose, once nuclear weapons, a single nuclear point is used against Japan from any adversary. What it's going to be, I think, a start of, at least, beginning of end of credibility of nuclear extended deterrence. Very little nuclear deterrence means or it brings strong doubt on the side of Japan about nuclear deterrence. So that's one point. Another point is, let's think about some sentiment in Japan in case a single nuclear weapon was, several nuclear weapons are used against Japan. Now that means we have already two treaties at the moment. If we have another one, a new one, a third one in our country, that's going to be, I cannot imagine, what could happen in our society or in our country about nuclear weapons. We may have a huge bunch of strong anti-nuclear movement. That's going to be quite harmful to U.S. strategy, especially nuclear strategy. So the single most important thing I would like to emphasize is our alliance had focused on, for the put highest priority, how to avoid use of nuclear weapons. First use, second use, it doesn't matter. Use of nuclear weapons is not option or realistic option. And I cannot represent other people of Japan, but my opinion is many people in Japan do not believe, actually, U.S. will really use nuclear weapons. It's just deterrence. It's not a tool to use. It's just too detour. Nothing more than that. So please state as a deterrent. But what I heard there, which is interesting, and Gina, I want you to pick up on this, is sort of the alliance as an anchor for the U.S. and the sort of global strategy. But the biggest challenge for credibility is absolutely on deterring first use. Not only against Japan, but in general. How does that look from South Korea? I thank Nagasaki University and Cardi for having me to this session today. When we talk about extended deterrence, South Koreans emphasize at least four points. First, shared threat assessment. Second, wide range of deterrence options against various threats from North Korea. And third, the possibility of forward deployment of U.S. nuclear assets in the region. And four, which is most important thing, his consultative mechanism. With regard to the first one, regarding the threat assessment, I think tailoring should be based on accurate understanding of North Korea's strategic calculus. So we emphasize shared threat assessment, not only the capability, but also the willingness to use nuclear weapons against the allies. But it seems to me that the U.S. believes that North Korea is building ICBM, which may take several months, according to the new NPR, especially. And it believes also that North Korea is developing technical nuclear weapons. And at the same time, it's concerned that North Korea may use nuclear weapons in a crisis. But South Koreans have some conservative views about this, because we believe there is some imperfect evidence to support this argument. And currently, South Korea and the U.S. do not have a standing body where we can have real-time assessment of the threat. So that is a big concern. Regarding the second point of wide-range of options, well, as you may know, South Korea has conventional military capability, and we are pretty much sure that South Korea can have some superiority over North Korea in that area. But we rely on offshore nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. So currently, we have an operational plan for conventional provocation by the North, but we don't have the kind of operational plan for nuclear crisis. So we have this kind of concern. And we have to... South Koreans are concerned about the possibility of stability in-stability paradox on the Korean Peninsula, which means we may have nuclear deterrence against North Korea at the strategy level, but we may have a possibility that North Korea may... On the one hand, we believe that it can constrain the risk of escalation, but on the other hand, it can engage in conventional provocation while expecting that the ROG and the U.S. may settle for a political settlement for a political outcome by using nuclear weapons. So there is a possibility that we have to be prepared for. So currently, we have just a guideline. We have agreed on 4D operational concepts, which include disrupt, detect, and defend and destroy, but South Koreans want to move to the next level of having, you know, developing operational plan for various type of situations. Regarding the third point, the possibility of forward deployment of nuclear weapons. Can I stop you there? Because I want to come back to the forward deployment. It's a huge issue. The last one. I think the consultative mechanism is very important because we have established a consultative mechanism by establishing EDPC Extended Deterrence Policy Committee in 2010, and now we have DSE, Nuclear Deterrence Component and Missile Defense Component all together. But the way we see the role of this consultative mechanism seems to be different between the two allies. For South Koreans, we believe it as a mechanism to build some concrete measures against the nuclear threats. But it seems to me that U.S. side may think it is a forum where we can exchange ideas and share information. So we have some difference. So, Rebecca, I want to turn to you and have you talk a little bit about the period from 2010 to include when you were in the Pentagon. You see these sort of different demands from Japan and South Korea in terms of what they want, how you manage credibility in the alliance and the extended deterrence. Can you talk a little bit about how you handled that? So I think if we step back, we would, the room, many here are quite knowledgeable, but credible deterrence is a function of will and capability. It's will and capability sufficient to convince an adversary that the costs of the action being contemplated are far greater than the potential gains. So that credibility always has those two pieces. Now, extended deterrence, the way I look at it is extended deterrence really puts an added premium on the capability. I think you can tailor, you can look at the extent to which it needs to be more forward, offshore or not. Those are fairly nuanced details. The will is the critical piece because the adversary now has to believe that the United States in this case is willing to take such profound risk for a threat that does not involve the U.S. homeland. And then to make it more complicated, we need actually the party that is being protected to feel assured and confident because in fact you can unravel that credibility by either the adversary not believing it or by the parties to the alliance becoming decoupled in different ways. Both will actually upend the process. So I'm going to get to what did we do but I think recognizing how those pieces go together are really important because we have to look at this more than how do we talk about nukes with each other. And I think that actually has come up in some of the other comments. So what's at the heart of the will? I actually think that is the extent to which the parties are actually entangled. To what extent are interests entangled? Fundamentally that's what produces coupling. So that coupling has to be economic, it has to be political, it has to be diplomatic. In both of these cases a critical part of that coupling is the conventional military relationship between the United States and both countries with a large number of U.S. forces as well as a huge number of U.S. civilians living in both locations. So that's absolutely critical. That's what makes us so coupled. When you go to look at the I think sort of started 2006 rumblings actually with the nuclear test but acutely in 2009 became this added question of how much nuclear coupling do we need? How do we link that piece together and how literal must that coupling be? So I think before that time frame that nuclear coupling that very sort of operational technical was political. It was really under the political bucket. Especially in like 2009 I remember landing in Tokyo for my first ever diplomatic encounter with Japanese counterparts to talk about a very early stage at that point of the nuclear posture review and quite literally while we were in the air North Korea detonated its 2009 test and so when we landed and everyone turned their phones on we realized what had just happened and then had to walk right into within hours a consultation on nuclear deterrence which was a little bit interesting. It definitely raised the stakes. So I think that really sparked this question. I think there were two pieces of that. I think in the Obama administration we had a pretty optimistic view of the role of nuclear weapons as their ability to decline over time. There were a few specific things that were being discussed at the time in terms of naval components of our overall nuclear force and the discussion about what was being anticipated correctly by the Japanese at the time that the U.S. would probably decide to retire the T-LAMN so that the sea launched cruise missile which was really sort of on its last legs so to speak. So there was a lot of tension and a lot of desire to figure out how to make things much more concrete with both countries because the tensions had risen because North Korea's capabilities were already progressing significantly and making this much more real. Not a political commitment but also a military commitment. So I think that's the context in which that occurred was a little bit of anxiety about whether or not the Obama administration would remain committed to extended deterrence in that time frame at a time when threats were rising including this reaction of China going on less than the nuclear front in the region but certainly in terms of its kind of expansionist intentions militarily and economically. So I think what was done and I think this is interesting. Gina brought this up in terms of these various discussions especially on the consultative mechanism. How do we better share ideas? How do we create the various extended deterrence dialogues? There was the extended deterrence policy committee, extended deterrence strategy and consultative group, the integrated defense dialogue different names slightly for both countries but both basically had specific dialogues that were meeting really twice a year kind of defense to defense and then a higher level government to government type dialogue. I think that's gone a long way and then increasingly what we had was different types of posture adjustment in presence. So far more actual signaling with nuclear assets the rotational assignments of things going through. Looking ahead the question I have is for the panel in general as we discuss this is what's really more important going forward? Is it maintaining that economic, political and other coupling that keeps our interest fully entangled that's what's really in my mind is the cement on the will that means the US will be there. We have to have skin in the game kind of like what you said you know how much of that is that and how much is it that we're really focusing in the nuclear bucket on which capabilities do we have and what decision making processes and so forth. I think one without the other doesn't buy us very much. Well good thing that we can put that question immediately to John then so as you look ahead what sort of future challenges picking up on some of the threads here you see. Yeah this has been a great discussion already so I'll try to be additive here. I'm going to steal Jenna's four point model so I see basically four big challenges moving forward I mean the first and foremost we're dealing with today which is just crisis management there is legitimate real concern about North Korea's growing capabilities and what that might mean for their behavior and you know whether it's the stability instability paradox whether it is just provocation below the strategic level as North Korea continues effort to try to decouple the alliance we need to get much better at coordinating and communicating both the risk assessment the threat assessment the capabilities but also in demonstrating a united front to the North Koreans that they won't be successful in this and I think a key to that has to be an emphasis on avoiding nuclear use. If you I would imagine and I have been to Seoul now for several years you know people in South Korea have gotten used to the idea that they are at risk conventionally the idea that they will become the target of a nuclear attack because of their alliance with the United States I imagine would put tremendous strain on the alliance just as we have dealt with the strains facing the possibility of nuclear use against us because of our alliance with South Korea or Japan put strains on the body politic that's a natural reaction and so I think we need to recommit ourselves at a high level not just coincidentally that's what the nuclear crisis group works on but I think that's foremost in our minds the second is I think related to that which is just the alliance management challenge and that's not just in the case of ROK but also in Japan and I I'm not aware I can't remember a time in my lifetime or at least adult lifetime I think when the U.S. withdrew a significant number of troops from South Korea in the 70's where the risk of decoupling and confidence of the alliance was so low and it's not because of our military capability but Rebecca hit this right on the head it's about will and the mixing of military, strategic political and I think misguided but poorly communicated economic interests on trade on support for the alliance economic commitment to the alliance I think has really done tremendous damage and so I think we need to really focus in on ensuring that the alliance coordination and communication and the communication of will is as high as possible I cannot imagine 200,000 Americans being evacuated from Seoul but every time we talk about that it damages the alliance I mean it's nonsensical I grew up in New York when they talked about trying to evacuate Manhattan should we have a nuclear disaster at Indian Point and a certain you can evacuate Americans from Namibia you can't evacuate Americans from Seoul but just talking about it I think has damaging and then in South Korea again the same because sorry in Japan the alliance management risks I think are quieter because Prime Minister Abe has made close coordination with President Trump such a high priority but there's a I think we're at risk of over personalizing the relationship and the alliance there because Japan is at the working level and at the political level there are these different strains in Japanese political thought and thinking and we are only on one side of them I'll sub up here the other two quickly and I've already talked about it just sort of the leadership deficit we're now seeing from the United States we're going to need to emphasize a lot of things Rebecca rightly pointed to in terms of our economic commitment our political commitment our shared values democracy which I know is different in Japan and South Korea than it is in the United States but those are things that are all under threat and that I think we need to recommit ourselves to and then the last thing I think this is a bigger challenge than just the extended deterrence for the two allies but also then gets to the bigger questions of the mixing of regional and strategic threats which are going to be mixed but just look at one example the Chinese reaction to that the United States is right and South Korea is right to want to protect our military capabilities and civilian population from North Korean missiles that is going to erode China's ability to threaten the United States military capabilities in Japan and South Korea they're going to increase their military capabilities in response as our national missile defense grows in response to North Korea it's going to call China's strategic capability into question the more that we are in an offense defense race and an arms race with China that's then going to affect the Russian dynamic even more and so we have to recognize that from these very important but smaller regional questions will become strategic challenges that I just don't think we are thinking about enough and that we need to get on top of So Jean I want to come back to you you mentioned in your opening remarks the sort of the NPR's reference to this window in which the North Korean capability won't have been fully consolidated and target the US talking about shared threat assessments is the view the same in Seoul that that is a capability that hasn't fully been achieved yet in North Korea? Talking about North Korea's missile capability Yes we have still imperfect information about especially about North Korea's mastery in the last phase of re-entry technology North Korea has not proved it fully yet so sometimes we talk about this the prospect of North Korea's mastering this capability we talk about possibly by 2020 but when I read the documents in a policy statement issued by Washington we see that Americans think that it's going to be just a few months before North Korea will master this type of technology Is that timeframe something that different? Reika do you the concern about decoupling that's specifically associated with the ICBM threat from North Korea it seemed like in your opening remarks you were pushing back against that as the main threat to decoupling is that fair? Well that's interesting that may be a threat to decoupling but it is what actually couples us to begin with what actually entangles us so I think that those that's not inconsistent that's the most immediate threat because it could shake the foundation of our interests but if we don't have the strong incentives the shared values the economic integration the political integration the rest of it doesn't really matter it doesn't really lie to way anyway I think I was thinking about something not unrelated if you think about the nature of this extended deterrence relationship in both countries but I think especially with the rock the as we look at the North Korea problem we've had actually a pretty mature assurance relationship that side how do we work with the ally and partner we're communicating we're doing all this it's the deterrence part it's the part of actually understanding North Korea getting inside that psychology accepting the fact that we're moving to more of a deterrence posture as opposed to exclusive focus on denuclearization that's actually the underdeveloped piece so when you think about crisis communication and crisis management increasingly that is going to be also more complex because it isn't just about establishing crisis communication between the allies that already agree with each other it's actually about how do we establish crisis communication with them at the same time we will have to have some mechanism of crisis communication with the adversary we haven't even kind of figured out how that goes into the mix so that's the difference I think in part between consultative mechanisms that are designed to align policy and build capability and look at plans extremely important but that's not crisis management that's fundamentally different just to jump in so we make this point all the time because we've been and I've been talking for some time about trying to see if you can establish military to military communication links between the United States and North Korea at a high level the chairman of the Joint Chiefs can pick up a phone and call his counterpart in every other country on the planet that has nuclear weapons except for North Korea the one country we're most likely to have a conflict with and that just doesn't make sense and getting to the point where we and the North Koreans who I think are signaling that they are worried about escalation and crisis management that we can find a way to connect into that is a real challenge that we haven't figured out yet and I want to come back to this point in the discussion about tailoring too because it seems like that's a fairly fundamental premise to be able to tailor is to be able to signal credibly and understand how those signals are going to be able to receive Gumi, do you want to comment? Yes, I just about to talk about the coupling and decoupling issues where as Rebek said the nuclear coupling it is sort of allies tend to request the United States to do more to give us more assurance it is understandable but by nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence it's quite questionable for me and for example if the United States try to make additional reassurance to allies by all by exercising a lot of nuclear weapons it's going to be a commitment trap for the United States it's hard for the US to really act on Japan's and it's it's can be a sort of the function of decoupling for that bicycle so I'm wondering nuclear coupling option is really a good coupling option it depends on how it could be figured out in detail but in general I have that kind of doubt I want to come back to that and talk about the forward deployment piece in a second but first Fumi here in Washington you pick up the newspaper today and you see a discussion about the so-called bloody nose and John referenced this idea of alliance entrapment in reverse if you will that now South Korea certainly and perhaps Japan also may feel entrapped by more aggressive US military planning as far as North Korea is concerned how is that perceived in Japan that the US may go too far and end up in a situation where there's accidental or even an inadvertent first use over nuclear weapons well as I mean this is just my observation but yes many people have some concerns with sort of increasing in that region also the strong rhetoric from the president here and also strong rhetoric from the leader in DPRK that's you know inspire some concern that is true but it is not quite clear for us this is just the extension of diplomacy this is just a step towards real military action it is not clear to us so that is the biggest concern so maybe building government to government there must be some communication but for the public it is quite out of you know we don't know yet what is it but what is going on actually and about nuclear risk or as I said before many people in Japan don't think nuclear option is quite serious option to be taken at this stage of crisis so because we know this is too terrible to be you know repeated so maybe this kind of perception gap exists between Japan and other countries that's true I think the demands from South Korea and Japan are looking a little bit different in this respect and Gina I wanted to come up back to the point that you started to raise about the forward deployment and certainly there is a narrative in South Korea that the return of US tactical nuclear weapons is a key way of restoring deterrence that's been eroded because of North Korea's program what's your sense of that argument was that kind of last year's argument and now South Korea has moved on or is this you know thinking still prevalent and likely to continue well South Korean government during times asked the US that you should ensure more frequent rotational deployment of nuclear assets in the region we have asked for the deployment of nuclear assets in the Asia Pacific well actually last September at the National Assembly there were lots of debates about these options among the politicians at the time Foreign Minister Kang Kyung Ha clearly mentioned that South Korean government is not pursuing the option of redeployment of US nuclear weapons back to South Korea personally I believe there are some pros and cons when we talk about the positive this option is possibly you can use it as a bargaining chip for future talks with North Korea for denuclearization or disarmament even but I'm so worried about the possibility that it can you know provide any legitimate reason for North Korea's development in its own tactical nuclear weapons first and the tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula is very vulnerable to first attack by North Korea second I think it violates 1991 joint declaration of nuclear free Korean peninsula South Korean government has never walked away from this commitment we have to think about the possibility that residents local residents will dislike this idea and there will be high protests against this idea this becomes realized so we have this kind of very difficult issues so the reason why you're asking the US to see if there is any possibility of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons is because on the one hand we are confident about defending our nation and deterring North Korea by using conventional means but we are not confident about the possibility that US may have several factors to be considered when crisis happens well as you know South Korea has long been exposed to nuclear threats from North Korea it's been a very long time but what's different now is the leaders in Pyongyang is threatening the US by developing ICBM so we are concerned that the US may have different in dealing with this crisis that's why we are talking of this option more often than before I'm not sure about the redeployment back to South Korea but rotational deployment of nuclear assets is for reassuring the public in South Korea because people don't know exactly what nuclear deterrence means because we don't have that kind of experience before so we just want to have some visibility that's why people are talking about this only now so visibility John do you think that sort of re-nuclearizing the alliance if you will or increasing the nuclear component of the alliance does that fundamentally address the perceived deterrence credibility gap is it more just window dressing for some of these broader problems in maintaining the coupling if you will to borrow Rebecca's face this is not a cop out because I'll always tell you what I actually think but I think that is really something that the alliance has to decide for itself the South Koreans and the United States have to have the type of relationship that's not just about politics but includes politics but also about military capabilities to decide is this necessary to deter this necessary to reassure I have no qualms if the alliance decides at a base level this is a requirement we have to do this or else the terms will break down alliance will break down but the United States should do it I'm just not convinced that we're anywhere near that and what I do worry about is we have I didn't invent this term I don't know who did actually I should go and try to find out I'm worried about the sort of shiny object reassurance option you don't have to worry about our commitment because we have this nice shiny object for you and it's nuclear so you're good the problem with that is it's a cheat when that thing ages out like the TLAMN are you caught in a trap we have to replace it even though there's no military requirement for it I do worry about the vulnerability of nuclear assets in South Korea and the idea that we might have to use them quickly or that they might be vulnerable and we might have to sort of scatter them around the country to ensure their survivability we used to like to joke about nuclear weapons we used to joke that when we want to reassure Europe for deterrence we should just take one of our strategic nuclear submarines and rename it the USS Europe because our strategic nuclear weapons aren't tactical or strategic therefore our security commitments which include protecting the United States and our allies so how do you communicate that and the challenges and we all know this and I think you all know this too accepting extended reassurance is an unnatural act like you know jumping out of a working aircraft right I mean why would you ever do that even for fun right it's a tough thing to get your mind around don't worry we'll seed our sovereignty and our ultimate to security to another country and that's why it's hard even in Europe where I think extended deterrence has been very successful for 70 years reassurance was you know we use this term a lot reassurance is a bucket with a hole in the bottom you can pour your heart and soul and all the capability you have into it it'll never reach the top because it is psychological so what are we communicating you need nuclear weapons don't worry we have them for you or don't worry we have a full suite of military economic political capabilities that are there for you and we need it if in the end the alliance says nuclear has to be it because all the other things fail I think that's a reasonable discussion but we are so many other assets and so many other capabilities that I don't think we're fully utilizing that I worry that jumping to the end makes it easier for North Korea to play with us I jump in on that I just think there's a couple things first of all I know it's a bit of a slip of the tongue I think but actually I think it's an important one to kind of state outright this is a fully nuclearized alliance it doesn't need to be re-nuclearized I just don't want that idea to even take hold it's fully nuclearized right so I don't think at all that we need additional capability to depend to kind of up that game and I worry about a few things in that regard I worry about the extent to which we actually overmatch on assurance in ways that actually work to the detriment of deterrence in my mind assurance is really intended to be a subset of deterrence everything you do to assure should be supporting your deterrence posture I'm not so convinced that going to kind of a simplistic approach of I'm going to just station additional lower yields DCA type nuclear capabilities on Penn is really going to help and in particular I am worried about the first strike incentives that exist in this dynamic which is different from other situations and I think that is really important I almost wish we had a stability instability paradox that would be better that would be better I think I'm worried that's not the case I'm worried that we have high levels of you know evolving first strike incentives on both sides and in fact and in an environment where we have low ability to do crisis management and control ability so I don't think what you want to do is then up the first strike incentive in that environment that doesn't strike me as a good idea and I think we have plenty of capability to respond to North Korea so that's kind of my take on that piece I want to try you out a little bit more before I turn to the audience on the capability point you kind of hinted earlier maybe it was a sort of around the bend critique of the NPR that it defines the assurance piece ultimately in terms of capability and it seems like we could get into this never ending cycle of meeting more needing more maybe that isn't fundamentally the challenge well so two points I mean I think first of all you know assurance based on capability in which we're not fully entangled in our interest is not going to last that is not going to be that's not going to build will that is just you know back patting and I'm not sure that is particularly helpful it doesn't mean the capability isn't important and you know that gets tricky because I do believe that actually as much as we never want a nuclear weapon to be used deterrence depends on the notion that we are fully prepared to use it so trying to drive to never use actually also kind of undermines deterrence it's really the notion that you know the cost will be so overwhelming and that we are not afraid to use these capabilities if you back us into that corner hard enough so I think that that's critical but you know political ideals, political arrangements close partnership and the ability to share those become critically important I think the way I would one possible way to think about it is going back to what I said earlier if you think about this what did deterrence look like to our allies I think pre 2009 2010 it was really a black box it was you know don't worry we've got your back it's a political commitment to define the curtain increasingly that hasn't been enough so it's been make that a more transparent box be more clear about what's in it you know share, have capabilities think about how things rotate through what we're talking about now is do we have to go from a transparent box to as much more shared box you know shared capabilities shared decision making shared stakes in the actual nuclear coupling and I guess my caution on that is that may not be the unqualified good that it might feel like at first blush to our allies yeah fair enough Gina go ahead I want to add regarding assurance I also believe that assurance of the public is a secondary benefit that's right because we have different types of audience at least the three groups the government, the people and leaders in Pyongyang so we have to have different communications but what but at the government level we have a new question right after release of MPR because in it what hatched our eyes was such a phrase that the US has the ability to to deploy its gases to ally the territory permanently or momentarily if necessary I know if it's just big if at this moment but we are wondering begin to wonder what kind of condition should be met if the US decides redeploying all the nuclear assets back to ally territory facing nuclear threats from North Korea we think oh this is South Korea so we have kind of the question just for fun there is something called the instability paradox in case you don't like the stability instability I think that's called instability so we'll turn to the audience now to take some questions there will be microphones that will come to you please tell us who you are and please make it a question rather than a five minute discussion or a thesis on whatever particular issue that you would like to address Mr. Harris Peter Wilson RAND Corporation I'd like to address Ms. Kim what's your appreciation now of the dear leader from Poyngyang as a potentially a much more sophisticated political opponent the initiatives associated with the Winter Olympics suggest to me that the Poyngyang has got the message that to avoid war of the United States and then we may be seeing a very dramatically change dynamic in North-South relations fostered by again an understandable opponent is now trying to find a way to carry out a strategy of alliance damaging policies good question I'm happy to take another one sir right here thank you I'm Ben Self with the Mansfield Foundation I loved the shiny object reassurance I'm going to say John Wolfstahl says uses this term if you find out who actually coined it let me know but in that regard you focused on Korea you did mention the TLMN and the problem of Japan and what I hear a lot of Japanese calling for some physical manifestation of a nuclear umbrella which is just a metaphor you described how hard it is for a country to rely on another country for its nuclear deterrent especially when it's only a metaphorical object where are we with the new nuclear posture review in terms of providing Japan with a tangible shiny object that satisfies their apparent need for that and how do we get out of this situation to where they can trust in our overarching capabilities that were described as perfectly sufficient thank you do you want to start on the the young general up north yes the reason why North Korea reached out to South Korea I think it's because of two reasons possibly one is perhaps North Korea declared that it has almost complete its nuclear missile program so it gained some confidence in dealing with South Korea so it is gesturing that we can gesturing that we can deal with inter-Korean issues and the second reason I think is North Korea may want to make South Korea to accept the fact that it is possible to co-exist nuclear armed North Korea as it is so at the same time the current South Korean government is trying to manage the security environment peacefully with North Korea because what we are doing under the name of maximum pressure and engagement is part of coercive diplomacy it's a political diplomatic strategy toward North Korea so the essence of coercive diplomacy is pressuring North Korea to undo what's been done at the same time to open the gate to escape the current crisis so what we are trying to do is possibly the world division the U.S. is pressuring North Korea so on the other hand South Korea is trying to keep the inter-Korean channels alive and possibly seeks the opportunity of moving beyond the inter-Korean dialogue for denuclearization that we are trying to do is there also concern though just using this as a gambit to buy time to prevent a preventive strike if you will sorry for the two prevents well as you know the asymmetric capability between the U.S. and DPRK it is unthinkable that North Korea will use nuclear weapons against the U.S. it does not have first strike capability it does not have second strike capability either so it is not likely that North Korea will react to any aggression from the to the any aggression from the outside very quick quickly because when we read the discourse coming from North Korea especially with regard to nuclear nuclear strategy back in 2013 North Korea began to use the word nuclear retaliation after nuclear test but at the time it was not clear whether North Korea will use nuclear weapons against conventional threat or nuclear threat but in 2015 North Korea began to talk about nuclear preemption against aggression from the U.S. and in 2017 North Korea mentioned that its nuclear strategy has changed more to preemptive in nature I did some quantitative and qualitative analysis of the oldest discourse for the last few years I came to a conclusion that still deterrence is dominant in its rhetoric rather preemption when North Korea talk about preemption it describes a situation where North Korea is exposed to preemptive nuclear weapons used by the U.S. so I think the focus is still deterrence John, shiny objects so the nuclear posture of you called for the development of two new types of nuclear weapons the first is to put a low yield or a lower yield warhead on a submarine launch ballistic missile this is talked largely about the Russian scenarios but I think has application for the North Korean scenarios for escalation control and dominance but more relevant to extended deterrence was the call to study and potentially to pursue a new nuclear arms sea launch cruise missile I think that gets us into particularly the shiny object region that I think is going to be quite controversial on Capitol Hill I don't know what the funding support will be they have to do the study first I think there will be a lot of calls for understanding the thinking inside the administration which to date they've laid out some but I don't think it's backed up by a lot of the intel information that the committees might want and I think there will be a big debate about this so I think it will be it will be pitched largely on the alliance management and reassurance piece and I think there's a lot of historical information that will be mine and also what's the current state of play I think the way out of the box quite frankly is to point at some of the things Rebecca talked about but also I think there's one issue that hasn't come up here which there's a lot of literature for and I think is a big part of the debate which is conventional deterrence of nuclear weapons can we use our conventional assets and even our non-kinetic assets to threaten credibly a response that would make the cost of using nuclear weapons too great and I think in some scenarios the answer to that is clearly yes in some scenarios the answer to that is probably not Korea however is one of those areas where I think it actually has true capabilities the ability of the United States with South Korea and Japan to respond to and destroy the North Korean leadership and the North Korean military with conventional weapons is I believe real today the nuclear aspect is designed to keep the alliance together in the face of nuclear threats and to the extent that we only emphasize those and we don't emphasize the conventional I think we're doing some damage and you look at what we were able to do in Europe where we talked about in the 2010 NPR and Rebecca knows this quite well because she worked on it probably even more than I did in terms of implementation was we wanted to expand the deterrence basket beyond just nuclear weapons it was conventional it was missile defense it was economic it was non-kinetic it was all of these capabilities and we made great progress we did significantly reduce the role of nuclear weapons in Europe I think we need to be pursuing exactly that kind of effort when it comes to North Korea in many areas we do we don't respond to artillery barrages from the southern parts of North Korea with a nuclear weapon we do it with anti-artillery radar and batteries there are very few contingencies that require nuclear use and I think the more we work on reducing them the more we can get away from the shiny object scenario we're not there yet and I think politically that's going to be an even harder thing to get to but I know we won't get there if we're not talking about it and emphasizing and that's where I think you really point to the value of all of these extended deterrent and strategic deterrent dialogues because they are supposed to get into the box I mean I shared Rebecca's concern we're green a lot today Rebecca I think either bad for you or good for me but I don't want to get into the jointly owned box but I think the more we understand the decision making the more we actually share in advance what this process might be like and gain confidence in the full range of capabilities the easier it is for us to manage these at the lowest level of destructive capability possible. Fumi, can you pick up a little bit how the Japanese reaction has been to the NPR and in particular it seems like the demand from Japan for a replacement for the TLMN has been a motivating factor Well, as you remember the foreign minister of Japan announced that his will to welcome the new NPR at the point that the US made a strong commitment to the alliance that is his point but he didn't talk about the details of the new NPR and the coalition party in Japan the Komei party the head of this party said something different towards the new NPR he has shown some concern to the plan to introduce more usable in the warheads so it is still divided but as a government it is basically it is welcoming in general if we go into the details of strategy we may have different views may I add one more thing? shining object if it is work as a deterrence shining if it is used no shine dirty object so I am wondering why we need to use nuclear weapons as a tool to reassure alliance I mean the request from the alliance is so strong to the United States not for sure for the citizens that is quite beyond our understanding I would be really curious Rebecca for your opinion on how you differentiate then between Korea and Japan in the symbolic value of nuclear weapons for reassurance okay remind me to touch on that I think though I want to go back one more hit on the shiny object and I will say I don't have a deep other people up here may I don't have a deep theoretical or emotional objection to either of the sea launched capabilities from the deterrence theory point of view we can come back to that but that is not my concern that is not what motivates my reservations about the capability that is being discussed is something that is fairly proximate and is fairly low cost so actually it is if it would be perceived by Japan as a relevant shiny object which is one of the questions it at least has the potential to be relatively real relatively quickly I am concerned about the slickum option the sea launched cruise missile not just for other reasons it is going to be a very long haul it is a study to a study it is years out and it is going to face a lot of controversy I believe both on the hill and politically but potentially even internally between the services and others the TLMN was not popular so I think there is going to be a lot of risks in that and one of my concerns is that we are really losing the TLMN in terms of the alliance management piece they already lost it once and then we worked through it and now we are like saying it may come back but what if it doesn't I think there is a risk to that so I am a little bit concerned about that and that just takes us back to this shiny object principle I really think that we should not be using these objects for as much for assurance purposes as really assessing their necessity for deterring the adversary I think we can handle assurance in ways other than parking things in various parking lots the issue is what is necessary to deter Kim Jong-un do we need more prompt capability well then maybe we need a sea launch capability what is it that we need the assurance ship flow from that and I think that that applies to both whether you are saying I want something on pen sea launched we may need those capabilities but it should really be ultimately about the calculus in the region of the adversary in my opinion unfortunately we have a very in my view very poor track record on making those decisions look at the fact that we still have forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe for which there really is no military requirement it is a political mission and we are now spending a lot of money to life extend those programs and forcing or forcing the allies to buy new nuclear capable aircraft even though there is no real military requirement for them and that is I think Rebecca and I are not disagreeing I just think maybe we are a little bit more optimistic or pessimistic about the ability to manage the politics and the perception and just let military requirements drive the train right additional questions Kingston I see you in the back Kingston reef with the arms control association and just a foot stop really quickly some of the points Rebecca was making about the sea launch cruise missile I mean the nuclear post review repeatedly refers to that capability as a useful bargaining chip to attempt to exact better behavior from the Russian federation so to the extent one believes that that capability is useful for deterrence in northeast Asia as well I think there is a disconnect there but I wanted to ask quickly about China and how the nuclear post review characterizes the Chinese nuclear threat there has been a lot of attention on Russia and how the review characterizes Russia and whether it does so appropriately or inappropriately but less attention on Russia but the review does paint the advances made by China and the nuclear arena in a very dire light and specifically it says that quote our tailor deterrence our tailor strategy for China is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear weapons that are ever limited is acceptable is acceptable end quote now that's interesting to the extent that one believes yield has an impact on deterrence my understanding from the open source literature is that China has only very high yield warheads so to the extent one thinks that China could engage in limited theater nuclear use how it would do so with high yield warheads is an interesting question but I would be interested in the panel's view on whether the NPR's characterization of the Chinese nuclear threat is on point or not is there evidence that China is preparing for limited nuclear use and do we need more graduated nuclear options to address the China threat thanks great thank you so Steve you had a question as well hi Steve Aoki retired we've had a very good discussion of perceptions by the key regional players at ROK and Japan individually of extended deterrence and the role of US nuclear weapons in providing a deterrence we haven't talked very much about the other side of the triangle the third side of the triangle namely how the ROK and Japan talk to each other or share perceptions to the extent that they do about strategic matters and whether any of that has changed and should it change and should the communications channels be different in light of developing North Korean capabilities so I'd be interested in panels reaction from all three countries so a good question to sort of expand the aperture a little bit beyond North Korea who wants to start Huumi can I look to you China what do you think about China well I'm an expert of China's nuclear strategy but we have been we have lived because we have lived with the nuclear China for many years and many of the nuclear chip missiles are intermediate range and many targets I presume are in Japan for long years that's true so if it is going emerging those are nuclear weapons it doesn't matter at all so I mean the flexibility or tail up the balance argument is like very professional narrow term argument for Japan for Japan the country like Japan we don't have nuclear weapons for nuclear strategy for many of us it's just a nuclear weapon as a joint shoot set in January more nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon and once used it's going to be escalated that's our perception in general that raises interesting question about whether the tailoring language that is very in vogue here actually resonates in South Korea and Japan or not I mean just a word I think the language and emphasis on China and the NPR and what I'm also told will be an emphasis in the missile defense review does I think really get to what the Pentagon and the State Department are hearing from Japanese security officials that they are really concerned about the growth of China's capabilities and the lack of emphasis but how well attuned the United States to deal with those particularly on the missile side but to a lesser extent the nuclear side and it gets to a larger problem in my view of the NPR which is I think the nuclear posture review is actually a very good reflection for the most part of the Pentagon's thinking on nuclear matters both the civilian side and the joint chiefs I don't view it as a reflection of President Trump's views on nuclear weapons I don't believe he read it I believe he was briefed on a couple of elements of it but when you look at the language about the commitment to alliances when you talk about the fact that the NPR says that any decision to use nuclear weapons would be a deliberative process that doesn't reflect what I believe we know about President Trump and so I think it is reassuring that the Pentagon is focused in on China but it lacks the whole of government view that I think really was the hallmark and the best thing about the nuclear posture review that Rebecca and I worked on which was it reflected not only the President's thinking but understanding that nuclear weapons is integrated into a larger context not just about global nuclear threats but alliance management about great power relations about not seeking to necessarily contain or constrain China but integrate it into a global system that benefited us and could benefit them I think that's what's missing and the emphasis that we see in the NPR is all about the threats and how to respond to those specific threats but without the larger context that we're talking about on both questions in terms of China, at least for me as I look at that I'm far more concerned about the way that China will take a very integrated perspective between nuclear capabilities but moreover for cyber space conventional working across even that subconventional space in ways that are very confounding for us however in artful I think some of the terminology in the NPR was when it was focusing on non-nuclear risks I think that was part of what was really being considered there and I see that as more urgent in terms of thinking through how to deal with China strategically than necessarily something about kind of limited war, limited nuclear war which I think is less realistic is a problem I did want to mention though this issue of the ability to work trilaterally especially in a crisis management context because this has been a huge gap for many years and it worked on it personally in the last several years and so I truly hope it's improved but at times when I was in government even just basic intelligence sharing basic agreement to allow the transfer especially on things like threat assessment was completely missing and that made so many things in your list of the four areas especially number one that shared threat assessment, the inability to do that trilaterally I consider to be a big impediment to our ability to manage crisis I think so because South Korea lacks ISR assets so we happily rely on the US side but we believe it's a good idea to work together to improve our capability regarding reconnaissance and surveillance etc but as you know at the current moment I think the diplomatic environment is not right enough to seek military cooperation with Japan at this point because sometimes the military cooperation between the two carries are troubled by so many factors including historical issues etc but we at the government level we fully understand that Japan would be the hub of force flow and logistic support so we value support from Japan and we think it is very important to make some preparation in peace time in preparation for any crisis that can happen but in fact since 2008 we had trilateral cooperation arrangements called DTT deterrence trilateral talk and we've been doing lots of things such as re-summary and exercise or aviation exercise or missile warning exercise etc so we're going to forward in this direction my sense is and maybe this is a little bit impolitic to say but there will never be a ripe diplomatic moment for Japan and Korea to come closer together and it's largely because the politicians can't help themselves it is political that's right and at a professional level absolutely there's a shared understanding of the value and even the necessity to have much deeper integration but it's hard to get over that and this gets to the role of the United States which is we've had improved trilateral coordination when the United States made it a priority to head a full team we worked it, we explained it, we worked to try to address the political issue so we could get down to real hard details and it's why I think we're having trouble today because we just don't have the people and we don't have the attention that this issue deserves we're almost at time and lunch is waiting I want to put one quick last question to the panel and have each of you respond to it so we heard during the 2016 presidential campaign concerns in particular about the burden sharing in the alliance and the idea that maybe it was better for Japan and even South Korea to have their own nuclear weapons that was campaign talk I think the record since then is a little bit different but I want you to sort of grade what you think the alliance management record is of this administration as it relates to the credibility of extended deterrence who wants to go first with that I feel like you're trying to bait me I'll just point I'll just point to a piece I wrote for foreign policy early in the year about how United States can't solve its alliance problems with small nuclear weapons this is about the commitment of the country and the commitment of the president to our alliances and whether it is the mixing of economic and military and strategic whether it is the learning curve whether it is just his personal views I think the president has done a lot of damage to the relationship with South Korea and I think we've now seen that by South Korean presidential actions and political actions trying to find their own way and losing coordination with the United States I think Prime Minister Abe deserves credit for reading President Trump correctly and getting as close to him as possible but I'm not sure that's a longstanding fix to the problem and I think there's a lot of work that we can still do over the course of this administration I think a lot of people are already thinking about how we repair the damage and where we will be at the end of this administration and I think that's why I think this panel was really valuable to me personally I hope it was useful because I think we need to really start focusing in on how we dig out of this hole What I can say is the trust level at the track one level is very very high as far as I know but we still have to work on more orchestrated strategy message to other neighbors because at this time when South Korea is trying to engage with North Korea for future dialogue and on the one hand the U.S. is talking about military options that's not a demonstration of collective resolve I think so where things has to be done as Rebecca mentioned earlier dive measures diplomatic intelligence military and economy measures should be well coordinated Well I think it is still time of the maximum pressure on the DPRK so far the personal relationship between Prime Minister President Trump seems to be good but we need to find out some exit strategy from this crisis situation so in that case we need more flexible or open discussions and bring up more variety of ideas about exit strategy so this kind of discussion is very important for among allies I would just say I think first of all I agree that I think there's a bit of difference actually between the two countries and the two alliances at the moment I think that there have been fewer pressure points on the U.S. Japanese alliance in terms of near term stresses in the same way there's a stronger political alignment we've been rather clever in the management of our own political transition so I have to give credit work to Abe there I think for Korea this has been much more difficult and I think among other things I think we really need to see an ambassador on the ground we need to have a relationship we need to have people who and a degree of confidence that is very difficult worries some choices whether it's a choice to retain or disrupt a major economic arrangement or a trade deal or similarly the contemplation of significant military action on the peninsula we need to feel like those things are working in concert and right now they're not and we need to feel like both countries have people working for them who can bring bad news to their leaders and force them to discuss it who can bring controversy and bring dissenting views forward without kind of shutting down those voices because we're going to need a lot of vigorous debate in both circles to come up with the best possible answers to such hard questions thank you for indulging my last question so just a logistics note the food will be waiting outside we encourage you to go fill a plate come back and enjoy the food in here it's quite tight out there in terms of standing around and visiting so please cooperate with us on that front but before then please join me in thanking this panel for next question