 Hi, my name is Monty Johnson. I teach philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, and this is the second of my lectures on Aristotle's politics book four, this part on the best constitution for most states and on the parts of a constitution. Now to remind you of the overall structure of book four in chapters one to two, Aristotle discussed the scope of political science, how it must figure out how to originate and preserve and actually destroy all of the different kinds of constitution, and so Aristotle distinguished in minute detail the various kinds of constitution or government in chapters three to ten. In this part, chapters 11 to 13, Aristotle discusses the best constitution for different kinds of states, including the best constitution generally. And the last three chapters are devoted to discussing the three parts of a constitution, basically the deliberative, executive, and judicial parts. But Aristotle discusses how one can establish the various kinds of constitution, including the best constitution for most states and the best constitution generally by means of appointment to the deliberative, executive, and judicial functions of the constitution. Now, what is the best constitution for most states? Aristotle puts down the following criteria after saying we now have to inquire what is the best constitution for most states and the best life for most people. Neither assuming a standard of virtue, which is above ordinary persons, nor an education, which is exceptionally favored by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state, which is an aspiration only, but having regard to the life in which the majority are able to share and to the form of government which states in general can attain. So not all of the kinds of constitution that we can theoretically distinguish and define can fit all of these criteria. So Aristotle explicitly says, for example, that aristocracies basically do not meet these criteria. Quote, as to those aristocracies, as they are called, they either lie beyond the possibilities of the greater number of states or they approximate to the so-called constitutional government or polities and therefore need no separate discussion. Aristotle then goes on to speak of aristocracies and constitutional governments or polities together as being kind of middle regimes, of which the most realistic, of course, is constitutional government, but of which a better form that we should strive for would be an aristocracy. But the middle kind of regime, which is essentially a constitutional government, though it's the least good of the correct forms of constitution, is the best attainable by most states and thus that that fits the criteria he lies out. So we can go back to our two by three table of the types of constitution and look at these according to what is attainable by most states. Again, kingship would be the best, but it is simply not realistic. Aristotle thinks to imagine a single individual so preeminent that it would be in all of our interests to give him sole rule and the only political power that may have been more common under much, much smaller cities, essentially glorified tribes, but now in modern cities, contemporary cities, that's impossible. Aristocracy is also perhaps, as Aristotle just said, an ideal not attainable by most states. There may be exceptions to that. There may be states that could put that together, but it's not attainable by most of them. So again, the best that's attainable by most states is the constitutional form of government or polity, polity, though it's the least good of the correct forms. It is better than all of the corrupt forms in which the rulers rule in their own self-interest and not for the common good, including it's better than democracy, which though it's the least bad of corrupt forms, it still is corrupt and is the most common of existing states along with oligarchies. Now, Aristotle discusses the virtues of what he calls the middle regime and specifically a state dominated not by the rich or the poor, but by the middle class. And there's a background ethical theory that he encapsulates very briefly here, according to which virtue in general is a mean or a moderate state between an excess and a deficiency. For example, to take a paradigm case from the Nicomachean ethics, courage is a mean state between an excess of confidence and so the vice of foolhardiness and the opposite vice, which is a deficiency of confidence, cowardice, and courage is the mean state between those. And so the mean state is the excellent state and it's a state that we should aim at and try to attain if possible. And Aristotle applies this general theory to his class analysis. So in general, the middle classes, which possess a moderate amount of wealth, avoid the vices of the rich and the poor. So for example, the middle classes avoid the over ambition and greed for power of the rich, but they also avoid the deficiency, the lack of ambition and shrinkage from responsibility of the poor. The rich are insolent, unwilling to obey, despotic. The poor, on the other hand, don't have the education or knowledge necessary to command. The rich plot against each other. The poor plot against the rich, for example, for democratic revolution, but the middle classes are contented and don't have these motives and don't have these deficiencies or these excesses. So they are less given to factionalism and strife than either the rich or the poor. And so they are a source of stability in any constitutional arrangement, but they're especially important, as we'll see in a constitutional government or a democracy. Citizens should be equal and similar and they will be more so the more the middle class predominates and then we'll have a society of equals where we can treat each other equally and recognize equal rights. As Aristotle says, quote, thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed from citizens of the middle class and that those states are likely to be well administered in which the middle class is large and stronger if possible than both of the other classes or at any rate, then either singly for the addition of the middle class turns the scale and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant, that is, prevents either the rich or the poor from being dominant and thus either oligarchic or democratic corrupt tendencies. Now, if this is so, why are most states in fact either democratic or oligarchic as they perhaps still are? Well, the main reason Aristotle says is because the middle class is so seldom predominant. Either a few rich people have power or the many poor do and so states don't do a good job of balancing the interests of those two different classes of society. Also, the rich and poor tend to seize power from each other suddenly and when they do, they institute radical changes in accordance with their preferred constitution and again don't, because these are corrupt forms of government, don't govern in the common interests of the rich and the poor, but if they're rich, then only in the interests of the rich or if they're poor only in the interests of the poor and they don't moderate these regimes. Another reason, incidentally, he mentions is foreign affairs. So democracies may tend to align with other democracies and oligarchies with other oligarchies and then there is pressure to maintain these constitutional forms in order to maintain these alliances and so the alliances push the constitutions more and more in one of those directions. Now, suppose you want to preserve a constitution. How do you do so? Aristotle raises that general question and then goes on to discuss it in detail for the rest of the book, how you should appoint offices and other stratagems that you use to preserve democracies or oligarchies. This sets up the discussion of how to instigate revolutions or to prevent them, which is the topic of book five. But here he begins with a consideration of general principles of how to preserve constitutions. So the first principle is that when the proportion changes between the quantity of poor people, the number of poor people and the quality, the excellence or wealth of the rich, that gives rise to either a democracy or an oligarchy. So again, when the quantity of the poor so outweigh the quality of the rich, you have a democracy, but when the quality of the few is so excellent or so wealthy, then they can counteract a greater quantity of the poor and maintain an oligarchy. As Aristotle puts it, I may begin by assuming as a general principle common to all governments that the portion of the state which deserves the permanence of the constitution ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse. Where the number of poor is more than proportion to the wealth of the rich, there will naturally be a democracy varying in form with the sort of people who compose it in each case. If, for example, the husband men exceed in number, the first form of democracy will then arise. If the artisans in the labrium class, the last, and so with the intermediate forms, but where the rich and the notables exceed in quality more than they fall short in quantity, their oligarchy arises, similarly assuming various forms or kinds according to the kind of superiority possessed by the oligarchs. So not only does this proportionality between the quantity of people and the quality of the few affect the kind of constitution, but it affects which species within each kind of constitution. And Aristotle gave reasons to accept that in the earlier analysis, minute analysis of each of the kinds of those different kinds of constitution, each of the different species of those kinds of constitution in the earlier parts of book four. Now, Aristotle also emphasizes and repeatedly states that political stability is only really possible with a strong middle class. Inequality between rich and poor necessarily produces mistrust, factionalism, instability in the society. So quoting him, the legislator should always include the middle class in his government. If he makes his laws oligarchical to the middle class, let him look. If he makes them democratic, he should equally by his laws try to attach this class to the state. This, incidentally, is why both Democrats and Republicans in our own society constantly claim that they are protecting the middle class. Both sides, as it were, Democratic and oligarchic can lay claim to the middle class and need to lay claim to the middle class. So continuing with the quotation from Aristotle, there can only can the government ever be stable where the middle class exceeds one or both of the others. And in that case, there will be no fear that the rich will unite with the poor against their rulers. For neither of them will ever be willing to serve the other. And if they look for some form of government more suitable to both, they will find none better than this for the rich and the poor will never consent to rule and turn because they mistrust one another. The arbiter is always the one trusted and he who is in the middle is an arbiter. The more perfect the admixture of the political elements, the more lasting will be the Constitution. So again, increasing inequality will result in a more radical, either a Democratic or an oligarchic Constitution and a more or less anarchic one, depending on the degree of inequality and the opposite tendency to supporting and entrenching the middle class will preserve the tendency to go towards either of those corrupt forms of government, those either the democracy in the self interest of the poor or the oligarchy in the self interest of the rich. But Aristotle discusses methods of preserving oligarchies, five of them in chapter 13. So in oligarchies might throw assemblies open to all, but either the rich only are fine for non attendance, or a much larger fine is inflicted on the rich that don't attend that sets up a great incentive for them to attend. Or second, with respect to the offices or majestacies, those who are qualified by property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poor may decline. So if you're rich, you must serve in the office. If you're poor, we might let you, but we'll also let you take care of your own things. And of course, the poor don't have time to just serve in offices, so then they won't be able to as much. A third stratagem for preserving oligarchies is in law courts the rich and the rich only are allowed to attend. They don't serve the poor, however, let off with impunity, similar to the previous case. But instead of talking about the assemblies or the offices, it's applied to the courts. Now, in some states, all citizens who have registered themselves are allowed to attend the assembly and to try causes, but if after the registration, they do not attend either the assembly or the courts, heavy farns and the intention of doing that is through fear of the fines, they may avoid registering themselves and then they cannot sit in the law courts or in the assembly. So we say, oh yes, the poor can participate if they want, but if they sign up to participate and then don't show up because they need to deal with their jobs or whatever, then we find them. We find them so much that it would discourage them from risking that that would happen. And a fifth stratagem concerning the possession of arms and gymnastic exercises, they legislate in a similar spirit for the poor obliged, not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not having them and in like manner, no penalties inflicted on the poor for not attendance at the gymnasium and consequently having nothing to fear, they do not attend whereas the rich are liable to a fine and therefore they take care to attend. So you essentially set up incentives for the rich to participate and you don't extend those incentives to the poor. Now the stratagens for preserving democracies which are also discussed in this book are essentially the reverse of those to entrench aristocracies, but the main methods that Aristotle continually gives as examples is paying the poor for attending the assemblies and the law courts and this could also apply to the offices and not inflicting penalties on the rich for non attendance, so that will have exactly the reverse effect as the stratagem applied by the oligarchs. Now according to Aristotle it's obvious that he who would duly mix the two principles should combine the practicable and provide that the poor should be paid to attend and the rich find if they do not attend, for then all will take part if there is no such combination power will be in the one party only, but if we find the rich for not attending and we pay the poor to attend then all will attend and as Aristotle argued in book three that will result in better decision-making when the poor and the rich intermingle you get better decision-making and you get just an aggregation of more people deciding, so you get the relative relevant expertise aggregation effect and everything is better. But Aristotle of course doesn't think that everybody whatsoever should participate because some people he thinks lack virtue and lack the kind of expertise that you would even want to aggregate in political decision-making and so he maintains that a moderate property qualifications should still exist. He points out that archaic regimes made the property qualification knights that is those who could afford to equip a cavalry unit like a horse and everything needed for a war use of a horse in war but Aristotle thinks that you could reduce these to for example those that could afford heavy armor and in light of their increasing number and then you would that would work better to entrench the middle class so there's a kind of middle class that can't afford to equip cavalry units they aren't knights but they can afford heavy bronze armor and bronze weapons and extending political power to them will have a tendency of entrenching middle classes and preserving democracies and getting these better decision-making effects that were mentioned in book three. Now the last part of book four is about the different parts of a constitution and Aristotle says in chapter 13 that all constitutions have three elements concerning which the good lawgiver has to regard what is expedient for each kind of constitution when they're well-ordered the constitution is said to be well-ordered and as they differ from one another constitutions differ so there is one element which deliberates about public affairs called that the deliberative part i.e. the assembly or something second is that concerned with the magistrates or offices the question being what they should be over what they should exercise authority and what should be the mode of electing them but this is basically what to in this day we would call the executive part the offices dealing with specific issues and you know sort of executing or carrying out the laws that the assembly has deliberated about and established thirdly then there is that part which has judicial power that makes judgments about the laws in the courts and those are the three parts of any constitution it's similar to the fact that there are three parts and for example the constitution of the united states of America has basically a deliberative part in the congress also a part concerned with these offices the executive branch and then the judicial branch which has power over the courts now the deliberative part has an important role to play in both democracies and oligarchies and has the most amount of political power as it were because it has authority in matters of war and peace making and unmaking of alliances passing of laws and even at this point in time inflicting death exile confiscation and so forth also electing magistrates and auditing their accounts now you can assign either all of these powers to all of the citizens or to some of them for example to one or more of the offices or different causes or you could assign different causes to different offices or you could give some of them to all or others of them only to some so we can let everybody participate or we can let some people participate or we could let everybody participate on some issues and only some people on other issues now the democratic modes of appointing who would be the deliberators would of course embracing either all can deliberate on everything or all take turns in deliberating so some some group deliberates but then the responsibility for deliberating rotates to another group and eventually through all of the group so that all eventually take their turn or having all deliberate on most issues but officers deliberate just on some where special expertise is needed for example or where all deliberate on all issues and offices exist merely to prepare proposals for consideration of the assembly that includes all now the oligarchic modes of course will be basically opposite of those only those who meet some strict property qualification are allowed to vote or those who deliberate are self-elected or they inherit these positions and instead of having them determined by law a third mode is allowing masses to deliberate on some issues like war and peace but handling everything else with officers and having officers be elected and not determined by lot so it's thought to be democratic to either have everybody take turns or draw lots and randomly select whereas it's kind of oligarchic or even aristocratic because it's kind of meritocratic to think that you elect people but it may be that the people who are elected are just the people who are rich not the people who really are virtuous in which case elections will actually be oligarchic instruments relative to using the lot to decide so democracies are advised to incorporate upper classes into their deliberative bodies and oligarchies to co-opt people from the masses into theirs again Aristotle is always looking for these ways to sort of moderate these regimes and stabilize the middle class and this and other measures that moderate them will entrench middle classes and so lead to greater political stability for either kind of government. Now about the offices there are different kinds of offices to some extent they are related to the different elements that make up the state but speaking generally those are to be called offices to which duties are assigned deliberating about certain measures of judging and commanding and especially about commanding for to command is the special duty of a magistrate so they're talking he's talking about command in a military context and so people are actually elected to offices of being generals generals over infantry generals over cavalry and so forth but the first kinds of offices he distinguishes are priests who he distinguishes from political officers he also mentions masters of choruses and heralds even ambassadors another kind of offices are political superintendents like the officers of the general or sub sections of that or inspectors of women or youth other offices are concerned with household management like measuring the the office that controls weights and measures also menial offices which in many cases the rich have executed by their slaves so we can distinguish all kinds of office offices over these various different parts of the citizens and managing different aspects of the economy and the society how do we appoint these officers or how can these officers be appointed well Aristotle discusses their appointment with reference to three variables first who makes the appointment either all of the citizens some of them or all and some of them make the appointments the last one means that all of them make the appointments for some offices but for some other offices only some appoint them for example all may all might make appointments for the for an inspectorship of the women and children but only some of them some people might be eligible to serve in the office of general like those who have military experience or military success the second factor from whom is the appointment made either all some or again all and some so is the pool of applicants come from the population at large or some subset of it again we might want to limit the pool that we're drawing from to those who have a certain kind of expertise like military expertise so the difference between those is who makes the appointment do you for example you could allow everyone to make the appointment or only those with military expertise to make the appointment the second factor is appointed from a pool of what people those people generally or only people with a certain kind of expertise or is that variable depending on the office the third factor is how is the appointment made it could be made by election or vote or by lot or again by election and lot if you had election for some offices lots for others now the paradigm democratic would be if all citizens made appointments from a pool of all other citizens and these appointments were made by lot most oligarchic would be if only some people made appointments and only from some subset of the population and they did it by election now there are more less there are less radical democratic regimes and there are less radical oligarchic regimes but these these embody the principles of who is appointing and from what pool of people and by what method and so those other combinatorial possibilities create the more moderate regimes or even other kinds of constitutions like polities or aristocracies now all in all since there's three sets of variables and three possibilities in each there must be twenty seven total possibilities we can lay these out Aristotle only focuses on the twelve that I've highlighted in red but if we assign each one a code based on an abbreviation for who appoints from whom and by what means then we can lay out all twenty seven possibilities the democratic ones will again be as the first three that I've put here when you have appointments all people making appointments out of a pool of all people by election or lot or by election and lot that's clearly democratic as opposed to purely oligarchic ones like sixteen seventeen and eighteen where some people make an appointment out of a pool of some people either by election or lot or election and lot and then the other options some of which are discussed by Aristotle as being polities which either lean oligarchic or lean democratic Aristotle does discuss some of those others and then other possibilities he simply leaves undiscussed but we could speculate about the kinds of constitution that those types of modes of appointing office would result in turning to the courts we again have several different kinds of courts Aristotle talks about a court for audits or scrutiny's courts taking cognizance of ordinary offenses against the state a third kind of court concerned with treason against the constitution a fourth kind determining disputes respecting penalties a fifth kind deciding more important civil cases a sixth kind dealing with homicide or there could be several kinds of courts dealing with different kinds of homicide also courts for strangers again you could have several kinds of those and courts for small suits small claims courts so those are six those are eight kinds of courts each of those could be broken down into further kinds and in a way some of them could be combined as well and so you could reduce or expand this list and would in an actual description of a particular constitution but those are the kinds of things we're talking about courts is places that rule about the law with respect respect to those certain areas now in discussing the modes of appointing judges Aristotle offers a kind of simplified version of what we were just looking at in the discussion of assignment of offices but here he just discusses basically twelve possibilities the ones in which all people do the appointing are essentially the democratic ones even if they do it just from a pool of some people Aristotle will still call that democratic and whether they do it by election or a lot or both and any form in which only some of the people do the appointing of the judges even if it's from out of a pool of everyone Aristotle will call oligarchic and he will consider constitutional or polity like forms when you have all people making the appointments for some kind of courts and some people making the appointments for others but he considers it aristocratic when you have that particular arrangement where all people on some issues appoint from a pool of all people but by means of election on some other cases only some people appoint but they still do from a pool of all people and they do so by election not by lot that would be a kind of aristocratic mode of appointing judges so in summary there's three parts of the Constitution deliberative executive or official the part concerned with the offices and third the judicial part and the participants in each of these can be chosen by all or some of the citizens by all or some of the citizens and by election or by lot and the most extreme democracy would be where all the citizens choose from a pool of all the citizens and basically do so by lot and do that with respect to all three parts of the Constitution and the most extreme oligarchy would be where some people choose from a limited pool of some people by election and do so for the deliberative executive and judicial parts of the Constitution but there are many combinatorial possibilities in between those extremes which will result in more or less moderate democracies or oligarchies and even polities or aristocracies so Aristotle presents a systematic and comprehensive theory about how every kind of Constitution could be constructed down to the level of how offices would be appointed and we can summarize these results on our two by three grid kingship and tyranny are taken out of this analysis because that's a case where a sole ruler does the appointing and possibly only from a pool of a sole person and there's no distinction election is just their individual choice so we're limited here to talking basically about the four kinds of Constitution that involve decision-making by groups of people whether few or many and in an oligarchy again some of the citizens appoint from a group of some of the citizens by election or vote as opposed to a democracy where all citizens appoint from all of them and do so by lot a constitutional government would be a mixture of those oligarchic and democratic modes in various ways to counterbalance each other were to mix or moderate each other whereas an aristocracy is the very special cases case where citizens appoint from all of the citizens on some issues all of them appoint from all the citizens on certain issues but on certain other issues only some appoint from a limited pool of some and they always do so by election an Aristotle thinks that this would be the best form because certain issues are better decided by all and other issues are better decided by some and that includes the decision of who to appoint to certain offices who to appoint to certain courts and even who to appoint to certain assemblies or certain issues within the assembly but once again this shows Aristotle's systematic theory that allows us to compare and relate and understand each form of constitution in relation to each other form thank you