 It is a real privilege today for me to welcome Secretary-General Stoltenberg. I've had a chance to see him from a distance for quite a few years. As I said, I wasn't kidding. I am the resident Norwegian, and I do have a very fond attachment to my old home country. And in that capacity, watched Secretary-General when he did a marvelous job as Prime Minister in Norway, I would say he's the first Prime Minister I know of that started off as a statistician in the government, which tells you his attention to detail is impeccable, but his policy interest and scope is vast. And I think it's a combination of skills we most need now in NATO. We're facing some very, very big challenges for NATO in a way, and I think all of us had hoped that the Cold War had ended and it had changed the trajectory of history. We're now back into a scratchy relationship, and we're grateful that someone of his talent and caliber is leading the way for all of us during these rather trying times. In our conversation, we're just talking about all of the challenges that America faces today, and we've got a lot of them around the world. But no place do we have the foundation of strength that we have in NATO. And it's on that foundation that we're going to build a successful strategy going forward. So I would ask you, with your applause, to please welcome the Secretary-General of NATO, His Excellency Hirstoltenberg. Ladies and gentlemen, Dr. Hamre, there, John, it's really a great honor and pleasure to be here and to address this distinguished audience and to be in this beautiful building. And you told me, John, when we were sitting in the room behind here, that your family is from Norway, and that's great. But you told me more than that. You told me that your family is from Voss and Granvin. And Voss and Granvin, that's perhaps the two most beautiful places in Norway at the West Coast. It's Granvin. The only problem is that when I was Prime Minister, I was responsible for building a power line to Granvin. And that was one of the big, big conflicts I had during my time. So I've never been back in Granvin since I built the power line. But if you go together with me, I will there go back to Granvin. And I also know that you are very proud of your Viking roots, and there are many reasons to be proud of that. And in addition to that, you have received the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit, and that is the highest honor my country can bestow on foreign citizens. And combined with the fact that you, for many, many years, have worked so hard to develop the bonds and the cooperation between North America and Europe, the transatlantic bonds, which are so vital for our security. I think the fact that you have these Viking roots and that you have the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit and your engagement here at the CSIS, all of that makes you a perfect host to Norwegian NATO Secretary General to speak about our changed security environment. And what we as a transatlantic community need to do about it, about the changing security environment we are facing. So we are at the turning point for Euro-Atlantic security. We face racing challenges, the very fabric of our security order is at stake, and we must be prepared for the long haul. And that is why we need to adapt. To the south, the challenges are complex and diverse. The Arab Spring has turned to brutal winter. Failed and weak states are fueling regional instability and sectarian strife. ISIL and other extremist groups spread terror and intolerance and inspired attacks from Paris to Texas. And people move in large numbers, many to flee and others to fight. NATO is playing its part in addressing these challenges in the Middle East and in North Africa. And I am ready to set out what we are doing in greater detail during our discussion. But let me in my opening remarks not address the challenges we see to the south, but focus on the challenges we are facing coming from the east. And then I promise to answer questions related to the south afterwards. The challenges we see coming from the south are clear and they are coming from a resurgent Russia. Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and its continued destabilization of Ukraine have brought armed conflict back to Europe. This conflict has already cost over 6,000 lives. There are continuous ceasefire violations and heavy fighting could flare up at any moment. That is why I fully support the efforts of the United States as well as Germany and France to find a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine. The path to peace is the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. So I urge all parties to take that path. Russia has a special responsibility. It supports the separatists in eastern Ukraine with training, weapons and forces. And it maintains a large number of troops on Ukraine's border. But we cannot look at Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine in isolation. They are part of a disturbing pattern of Russian behavior that goes well beyond Ukraine. And this pattern undermines key principles of European security. Respect for borders, the independence of states, transparency and predictability of military activities and a commitment to resolve differences to diplomacy not force. First let's look at respect for borders. The UN Charter and the Helsinki Fine Act are clear. Russia actually helped to draft these documents and signed them. But it has broken its commitments. Crimea has been part of Ukraine since the country became independent. But Russia sent in troops without insignia, organized a so-called referendum which met no international standard and ceased part of another country. Even Putin even admitted publicly that Crimea's annexation had been planned in advance. After the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, Russia recognized two Georgian regions as independent states. It has taken almost full control over both and built fences between them and the rest of Georgia. It has also sent troops into Moldova that Moldova wants out and which Russia pledged to withdraw in 1999. So Russia has been violating the territorial integrity of its neighbors for years and continue to do so. That brings me to my second principle, the independence of states. Russia's desire to move closer to the European Union was met by force. So was Georgia's aspiration to join NATO. Moldova has also received clear warnings about closer moves toward Europe. Georgia's leaders claim that its neighborhood represents a zone of privileged interests. But its efforts to create a sphere of influence risk taking us back in time. To when great powers drew lines on the map at the expense of smaller states. And nations were not free to decide their own destiny. This could create a sphere of instability for us all. And it's not the sort of Europe we want, we will accept 25 years after the end of the Cold War. The third principle is transparency and predictability in military activities. For decades we built a stable European security system based on fewer forces, fewer weapons and fewer large exercises. On more information sharing and on arms control agreements to build trust and confidence across former dividing lines. These agreements reduce the risk of conflict and miscalculation. The conventional forces in Europe treaty put limits on number of movement and movement of equipment like tanks and fighter planes. But Russia unilaterally suspended implementation. The open skies treaty allows us to look at each other's territory from the air to increase transparency. But Russia is obstructing these activities. The Vienna document sets out rules for reporting large military exercises and allows for inspection. But Russia has found ways around it to avoid notifying the largest military exercises in the post-Cold War era. Three of these SNAP exercises have included over 80,000 troops, moving over great distances and at great speed. One such SNAP exercise in February of last year was used to deploy forces to annex Crimea. Others masked support to separatists in eastern Ukraine and led to the buildup of forces on Ukraine's border. As I speak, Russia is conducting yet another SNAP exercise with 250 aircraft and 700 pieces of heavy equipment. NATO, on the other hand, strives to create transparency and predictability. Our largest exercise in 20 years will take place next fall in Italy, Portugal and Spain. It was announced one year ago. It was not a SNAP exercise. International observers, including Russia, will have access to our exercise. And you can find the schedule of our planned exercises on NATO's website. Because we have nothing to hide, whereas Russia is doing all it can to minimize the transparency of what its forces are doing. And this brings me to my final principle, resolving differences to dialogue, not forces. Through the pattern I have described in Ukraine, in Georgia and in Moldova, Russia has shown the will to use force or the threat of it to coerce its neighbors. And Russia's recent use of nuclear rhetoric, exercises and operations are deeply troubling. As are concerns regarding its compliance with the International Nuclear Forces Treaty. President Putin's admission that he considered putting Russia's nuclear forces on alert while Russia was annexing Crimea is but one example. Russia has also significantly increased the scale, number and range of proactive flights by nuclear capable bombers across much of the globe. From Japan to Gibraltar, from Crete to California and from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Russian officials announced plans to base modern nuclear capable missile systems in Kaliningrad. And they claim that Russia has the right to deploy nuclear forces to Crimea. This will fundamentally change the balance of security in Europe. We learned during the Cold War that when it comes to nuclear weapons, caution, predictability and transparency are vital. Russia's nuclear cyber-rattling is unjustified, destabilizing and dangerous. All of this takes place against the background of Russia's significant rearmament program. Some of its new military systems were put on parade during this year's Victory Day celebration. And Russia is deploying many of its most modern systems and basing military units near NATO borders. Ladies and gentlemen, these are not random events. They form a bigger picture, which is of great concern. Russia is a global actor that is asserting its military power, staring up aggressive nationalism, claiming the right to impose its will on its neighbors and grabbing land. We regret that Russia is taking this course, because when might becomes right, the consequences are grave. For 25 years, we have worked hard to include not isolate Russia. Our aim was a strategic partnership. Wars were opened, trade went up and trust increased. The G7 expanded to become the G8, and Russia was invited into the World Trade Organization. We created the NATO-Russia Council and offered to work together on missile defence. We co-operated in many years from countering piracy and terrorism to helping Afghanistan. All of this benefited us and it benefited Russia. But today, the choices made by Moscow have taken our relations with Russia to their lowest point in decades. We are not back to the Cold War, but we are far from a strategic partnership. So we need to adapt to deal with the challenges that may be with us for a long time. This adaptation, we are doing it in three ways. Managing our collective defence, reinforcing our deterrence and defence. Managing our relations with a resurgent Russia, and supporting our European neighbours. First strong defence. NATO's core task is collective defence. Our commitment to defend each other enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is as strong and as relevant today as ever before. That is why we are implementing the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence since the end of the Cold War. We have increased our presence in the eastern part of Europe, in the air, on land and at sea. Managing our air policing and beefing up our exercise programmes. We are doubling the size of the NATO Response Force. Its centrepiece is the spearhead force with lead elements ready to move in as little as 48 hours. Seven European Allies have volunteered to lead the spearhead force over the coming years. And we are establishing new NATO command units across the eastern part of our Alliance. To make it easier to our forces to exercise, deploy and reinforce. Yesterday, I thanked President Obama for his leadership and for America's quick and substantial contribution to reinforcing our collective defence. Through the 1 billion dollar European Reassurance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve. Everywhere I go across the Alliance, I meet US servicemen and women. Their presence sends a clear signal. America stands with Europe. And European Allies are in lockstep with the United States. This is transatlantic teamwork. But for all of us, there is more to do. Before the NATO Summit in Warsaw next year and beyond. We are enhancing our cyber defences and making clear that the cyber attack could trigger a collective response. We are actively developing how we deal with hybrid threats, including by working closely with the European Union. We are speeding up our decision making and we are deepening our intelligence sharing. We are carefully assessing the implications of what Russia is doing, including its nuclear activities. Keeping NATO strong does not come for free. So we must redouble our efforts to meet the defence investment pledge we made last year. To stop the cuts and gradually increase spending to 2% of GDP and spend better. Because we cannot take our security for granted. And this brings me to my second point. A strong NATO is not only our best protection, but it also provides us with the best foundation to manage our relationship with Russia. We do not seek confrontation with Russia, nor do we seek its isolation. We still aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia. Because that would benefit the Euro-Atlantic security and the whole international order. Russia has changed and we must adapt. In doing so, we will not change who we are. We are sticking to our principles and to our international commitments. We are committed to preserving European security, institutions and agreements. We will remain transparent and predictable. We will continue to respond to this information with information, not propaganda. And we will keep the channels of communication open with Russia. Both military to military and diplomatic. Because there is no contradiction in strengthening our collective defence and staying open for dialogue. A vigilant dialogue where actions speak louder than words. And in this dialogue, we will firmly uphold the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all European countries. And this brings me to my third and final point. Supporting our partners in Europe. It is in our interest as a transatlantic community to have neighbours that are stable and independent. That is why NATO is working with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to help them to carry out reforms and build strong institutions. These nations are not buffer zones. They are independent sovereign states. They have the right to choose their own path. And we will continue to help them on that path. Because if our neighbours are more stable, we are more secure. Ladies and gentlemen, for decades as a transatlantic community, we have kept our peoples safe. We have erased divisions in Europe. We built a rules-based order which benefits us all. But as our challenges increase, we must adapt. To ensure our security. To protect the values of our open and democratic societies. And to support our partners. This requires continued commitment and solidarity. The world is changing and we are changing. But one thing that will not change is our determination to stay and stand united. Thank you. Thank you. Secretary General Stoltenberg, that was a clear, concise message that is urgently needed. I thank you for that. And good morning, everyone. We're delighted that you could join us. My name is Heather Conley. I'm Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and Arctic here at the Centre. And what a privilege it is to have this, I believe, your first public address as Secretary General here in Washington. I believe. That's true. That's true. That's exciting. We're awfully glad you're here. What we thought we'd do for the next 30 minutes or so is take you up on your kind of questions that we offer to ask questions, particularly on Russia, but moving to some of the challenges we see to NATO's South. But if I might, I'd like to ask you a few questions. In fact, I think the most challenging part of my job was trying to limit my questions. There's so much we could cover. After we have a few moments here, then we welcome our audience. And I know, I know a CSIS audience, they ask very tough questions. So we look forward to turning to you to engage in a conversation. Secretary General Stoltenberg, you've been in the job for about six months. Maybe a little bit longer, starting after the NATO summit in Newport. And you offered a very frank assessment of Russia's military exercises. I'd welcome your frank assessment of NATO's exercising, as we've seen. Certainly not the scale. But could you offer some reflections on how NATO has been exercising? We haven't done this type of collective defense in quite a long time. What are your reflections? What are you seeing as you're hearing the reports back from our exercises? Every nation has the right to exercise its forces. That goes for NATO, NATO allies, and of course also for Russia. So my point is not to argue against exercises. If you have forces, you have to exercise them. That's obvious. The challenge is that Russia is conducting the exercises in ways which are undermining transparency and predictability, and especially the snap exercises. Because as I stated in my speech, they have used these snap exercises as a disguise for annexing part of another country, annexing Crimea. And they have used snap exercises as a way to mass troops on the borders of Ukraine and also to send troops into eastern Ukraine to support separatists. So they're actually using the snap exercises as a way to disguise aggressive actions. And by doing so, and also by having all these exercises without notification, without any warning, there are decreasing predictability and increasing uncertainty. And that's exactly the opposite of what the intentions of the Vienna document, the open skies agreements, and all the other agreements we have, which are aiming at creating transparency, predictability. So we avoid misunderstandings. We avoid that incidents, accidents, spirals, out of control. And that's the reason why we are, from the NATO side, transparent, predictable. So you can go on the website of NATO and you can find a list of our next exercises and invite international observers to be there, just to make sure that they are transparent and open. We do more exercises because that's part of our response to aggressive actions of Russia in Ukraine. And we will do even more exercises as part of the reinforcement of our collective defence. But we will do it in a transparent and predictable way to avoid that exercises are creating problems in themselves. Two follow-up questions. Do we, is it best to get, to return Russia to the documents that they've signed, whether that's open skies, CFE, or do we need something new? Some have suggested that we need a code of conduct immediately to try to get to this notification of exercises. We're increasingly concerned that Russian military aircraft have turned off transponders as they're flying into quite crowded civilian airspace over northern Europe. How do we meet this immediate challenge? Do we need something now as a placeholder, as a code of conduct in the immediate future? An immediate step will be just to implement agreements we already have. That's, what I say, a very straightforward thing to do. And to fully respect Vienna documents and all the documents we have related to exercises military activity. Then, of course, we will always be open for looking into how we can develop these kind of agreements and documents. These are not NATO agreements. This is within the framework of the OCE. But of course, all allies are taking part in these agreements in different ways. And we have had a special focus on risks connected to increased air activity. Russia has increased its air activity by around 50%. That's also one of the reasons why we have increased air policing from the NATO side. We're intercepting many more Russian flights now than just a few years ago. And the European Aviation Security Agency, I think that's the correct name, at least the European Agency, provided a report recently addressing the challenges related to the increased air activity, military air activity, and also the large number of flights of planes without the transponders. And there actually, NATO was commanded for the way we are doing and conducting our military flights. And it was stated that military flights without transponders poses a risk to civilian air traffic. So to turn on transponders and to do military flights in due regard to civilian air traffic is also something which can be done immediately. And it will, of course, increase transparency, predictability, and reduce the risk for international civilian air traffic. Secretary General, you painted a very stark picture of Russia's increasingly aggressive posture, the question of the nuclear issue. At last September's Newport Summit, there was a series of actions that NATO was taking, readiness action plan. You mentioned the very high readiness task force and a variety of other issues. As we look forward to next year's Warsaw Summit in July, you mentioned we're in this for the long haul. Do you see that summit as one that just checks the implementation of what happened at Newport? Or do you see it moving into the long haul? A long-term strategic posture for NATO. We hosted Polish Defense Minister Szymoniak here last week and he argued for a Warsaw Initiative for strategic adaptation, a long-term permanent presence in NATO's east. What are your thoughts as you look towards a year in advance of the next NATO Summit? As we are facing a fundamentally changed security environment and therefore we have to adapt to this fundamentally new environment. And therefore the adaptation has to also be big and fundamental. And therefore I very much believe that what we are going to do in Warsaw is to chart the way forward in this adaptation of NATO. Both when it comes to military adaptation, political adaptation and institutional adaptation. And that's partly about increasing our collective defense. We are already doing that. We have to do more. But also of course addressing other elements. For instance, cyber, the importance of intelligence, hybrid warfare, and many other elements where we have to do more and develop new capabilities and adapt. Then I will add that in addition to, what should I say, outlining the next phase of adaptation beyond the after-war show. I think it's also important that Warsaw is the summit where we take stock of what we have done from Wales to Warsaw. Because implementation is also important. I have been a politician for decades. And I'm sorry to admit, but many politicians make many decisions and adopt many plans. But they're not always as good as they should be in implementing the plans. So I think it's extremely important that we also make sure that we are implementing what we have already decided to do. About the Red List Action Plan. About the increased preparedness of our forces. And not least about when it comes to defence investment that we are stopping the cuts in defence investments and starting to increase defence investments as we promised in Wales. Just a quick follow-up question on the speed of deployability. I think it was Estonian President Ilvis who mentioned that there's a bit of a time gap as Russia puts forward its forces much closer to the Baltic states, borders. The spearhead force has a 48-hour deployment. It could be something of a much faster speed potentially using hybrid tactics. Are you concerned about timing and how fast NATO can deploy in case, worst case scenario, that it needed to respond to a border crossing? Preparedness and redness is key. And that's the reason why we have increased preparedness and also welcome what the Baltic countries are doing themselves. I'm coming from Norway and of course we live in decades. We felt safe during the Cold War and we feel safe today. Because not because we have NATO troops based in Norway, but because we believe in the Terrans. We believe that NATO troops in the U.S. would be there if needed. And of course then this is the combination of our ability to reinforce, but also of course the importance of national forces being the first responders. And I welcome there for that also the Baltic countries, Poland are now increasing their own investments in defence. We will establish a persistent presence in the way that we will establish the NATO command units in the six East and Allied countries, the three Baltic countries, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. And that is something new. I think it's important. It's not the big command and control units, but there will be a NATO presence there. It will be important for planning, for exercises, but it will also make reinforcement easier. So national presence increased preparedness and redness, improving our ability to reinforce, but in addition to that we have what we call the reassurance measures. So we have already increased also NATO presence in the eastern part of the alliance with more air policing, with more troops on the ground and more presence in the Baltic and the Black Sea. So it's the whole combination that provides the deterrence, which is so important for NATO. One last question before I turn our audience and open the floor for questions. Another aspect of managing our relations with Russia is about NATO's enlargement agenda. And I can't let you go unless I ask a question about enlargement. I think it was in 2012 then Secretary Clinton had argued after the Chicago NATO summit that this would be the last summit where enlargement would not be discussed. Well, we've had another summit at Newport. The enlargement question was not tackled. As we head towards Warsaw, I'd love your thoughts on the open door. Obviously not just for Georgia and Ukraine, a very divisive issue within the alliance. But today's Finland's coalition platform suggests that even Finland's keeping its options open for NATO membership, Montenegro. Is there really a path forward in the open door policy for NATO? The open door policy has been a historic success. It has contributed to stability to democracy in Europe and of course a combination of the enlargement of NATO and the enlargement of the European Union has really transformed Europe in a very good way. And I think it's important to underline the fundamental principle that every nation has its sovereign right to decide its own path, including what kind of security arrangements it wants to be part of. This is enshrined in the many documents, including the Helsinki Fine Lact, and it's something which also Russia has signed to. And the consequence of that is that whether another country is going to become a member of NATO or not is something which is going to be decided by that Aspen country and 28 Allies, no one else. No one else has the right to try to veto or to deny sovereign country to join an alliance or to choose the path it wants. We have decided that we'll make decisions on Montenegro by the end of this year. So this will be a key issue after the Foreign Ministry meeting of NATO at the end of 2015. And then I'm reluctant to speculate about the Swedes and the Finns. They are neighbors of Norway. And if I say anything about that, I think it will only create a positive way. So they have to decide whether they apply. And then we will assess any application from them in the exact same way as we assess any other application. Thank you, Secretary General. Okay, you've been warmed up. We're ready to unleash the audience. We have about 15 minutes. If it's okay, can we bundle a few questions? And perhaps that will be most efficient. So if you could please identify yourself and your affiliation. We have microphones passing around. Sometimes you have to speak very directly into those microphones. It can be a little hard to hear. And so why don't we start in the back? I see a question way in the back there. Just wait for that microphone, please. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Solbenberg. My name is Mariam Darzysvili. I'm a fellow at National Endowment for Democracy. First of all, I should recall that I had pleasure to meet with you a few years ago in Oslo and Utea, while as a young activist of Social Democrats in Georgia. Well, now my question, I applied with this question for the NATO Defence College Fellowship, but I was denied and I have a hope now that you would help me to find an answer. No, to find an answer for this question. So, well, NATO reshaped its security architecture after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and enlargement helped the organization to maintain its strength. And, well, my question is regarding Georgia and upcoming Warsaw Summit. Would you think that Georgia would make another step towards membership? I mean, membership action plan? Or, if not, what would you say would be for Georgia? Like, would Georgia benefit from long-term partnership versus membership? Thank you. Thank you for internships. Eric, right there. Thank you. Eric Papperg from the McCain Institute. Thank you for your words, Secretary General. I wanted to see if I could push you a little bit on the issue of Sweden and Finland. Obviously, we've had a lot of developments taking place since the Wales Summit with Enhanced Partnership and the MOU on host nation support. How do you see this relationship going forward as a partnership? And in terms of the membership, we've heard new signals from the Finnish government keeping the options open. Just wanted to see if I could get your take on how useful would it be from a NATO perspective to have Sweden and Finland be a member. Would that really help NATO defend the Baltics and reassure them? And would it even be provocative to Russia? Thank you. And we'll take one more of the Ambassador, right here, please. Thank you. Claudia Bisognaro, the Italian Ambassador and the former Deputy Secretary General of NATO until three years ago. Italy is very proud of providing air policing to the Baltic states as we speak. We are one of those seven nations that will be one of the lead nations for the rapid reaction force and we are actively contributing to the Estonian cyber center in Estonia. At the same time, you did mention the complex challenges emanating from the south. I would be interested in you elaborating on that and also what the NATO role could be in those challenges. Thank you. We took you up on your kind offer of asking you some questions on the south. So Georgia, Sweden, Finland and the complexities of the south. Yeah. The first... about Georgia, the first role is good to see you again after I saw you at Yttojo. Then, to be Secretary General of NATO gives me a lot of, let's say, power and mandates, but I don't have the mandate to grant any scholarships for the NATO... I'll say Balma I pay grade. But good luck. But then on enlargement, what we have is that we have a very close partnership with Georgia. We are in the process of implementing the substantial package which is expanding further the cooperation and the partnership with Georgia. We are establishing a training center and we are really doing a very substantial activity together with Georgia and I think that's important. We also do defence capacity building in Georgia, which increases Georgia's ability to defend itself and I think that's important for Georgia and to the stability in the region. But when it comes to membership I think I have nothing more to say than what has been stated again and again and I was at the summit in Bucharest in 2008 where we made the decisions related to Georgia. Those decisions are restated as late as our summit in Wales last year. But what we decided also in Wales was that the first applicant or husband country we are going to address is Montenegro and as I said we are going to address Montenegro later this year. Then on Sweden, but anyway I appreciate the very close cooperation we have with Georgia and Georgia is also contributing a lot to many different NATO operations so we already have a very important partnership which we have to develop and which is of importance. Then on Sweden and Finland you said that you would try to push me a bit further you will not succeed. I can talk for some minutes but I will not say anything more of substance about that. It's easy to joke about this but I think it's so important that it has to be a Swedish and or Finnish decision. I think that everything I say about the advantages and disadvantages and how different things can affect the debates within Sweden and Finland can only be misused and misunderstood. So if I was a journalist or if I was a scientist or if I was anything else than the Secretary General of NATO I could say a lot but because I am the Secretary General of NATO I can say a little and then add to that I am an witch and then that's the reason why I am saying so little. I think there is debate now in Sweden and Finland and we just have to follow that and it's a democratic decision in democratic nations, countries to decide whether they would like to apply and then of course we will assess the application in the same way as we assess any other applications but let me add and you also alluded to that we have a partnership with Sweden and Finland and we are developing that and they are enhanced opportunity partners and we are really doing more and more together with them and actually now there is we are exercising together with the Swedes and the Finns we are sharing information and we are working more and more closely together with them and at the Foreign Ministerial Meeting of NATO in Antalya a few weeks ago we decided to go further in developing our partnership with Sweden and Finland so they are really close partners we do a lot of work together with them and I welcome that the south to the east we see challenges, threats related to a state and we respond in a way which is familiar to what we have done before collective defence and so on to the south we meet and we are faced with non-state threats and challenges and that is a much more mixed and complicated picture we see violence, turmoil in Iraq, Syria, in North Africa we see people trying to cross the Mediterranean and we also see terrorist attacks taking place in our streets inspired by some of the ISIL and other terrorist organizations in the south I welcome that all NATO allies contribute to the coalition the US-led coalition fighting ISIL and I think we have to understand that one of the reasons why NATO allies and NATO partners can contribute to this coalition is that they have developed interoperability they have learned how to work together through the cooperation in NATO and through for instance working together in Afghanistan and other NATO missions so even though this is not a NATO operation NATO-led operation I think a lot of NATO experience, NATO knowledge NATO interoperability is very useful for the coalition fighting ISIL then in addition NATO is, we decided in Wales last year to develop the defense capacity building as a new important tool and I think the defense capacity building is key for the south because I believe very much in the idea that we should try to project stability by building local forces local institutions so they can take more responsibility for their own security and thereby we can project stability without always deploying large number of NATO forces and we are doing that in Jordan we have boosted substantially our cooperation with Jordan doing defense capacity building in Jordan we are now in the process of assessing a request from the Government of Iraq to help them with build the institution, reform increase their ability to create stability we stand ready to do that in Libya when the situation on the ground allows and actually even if you don't call it the defense capacity building what we are doing in Afghanistan now is the defense capacity building we are helping the Afghans building their capacity to take full responsibility also in the future for their own security and I think that to develop also the ability of countries in the region to take more responsibility for their own security is important for the countries in the region but also for NATO and we have to do more of that Fantastic, I think we'll take a lightning round of the next three questions we'll go to this side the one in the back right there please Thank you Vadim Allen, Voice of American News I would like to ask we here in the United States we hear more voices now in the media and on the internet that crisis in Ukraine and standoff with Russia is mostly a European problem and what would you say to those people who say that it should be European countries putting most efforts into resolving the crisis and it should be Germany or France leading the way, thank you So good morning my name is Paul Tenet, I'm a British exchange officer here in DC there was a fascinating exercise here last year in CSIS which considered a Russia scenario and one of the most interesting things was an interaction with the audience in which there was almost no agreement on what constituted a breach of Article 5 I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the challenge of defining the threshold at which Article 5 is breached particularly in a domain like cyber and also maybe speak slightly to dealing with an adversary who determinately stays below that threshold Good question I think with time I'm going to have you respond to those two questions First about Ukraine Ukraine is in Europe but of course it's a problem or a crisis which affects not only European countries because when international law is violated it undermines the whole idea of a world order which is based on rules so of course it's important for a world order when international law is violated in the way we have seen in Ukraine and when it comes to the annexation of the illegal annexation of Crimea Europeans are in lead when it comes to trying to find a solution because France and Germany in particular but also all the European countries need but of course it's great to also have the United States taking part in the efforts and the United States is doing that Canada is providing support for Ukraine and the whole NATO alliance is providing both strong political and practical support to Ukraine in addition several NATO allies provide for instance training and direct support to Ukraine which is a European challenge but it's also a global challenge and it's a challenge which NATO has an alliance, a transatlantic alliance is addressing then when it comes to article 5 the important thing is that NATO stands ready to protect and defend all allies against any threat and when it comes to for instance cyber the important thing we did so last year was to decide that also cyber attack can trigger article 5 collective defence because we regard cyber as potentially as dangerous as a conventional attack and and therefore we are developing our capabilities to respond partly to detect who is behind our main responsibility is to defend our own NATO networks we are developing teams capabilities we are doing more exercises we recently visited the cyber defence exercise so we are increasing our readiness to do cyber defence but we are also assisting and helping allies in developing their own capabilities to do cyber defence and as always every situation, every attack is unique but I think we all can just trust and rely that NATO will respond in a proportionate way if and when needed whatever kind of attack we are also which are launched against us I think the one thing we learned from that particular simulation that we did here was that political leaders need to exercise how they make those decisions when they are below threshold levels it actually has to be practiced and understood because attribution will never be perfect and when political will is perhaps not there it's really leaders sitting around the table exploring well what would that mean what would we need what is the intelligence required and I think that is one area where we see NATO's political leadership could gain some value in practicing how that decision making process works first of all I very much believe in exercises second I believe in the importance of exercising also political leaders third I think we have to trust political leaders because we have elected them and related to that I think is that we have never in NATO said that if X happens then why will we have a response so at some stage you have to prepare your strategies, your planning to exercise you have to imagine different scenarios but at the end it will be a decision taken by political leaders how to respond therefore we need the capabilities we need the capacity to respond we need to exercise I mean to understand that cyber is also a real threat but we can never have a specific list exactly how we are going to respond to every possible and impossible threat because it's the world and the future is too complex so as long as we have the capacities, the capabilities and we have exercised it and we have to trust that our political leaders are able to take the right decisions even when we have lost elections and that is a very positive note to end on secretary general Stoltenberg thank you so much for your clarity of message and we look forward to watching how NATO evolves in the next year on the road to our next summit in Warsaw in July of next year please join me in thanking secretary general Stoltenberg