 excuse me, to put it bluntly, to bargain for something. And China would easily let that leverage go. So that's always, this is strictly to say, when we say that, okay, this is completely aligned with your national interest. Why don't you just go boulder? Why don't you just, but no, it's always, I think it's a certain, that's the first thing. It's just the same as in Copenhagen. But this time what has changed is the UNFCCC process. It's now, it's about IMDC. So in a sense it's quite different. Everybody come in with their offer already on the table and we know somewhere there will be agreement. In that sense, I think, I don't know, it's much even less that still guessing what China's position is. The position is there, it's already there. The second point that I think is the leadership. That's where I say, where perhaps, it's changed the most since Copenhagen. The Copenhagen time, China is still a bit shy or still hanging with the Deng Xiaoping's doctrine that we will lay low. We don't want to demonstrate or show the willingness to take on any leadership. But now you see that's where start changing. China is carefully measuring that to what extent they are going to take on that leadership. I think the South-South thing, if anything, I would say that's a step that China is showing that it want to take on some leadership in the climate change area by having that and run that themselves. The Obama shake, I think for one, is also shows that. I think it's their start to now willing to hide behind each other anymore to take on a bit of the leadership to break that suicidal pack. I think if anything, to me that handshake, the most significant is that is no longer there. Is that the leadership, to what extent China willing to go, and this is clear, the one thing is China now is willing to take on some of the leadership. But how far they were willing to go, I guess that's what we will see in Paris. Let me then, I think, Christian, and maybe you as well, Gunilla, since you're writing this paper together, you talk about the opportunity for China here to play a bridge-building role. And personally, I'm maybe a bit more cynical about that opportunity and even the willingness for China. I think it's more of a balancing act for China. But I could tell you why I think it's a balancing act. And you could try to explain why you think there is an opportunity for China to build bridges in. I agree with what you said there, Gowri, that China doesn't have the Deng Xiaoping doctrine on laying low in foreign policies anymore. They showed a lot of boldness. We will talk about that later. And why don't they also use this opportunity that is big, you and negotiation to actually show that we could go further than what we're obliged to do as developing country or as a non-anx one country. But I think the answer to that question, you have to look for outside of the time of negotiations. We had an interesting, Andreas and I were at the meeting at the morning yesterday. I had very interesting discussions. And then Janne Ceele de Grian, who is the Swedish representative of the Green Fund, he came up to us afterwards. And he told us about the interior from the meeting, the board of the Green Fund, where he said, well, you know, the Chinese delegate there, he's very positive and very forthcoming, but it's the Inje guy, he's the problem. He's always saying, no, he's really are trying to obstruct any progress. And my hypothesis here is that the relationship with India is very important for China on a broader geostrategic scale. And if China were to leave anything and any of the positions it has together with India, in the like-minded group, in the basic group, which have well-established corporations, then they would leave India out. India would be the big country alone with rising coal consumption, rising emissions. And of course, a lot more need than China for rapid development. I think there is a bigger game there. And I would be very happy to try to hear from any of you else, I mean, how could China be a bridge, constructed bridge builder here? Sorry, just a question, I was saying, like I'm facing, it's not my area of focus, but where, because you spoke about India, and as I've been following the US discourse on China as a polluter, I was always wondering like, okay, why can they only single out China because India is also a problem in that sense. So just a question on the facts, where do China and India stand comparatively in terms of emissions? I hope because of the gap actually, I mean, approximately. Quite big. China's emissions is like greenhouse gas emissions, it's several times higher than India's. And yes, so that makes a big difference. But to what you were saying, it's- Like just to make the projections are quite scary. Yeah, so that's what I mean, I always just get the impression that they should also care about what it is doing, which makes this question even more important. Yeah, I mean, even for like demographic reasons, India's going to- Exactly, exactly. Continue to. The projections are making the next decade definitely come very good. Yeah, and we're not expecting a one child policy in India anytime soon. So no, so that's, so in that sense, you can see that they do look like each other, even though China might be slowing down in terms of emissions, India is doing, well, about to do now what China has done recently as an indevelopable lot, both in terms of GDP, but also in terms of emissions. So that similarity sort of prompts the comparison. Let's see, what can we use these two countries for? Theoretically, even. And the idea is that if China is part of all these forum, where, together with India and the South, the developing world, if you will, I'm going to try to stop using the South because that's what I'm trying to argue against. But yeah, then there is some level of influence as well. And if China is once overall reductions of emissions, and they do, then it's important to get the US in on that. So in that sense, China has to do something for the US to join in, because the US is very reluctant, has shown through a long time that to do any reductions. Even the deal, the C Obama handshake deal is probably too good to be true because Obama doesn't have the democratic backing for it. He's using all these presidential powers, basically, in trying to get emissions to stay down, but not really anything that requires voting in Congress, which is hugely problematic. And it's probably going to last like that for a while. So China needs to be a balance in that in between enticing the US into a deal, and at the same time not leaving its developing country roots. And that's where I think it is in a unique position to facilitate that dialogue. And that's really difficult. I mean, if I was China, I wouldn't know how to keep both ends happening at the same time, because India is still, as you're saying, very hard line about where we're developing country and we need to develop before doing anything else. So it's a practical negotiation position that I think is interesting to explore. How exactly, in practical terms, they're going to reconcile that as an open question. And something which will be very interesting to look at in how things are unfolding in Paris. Any other questions? I think we should turn to soon to the next topic, but let's pick up a few questions or reflections before we do so. Yeah, if I can just follow up on that, the color's question of in terms of China, whether it can serve as a bridging rule. Again, my sense is this is back to the leadership position that China has to carefully maneuver. I think the Obama shake, if anything, and China want to show some extent of leadership say, we want to be a constructive force in moving forward the global agenda. But equally, and China also see itself the first for most, the leadership in terms of defending so-called developing country's interest in this process. I think in that sense, of course, they naturally aligned with the rest of the, either the bricks or the basics or the broader if the G77 is still relevant, they wouldn't let that go. Even you see that every time, whichever level the Chinese officials speak is always this common, but differentiates the responsibilities is something that's enshrined in the Bible you cannot. So I think that's where they get their support also. China has to, we've been like serve that role, we are. So I think it's, again, the leadership role for them, they wouldn't let that go. One last couple. Well, just lastly, I mean, looking at what I guess are some of the main struggles in the negotiations and considering this question whether they could be a bridge builder. If I look at the ambition level, which is, I mean, the main concern but we can't really on just looking at facts, it's so low ambition level for the world. It won't be enough. Still, the model here that is in reality accepted, I think, is a national model where everyone just reports their national ambition level. That is very good for US, even if they are internally struggling with the ambition level. And it's also very good for China. So I think it's all the rest that could be against that, even if EU, I think, has finally accepted it. But it's really, it's more, I mean, just to make a prediction, the financing issue, I don't really, I'm curious to understand this, they announced this 3.1 billion, an annoying extra 0.1 billion more than the United States. Why? And again, I mean, it's obviously not through the Green Fund, but as I understood it, distributed directly, which would give it for the digital tool as well. Then it's the differentiation. Again here, I think there are, as I understand it, and based very much from the facts of what we call it, it is really that they are hard liners on these two groups. I think the United States and most of the others now accept the national differentiation. And then the legally binding thing from between Copenhagen and Paris is what you touched up on the clean tech business, the dramatically falling prices in the renewable energy. And by that, the cost of the transformation. And China being such strong in this area also means it's already is a potential market growing industry and export business for them, which means, should mean that the maneuverability, politically, is much, much greater for them now. They have a potential of promising more or giving more, and they will deliver on it, I'm perfectly confident. And they're doing already at home, as you say, much more than they are ready to discuss and even less sign on anything in any national negotiations. But then of course, back to your question, Karas, and others, that why, what is the strategic thinking? You would expect them to use that potential leadership, kind of leadership in a more, in a stronger way that they are already doing. And if you're right, I'm not for the negotiations now I said it either up to Copenhagen, but if it's still that other language within those political groups, then what is there, which I sometimes think, there is a disconnect between the political level and the machine of climate, it is no explanation either. Just that the gap between the political level and what's actually happening out there, where China is really active, is growing, and that's a potential for that to take a very strong leadership if they go that route. Yeah, one way or another. I think that's also good observation here. The disconnect between what's happening here inside the climate negotiations and what's happening in the real world, and maybe that disconnect is also what we see in the very strong language of the like-minded group and basic groups, for example, versus the image of Presidency and Obama and so on. I think that- Yeah, I was wondering about the other countries in the basic or like-minded groups, do they have influence on the Chinese position in the negotiations as well? My personal view is that it's all about China and India, or it's mostly about China and India in both of these groupings. I mean, we did quite serious research on the formation of the basic group, and we came to the conclusion that it was actually initiated, the architect behind that was India and not China. So it's an Indian idea, and also if we hear what's happening today, what we heard from Jan Sirigen, it's also what's being reflected in the board meetings of the Green Fund, the same type of dynamics. It's about a relationship between China and India. That's my response to that question. Yeah, I just want to say, you can imagine if those countries develop significant green markets and that expands the overall green-image market, that that would make a contribution. Probably through climate finance, but generally. I think we should move on. Yes, I think so. So maybe Silvia would like to do your presentation. Yes, so we leave the negotiation game for a while. I think we could come back to that and reconnect adults. But let's move towards China itself and the economic slowdown that is happening in China right now and look a bit at its possible environment, climate, energy implications. Hi, I'm Silvia. And I'm just going to give a brief comparison of China's historic economic trend. Sorry, I'm standing over here, but here's some slides that I need to go through. And compared to the recent turn events, I want to highlight that China's at an economic turning point and it's going to be important for the climate and energy future. So when I think about China, I've been there three times, but I go to places like Beijing, Shanghai, Tengdu, places that are extremely crowded. So basically the opposite of what's shown in this photo. But these are also Chinese cities. They're ghost cities. They're cities with enough capacity for 10 to 100,000 of the people, but they're pretty much empty. You can see in this bottom photo here, two of the apartments in that complex are occupied, about 2000. And these ghost cities are phenomenal and that's happening in China, but where do they come from? They came from their fuel essentially by these basic ingredients. When you build cities, you need infrastructure, you need cement, concrete, steel, aluminum, things like that. And you can see from 2004 to 2013, there's an extreme growth in these sectors. Double digit growth. But this, a lot of this was pumped up by government backing by things like subsidies, a stimulus package during the recession. You can see that even through the recession, there was extremely high growth. And so that has led to a giant overcapacity in those sectors. And now with slowing international and domestic demand and having the stimulus package run out, these sectors are experiencing a dramatic change. You can see that there's now a decreasing growth, very dramatic in the last year. Compare that with GDP, smaller changing growth, but also substantial given China's double digit growth rate in the last decade. It's now around 7%, but perhaps even lower than that, a lot of outside experts think that China might be playing that number a little bit as they like to do. Now we know what kind of the background of the economic situation, let's connect it to the environment. When we talk about environment, it's very easy to talk about coal. And especially coal in China, the scale is such that it's large enough that it could tip the global climate between reaching our two degree, we focus so much on coal in China. You can see in the last decade, in the last 10 years, we were across the zero axis around 2008 to the Dramat. Now they import a lot of coal, until, I mean, they still import coal, but in the last year or so, they've imported a lot less. And this has a huge impact on global coal commodity market. This is like a horrible year for coal. Coal giants like Keybody and the US are about to be bankrupt. Coal brands are extremely low. It's going to really affect their direct trade partners like Australia and Indonesia. And a part of this could go back. I just want to point out that the different scales for the consumption and the imports. So you have the scale on the consumption on the. Yeah, China provides most of its own coal, given that it has a huge supply of it. One more thing I was going to say here, for now, kind of. It will come back. Yeah, it will come back. Well, why are we relating coal use to heavy manufacturing? Is that heavy manufacturing, like about 40 to 50% of their production costs are energy. And most of the energy in China, about three quarters of the electricity come from coal and maybe like two thirds of the primary energy all come from coal. So that's why we're relating that back to it. And given that China has been such an industrial country in the past, and even now, we can link its energy use, and especially its coal use, given that it's the base of their energy system, to their general economic growth. So we can see that from 1980s to early 2000s, there was a slower growth, more focused on like, coming more from like labor productivity gains. And then early 2000s to about 2013, 2014, it's a much more rapid growth, more from manufacturing, industrialization, urbanization, and that also corresponds with a huge increase in energy and coal consumption. But then, now, you can see that maybe there's a change in that trend to decreasing use of coal. Perhaps there's a peak in 2014, perhaps it's an anomaly. So we wanna know what you think the trend in coal might become, and where I'll go from here. And relating to coal, it's carbon emissions, given that it's coal is a very high, high carbon per energy unit fossil fuel. And what might influence this trend and to what degree? There's a lot of different things. Christian talked about a lot of these that were on pollution, which is like a bigger overarching policy to fight air pollution in urban areas in China. There's market interventions, given that China's not an entirely free economy. The government has the power to, for example, change power prices, change the subsidies that the high manufacturing sectors or other sectors can get, which affects the production level. Their outbound investment, which is related kind of to the climate financing in terms of how much they support their surrounding countries or other developing countries in terms of them developing. For example, Pakistan or something like that. And Goyi will touch on that later in his presentation. And they're the growing share of renewables in the Chinese energy market and as well as they're creating an export market for renewables. And that will influence their whole use. And of course, there's international pressure to take climate action, which we've just been talking about. And overall, the Chinese government has this umbrella policy that they're talking about called the new normal, which is basically a way of saying, we want our economy to slow down. This is on purpose. They realize that the 10% economic growth is not sustainable. And so they're saying, oh, we're gonna switch down to 7% because that's healthier. We want that. It's quality growth. So that's their way of putting a positive spin on their economic slowdown. And all of these things will affect the culture. But we're trying to talk and discuss about which ones are going to win out and what will happen to coal. Because it'd be really interesting if coal would peak last year or this year. Yeah. Thanks a lot, Silvia, on intriguing. I think you could read a little bit more about this in the policy brief that is in front of you. So to put it simply, and I've been building on what Silvia said here, it's the economic slowdown in China is also causing less emissions. So there is a correlation between economic activity and emissions. And it's particularly strong in a country like China where we chat as coal as a basic source of its energy. So leverage will be much higher. So, and the question here, do we already see a peak in coal consumption? And will that mean that China is soon to peak on carbon emissions when President Xi promised that carbon emissions would not, would stop increasing at 2030. It's a long time to 2030 if we look at these curves. And I think it would be valuable to consider what's really going on here and what's the turning point. And what will happen to all these capacities that China has built up in heavy manufacturing? Where does that capacity is just going to be scrapped or will it go somewhere else? Okay. Luca. So first of all, I think it's very good numbers and the graphics. I think that's for me to answer, start answering those questions, we need to deconstruct a little bit the variables that make those numbers. Let me explain what I mean. So you could see that downwards trend, which of course from our environmental climate point of view, you're welcome. It's down to emissions and down, you always welcome that. But that could just simply be if you're driving a car, that you lift off the accelerator. The economy's good, but you haven't changed anything in the car. So the truth is that the moment you press again, they'll just go up again. So here it would be interesting to see if this is due of course to a slowdown, but at the same time, if you're starting to see structural changes. And then the structural changes actually happen in two ways. One is structural change to your energy system. So it's the carbon intensity of your energy system. That's one type, which is very technical if you want. It's basically how much of your energy is associated with some carbon somewhere. And the other structural change is that is pure economics. Still related to energy, but it's your energy intensity. So it's how much energy you use to create one dollar, dollar of GEP. And I think if you know, I'm sure these are all nested in there, but with these, and I think that we can have discussions about this if you like the breakdown or create a new breakdown. But I think this structuring these, I think it's very helpful in the conversation. And then I know that China has goals actually on both axis, right? So I'm sure they want to transition their economy and make it more service oriented, which typically means higher energy productivity to create less energy per dollar. And at the same time, they also quite keen on decarbonizing the energy system. So they're active on both, but it would be fun to see where they're active the most and what the impacts are. So I'm more, yeah. And I don't know those numbers. So sorry for that. I don't know those numbers either, but just as like a double advocate, they're also doing opposite of the green side of those things. They're also still building a lot of coal plants. And they're still funding the carbon heavy industry. They're still giving subsidies to like aluminum smelters by decreasing the price they have to pay for power, which allows them to keep producing even when they should be at a loss when it should be shutting down. So they're both sides of that story. Even if they're putting in more renewables and even if they're trying to change into the service sector. Yeah. So your point is that although there's a lot of fuss about green development in China, in reality, you see policy that is leveraging support to the carbon intensive industry. Okay. Hola. Yeah. It's really fascinating. To start with just one line that as you pointed out, the strawmatics in these figures. Once again, compared to Copenhagen, we learned that by 2030, China would kind of soak up all the coal on the world market and we need to be found. It was just massive. Every like business issues show scenarios was just incredible. And then I know Sierra had some Citibank reports and some optimistic and say, well, maybe this is, there is a change. There might be a peak coal in 2020. And that just few weeks later, I started picking up news on saying that, well, maybe this is happening right now as we write or speak. And it seems like your figures, I realized there are some uncertainties, of course. At least some kind of peak or a pitch or something. But, well, that in itself is, I think, something is dramatic turning to it. So then, of course, you are much more experts on it. I realized that both economic figures, I guess, and emissions and there are some uncertainties on the official reporting and all that in addition. But I'm quite sure that this turning point, whether it's 2014 or 15 or if it's actually peak or planning out, but still it's dramatic compared to the basics in order to be all working. And not so much about international pressure or everybody. I think the, well, one is the renewables. Because the expansion we have seen has been on a few heavy subsidized markets, Germany here, US, maybe other Europeans, China, themselves. But what's happening is that, well, you know that, but if solar produced electricity is competitive without subsidies, that will change everything. And it happens to be those markets which are the emerging economies. For example, India, by the way, but it will no longer be a political-driven game or subsidies, it will be business, business. And so, well, my point is, this is dramatic and it's happening exactly when I'm, in a way, I'm quite confident. And also that those bankers, they pointed out another thing that of course still renewables or solar is too small to count in the total figures of world energy balance. But the turning point for investments and for stock markets is not the day when this happens, when it's too big enough to count. It's the day when the investors realize this day is coming, because then investments are turning in other ways. So it's kind of how market works, they kind of really just see the future. So I think this is, as usual, I guess, it's not as quick as we think on the short run, but in a longer perspective, it's something, it's something in a way much more important than the Paris conference or anything else. And then all about any intensity, of course, another thing, the industrial structure. But also, I guess, if it's primary energy per GDP unit, there is a kind of statistical thing that if you turn in one unit of coal, it's, you get one third of electricity because there are such heavy losses, the solar is like one to one, so the intensity will be affected in that way as well. But of course, it's also about the use and industrial structure. Yeah, so in the way I might quite talk to Mr. Yano, of course, then also the concerns of local emissions and so on is driving it. If it's a political agenda in China, that's of course more important than it's a bit... Obama is using the same, as you say, he can't go to Congress using the EPA to say, well, our children should be not brave for clean air and so to actually move the climate agenda. So in a way, they are using the same strategy. So finally, my question is then, because another thing I thought when I was more into this was of course that the Chinese government was extremely occupied by keeping growth at the same level of the new, the young generations coming out of the labor market and if there is an economic turn down or even if it's a new normal and they kind of argue that this is fine, it's intentional, then will that, because they were afraid of, because of social unbalances, if they couldn't keep up with employment and so on. So that's my question back to the Chinese, the expertise. Is that something, because that will, that's not climate, but it will, because it's really important if they can keep the country together in a, in an economy that is growing more slow, I guess. So there's more questions, but. So I think, my impression is that I don't really see this a return on consumption. I'm not sure exactly the year which was taught because I think the country has figured out exactly how much coal is being consumed. There were news saying that the quality of coal is much lower, so their carbon emissions are much lower. Or just a couple of weeks ago, this day off, we had actually these local nearly expected. So I think it should figure out exactly that number first, but impression is, I don't think there will be a return on coal. And I think what you mentioned about the structure change, there's the existence change and the change. I think what's most important in China is the political. I think what we have seen is a mass of the transition that of coal, they have just say coal, but then in some region there's just different interests. And I think it's also a strategy. You know, it's also a function from to west, I don't know. So I think some of the kind of contradiction that was in my mind is just coming up on all this particular change and the switch from east to west. Very short comment about the data. The people we got the data from who collaborate with Petroleum University, they've been, since I've met them first time three, four years ago, three years ago, I think, they say that the real consumption is higher than what is reported. So I think those have been no news to most of us have been looking at this and it's just a level change. The trend changes, it doesn't affect the trend change at all, I think. And the important and interesting thing here is the trend change, of course. So that's just a short comment. Can you say now how to... Yeah, I just wanted to say something about the magic 8%. So if they always talk about how to have magic 8%, if it's not, if it's either way, it would be either too much inflation or too much importance and so on. The beauty of what we're seeing now is that you have the service sector is growing faster than the industrial sector. And the service sector is also employing more people. It means that the people that would be employed, they actually get sucked into the service sector. And that's why you can now talk, we will probably talk now when you're about the magic 7%. We'll probably hear about the magic 5% and then we'll be surprised because of the economy that is this big growth of 10% year after year without destroying the earth basically or it's not sustainable, plus the fact that the more investment you have, the excessive investment is not paying off as much as it did before. Plus that it is a massive investment program you had in 2008, 2009, created massive debt mountains. We have, nobody really knows how much debt there is in the local government for example, and also within the state government and enterprise sector. I think that when we talk about productivity and so we also hear from China now that digitalization is increasing quite rapidly and that will also increase the productivity quite a lot. Another thing that comment on these new coal power stations that they are building, as far as I've understood, it's not that they are building like with the old crappy technology that they did before but they are actually improving them and then you have a problem with the steel and cement over capacity and especially steel industry. I think it's quite interesting to just note that this is, as far as I'm concerned, as far as my interpretation is that this isn't basically a heritage from the great forward when every city should have its own steel factory. And nowadays it seems like, as far as I looked into this sector in 2011, that many of the cities with big steel factories, they are owned by the cities themselves. So you go to tell Ma and Shang, you should close down your steel factory, look. They employ loads of people. They will not close down this factory. They would rather keep it up so that people, it's like us in Sweden, if we would have kept SOB going, we know that it's like not going well but being the mayor of Trollhättan, you'd rather have keep SOB going so that you don't get unemployment, right? So it's a little bit, I think we should also, so even if Beijing would like to cut steel consumption or steel production, it's very hard for them to do that. I know that they have, that you probably know more about this, new laws that they have had, they should, that Beijing can actually nowadays force jerky power plant, local plant factories to be closed down because even if you sit in Beijing and you say, you should close down Ma and Shang, Ireland's being, that will never happen in Ma and Shang. But maybe Beijing can actually force them to close down. So, yeah. So I think you bring up a number of very important structural questions here about China, and I come back to all of us comment here, how quick will this, is this a turnaround to begin with? Most of us seem to think there is a turnaround. How quick is it coming? Is it coming quicker than we thought? Or will it just, is this the plateau we're seeing now? And of course that has all to do with how well China is going to restructure what is really going on in China and how they choose choices they will make in the restructuring. For example, will they keep subsidizing the heavy manufacturers, although there are no buyers for the products? Well, we see them doing that, so to keep aluminum shelters alive. We see that the devaluation of the yuan of course makes Chinese heavy manufacturing more competitive in international markets. Chinese steel exports will go beyond 100 million tons this year, which is the top level ever. Or will they use all this capacity to build the run run? Yeah. I think that's a great transition. I think it's a great switchovers. We go to the next presentation. Yeah, but before I start on the last bit and if I can also offer some, I think those are some of the great comments about that. I think for me it's puzzling over, especially the past year when you frequently travel to China and compared to what you read on the plane going there, all the international sources, you have this rather distinct distinction actually. When you read the international reviews, all about the concerns about China's economic slowing down. But when you landed in China, you met friends and your relatives did the ordinary Chinese. You hardly hear anyone talking about all the concerns slowing down. So what I'm saying is, build on USA is for the international researchers, we got a lot to think about. We used to talk about the magic eight. If it's below eight, old hells will broke loose and China is going to, and that didn't happen. And the seven has not happened. If we trust everybody, analyze the real growth rate of China this year and the coming year, many people talk about no, it's not seven. It's already four. And some yesterday I read the financial times the one sources even say it's 3.5. So of course, to me the real question is, who is feeling the pain of China's economic slowing down right now? And obviously at the moment it's not a threat to the social stability in China. On the other hand, and close to this topic and even last week we were talking to who I'm gonna was speaking for. Those of you follow China, you know that name is a professor at Tsinghua University. And he said, when I asked him, guess the China's 13th five year plan just came the proposal just came a few weeks ago, approved, adopted by the Chinese Communist Party. And he said, this time the 13th five year plan, if anything, is deep green. Because the reason he said this time is deep green is when the 12th five year plan came out. Huan Gong said, this is the first green divided five year plan in the Chinese history. And I see this is not with any mockery of professor Huan, is this true? Everything he said is true. So the question I put to him is to say, what is different this time, 13th compared to the 15th in terms of enormous and resource and the translation transformation. He said, if anything, this time is deep green. I said, well, if I agree to that is still, what is, and then he said something I think is true. I think this time what is different is the slower, much slower economic growth actually offers a genuine opportunity for China's green transition. I think that's true. To me, that is true. Back to Luca's question, that's what we've been working on. At the moment, we've been to say this. We detect that there's a trend change. So the question is, has China already co-peaked? We inclined to say yes, it has been peaked. But then the even more important question is to say, okay, if it is peaked, what is likely trajectory from now on? So that also related to how you attribute the peak to, is this mere artifacts of slowing down like Luca said, you took your foot on the accelerator? Or is this, of course, the answer is combined. It is a huge factor is that now is much slower growth rate and there is also economic transition. That's anti-structure transition. There's even carbon intensity in the current five-year plan. There's a compulsive goal about 17% reduction and China is achieving those. So you can see that as a combination. But then it's the next five years. If any indication, I actually think a much slower pace is a good news. But then it's the other, to me, it's the million dollar question, it's the pace. The pace of saying that will actually, you know, how low, the question is how low is the lowest it can go? I think low is actually good for us. For us that who concerned with the environment, concerned with China's green transition. But really, how low it can go? Before that, the situation gets desperate, you have another massive statementless plan, like they did in 2008, which retrospectively, China still don't want to say they have done a wrong thing. Because they're still saying, oh, you know, what China did actually saved the world. But China ended up with this nasty situation right now. They're trying to clean up. So should I? Yes. Yes. We should take the floor again. Yeah. Up there. There's a few slides, but I don't know whether to use them. You should. So we move into the last stretch of our discussion today, where we focus more on China's outward investments. And what's happening, what type of strategy is China is, is rolling out partly to meet and to deal with it. It's slowing economy to what extent this could play a role for future energy and climate projectors. And while going and going on this one, I think, of course, the question of how low could the economy go off is a matter of how well they manage restructure, because more services means more employment per unit of GDP. That is what they need to get out of the trap there into right now where heavy manufacturing is actually providing one third of GDP from manufacturing. So one question is what is going to happen with all that heavy manufacturing capacity if China is going towards another development trajectory? Go ahead. Yeah. I think most of you and a sense of view of us have a lay research on China. So I don't need to, I guess, I guess every one of us heard this one belt, one road, and more or less. So this is something I think as a matter of our way of introduction, I would just say briefly three things. And what is this? Probably I can say very little about that. And then hopefully say what concerns us, perhaps is what it is to become. And particularly in terms of the potential environmental climate implications. And then lastly probably say a few words about since I just returned from China last week. So some new development in this area. So this is a master redraw by Kutla and Sylvia about China's one belt, one road. The belt is actually counter-intuitive. Is the belt, is the notion generated on the land? This is a belt meant to be along with Asia a belt meant to be along with Asian Silk Road. So now it's called the Silk Road Belt. The belt, well, just simplify this. The belt is things on land. And then in this color is the full name is 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which is the new thing. This is of course, you can say on the land that they basically talk about you go to Russia, go to the Mr. East and the South Asia and on the sea and then you have all those ways and they even go where it goes to, it goes from Australia and all that. So but it's basically is as called the former Australia Prime Minister, Kevin Robb, and he speaks Chinese to say he doesn't like the one belt, one road. He offered a practical translation. He said this is China's trans continental structure project, which in a way is exactly what that is. And this is a massive plan along the belt and the road about building pipelines, roads, railways and the ports. At least what that's, the infrastructure and energy infrastructure. Yes, it is something to start with. And the one we in April and the Stockholm Science of Form alluded to say this is, we argue the other big thing coming up from the China Watch list. And since then, I think we have been right on that. I think it's all indication that this is the big thing that we need to pay attention. And to show that indeed this is the last week I was there, this is a picture of in conjunction with the China Council meeting this year. This is rather high level. Again they had a full day on this talking about the greening of one belt and the one road. The environment minister himself was in that discussion. So I will say very little about how did this came about and the ranging from all kinds of simple reasonings to conspiracy theories and this is all kinds. But to me it's actually quite straightforward. I will not go through this. There's whole sets of things. But initially I think it is that this is an outgoing strategy to address the over capacity lack of demand issue that China has struggled with since the global financial crisis and with the horrible stimulus plan. And this is even to a lot of extent being exaggerated and there's just no way to go out. And the enhancing the domestic consumption driver, it is happening if you look at the numbers, it is happening the economic structure as some of you has mentioned the service center is picking up but the pace, the speed is far from enough to make that, make the economy to go on. So this is really, if you look at there's a lot of discussions and say the very route is originally somebody in department of what the ministry of finances sort of a China's Marshall plan. But that is never. So for us, as I said earlier, and what important is what is to become. And there's a lot of this, but for us it's really the energy and the environment and back to what we've been talking about in the climate and also slowing down China's economic transition. And the one thing is that this thing really has a dark side, dark side in a sense of if really take off and if the Chinese economic miracle pattern repeat along the road and the belt, then we have a general concern. And what I mean that is I said this earlier this year in even 10 years, oh, okay. It's anyway, it's say if the same emission growth pattern repeat as what did in China along belt and road. And there's a general concern of this. Kala made those, say those are all little coal-fired power plants. But this is of course not to say that we should stand and say no coal-fired power plants is going to be built along the road and belt. I think that the message is equal and hard to argue, but there's general concerns of those. But again, this is Kala made this. So there's also general opportunities with this one belt, one road, because those are the areas and the representing either the renewable transitions and the general opportunities for show or model of low carbon development. So yeah, the gamble of course now is where this will go. It is anything is still to say one way or another since this is just starting. But every indication that this is going to happen very soon and China is going to put a increasingly emphasize on this, the financial institutions to make this happen is all lining up. So to say where we're short is something that we should all watch very closely. Sorry about the game came too long. Yeah, we will use the remaining 15 minutes and then you have to walk us out. Yeah, because we came late if we leave. We can't leave after five o'clock without someone from the UB to join us because then we set off the alarm and it will be very expensive. But to round this off and to take the core of messages I think from your presentation is that China has a brand new strategy of international expansion. Which looks like being real. It's not just talking talk. It's also walking the walk. Something is happening. Yeah, it is. For those of you follow China, you know that now they have listed as one of the three major national development strategies. Although in English, this is still China insists. It's only called initiative. But in China, this is among one of those development strategies. The other two are domestic. One is the integrated development of the Jing Jing Ji region. The other is the Yang's river economic belt. So those are both two. So international level. Yeah, and this one is one of the major outgoing development strategy. Then if I think a little bit more about that, I think of the, so this is about building things outside of China. So it's an idea of a continued supply side driven development. And you say it's to suck up part of the excess capacity in China. Right? So, but that needs to do that needs money. And then I think about the AIIB and all those new financial institutions. It looks like a match here with the, so is it so that the Swedish government and other government that subscribe to the AIIB actually are going to be part of financing a Chinese expansionist strategy together with other type of financial institutions. The new development bank, the BRICS Bank and the Silk Road Fund. And maybe even the, what we talked about here earlier, the South-South Green Fund would probably fit in here. Well, at least in my head, these are questions I would like to know more about. And of course, is this going to be the vehicle for selling over capacity in Chinese coal manufacturing? Because they have the best coal manufacturing to produce the equivalent of coal power plants. China is leading in the world and have excess capacity. They're also leading in the world in solar and wind. So I think it's very interesting to know where this is going. I'm not sure you have. I would like to hear some reflections. May I ask, is there a specific reason why you've made them in this map? Mm-hmm. Why it's one-way arrows on? It's why there are one-way arrows. Yes. Because it's a Chinese outward strategy. But it would, in reality, it would be two-way arrows, right? Yeah, maybe. It will increase trade, generally. Maybe, yes. I think so. I'm not sure what, anyone else? Why, in trade, that point is certainly valid. I guess in that map, it was mostly indicating this is a Chinese outgoing strategy. Yeah, but it's a good point. Any reflections there? Yeah, yeah, quite a lot of that, not yelling from ceiling. I don't have the answer to Chris' questions, but I just would like to add one question to that, for the role of AIIB as a Sweden, it's part of that. I mean, is there some kind of coordination going on by the members of AIIB, Sweden, and like my country is trying to influence their strategies? Is there a role for actors to support that in that case? That's a question I would like to find out. What is the reason for joining? Is it not to try to bring the fun? Could be, of course. Well, maybe I can quickly add to that. I think that if you are interested in the AIIB, I would recommend that fairly recently in late October, the president designated Mr. Jin Li-Qun had a very interesting dialogue and discussion and the briefings, so the video was there. And so, of course, give a most updated address on the AIIB. A lot of those questions, for example, now became his model for the AIIB is lean, clean, and green. And he claims that the bank will both have the best available governance structure of the multilateral banks, and it's all those things. You said that, of course, this has been negotiating the article for the chart or whatever that is called. They just agreed on by 50 of the 57 member countries. I don't know whether Sweden is among 50 or the rest of the seven. But that's very much still the sign during the location. And they said the first bench of the project will be launched in the second quarter of 2016. But anyway, if you're interested in that, it's recommended. It's a very good chat. Maybe we could share the link after this. Sure. Christina? I just think that one thing that you should remember when it comes to the One Belt One Road project is that it's an imposing trade. It's also, when I look at it, I think that China would like to export stuff to its neighboring countries, which are pretty poor. And also we should think about it in foreign policy, foreign policy as well, that it's also a way for China to increase its importance in the area. And given the situation today when we have loads of Afghans coming to Sweden because it's so vulnerable in Afghanistan, we should perhaps also think about, we should remember that China is actually, as far as I know, they are the biggest foreign investor in Afghanistan since they bought this huge copper mine in Iraq some years ago, which is actually a bigger investor than the US at the time. So maybe we should invite them into the dance after they have all the Afghanis. Very far-fetched thought. On the other hand, maybe they are already in the dance. Yes. Yeah, Ola? I'm just looking at the map, not so much related to the climate and environmental aspects, but what is the Indian take on this whole strategy? Do you think, I mean, heavy investments into a neighboring country start? Yeah. Well, to say what was short is, India has been very suspicious. Yeah. That was my guess. Yes. But you have to remember one thing when it comes to the Pakistan investment, for example, this pipeline and the railway and the road that is supposed to go from Qatar to Kashgar is passing through these terrorist-ridden areas. This is where Malala was shot and so on. So China has to take into account that you cannot just go in there and build a pipeline because then somebody will probably cut it down and sell the parts. You have to have stability and security and that's a big question. Your point is, if China is engaging there, they will also have to protect it somehow. That means security issues. They have to deal with security. I don't know how they will solve this. I mean, India with one shameless plug on that point, but next week we're actually having a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and she's going to give a short lecture on water diplomacy. Which is also indicative that they are considering these exact points and are actually open for discussion on all these topics about how this is going to incorporate this. So I think that's one of the major things that we're looking at with the world over is not just industry development, it's also a large diplomacy strategy in the region. I mean, China is both extremely good at development if they're building these actually railroads. My favorite example I have to think about is something that they're bad, they're bad in Beijing. You know, suddenly Twin Village is actually a number of effective, but you could say it's very successful in development across the way. There is suddenly Twin Soho, which looks like the 22nd century development building is very flashy, it's very nice, it's in probably the most expensive real estate of all of Beijing. It is dead inside because of those crappy buildings, like those cities, you know, those low ceilings that are probably being taken. So China can be also very bad in development. What are they going to be building in these countries and what is what is having to be allowed? And I think there's quite an open door to Swedish influence or dialogue on how this development is done. And they're quite open if you're willing to come forth with the perspective they're the ones going to be setting up this strategy. I'm not sure if everybody else knows how to respond yet. I think that is the interesting question for Sweden, Europe, other countries in the world, what are their proposals and how do we want to meet on this? What do we want to discuss? We look at a lot of water infrastructure and hydropower infrastructure. How are they going to build the water, the standards that are going to be used and what are the arguments and actual effects to do that? If you have not to use good assessments of what climate variability is going to be, the hydropower infrastructure will need to be less competitive. I think there is a general lack of imagination around the next dots here. There is a discussion around the financial institutions focusing entirely on AIB, which is a small piece of a bigger picture of financial institutions that have China as the initiator. So it's the BRICS Bank, the New Development Bank. It's the SIGCRO Fund, it's this new South South Green Fund. It's already existing institutions like the the big C sorry, wealth fund. What's it called? C, the big sorry, wealth fund of China. They set up in 2010. China Investment Corporation? Yes, China Investment Corporation is already existing. And we have the two main policy banks, the China Development Bank and the XIM Bank that already last year was lending more than the World Bank. So it's not just AIB. Not strings attached. The World Bank is always they give you money if you democratize that China does not democratize. So there is a big picture of financial of China's moving much more progressive engagement in leveraging international finance. But none of that is part of the all the Breckenwood system. So it's a new animal. New animals. And I think it's very interesting here to follow this and to understand to what extent this will leverage in what we concern, will it leverage green type of investments or will it leverage not so green investment because that will make a lot of difference to how we look upon the future trajectories of China related global emissions if you call it like that. Just to introduce a slight angle. In terms of having an export strategy that's three minutes. No, sorry. I'll leave you 30 seconds. That's clearly every nation has that. That's in the core of the way you run mostly how you run a country. The key is for me the one I want to introduce is where you can sense around innovation, technology innovation and being part of the next wave of things. And that of course is linked also to which is another national characteristic which is national pride. We have this industry, this is what we do we take German car makers but they're struggling a bit lately but that was a pride and we do very nice cars they're efficient, they're the best and the Chinese by them. And here it's the other way around and I'm wondering how much in this conversation we can either that you sense or that we can poke their strategy in saying if you really want to be competitive in the next couple of decades look at innovation look at technology export this stuff I just don't know though. Well it's very short if you look at every strategy in China about the next five years, innovation is the first word and two days ago when China take over the G20 presidency for the next year and then they claim the same the first word again is innovation. So there's certainly that within China you say all this discussion of course the difficulty is innovation takes time it's not like you can do the group lead forward and say if we decided to innovate tomorrow we're going to be an innovative nation it doesn't happen that way so and but meanwhile if other pressures became so hard for the government to handle this again back to my view of in the next five years perhaps the key is you have to slow in trend and tremendous pressure and as long as that pressures can be handled and all indication that China will emphasize on the innovation emphasize on all this green transition to stick with that transition agenda but you know let's just pray that will not go too low and then they say now forget it so we have to flush the money again and to get all those things we know it's bad but can reduce the short term pain okay I think that should be the last word it's been very nice this experience I'm a global governance scholar so it's been very educational for you to listen to me what governance is all about and how China could actually change the game and I'm also very happy that we were able to organize this together on a very short notice yes a very short notice so we should continue doing that it's been very nice and also I'm extremely happy to have such a knowledgeable and active audience here and participating in this it's a very nice format for these kind of seminars to make the more discussion doing and sharing their knowledge so that's my final word before we thank the audience and the speakers would you like to add something no I agree very much it's been great to have this round table format it's almost always much more difficult when you have a big audience to really have exchange of views and give people time to actually to think out loud and so on so I think it's been extremely valuable for me also and for us from SCI to have this opportunity for dialogue and conversation I sincerely think that we should try to organize more of these type of smaller exchanges which could we should of course have the big audience things as well in the future but this serves another kind of purpose so let's continue I have people in the room getting the right people in the room is important yeah but thank you for the speakers as well thank you so now remember someone have to go down with you right maybe you can come over Chris look through that the rest of us will leave in a few minutes as well